A1 Investments & Resources Ltd Overview
A1 Investments & Resources Ltd is a Sydney-based micro-cap investment holding company. Its shares were quoted on ASX from about 2007 until its forced removal from the Official List in August 2025. Over its listed life it moved through a series of thematic ventures, each small and none reaching profitability:
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general investment and management-fee activity;
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vegetable farming through the A1 Qualipac joint venture in Queensland;
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a proposed leasehold of the Bundybunna pastoral property in Western Australia;
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trial sandalwood oil production;
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a vertically linked Western Australian sea-cucumber harvesting, processing and Japanese health-supplement chain built around Tidal Moon and its own Japanese subsidiary, Blue Ocean Japan.
COVID-19 freight disruption, a stagnant Japanese consumer market and supplier under-delivery undermined the sea-cucumber model. The company exited it in 2023 and sold Blue Ocean Japan for A$473. Since then A1 has been a cash-depleted shell with net liabilities. It has pursued, without completion, a reverse-takeover-style acquisition that would require ASX re-compliance. Its residual value lies mainly in the corporate vehicle and its shareholder base, not in any operating business.
Company's own description
In its FY2020 Annual Report, the company described its principal activity as an investment company focusing on projects with operations in Australia. It said the group "remained focused on food production businesses and general investments" (FY2020 Directors' Report).
By the H1 FY2024 Interim Report (lodged February 2025), the stated principal activity was being an investment company focusing on projects with operations in Australia and Japan. The same report said the sea-cucumber business had fully ceased, and that no agreements for new business had been entered into during the half-year.
Morningstar's profile (derived from company filings) describes:
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an investment orientation toward tourism, food, financial and property sectors;
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two operating segments: General Investment, and Food Products and Supplements;
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the food segment as the main revenue source, selling dried seafood products and supplements in Australia and Japan.
Business model and revenue model (historical)
| Revenue stream | Model type | Period active | Evidence (source, FY) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Management fees from a director-related entity | Service (fee-for-service) | FY2019–FY2020 at least | A$200,000 (FY2019) and A$220,000 (FY2020) from a director-related entity (FY2020 AR, Remuneration Report and Note 5) |
| Consulting fees | Service | FY2019 | A$44,091 (FY2020 AR, Note 5 comparatives) |
| Sales of fresh produce and seafood | Product | FY2019–FY2023 | A$24,708 (FY2019), A$208,540 (FY2020) (FY2020 AR, Note 5) |
| Dried sea cucumber and supplement sales in Japan (Blue Ocean Japan) | Product | FY2020–FY2023 | A$21,562 Japan revenue (FY2020); A$17,375 BOJ sales (FY2023, discontinued) |
| Joint operation share (A1 Qualipac Agriculture, 50%) | Product (vegetables) | to December 2019 | FY2020 AR, Note 3 |
| Subscription / licensing | — | — | Not applicable |
Mix: In FY2020, the last year with a full audited segment note:
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services (management fees) were 51% of revenue from contracts with customers (A$220,000 of A$428,540);
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products (fresh produce and seafood) were 49% (A$208,540).
The company disclosed that one customer accounted for 51% of FY2020 external revenue and one customer for 74% in FY2019 (FY2020 AR, Note 4). Given the related-party management fee, that customer appears to be the director-related entity.
Value-chain position (sea-cucumber model, FY2020–FY2023)
The FY2020 Annual Report set out a three-tier structure:
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Tidal Moon Pty Ltd (TM), a private, unrelated party, held harvest rights along about 1,200 km of Western Australian coast from Shark Bay to Onslow. It sold 100% of the harvest to Tidal Moon Australia at cost plus 20%.
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Tidal Moon Australia Pty Ltd (TMA), owned 51% by TM and 49% by A1 (with an A1 veto over capex), processed the catch at a new factory in Denham on Shark Bay that included a solar-powered drying room. It sold 80% of processed product to A1's "Blue Ocean Health" division at cost plus 20%.
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Blue Ocean Japan Co., Ltd (BOJ), acquired 31 January 2020, was to further process dried sea cucumber into health-food supplements for sale mainly in Japan and the PRC.
A1 therefore sat in the mid-stream (procurement and financing) and downstream (branding and supplement sales) parts of the chain. It pre-funded upstream supply: advance payments to TM and TMA reached A$641,271 by 30 June 2020. Upstream harvesting and processing risk sat with counterparties A1 did not control.
Customer types and end-markets
Historical: - a director-related entity (management fees);
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Australian wholesale and fresh-produce buyers (Qualipac JV vegetables);
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Japanese consumers and distributors of health-food supplements (BOJ);
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targeted, but not achieved at scale, PRC supplement buyers.
