Badaro No. 19 Ship Investment Company Overview
| Field | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Legal name | 바다로19호선박투자회사 (Badaro No. 19 Ship Investment Co., Ltd.) | KRX KIND half-year report FY2021 |
| Former names | None identified | — |
| Legal form | Ship Investment Company (SIC) under Korea's Ship Investment Company Act. A "paper company" with no employees; operations are outsourced to a licensed ship asset manager | Moneypie wiki (DART excerpt) |
| Incorporation date | 29 September 2011, formed with KRW 20,000 initial capital | DART FY2020 Q3 report excerpt (Findata) |
| Licence | Ship investment business licence granted by the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs (MLTM). The ministry announced approval on 31 Oct 2011; the financial statements give 1 Nov 2011 | KLNews, 2 Nov 2011; KRX KIND FY2021 H1 |
| Licence amendments | 1st amendment 23 Feb 2012; 2nd amendment 3 Apr 2012 | DART excerpt (Findata) |
| Incorporation jurisdiction | Republic of Korea | — |
| Headquarters address | Investing.com lists Jeju-si, South Korea. | Investing.com |
| Ship asset manager / promoter | Segero Ship Finance Co., Ltd. (세계로선박금융㈜), www.globalmarifin.com | KLNews 2011; DART excerpt |
| Asset custodian | Hana Bank (later KEB Hana Bank) | KRX KIND FY2021 H1 |
| Lead offering broker | Mirae Asset Securities | Asia Economy, 23 Apr 2012 |
| Exchange / ticker | KOSPI (Korea Exchange), 155900. Listed 29 Jun 2012; delisted 22 Nov 2023 | KRX KIND FY2021 H1; Energy Economy News |
| ISIN | KR7155900004. Derived from the KRX code using the ISO 6166 check-digit algorithm | Derived |
| CUSIP | Not applicable (no US listing) | — |
| Fiscal year end | 31 December | DART filings |
| Employees (latest, 3-yr trend) | Zero. The SIC is a paper company administered by Segero Ship Finance | Moneypie wiki (DART excerpt) |
| External auditor | — | — |
| Shares outstanding (pre-reduction) | 15,200,004 common shares | Energy Economy News, 18 Oct 2023 |
| Paid-in capital | Approx. KRW 76.0 bn (KRW 760 억원 reported as of 31 Dec 2021) | JobKorea company page |
| IPO price | KRW 5,190 per share; offering size KRW 78.9 bn | Asia Economy, 23 Apr 2012 |
| Market capitalisation | Not applicable (delisted). Last quoted value approx. KRW 47.6–48 bn at KRW 3,130 per share | GuruFocus; Stockopedia; Investing.com |
| Last enterprise value quoted | KRW 30.54 bn, implying approx. KRW 17 bn net cash (derived) after the vessel sales | GuruFocus |
| Website | No standalone site. Disclosures were posted via Segero Ship Finance (www.globalmarifin.com) and DART | DART excerpt (Findata) |
Badaro No. 19 Ship Investment Company was a single-purpose, closed-end Korean ship fund. It raised KRW 78.9 bn from retail and institutional investors in a 2012 public offering and used the money to buy two newbuild 57,000 DWT Supramax bulk carriers, PACIFIC DREAM and PACIFIC VISION. The ships were built at China's Jiangsu Hantong yard and sold to the fund through Samsung C&T. Both vessels went on long-term charter to Hyundai Merchant Marine, now HMM Co., Ltd. The fund paid charter income to shareholders as monthly distributions, which made it, for most of its life, the only monthly-paying stock on the Korean market, with trailing cash yields of roughly 11–14% between 2018 and 2021. A 2016 charter restructuring during HMM's debt crisis, together with a weak dry-bulk asset market, delayed the planned exit for years. The fund sold both vessels in 2023, returned KRW 3,156 per share through a capital reduction, and delisted. It was the last listed ship investment company in Korea.
