Allbirds, Inc

Employees (period-end headcount)

FY2023 headcount per third-party compilation of the FY2023 Form 10-K; FY2024 and FY2025 figures are as stated in the Form 10-K for each respective year. FY2021 and FY2022 headcounts were not verified against a primary source in this review. The FY2025 10-K discloses that more than 200 of the 362 employees were in retail store operations at 31 December 2025 and that this cohort was reduced to fewer than 50 following the Q1 2026 U.S. full-price store closures and associated reduction in force. Post-Asset-Sale headcount at Smartbird has not been publicly disclosed.

Market capitalisation and share count

Discrepancy flag: the widely quoted market capitalisation of approximately $22.3 million implies roughly 8.8 million shares, and therefore appears to capture only the Class A float rather than the full 11.81 million Class A plus Class B shares outstanding. On a fully counted basis the equity value at $2.53 would be approximately $29.9 million. Both figures are presented; the discrepancy is a share-count convention issue, not a pricing dispute.

Positioning statement (150 words)

Smartbird, Inc. is the residual public vehicle of Allbirds, one of the defining direct-to-consumer brands of the 2015–2021 venture cycle, and is now a sub-$30 million market-capitalisation attempt to convert a listed shell, roughly $40 million of asset-sale proceeds and a $100 million convertible note facility into an enterprise AI compute infrastructure business. The legacy footwear operation — built on merino wool, eucalyptus fibre and sugarcane-based foam, certified B Corp, and structured as a Delaware public benefit corporation — reached a $4.1 billion first-day market value in November 2021, peaked at $297.8 million of revenue in FY2022, then contracted for three consecutive years to $152.5 million in FY2025 while accumulating a $561.8 million deficit. The brand and all associated intellectual property were sold in June 2026 for $40.7 million. What remains is a strategy, a balance sheet and a ticker: no operating history in compute, one $2.75 million GPU lease, and an unproven claim on one of the most capital-intensive markets in technology.

2.1 The company's own description — legacy footwear business

The most recent annual report describes the business as follows: "Allbirds is a global lifestyle brand that innovates with naturally derived materials to make better footwear and apparel products in a better way, while treading lighter on our planet." (Source: Form 10-K FY2025, Item 1, Overview.) The 10-K articulates a founding thesis resting on three consumer beliefs identified in 2015: that climate change is an existential threat; that consumers connect purchase decisions to planetary impact; and that consumers refuse a trade-off between looking good, feeling good and doing good.

The FY2025 10-K states that footwear "is the foundation of our brand and represents the majority of our revenue," with apparel — tees, sweats, socks and underwear — explicitly characterised as "secondary." This is a material narrowing from the 2020–2022 period, when apparel was positioned as a growth vector.

2.2 The company's own description — post-Asset-Sale business

Smartbird describes itself as delivering "dedicated AI infrastructure as a service, giving organizations the performance, control, and security of a private AI cluster without requiring them to finance, operate, or maintain the underlying infrastructure." The company states it "manages the entire lifecycle, from procurement and deployment to operations and hardware refreshes." (Source: Smartbird press release, 3 Aug 2026.) The April 2026 announcement framed the ambition as becoming "a fully integrated GPU-as-a-Service (GPUaaS) and AI-native cloud solutions provider" and referred to building a "neocloud platform" (Source: 8-K Exhibit 99.1, 15 Apr 2026).

Target verticals named by management are healthcare, pharmaceuticals, financial services and public-sector agencies — segments selected on the basis that they require sovereignty, control and compliance characteristics that spot markets and hyperscalers do not reliably provide.

2.3 Independent characterisation

Legacy business model. Allbirds operated a vertically integrated, digitally-led DTC model with four revenue channels: (i) owned e-commerce (allbirds.com and app); (ii) company-operated retail stores; (iii) third-party marketplaces; and (iv) wholesale and international distributor sales. Revenue was 100% product sales; there was no subscription, licensing or service revenue stream in any reported period. The FY2025 10-K confirms the company operated as one operating and reportable segment throughout.

The economic architecture was that of a premium-priced, narrow-assortment consumer brand with unusually high fixed-cost intensity for its revenue base. At FY2025 scale, SG&A plus marketing consumed materially more than gross profit — the structural condition that ultimately forced the sale.