Current: none. Revenue from ordinary activities was A$10 (interest only) in H1 FY2024 (H1 FY2024 Appendix 4D).
Independent characterisation
A1 is best understood as a serial-pivot shell company. Across the 2019–2023 filings it announced or examined a long list of projects:
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vegetable farming (Hirchbrooke, Queensland);
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wheat and livestock on Bundybunna (Western Australia);
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sea-cucumber harvesting, breeding (with Curtin University support via TMA) and supplements;
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sandalwood oil;
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an Indonesian waste-management investment and a Sri Lankan renewable project (both with Aura Green Energy Group);
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advisory work for a Japanese renewable-energy limited partnership.
None generated material, sustained revenue. The business was funded by:
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repeated sub-cent placements (as low as A$0.0001 per share);
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conversion of creditor loans to equity, including a A$1.91M loss on conversion in FY2019;
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a A$2.0M secured loan from WIN Properties Australia Pty Ltd, later converted to 2 billion shares in December 2022;
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director loans and accrued but unpaid director salaries, of which A$444,800 was later waived.
The structure is typical of ASX "zombie" micro-caps: high share count (more than 20 billion shares), going-concern qualifications, heavy related-party and Japan-network linkages, and recurring losses against negligible revenue.
Strategy
Stated strategy: themes from the latest filings
| Period | Strategic theme (paraphrased from filings) | Source |
|---|---|---|
| FY2020 | Focus on food production in Australia, including export food. Specific aims: vegetable supply to Singapore, Taiwan and Japan; grains, meat and wool to Asia; expansion of A1 Qualipac; Bundybunna wheat and livestock; sea-cucumber harvesting, breeding, aquaculture and supplements; possible acquisition of a successful wholesale food business | FY2020 AR, "Likely developments" |
| FY2023 | Exit from sea cucumber and sandalwood. Search for opportunities less dependent on worldwide production and sales chains exposed to separate supply and demand shocks in different countries | FY2023 4E |
| H1 FY2024 (signed Feb 2025) | Acquire 100% of an existing business and raise working capital, requiring ASX consent, a full re-compliance prospectus, shareholder approval and likely a share reconstruction. Management expected one proposal to be finalised within 4–6 weeks of February 2025 | H1 FY2024 Interim, Note 14 |
Initiatives in the last 24 months (Oct 2024 to Oct 2026)
| Initiative | Date | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pursuit of two separate 100% acquisitions of existing businesses (targets unnamed) | Quarters to Mar, Jun, Sep and Dec 2024 | Not finalised | H1 FY2024 Interim |
| A third acquisition proposal (unnamed) | After the Dec 2024 quarter | Not finalised; no ASX consent obtained before delisting | H1 FY2024 Interim |
| Short and medium-term loan funding of A$300,000 | Dec 2024 quarter | Secured | H1 FY2024 Interim; Dec 2024 Appendix 4C (title only) |
| Expected A$500,000 funding plus retail capital raise, conditional on shareholder approval and share reconstruction | Disclosed Feb 2025 | Not completed before delisting | H1 FY2024 Interim |
| Relisting / re-compliance | 2024–2025 | Failed; removed from Official List 3–4 Aug 2025 | Class register |
ESG commitments, cost programmes and medium-term targets
ESG: The FY2020 report stated that the TM and TMA operations were designed to be as environmentally neutral as possible, using a solar-powered drying room. A1 also supported a sea-cucumber breeding R&D programme with Curtin University. A "Sustainability of Operations 2020 Policy" was lodged on 9 December 2019 (InvestSMART log). No quantified ESG targets were disclosed.
Cost programme: No formal programme was announced. De facto cost elimination took the run-rate loss from about A$0.74M (FY2023) to about A$0.20M annualised (H1 FY2024 × 2).
Medium-term financial targets / guidance: None disclosed. Management only said it expected FY2023-24 to be no less challenging than the prior three years (FY2023 4E; H1 FY2024).
Products & Services
All products and services below are discontinued unless stated. No product is currently offered.