The company's own description
In its periodic reports, the company describes itself as a performance-based ship investment company. It used publicly raised capital to buy two Supramax bulk carriers through overseas subsidiaries and placed them on time charter with a creditworthy domestic shipping operator. It aimed to recover investor principal by selling the ships and to capture any increase in vessel values. The original plan was to sell the ships in the second-hand market around the end of the tenth year after delivery (DART FY2020 Q3 report, excerpt via Findata). Elsewhere the filings describe the company as a "paper company" licensed under Article 13 of the Ship Investment Company Act. It earned returns for investors from charter hire on vessels bought with investor money (Moneypie wiki, DART excerpt).
Independent characterisation
Economically, the company was a tax-advantaged, unlevered, single-lessee ship-leasing vehicle. Its features were:
Asset base: Two identical 57,000 DWT Supramax bulk carriers, delivered 1 July 2013 (PACIFIC DREAM) and 28 August 2013 (PACIFIC VISION). The purchase price was USD 27.0 M per ship, or USD 54.0 M in total (DART FY2019 annual report excerpt).
Capital structure: The KIND FY2021 half-year report states that the SIC funded 100% of the vessel purchase price and incidental costs by issuing shares to domestic investors. There was no senior bank debt at the SIC level. The Panamanian subsidiaries were formally the vessel buyers and borrowers, but they borrowed from their parent SIC, not from external lenders.
Revenue model: 100% lease (charter) income from one counterparty, HMM. There were no product, subscription or licensing revenues.
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Original charter: an 8-year time charter (TC), extendable by two 1-year options at the charterer's choice. It paid a guaranteed base hire of USD 8,200 per day per ship plus variable hire linked to the Baltic Supramax Index (BSI).
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From 18 August 2016: converted to a bareboat charter (BBC) at a reduced rate running to the end of year 10 after delivery (DART FY2019 report excerpt).
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Later extended so that the fund's term ran to 2028 (Orangeboard investor report, c. late 2021).
Downside protection: Samsung C&T provided residual value insurance guaranteeing USD 14 M per vessel before sale costs, for a premium of USD 1 M per vessel (DART excerpt).
FX management: A cross-currency swap with KEB Hana Bank covered USD 54 M against KRW 60.777 bn at a contracted rate of KRW 1,125.50 per USD. At maturity, USD 50 M was to be exchanged against KRW 56.275 bn, about 74% of investor principal. The vessels were pledged as collateral. A separate USD 8.1 M currency forward at the same rate ran between the subsidiary and the SIC (DART excerpts).
Value chain position: A passive tonnage provider (financial owner and lessor) sitting between the shipbuilder/seller (Samsung C&T, Jiangsu Hantong) and the operator/charterer (HMM). Technical and commercial operation sat with HMM, especially after the switch to bareboat terms.
Customer type and end-markets: One B2B customer, HMM. Indirectly, the fund was exposed to global seaborne minor-bulk and grain trades carried by Supramax tonnage (coal, grains, steel products, fertilisers, cement).
Distribution mechanics
Distributions were declared monthly. Each month's record date was the 27th, and payment followed about four weeks later, in the second half of the next month (Newstomato, c. June 2020). Typical monthly payments in 2016–2022 were KRW 27–32 per share. For example:
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KRW 29 (total KRW 437.3 M) declared October 2016 (Etoday)
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KRW 32 (total KRW 481.0 M) declared April 2019 (Etoday)
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KRW 28 declared August 2019 (Etoday) and April 2022 (Edaily)
Strategy
Stated strategy
The fund's strategy was fixed at the outset rather than set by an evolving management agenda. Paraphrasing the filings, it aimed to:
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Earn stable charter income from a creditworthy Korean operator.
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Distribute that income monthly.
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Recover principal by selling the vessels, with residual value insurance as a floor.
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Capture upside if vessel values rose, through early sale.
The 2012 offering materials set a target of about 7% annual distributions and an 11-year-1-month life (Asia Economy, 2012).