Value chain position. Allbirds sat as a brand owner and marketer with no owned manufacturing. Footwear was produced by third-party contract manufacturers concentrated in Vietnam; apparel and non-footwear products in the United States, China, Peru and Mexico (Source: 10-K FY2025, Item 1). Distribution ran through three primary third-party-operated distribution centres in the U.S. and U.K. Technology was similarly outsourced — the 10-K names Shopify as the platform partner enabling scale.

Customer types and end-markets. The 10-K describes the typical customer as living an active and curious lifestyle, health- and wellbeing-oriented, willing to pay for premium products, a frequent online purchaser, urban-resident and appreciative of socially conscious brands. End-markets were casual and lifestyle footwear, with a secondary performance/active adjacency (Dasher franchise) and a minor apparel adjacency.

New business model. Smartbird's disclosed model to date is not a cloud service model but an asset-leasing model: the company, through a wholly owned subsidiary (NewBird AI, LLC), purchases GPU server equipment and leases it to a counterparty under a multi-year contract with an end-of-term purchase option. The single disclosed transaction — approximately $2.75 million over three years with a subsidiary of QumulusAI, Inc. — is structurally an equipment finance lease, not a compute service (Source: 8-K/A, 20 Apr 2026). Management's stated intent is to migrate over time toward managed service and neocloud delivery, but as of this dossier's date no managed-service revenue has been reported.

Revenue model mix. Both historically and prospectively, the revenue model is essentially single-mode:

10.1 The legacy strategy — verbatim themes from the final annual report

The FY2025 10-K articulates a long-term growth and profitability strategy dependent on the ability to:

• "increase brand awareness and drive efficient customer acquisition through brand marketing and leveraging third party stores"
• "continue growth within our existing customer base and increase closet share"
• "navigate the transition of our operating model following the closure of our retail store fleet, and manage the infrastructure of our remaining U.S. outlets"
• "grow our product innovation platform while understanding the market opportunity for new product styles"
• "materialize our product and brand initiatives in a timely fashion"
• "accurately forecast demand for our product and implement a more focused product strategy"
• "continue focusing on using sustainable materials"

The stated investment priorities were "our e-commerce platform, wholesale partnerships, and supporting our international distributor relationships, as well as maintaining our limited retail presence."

10.2 The March 2023 Strategic Transformation Plan — four pillars and outcome

The transformation plan reduced losses in absolute terms but never approached the crossover point. Over the three years of its execution, cumulative adjusted EBITDA losses totalled approximately $208 million against a starting cash balance of $167 million.

10.3 Strategic initiatives announced in the last 24 months

10.4 The AI infrastructure strategy — stated content

Per the April 2026 announcement and subsequent disclosures, the strategy has four articulated components:

1. Acquire high-performance, low-latency AI compute hardware and provide access under long-term lease arrangements, "meeting customer demand that spot markets and hyperscalers are unable to reliably service."
2. Grow the neocloud platform by expanding compute and service offerings.
3. Deepen partnerships with operators and customers.
4. Evaluate strategic M&A opportunities.

The demand thesis stated by management: "GPU procurement lead times are increasing for high-end hardware, North American data center vacancy rates have reached historic lows, and market-wide compute capacity coming online through mid-2026 is already fully committed."

Under CEO Carlsten the positioning has been sharpened from generic GPUaaS toward "AI infrastructure as a managed service" for the enterprise mid-market — specifically healthcare, pharmaceuticals, financial services and public-sector agencies requiring secure, compliant, dedicated infrastructure without operational burden. Management has emphasised a vendor-neutral approach and full-lifecycle management including hardware refresh.

10.5 Management's medium-term financial targets and guidance

Legacy business guidance history:

The FY2025 outcome fell below the bottom of even the twice-reduced guidance range — a $8.5 million miss against a $161 million floor and a $22.5 million miss against the original $175 million floor.

Smartbird guidance: none has been issued. No revenue target, EBITDA target, capacity target, contracted backlog figure or timeline has been formally guided. The only forward statement of substance is management's press commentary that the company plans to deliver its first GPU clusters and generate revenue within the next year. Investors have no quantitative management framework against which to assess the new business.

5.1 Proprietary material platforms (the technical basis of the portfolio)

5.2 Footwear franchises

All footwear in the core franchises is described by the company as machine washable (with insoles removed and hand-washed separately) — a durable point of product differentiation that the company has marketed consistently.