General investment segment
| Offering | Description | Target customer | Period | Pricing / economics | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Management services | Management services provided to a director-related entity | Director-related entity | FY2019–FY2020 (later years not disclosed) | A$200,000 (FY2019); A$220,000 (FY2020) | FY2020 AR, Note 5 and Remuneration Report |
| Consulting services | Corporate consulting | — | FY2019 | A$44,091 | FY2020 AR, Note 5 |
| Proposed: Aura Green Energy Group waste-management investment (Indonesia) | Passive investment in a waste-management project; operations by independent contractors | — | Examined FY2020–FY2021; no completed investment disclosed | — | FY2020 AR |
| Proposed: Japanese renewable-energy limited partnership advisory | Management advice to a proposed Japanese LP investing in Asian renewables | Japanese investors | Examined FY2020–FY2021 | — | FY2020 AR |
| Proposed: Sri Lankan renewable-energy project (Aura Green Energy Group) | Investment and/or fund management, with funds to be raised in Japan | Japanese investors | Examined FY2020–FY2021 | — | FY2020 AR |
| Proposed: re-compliance acquisition (2024–2025) | Acquisition of 100% of an unnamed existing business plus working-capital raise, to support relisting | — | Q1 2024 to early 2025; never completed | Expected funding A$500,000 conditional on shareholder approval and a share reconstruction | H1 FY2024 Interim, Notes 2 and 14 |
Food / Food products and supplements segment
| Product / brand | Description | Key specifications | Target customer | Launch / latest year | Pricing model | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A1 Qualipac vegetables | Fresh vegetables from a leased Queensland farm (Hirchbrooke) run as a 50% joint operation with the Qualipac group | Planned supply to Singapore, Taiwan, Japan and the Australian domestic market | Wholesale produce buyers | Ceased Dec 2019 when Hirchbrooke settled | — | FY2020 AR |
| Bundybunna agricultural lease (proposed) | 10-year lease with a 10-year option over Bundybunna, held through Resi Property Holdings, for wheat and livestock | Upper reaches of the Irwin River flow through the property, so strict environmental regulation applies | Grain and livestock markets | Never commenced; abandoned FY2024 | A$260,000 deposit fully impaired | FY2020 AR, Note 14; FY2023 4E; H1 FY2024 |
| Dried Australian sea cucumber ("Blue Ocean Health" division) | Dried sea cucumber sourced from Tidal Moon Australia (Denham, WA) | Expected volume up to 1 tonne of dried product per month to Japan by Dec 2020; 12 tonnes expected in FY2021 at no more than A$480,000 | Japanese and PRC buyers; positioned as a high-end product | First deliveries mid-2020; ceased Q4 FY2023 | Cost-plus: TM to TMA at cost +20%; TMA to Blue Ocean Health at cost +20% | FY2020 AR; Stockhead; FY2023 4E |
| Blue Ocean Japan sea-cucumber health supplement | Further-processed dried sea cucumber manufactured into a health-food supplement | — | Japanese and PRC consumers | Subsidiary acquired Jan 2020; sold Jun 2023 | — | FY2020 AR; FY2023 4E |
| Peruvian sea cucumber sourcing (proposed) | Deposits paid for a Peruvian sea cucumber production project | — | Supplement supply chain | Deposits of A$48,391 impaired FY2023 | — | FY2023 4E, Note 6 |
| Sandalwood oil (trial) | Trial production of sandalwood oil | — | — | Trial closed Q4 FY2022; inventory of A$99,800 written off FY2023 | — | FY2023 4E, Note 5 |
Flagship offering: The sea-cucumber supply chain (Tidal Moon to TMA to Blue Ocean Japan) was the company's only substantive product initiative of the last decade. It generated at most a few tens of thousands of dollars of Japanese sales per year:
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A$21,562 Japan revenue in FY2020;
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A$17,375 in FY2023.
It also produced large impairments:
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A$520,034 prepayment to Tidal Moon impaired at 30 June 2022;
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A$170,671 of sea-cucumber inventory written off in FY2023;
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A$208,020 of BOJ inventory written off in H1 FY2023.
Financial Narrative
Data basis:
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FY2019 and FY2020 are audited (FY2020 Annual Report; the auditor's report flagged a material uncertainty over going concern).
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FY2022 comparatives and FY2023 are from the unaudited FY2023 Preliminary Final Report.
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FY2021 full-year P&L and cash flow could not be retrieved. FY2021 balance-sheet equity items are taken from the 1 July 2021 opening balances in the FY2023 statement of changes in equity.
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The H1 FY2024 interim report restated 30 June 2023 total assets to A$62,594 and equity to –A$202,574. Those are the "restated" figures in the notes; the tables use the originally reported unaudited values. The source of the A$7,253 difference is not explained in retrieved text, but it equals the FY2023 intangibles balance.
Income statement (A$)
Notes:
Gross profit: is not reported. The company uses a nature-of-expense format, so gross profit is not publicly disclosed.
EBITDA: - FY2019 and FY2020 are the company's own segment EBITDA (FY2020 AR, Note 4).
- FY2022 and FY2023 are analyst-derived for continuing operations only: continuing loss before tax + depreciation and amortisation + finance costs – interest revenue. FY2023: –394,367 + 16,357 + 32,282 – 40 = –345,768. FY2022: –818,177 + 48,765 + 53,375 – 283 = –716,320; the table shows –716,085 after a minor rounding difference, and either figure can be used.