Strategic decisions over the life of the fund
| Date | Initiative / decision | Rationale | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Feb–Apr 2012 | Restructured from a 4-ship private placement to a 2-ship public offering | Funding feasibility | KLNews 2011; DART excerpt |
| Aug 2016 | Accepted conversion of the TC to a BBC at reduced hire | Counterparty preservation during HMM's 2016 restructuring; avoid charterer default | DART FY2019 excerpt; Etoday 2016 |
| 20 Dec 2017 | Deferred the planned exit and continued operating | Projected IRR below the 7% hurdle | DART excerpt |
| c. 2021 | Five-year charter extension; fund term moved to 2028 | Lock in hire during the market upcycle | Orangeboard |
| Apr–Jun 2023 | Sold both vessels ahead of the 2028 term | Not stated in sources reviewed. The analyst view is opportunistic monetisation while second-hand Supramax values were still elevated after the 2021–2022 peak | Energy Economy News |
| Nov 2023 | Capital return via compulsory paid capital reduction; delisting; dissolution | Completion of investment life cycle | Energy Economy News |
Activity in the last 24 months
There have been no strategic initiatives in the 24 months to October 2026. The entity has no ongoing operations.
Medium-term targets/guidance: None outstanding.
ESG commitments, transformation programmes, cost programmes: None disclosed.
Products & Services
The company had one "product": bareboat charter (originally time charter) of two Supramax bulk carriers to one charterer.
Investor-facing product terms (2012 offering):
Note on tax regimes: Energy Economy News (2023) describes the earliest SIC regime differently: dividends on up to KRW 300 M par were tax-exempt and dividends above that were taxed separately at 15.4%. That regime sunset in 2016. The two accounts describe different periods of the regime.
Product Portfolio
| Item | PACIFIC DREAM (Vessel 1) | PACIFIC VISION (Vessel 2) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Vessel type | Supramax bulk carrier | Supramax bulk carrier | DART FY2019 excerpt |
Deadweight | About 57,000 DWT | About 57,000 DWT | DART; Asia Economy 2012 |
Builder | Jiangsu Hantong shipyard, China | Jiangsu Hantong shipyard, China | Moneypie (DART excerpt) |
Seller to fund | Samsung C&T Corporation | Samsung C&T Corporation | DART excerpt |
Purchase contract date | 21 Dec 2011 | 21 Dec 2011 | DART FY2019 excerpt |
Purchase price | USD 27.0 M | USD 27.0 M | DART FY2019 excerpt |
Delivery date | 1 Jul 2013 | 28 Aug 2013 | DART FY2019 excerpt |
Owning entity | MIRAERO HMM NO.1 LTD (Panama) | MIRAERO HMM NO.2 LTD (Panama) | KRX KIND FY2021 H1 |
Original charter | 8-yr TC + 2×1-yr charterer options; USD 8,200/day guaranteed hire + BSI-linked variable hire | Same | DART excerpt |
Restructured charter (from 18 Aug 2016) | BBC to end of year 10, reduced hire, hire paid monthly in advance | Same | DART FY2019 excerpt |
Further extension | Fund term extended to 2028 (c. 2021) | Same | Orangeboard |
Residual value insurance | USD 14 M guaranteed (Samsung C&T); USD 1 M premium | Same | DART excerpt |
Disposal | Sold Apr 2023 | Sold Jun 2023 | Energy Economy News |
Sale price | — | — | — |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
| Term | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
Structure | Closed-end; no redemptions; liquidity only through exchange trading | Asia Economy 2012 |
Term | 11 years 1 month (about 1.1 years construction plus up to 10 years operation) | Asia Economy 2012; DART |
Target distribution | About 7% per year, paid monthly after delivery | Asia Economy 2012 |
Original exit plan | Sell both vessels 4.5 years after delivery. Early sale if expected net gain exceeded 10% of outstanding principal; continue operating if expected IRR was below 7% | DART excerpt |
Tax treatment at launch | Under the Restriction of Special Taxation Act, until end-2013, dividends on up to KRW 100 M par were taxed at 5% and dividends above that at 14% (excluding local tax), separately from other income | Asia Economy 2012 |
Financial Narrative
Consolidated income statement (KRW 100M)
Source: FnGuide company snapshot (consolidated, IFRS), FY2018–FY2022.
Exact consolidated figures from filings
Source: KRX KIND half-year report FY2021, summary financial information. These reconcile to the FnGuide figures. The FY2019 annual report excerpt (Findata) gives FY2018 consolidated revenue of KRW 6,024.1 M and operating income of KRW 2,171.7 M.