5.3 Apparel and accessories

The FY2025 10-K characterises apparel as secondary: "from classic tees and sweats to socks and underwear." This is the residue of a category that was launched in 2020, expanded aggressively, and then substantially retrenched. The FY2022 results disclosed "the previously announced discontinuation of certain first generation apparel," which carried $1.5 million of Q4 FY2022 revenue and a $3.5 million adjusted EBITDA drag. Retail Dive's contemporaneous assessment — that the 2020 apparel foray "appeared to go too far too quickly" and that the brand began retreating two years later — matches the filing record.

Named apparel sub-lines historically included the Trino™ wool-and-tree fibre blend used in tees and base layers (press-reported). No apparel product-level pricing, unit economics or revenue contribution has been disclosed in any filing reviewed.

5.4 Smartbird service portfolio (current)

Management stated in June 2026 that with over $100 million of capital available it plans to deliver its first GPU clusters and generate revenue within the next year (press-reported management commentary). No pricing model, contracted backlog, utilisation target or unit economics has been disclosed.

All figures in USD millions except per-share data and percentages, for fiscal years ended 31 December. Sources: FY2021–FY2024 quarterly and annual earnings releases furnished on Form 8-K; FY2025 Form 10-K filed 31 March 2026; FY2026 interim data from Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 31 March 2026.

6.1 Income statement

Notes and flags. FY2022 SG&A of $166.7 million and FY2023 SG&A of $174.0 million are as reported; FY2024 and FY2025 full-year SG&A were not disclosed in a single primary figure in the sources reviewed and are left blank. FY2022 EPS was not verified against a primary source and is left blank rather than derived. Split-adjusted EPS for FY2021 and FY2023 applies the 1-for-20 September 2024 reverse split to as-reported figures; the FY2025 10-K confirms all share and per-share data have been retroactively adjusted for the split. FY2022 adjusted EBITDA of -$60.4 million and FY2025 adjusted EBITDA of -$59.5 million are derived from the disclosed adjusted EBITDA margins of -20.3% and -39.0% applied to disclosed revenue; the underlying margins are as reported, and this derivation is flagged. FY2024 operating loss of -$97.6 million is per a third-party compilation of the FY2024 10-K and was not verified against the filing itself; FY2025 loss from operations of -$79.962 million is as reported in the FY2025 10-K. Restructuring expense in FY2023 equalled 2.7% of revenue and in FY2024 0.9%, both as disclosed.

Revenue CAGR. FY2021 to FY2025: -13.9% per annum (from $277.5 million to $152.5 million over four years). FY2022 peak to FY2025: -19.7% per annum, a 48.8% cumulative decline from peak.

6.2 Balance sheet

Notes and flags. FY2022 inventory of $118.0 million is derived from the disclosed FY2023 inventory of $57.8 million and the disclosed 51% year-on-year decline; this derivation is flagged. FY2024 total assets of $188.9 million and total equity of $101.7 million are per third-party compilation of the FY2024 10-K; FY2024 equity of $101.685 million is independently corroborated by the equity roll-forward in the Q1 FY2026 10-Q. FY2021–FY2023 total assets and equity were not verified against primary sources and are left blank. FY2025 balance sheet items are as reported in the FY2025 10-K and corroborated by the comparative column of the Q1 FY2026 10-Q. Goodwill was nil in every period; the company made no acquisitions.

Q1 FY2026 balance-sheet update (31 March 2026): total assets $84.729 million; cash and cash equivalents $14.397 million; inventory $37.199 million; total liabilities $68.453 million; long-term debt $17.443 million; total stockholders' equity $16.276 million; accumulated deficit $582.524 million. Equity fell 54.7% in a single quarter.

6.3 Cash flow

Notes and flags. FY2021 and FY2024 operating cash flow were not verified against primary sources and are left blank. Full-year capital expenditure was not disclosed in a single figure in the sources reviewed for any year and is left blank throughout; Q1 FY2026 capex was $0.072 million and Q1 FY2025 was $0.643 million, indicating a near-zero maintenance capex run-rate in the terminal period. The company never paid a dividend or repurchased shares prior to the August 2026 special dividend. Under the ATM programme the company sold 386,289 shares for $1.7 million gross through 31 December 2025 — an average of roughly $4.40 per share, executed well below the $10.63 mid-year quote.