EBIT: pre-tax loss + finance costs – interest revenue. FY2022 and FY2023 are continuing operations only.
FY2019: includes the A$1,913,753 non-cash loss on conversion of loans to equity.
FY2023 other income: includes a A$444,800 non-cash reversal of accrued director salaries and superannuation that directors agreed not to pursue (FY2023 4E, Note 1). Excluding it, the FY2023 net loss would have been about A$1.18M.
Dividends: none paid, recommended or declared in any period (all filings).
H1 FY2024 (6 months to 31 Dec 2023): revenue A$10 (interest only); net loss A$98,132; EPS –0.0005 cents (H1 FY2024 Interim).
Margins and growth
Notes:
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Margins are calculated on revenue from contracts with customers.
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FY2023 margins use total group revenue including discontinued BOJ sales (A$17,375) against continuing-operations EBIT and EBITDA, so they are indicative only.
Revenue CAGR FY2019 to FY2023: (17,375 / 268,799)^(1/4) – 1 = about –49.6% per year.
- The FY2023 –83.9% decline is the company's own figure on "revenues from ordinary activities" (FY2023 4E).
Commentary. Every year in the series is loss-making, and losses run at several multiples of revenue. The FY2019 loss (A$2.58M) was inflated by the A$1.91M non-cash loss on converting debt to equity at a discount. FY2020's lower loss (A$1.14M) still included A$260,000 of Bundybunna deposit impairment and A$140,000 of shares expensed for the Tidal Moon supply agreement. FY2022 (A$1.00M loss) and FY2023 (A$0.74M) were driven by:
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overheads (consultancy and professional fees of A$235,576 and A$273,497);
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employee costs of about A$220,000 per year;
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listing and registry costs of about A$60,000 per year;
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repeated inventory write-downs (sandalwood oil, sea cucumber).
The apparent improvement in FY2023 comes entirely from the A$444,800 director-salary reversal. Underlying cash burn continued until the treasury was nearly empty. By H1 FY2024 costs had been cut to about A$98,000 per half, mostly professional fees and ASX/registry costs.
Balance sheet (A$, as at 30 June)
Notes:
FY2021: - Cash is the opening cash balance (net of overdraft) for FY2022 in the FY2023 cash-flow statement.
- Equity, issued capital and accumulated losses are the 1 July 2021 balances from the FY2023 statement of changes in equity.
FY2022 cash: the cash-flow statement figure net of a A$2,046 overdraft is A$786,944.
Long-term debt: - FY2020 and FY2022 are mainly the A$2.0M WIN Properties loan, secured over all Australian assets.
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FY2022 short-term debt includes the JPY 50M converting notes (A$532,595).
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FY2023 debt is A$111,498 of unconverted notes plus a A$10,000 interest-free director-related loan.
Goodwill: the A$15,254 of BOJ goodwill was recognised and fully impaired in FY2020.
31 Dec 2023: total assets A$17,027; cash A$14,327; total liabilities A$317,733; net liabilities A$300,706 (H1 FY2024 Interim).
Cash flow (A$)
Notes:
FY2019 equity cash: excludes A$264,690 of subscriptions received in advance.
FY2023 equity: A$2,421,098 of new equity was entirely non-cash (debt conversions).
H1 FY2024: operating cash flow –A$35,344; no investing or financing flows.
After 31 December 2023: the company disclosed A$300,000 of short and medium-term funding secured in the December 2024 quarter (H1 FY2024 Interim, Note 14).
Ratios
Notes:
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ROE is not meaningful for FY2021–FY2023 because equity was negative.
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Debt to equity is not meaningful for FY2022–FY2023 for the same reason.
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ROIC and net debt to EBITDA are not meaningful because invested capital and EBITDA were negative.
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The cash conversion cycle is not publicly disclosed and is not meaningful given negligible revenue.
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Asset turnover is revenue divided by year-end total assets.
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Interest coverage uses EBIT from Table 6.1 and reported finance costs (FY2019 A$129,296; FY2020 A$58,262; FY2022 A$53,375; FY2023 A$32,282).
Trend commentary. There are three phases:
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FY2019–FY2020: recapitalisation. Equity raises and the WIN Properties loan restored liquidity (current ratio 10.2x at June 2020) to fund the sea-cucumber build-out.
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FY2021–FY2022: capital destruction. Supplier prepayments were impaired, inventory was written down and equity turned sharply negative (–A$1.87M at June 2022).
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FY2023 onward: balance-sheet clean-up without operations. Debt-for-equity swaps and a director-salary waiver removed almost all liabilities. Cash fell below A$50,000, leaving a small net-liability shell.