Q1 FY2026 cash flow: operating cash outflow of $12.065 million (versus $27.883 million in Q1 FY2025); investing inflow of $0.065 million; financing inflow of $0.072 million; total cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash of $15.605 million at quarter end.

6.4 Ratio analysis

Basis of calculation. ROE for FY2025 uses FY2025 net loss of $77.283 million over average equity of ($101.685m + $35.914m)/2 = $68.8 million. ROA uses average total assets of ($188.9m + $109.4m)/2 = $149.2 million. Current ratio uses FY2025 current assets of $82.116 million over current liabilities of $40.642 million. Debt/equity uses FY2025 long-term debt of $17.371 million over equity of $35.914 million. Net debt/EBITDA is not meaningful given negative EBITDA and is shown as net debt of $9.3 million over the absolute value of adjusted EBITDA loss purely for scale reference. Asset turnover uses FY2025 revenue of $152.466 million over average total assets. ROIC, interest coverage and cash conversion cycle are not computed: interest coverage is undefined against a full-year operating loss; ROIC is not meaningful for a company with negative NOPAT in every reported period; and the days-payable and days-inventory inputs required for a cash conversion cycle were not available for a full five-year series in the sources reviewed. FY2024 effective tax rate of 2.05% is as disclosed in the FY2024 income tax footnote (FY2023: 0.22%), with a valuation allowance contributing 20.29 percentage points in FY2024 and 24.28 points in FY2023.

6.5 Commentary — trends, inflections and drivers

Inflection 1: FY2021 to FY2022 — the growth thesis breaks. Revenue grew only 7.3% in the first full year as a public company against IPO-era expectations of high-twenties growth, while gross margin collapsed 940 basis points from 52.9% to 43.5%. Management attributed the margin destruction to the discontinuation of first-generation apparel, promotional activity, higher logistics costs, a lower mix of international sales and adverse FX. Simultaneously SG&A rose from $122.2 million to $166.7 million — 44.0% to 56.0% of revenue — driven by 23 new store openings, headcount and public-company costs. The company added fixed cost into a decelerating top line. Net loss more than doubled to $101.4 million.

Inflection 2: FY2023 — the write-down year. Revenue fell 14.7%, driven explicitly by lower average selling price from increased promotional activity. This is the single most important disclosure in the five-year record: the brand had lost its ability to sell at full price. Gross margin fell a further 250 basis points to 41.0%. SG&A rose in absolute terms to $174.0 million on a full year of 2022's store openings, reaching 68.5% of revenue. A $27.4 million Q4 impairment drove the net loss to $152.5 million, or 60.0% of revenue. Restructuring expense of $6.8 million reflected the March 2023 Strategic Transformation Plan.

Inflection 3: FY2024 — controlled contraction. Revenue fell 25.3%, but this was substantially self-inflicted: distributor transitions and 15 store closures. Gross margin recovered 170 basis points to 42.7% on lower freight and duty costs per unit and fewer inventory write-downs. Adjusted EBITDA loss improved to $70.0 million and net loss to $93.3 million. Headcount fell 42% from 927 to 542. Crucially, cash fell from $130.0 million to $66.7 million — the company had roughly one year of runway remaining at the prevailing burn rate.

Inflection 4: FY2025 — the endgame. Revenue fell 19.7% to $152.5 million and gross margin gave back the FY2024 gain, returning to 41.0%. The Q3 guidance cut — full-year revenue reduced from $165–180 million to $161–166 million, and the final result of $152.5 million landing below even the reduced range — is the clearest signal of loss of forecasting control. The June 2025 refinancing converted the company from a net-cash to a leveraged position for the first time in its public life. By 31 December 2025 cash stood at $26.7 million against $17.4 million of drawn revolver. The FY2025 10-K carried a substantial-doubt going-concern qualification. The FY2025 10-K also records a candid product admission: "in 2025, we refreshed certain foundational product franchises, including our original runner, and sales of these updated products have been slower to rebuild than anticipated."

Q1 FY2026 — terminal deterioration. Revenue of $22.319 million (-30.5%) with gross margin of 27.8%, down 1,700 basis points year on year, and cost of revenue falling only 9.0% against a 30.5% revenue decline. Q1 2026 also carried $1.016 million of impairment and $1.280 million of restructuring on the U.S. store fleet closure, plus a $0.963 million bad-debt provision — the latter a notable new line, suggesting distributor receivable stress. Equity fell from $35.914 million to $16.276 million. At a $12.065 million quarterly operating burn against $14.397 million of cash, the company had roughly one quarter of liquidity. This is the arithmetic that made the Asset Sale non-discretionary.

Structural diagnosis. The 2021–2025 record describes a business in which gross margin compressed approximately 1,190 basis points from peak while the operating cost base — SG&A plus marketing — never fell as fast as revenue. Marketing at 37.4% of revenue in Q1 FY2025 against a 44.8% gross margin means marketing alone consumed 83% of gross profit before a single dollar of SG&A. That is not a fixable cost structure at $150 million of revenue; it is a business that required roughly three times its actual revenue to work.

22.1 Management guidance

There is no financial guidance. No revenue target, EBITDA target, capital expenditure plan, contracted backlog, utilisation assumption or margin framework has been issued for the Electronics Infrastructure Business. The only forward statement of record is management's press commentary in June 2026 that, with over $100 million in capital, the company plans to deliver its first GPU clusters and generate revenue within the next year.

Legacy guidance is now irrelevant, but its track record is the relevant prior: FY2025 revenue guidance was issued at $175–195 million in March 2025, reduced to $161–166 million in November 2025, and the actual result of $152.5 million landed below even the reduced floor. Management's forecasting credibility entering the new business is poor, and the forecasting problem in AI infrastructure — where utilisation, pricing and residual values are all volatile — is materially harder than in footwear.

22.2 Consensus growth expectations

No meaningful sell-side consensus for the post-transaction business was located. The only captured formal rating is a Buy at a $14.00 price target — approximately 453% above the 9 August 2026 close of $2.53 — set against a company with no disclosed revenue, no backlog and no guidance. A published contrary view rates the stock Sell. A third-party AI assessment rates it Neutral. The dispersion is total, and appropriately so: the outcome distribution is genuinely bimodal.

22.3 Bull case

1. The capital structure is now materially cleaner than at any point since 2022. The company received $40.7 million on 9 June 2026, repaid $17.4 million of ABL debt at closing, distributed approximately $3.7 million in dividends, and carries only $8.25 million of convertible notes. Against a market capitalisation of roughly $22–30 million, a substantial portion of the enterprise value is cash. Downside from here is partially collateralised.

2. The strategy targets a real and structurally underserved segment. ABI Research's warning that neoclouds risk "being relegated to a merely back-end role if they fail to acquire enterprise customers" and that enterprise AI demand "may never materialize at scale unless neoclouds actively educate verticals and build tailored solutions" describes exactly the gap Smartbird has positioned into. Anchor-tenant-driven leaders — CoreWeave with Microsoft at 62% of 2024 revenue, Nebius with Microsoft at up to $19.4 billion — are structurally disinclined to serve regulated mid-market enterprises requiring dedicated, compliant, small-footprint clusters. A $150 million business in that niche would be transformational for this equity and invisible to CoreWeave. With inference forecast to reach 80% of the neocloud market by 2030, the workload mix is also shifting toward smaller, distributed, latency-sensitive deployments that favour this posture.

3. Leadership and board composition are genuinely fit for the stated purpose. Dr. Carlsten built and commercially deployed Denmark's sovereign AI supercomputer with NVIDIA at DCAI, led product at SandboxAQ, and ran product for the AWS Center for Quantum Computing. Nominee Elizabeth Mora was CFO of an $800 million contractor serving NASA, DoD and DARPA and holds TS/SCI clearance. Nominee Daniel Kasun spent 11 years at AWS in public-sector and financial-services channel leadership. This is not a shell with a press release; it is a shell with a credible and specifically matched team, willing to accept the majority of their compensation in equity.