The going-concern basis has rested every year on management's expectations of future funding. The FY2020 auditor's report flagged material uncertainty, and the H1 FY2024 review report drew attention to going concern.
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Income Statement (AUD) and Per-Share Data
| Metric | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue from contracts with customers (AUD) | 268,799 | 428,540 | — | 107,889 | 17,375 |
Other income (AUD) | 233,457 | 97,632 | — | 47,224 | 479,800 |
Interest revenue (AUD) | 313 | 7,001 | — | 283 | 40 |
Operating income / EBIT (AUD) | -2,446,699 | -1,092,059 | — | -764,850 | -362,125 |
EBITDA (AUD) | -2,410,061 | -1,029,012 | — | -716,085 | -345,768 |
Pre-tax income (AUD) | -2,575,682 | -1,143,320 | — | -1,003,922 | -739,626 |
Net income (AUD) | -2,575,682 | -1,143,320 | — | -1,003,922 | -739,626 |
EPS basic (A$ cents) | -0.021 | -0.004 | — | -0.0061 | -0.0041 |
EPS diluted (A$ cents) | -0.021 | -0.004 | — | -0.0061 | -0.0041 |
Dividends per share (A$ cents) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue growth YoY (%) | — | 59.4 | — | -83.9 |
Operating (EBIT) margin (%) | -910.2 | -254.8 | -708.9 | -2,084.2 |
EBITDA margin (%) | -896.6 | -240.1 | -663.7 | -1,990.0 |
Net margin (%) | -958.2 | -266.8 | -930.5 | -4,256.8 |
Balance Sheet (AUD)
| Metric | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total assets (AUD) | 1,395,444 | 3,070,954 | — | 1,248,882 | 69,847 |
Cash and cash equivalents (AUD) | 472,866 | 2,234,632 | 1,286,614 | 788,990 | 49,671 |
Total current assets (AUD) | 909,096 | 2,811,382 | — | 1,192,910 | 59,630 |
Total current liabilities (AUD) | 571,669 | 275,638 | — | 698,998 | 248,944 |
Short-term debt (AUD) | 226,047 | 5,000 | — | 564,492 | 121,498 |
Long-term debt (AUD) | 146,263 | 2,027,915 | — | 2,000,000 | 0 |
Total debt (AUD) | 372,310 | 2,032,915 | — | 2,564,492 | 121,498 |
Net debt (AUD) | -100,556 | -201,717 | — | 1,775,502 | 71,827 |
Total liabilities (AUD) | 1,088,407 | 2,753,674 | — | 3,117,080 | 265,168 |
Total equity (AUD) | 307,037 | 317,280 | -878,336 | -1,868,198 | -195,321 |
Issued capital (AUD) | 34,738,717 | 35,894,730 | 36,207,230 | 36,207,230 | 38,628,328 |
Accumulated losses (AUD) | -35,251,382 | -36,394,702 | -37,080,101 | -38,084,023 | -38,823,649 |
Goodwill and intangibles (AUD) | 0 | 0 | — | 21,029 | 7,253 |
Working capital (AUD) | 337,427 | 2,535,744 | — | 493,912 | -189,314 |
Cash Flow (AUD)
| Metric | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Operating cash flow (AUD) | -603,018 | -712,094 | — | -1,030,335 | -757,042 |
Capex incl. intangibles (AUD) | -178 | -26,448 | — | -20,716 | -603 |
Free cash flow (AUD) | -603,196 | -738,542 | — | -1,051,051 | -757,645 |
Proceeds from share issues (AUD) | 918,172 | 695,323 | — | 0 | 0 |
Proceeds from borrowings and convertible notes (AUD) | 146,019 | 2,000,000 | — | 537,595 | 10,644 |
Dividends paid (AUD) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Share buybacks (AUD) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Net change in cash (AUD) | 421,496 | 1,761,766 | — | -496,197 | -746,528 |
Returns & Leverage Ratios (%) and Financial Ratios (x)
| Ratio | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ROE (%) | -838.9 | -360.3 | — | — |
ROA (%) | -184.6 | -37.2 | -80.4 | -1,058.9 |
Current ratio (x) | 1.59 | 10.20 | 1.71 | 0.24 |
Debt to equity (x) | 1.21 | 6.41 | — | — |
Interest coverage (EBIT/finance costs, x) | -18.9 | -18.7 | -14.3 | -11.2 |
Asset turnover (x) | 0.19 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.25 |
Revenue by Region (AUD)
| Region | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Australia revenue (AUD) | 268,799 | 406,978 | 107,889 | 0 |
Japan revenue (AUD) | 0 | 21,562 | 0 | 17,375 |
Total revenue (AUD) | 268,799 | 428,540 | 107,889 | 17,375 |
Revenue by Region (AUD) by Segment × Region
| Segment × region | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
General investment, Australia (AUD) | 244,091 | 220,000 | — | 0 |
Food, Australia (AUD) | 24,708 | 186,978 | — | 0 |
Food, Japan (AUD) | 0 | 21,562 | 0 | 17,375 |
Share Count (millions) and Capital Markets Data
| Metric | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Shares on issue (millions) | 22,355.2 | 30,612.5 | 16,421.9 | 16,421.9 | 20,527.4 |
Issued capital (AUD Mn) | 34.74 | 35.89 | 36.21 | 36.21 | 38.63 |
Valuation Multiples
| Multiple | A1 (latest) | Peer comparison |
|---|---|---|
P/E | n.m. (loss-making) | Not applicable |
EV/EBITDA | n.m. (negative EBITDA; no market price) | Not applicable |
EV/Sales | n.m. (revenue A$10 in H1 FY2024) | Not applicable |
P/B | n.m. (negative book value of –A$300,706) | Not applicable |
Stale aggregator market cap | A$20.53M (20.53bn shares × A$0.001); not a meaningful valuation | GuruFocus; Simply Wall St |
Capital Markets
| Item | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
Analyst consensus | None; no broker coverage | — |
Dividend history and policy | No dividends paid, recommended or declared in any period reviewed (FY2019–H1 FY2024) | All filings |
Credit ratings (Moody's / S&P / Fitch) | Not rated | — |
Capital raising history | Sub-cent placements: A$0.0001–A$0.00014 (FY2019–FY2020); A$0.001 and A$0.0002 debt conversions (FY2023) | FY2020 AR; FY2023 4E |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance
The last formal management outlook (H1 FY2024 Interim, signed 25 February 2025):
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FY2023-24 was expected to be no less challenging than the preceding three and a half years.
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The company was pursuing acquisition proposals and expected one to reach final terms within 4–6 weeks.
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New funding of about A$500,000, plus a retail raise, was reasonably expected, subject to shareholder approval and a share reconstruction.
None of these milestones was publicly confirmed before delisting in August 2025. No revenue or earnings guidance has been given. There is no consensus.
Bull case (grounded in data)
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Clean shell with concentrated ownership. Liabilities are only about A$0.32M. About 56% of shares sit with three holders, so a well-capitalised vendor could inject a business into the unlisted public company cheaply and seek a fresh IPO or admission.
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Demonstrated capital-structure flexibility. Lenders and noteholders have repeatedly accepted equity: A$2.0M WIN loan, A$421,098 of notes, and A$1.91M of FY2019 conversions. That makes a balance-sheet reset feasible.
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Japanese capital network. Japanese corporate holders, JPY-denominated financing and a CEO with long Japanese banking ties could support a Japan-linked transaction.
Bear case (grounded in data)
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Value already exhausted. Accumulated losses (A$38.93M) exceed all capital ever raised (A$38.63M), and book equity is negative.
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Execution record. Five-plus ventures since 2019 failed or were abandoned. None of three re-compliance proposals reached final terms over about 18 months.
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Compliance failure. FY2024 and H1 FY2025 accounts were never lodged. Delisting removes liquidity and probably most of the vehicle's appeal as a backdoor listing.
Key catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
| Monitorable | Why it matters | Where to check |
|---|---|---|
| ASIC register status (registered / deregistered / external administration) | Determines whether the entity survives | ASIC Connect (ABN 44 109 330 949) |
| Lodgement of FY2024 and FY2025 financial reports with ASIC | Corporations Act compliance as an unlisted public company | ASIC |
| General meeting to convert the remaining A$111,498 notes and approve a share reconstruction | Precondition for any new funding | Notices to shareholders |
| Announcement of any acquisition or new IPO / re-admission application | Only path back to liquidity | ASX / NSX / company website |
| Repayment terms of the A$300,000 loan funding | Solvency | Company communications |
| Recovery action against Tidal Moon | Possible small cash inflow | Court records / company communications |
Concluding analyst verdict
A1 Investments & Resources Ltd is a failed micro-cap investment shell. It has no operating business, no listing, negative equity and an incomplete set of statutory accounts. Its story over the past seven years is consistent and unflattering. Successive thematic pivots were each announced with ambitious multi-market visions:
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Queensland vegetables;
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Western Australian wheat and livestock;
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sandalwood oil;
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a vertically linked sea-cucumber chain from Shark Bay to Japanese supplement shelves.