22.4 Bear case

1. The capital is a ceiling, not a commitment — and the terms are punitive. The company's own risk factors state that "Only $5.25 million of the contemplated Facility is committed, and the remaining $44.75 million is solely at the option of the holders of the Convertible Notes. Stockholders should not assume that any additional tranches will be funded." Actual issuance through 4 June 2026 was $8.25 million. That capital costs 12% plus a 5% original issue discount, is senior secured over every asset, and comes with a 24-month right for the holder to co-invest at least 55% of any future financing — a provision that effectively subordinates the company's entire capital strategy to a single unnamed counterparty. Meanwhile CoreWeave holds an approximately $14 billion Meta contract and Nebius an up-to-$19.4 billion Microsoft agreement. Smartbird's realistically available capital is roughly 0.06% of a single competitor's contract book.

2. Dilution is the dominant term in the equation. Existing overhang at the record date was 25.6%; the proposed 3,500,000-share plan increase lifts total potential overhang to 55.3%. Layered on top: up to $100 million of convertible notes, with the incremental $50 million at a $4.00 conversion price and the original tranche at a formula-based price that falls as the stock falls. Layered on top of that: an expanded ATM for up to $48.1 million with Chardan. And already granted: 2,423,569 RSUs to three executives, equal to approximately 20.5% of shares outstanding, awarded before any new-business revenue. A shareholder buying today is buying a claim that will be repeatedly and substantially subdivided.

3. The execution record does not support the execution requirement. This management team is new, but the institution is not. The same corporate entity guided FY2025 revenue to $175–195 million, cut to $161–166 million, and delivered $152.5 million. It burned $291 million of operating cash across the public period. It let gross margin fall from 52.9% to 27.8% in nineteen quarters. It refreshed its foundational franchises and conceded in its own 10-K that they "have been slower to rebuild than anticipated." Building a compute infrastructure business requires hardware procurement at allocation-constrained volumes, cluster design, data centre and power partnerships, enterprise sales cycles into regulated verticals, and operational uptime discipline — against competitors with three-year head starts, secured power, and multi-billion-dollar anchor contracts. The company's own risk factor is the fairest summary available: "Even if the Asset Sale closes, we may not be able to establish a viable continuing business in our anticipated Electronics Infrastructure Business."

22.5 Key catalysts and monitorables for the next twelve months

22.6 Analyst verdict (300 words)

Allbirds is the most complete case study of the 2015–2021 direct-to-consumer cycle available in the public record: a genuinely innovative product, a genuinely earned ESG credential — a B Impact score of 96.5 against a 50.9 median — a Net Promoter Score above 83 for four consecutive years, and a $4.1 billion first-day market value, all of which proved insufficient. The business failed for a reason visible in a single line of the FY2025 benchmark: a 41.0% gross margin against 57.9% at Deckers, 58.3% at Crocs and 62.8% at On Holding. A premium brand that cannot out-earn mass-market comparables on gross margin does not have a premium; it has a cost problem wearing a story. The 2023 disclosure that revenue fell on "a lower average selling price, driven by increased promotional activity" was the epitaph, written three years before the funeral.

Smartbird is a different security requiring a different judgment. Stripped of narrative, it is: approximately $40 million of proceeds, $8.25 million of 12% senior secured debt, one $2.75 million equipment lease, no revenue, no guidance, no proprietary technology, a credible CEO, a fit-for-purpose board slate, and a proposal to take equity overhang to 55.3%. The addressable market is real and the chosen niche is genuinely underserved. The capital is roughly two orders of magnitude below what the sector's economics demand, and 92% of it is optional at a single counterparty's discretion.

The market's verdict is instructive and, in this analyst's view, correct: four months after the pivot, the stock trades 1.6% above its pre-announcement price. Investors have priced the transformation at approximately zero and the returned cash at approximately its face value. Until a second customer, a funded tranche and a delivered cluster arrive, that is the appropriate price. This is an option on execution, not an investment in a business.

Dossier compiled from primary SEC filings (Forms 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, 8-K/A, DEF 14A, PRE 14A, PREM14A, PRER14A, DEFA14A, S-1MEF, CERT), company press releases furnished via GlobeNewswire, the Allbirds and Smartbird investor relations websites, and identified third-party market research and financial compilations. Every figure states its fiscal year and currency. Figures not verified against a primary source are left blank in tables and flagged in the accompanying commentary. Where sources conflict — notably the FY2023 carbon footprint reduction, the market capitalisation share-count basis, and the 2025/2026 neocloud revenue estimates — both figures and the nature of the discrepancy are stated. No figure has been fabricated, estimated or interpolated.

Chronological register, February 2025 to August 2026.