Each produced negligible revenue. Revenue peaked at A$428,540 in FY2020, about half of it management fees from a director-related entity. Each also left impairments behind: supplier prepayments, deposits and spoiled inventory. Funding came from ever-cheaper share placements and debt-for-equity swaps, pushing the share count past 20 billion and eroding essentially all of the A$38.6M of capital raised since inception.
The 2023 exit from Japan, through the sale of Blue Ocean Japan for A$473, was rational given stagnant Japanese demand and fragile cross-border logistics. But it left nothing to build on. Management then spent about 18 months pursuing re-compliance acquisitions that never reached final terms. Meanwhile, reporting failures compounded: the FY2023 accounts were about a year late, and the FY2024 accounts were never lodged. ASX applied its long-term suspension rule and removed the company in August 2025.
Its balance sheet in the latest accounts was A$17,027 of assets against A$317,733 of liabilities at December 2023. There is no public market, no dividend capacity and no disclosed post-delisting activity. From an equity-research standpoint the shares carry option value only: a holder's recovery depends entirely on a third party choosing to inject a business into this specific vehicle, and on that transaction being approved by ASIC and an exchange.
Both events have low observable probability. On disclosed fundamentals, the equity's intrinsic value is effectively nil. Any engagement with the entity — commercial, credit or investment — should first verify its current ASIC registration status and whether outstanding financial reports have been lodged.
Sources referenced (by document and fiscal year): ASX filings by A1 Investments & Resources Ltd: - FY2020 Appendix 4E and Annual Report (31 Aug 2020)
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FY2023 Appendix 4E, Unaudited Preliminary Final Report (30 Aug 2024)
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Appendix 4D Interim Report for the half-year to 31 Dec 2023 (25 Feb 2025)
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ASX "Long Term Suspended Entities" notices (10 Jul 2024; 18 Oct 2024; 22 Jan 2025; 9 Apr 2025; 16 Jul 2025)
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ASX "Removal from Official List" notice (4 Aug 2025)
Class Ltd, "List of Companies Delisted from ASX August 2025": - InvestSMART AYI announcement and directors'-interest logs
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Morningstar AU, Simply Wall St, Yahoo Finance and MarketScreener company profiles
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Motley Fool AU (shareholder register snapshot)
TipRanks announcement summaries: - Stockhead (Tidal Moon sea-cucumber venture coverage)
- Industry context: SeafoodSource, Benzinga / Bamboo Works, Undercurrent News, Weareaquaculture, Finboard
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Title | Tenure | Prior roles | Education | Age / birth year | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Charlie (Kazuya) Nakamura | Managing Director and CEO | Since 7 Nov 2011 | Tokai Bank, 1991–2002 (corporate, project and structured finance). From 1998 at Tokai Australia Finance Corporation, heading corporate finance for Japanese corporates in Australia (e.g. Toyota, Mitsubishi Corp., Mitsui). Tokai's representative on the BHP–Mitsubishi "Blackwater" coking-coal project finance (2000). Previously MD of Jinji Resources Pty Ltd | B.IE (Nihon University); MBA (University of Dubuque, 1991) | Born 1965 (about 61) | FY2020 AR; MarketScreener; Yahoo Finance |
Peter John Ashcroft | Executive Chairperson; General Counsel; Company Secretary | Director by at least FY2019; contract from 6 Jul 2018 (first appointment date not disclosed) | Commercial lawyer with 35+ years' experience; advised on joint ventures in Indonesia, NZ, Philippines, India, USA, Sweden, Ghana, Canada and Madagascar; lectured on natural resource law, trade practices and corporate governance | LLB (University of Sydney); former Solicitor of the Supreme Court of NSW and High Court of Australia (non-practising) | Born 1952 (about 74) | FY2020 AR; Yahoo Finance |
Akira Sunaga | Director | Director during all of H1 FY2024; appointment date not disclosed (possibly the June 2021 change) | — | — | — | H1 FY2024 Interim |
Greg Poole | Director | Appointed 10 Nov 2023 | — | — | — | H1 FY2024 Interim |
Peter Kao | Chief Operating Officer | — | Earlier disclosed as a director who traded shares in Apr 2009 | — | Born 1981 | Yahoo Finance; InvestSMART |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Directors' Remuneration
| Name | Cash salary and fees | Superannuation | Long-term benefits (leave) | Share-based | Total FY2020 | Total FY2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Charlie Nakamura (MD/CEO) | 150,000 | 14,250 | 30,178 | 0 | 194,428 | 164,250 (accrued, unpaid) |
Peter Ashcroft (Exec Chair) | 100,000 | 9,500 | 10,000 | 0 | 119,500 | 109,500 |
Masahiro Ito (NED) | 15,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15,000 | 0 |
Takashi Araya (NED) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Total KMP | 265,000 | 23,750 | 40,178 | 0 | 328,928 | 273,750 |
Directors' Remuneration by Attribute
| Attribute | Assessment | Source |
|---|---|---|
Board size | 4 (FY2020 and H1 FY2024) | FY2020 AR; H1 FY2024 |
Independence | FY2020: 2 executive directors and 2 non-executive directors. No formal independence assessment was retrieved. In H1 FY2024 the independence status of Sunaga and Poole is not disclosed | FY2020 AR |
Committees | None separately constituted. Corporate governance committee matters were dealt with by the full board | FY2020 AR, "Meetings of directors" |
Board meetings | 13 held in FY2020; full attendance except Araya (12/13) | FY2020 AR |
Chair / CEO separation | Roles held by different people, but the Chair is an executive and also Company Secretary and General Counsel. This concentrates governance functions | FY2020 AR; Yahoo Finance |
Governance framework | Claimed substantial compliance with ASX Corporate Governance Principles (3rd edition) "to the extent appropriate". Corporate Governance Statement 2021 and Appendix 4G lodged 31 Aug 2021 | FY2020 AR; InvestSMART log |
Related-party dealings | Management-fee revenue from a director-related entity (A$220,000 FY2020); director loans at 0–25% interest (FY2019); A$10,000 interest-free director-related loan outstanding at 31 Dec 2023 | FY2020 AR; H1 FY2024 Interim |
Remuneration vote | 2019 AGM: 100% of votes cast in favour of the remuneration report | FY2020 AR |
Major Shareholders
| Rank | Holder | Shares | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Kubota Honten Co Ltd | 3,994,634,980 | 19.46 |
| 2 | THEG Pte Ltd | 3,994,634,980 | 19.46 |
| 3 | BNP Paribas Nominees Pty Ltd (IB AU Noms Retailclient DRP) | 3,586,265,563 | 17.47 |
| 4 | Sarlat Securities Pty Ltd | 1,071,428,571 | 5.22 |
| 5 | Kooriya Kawakyu Co Ltd | 492,759,000 | 2.40 |
| 6 | Ashware Holdings Pty Ltd | 363,253,968 | 1.77 |
| 7 | Tidal Moon Pty Ltd | 250,000,000 | 1.22 |
| 8 | Marvel Green Power Energy Pte Ltd | 250,000,000 | 1.22 |
| 9 | Super Sorghum Asia Holdings Pte Ltd | 125,000,000 | 0.61 |
| 10 | Yamagen Securities Co Ltd | 89,698,500 | 0.44 |
Competitive Landscape
Competitors by Segment
| Segment (historical) | Named competitors / peers | Relative positioning | Source / verification |
|---|---|---|---|
ASX seafood / aquaculture micro-caps | Ocean Grown Abalone (OGA); Clean Seas Seafood (CSS); Angel Seafood (AS1); New Zealand Coastal Seafoods (NZS) | All were larger listed seafood vehicles with operating revenue. A1's seafood revenue never exceeded about A$0.2M | Stockhead (c. |
PRC sea-cucumber aquaculture | Anyuan Marine Breeding; Oriental Ocean; Zoneco Group | Industrial-scale Chinese breeders and processors; A1 was a tiny trading intermediary | Benzinga/Bamboo Works (2021); SeafoodSource; Undercurrent News |
Japanese / Asian seafood processors | Maruha Nichiro; Kyokuyo; Ocean One (HK) | Large integrated incumbents in Japanese distribution channels | Weareaquaculture; Undercurrent News; SeafoodSource |
Hong Kong seafood importers | Ocean One | Import and distribution to HK and mainland China | SeafoodSource |
Sandalwood | Large plantation sandalwood operators in northern Australia, e.g. a Middle-East sovereign-fund-backed plantation near Kununurra | A1's sandalwood activity was a trial only | Institutional Investor (WSJ citation) |
ASX shell / reverse-takeover vehicles | Other long-term suspended ASX entities on the same ASX lists (e.g. Asaplus Resources, AJY) | Competing for the same pool of backdoor-listing targets | ASX LTSE notices |
Peer Comparison FY2023
| Metric | A1 Investments & Resources (FY2023) | Maruha Nichiro |
|---|---|---|
Revenue | A$17,375 (incl. discontinued) | ¥1,078,631M (FY ended Mar 2025, per Finboard) |
Revenue growth | –83.9% (revenue from ordinary activities) | +4.65% (FY Mar 2025) |
Net margin | n.m. (loss about 42× revenue) | — |
Recent Developments
Only four dated items fall within the strict 18-month window, and none was found after delisting.
There were no product launches, contract wins, guidance revisions or layoffs in the window.