Interim FY2021 (H1, consolidated): revenue KRW 4,305.1 M; operating income KRW 2,708.5 M; net income KRW 4,899.9 M, of which KRW 3,806.8 M came in Q2 (KRX KIND FY2021 H1).
Separate (standalone SIC) income statement
Sources: DART FY2019 annual report excerpt (FY2018–FY2019); KRX KIND FY2021 H1 (FY2019–FY2020); JobKorea company financials (FY2021).
The standalone FY2021 operating income (KRW 17.5 bn) far exceeds standalone revenue. This indicates that items such as valuation gains or subsidiary-related income were classified within operating results at the SIC level. The FY2021 standalone figures come from an aggregator and were not checked against the filing.
Per-share data
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View Subscription PlansFinancial Detail
Group Entities
| Entity | Jurisdiction | Role | Ownership | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Badaro No. 19 Ship Investment Co., Ltd. | Korea | Listed SIC. Raised equity and on-lent it to subsidiaries | Public shareholders | KRX KIND |
MIRAERO HMM NO.1 LTD | Panama | Formal vessel buyer and borrower; bareboat lessor to HMM; party to ship management contracts | 100% subsidiary | KRX KIND FY2021 H1; DART FY2019 |
MIRAERO HMM NO.2 LTD | Panama | Same as above, for the second vessel | 100% subsidiary | KRX KIND FY2021 H1; DART FY2019 |
Segero Ship Finance Co., Ltd. | Korea | Licensed ship asset manager: set up and runs subsidiaries, handles disclosures. Must keep KRW 7 bn paid-in capital and at least 6 specialist staff | Third party (contracted) | Moneypie (DART excerpt) |
Hana Bank / KEB Hana Bank | Korea | Asset custodian; currency swap counterparty | Third party | KRX KIND; DART excerpt |
Samsung C&T Corporation | Korea | Vessel seller; residual value insurer | Third party | DART excerpts |
HMM Co., Ltd. (formerly Hyundai Merchant Marine) | Korea | Sole charterer (TC, then BBC) | Third party | DART excerpts |
Revenue by Segment (KRW) and Segment Margins & Growth (%)
| Segment (KRW 100M, consolidated) | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|---|
Vessel chartering revenue | 77 | 114 | 116 |
Vessel chartering operating income | 32 | 77 | 73 |
Operating margin (%) | 41.61 | 67.63 | 62.73 |
Share of total revenue (%) | 100 | 100 | 100 |
Income Statement (KRW) and Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (KRW 100M) | 60 | 64 | 77 | 114 | 116 |
Operating income (KRW 100M) | 22 | 23 | 32 | 77 | 73 |
Net income (KRW 100M) | 74 | 54 | -27 | 144 | 113 |
Operating margin (%) | 36.05 | 35.55 | 41.61 | 67.63 | 62.73 |
ROA (%) | 15.53 | 11.60 | -6.29 | 32.91 | 22.80 |
Income Statement
| Metric | FY2019 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|
Revenue (KRW Mn) | 6,440.0 | 7,744.8 |
Operating income (KRW Mn) | 2,289.2 | 3,222.8 |
Net income (KRW Mn) | 5,449.0 | -2,707.7 |
Income Statement (FY2018–FY2021)
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (KRW Mn) | 5,957.5 | 6,406.2 | 6,297.6 | 6,653.6 |
Operating income (KRW Mn) | 4,381.3 | 3,940.5 | 653.8 | 17,530.5 |
Net income (KRW Mn) | 7,231.7 | 6,684.6 | -3,373.9 | 22,982.3 |
Per-Share Data and Returns & Leverage Ratios (%)
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
EPS consolidated derived (KRW) | 487 | 358 | -178 | 947 | 743 |
DPS cash (KRW) | 354 | 352 | 343 | 340 | — |
Cash dividend yield on avg price (%) | 12.23 | 12.08 | 14.50 | 11.47 | — |
Key Financials (KRW) and Returns & Leverage Ratios (%)
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Total cash distributed derived (KRW 100M) | 53.8 | 53.5 | 52.1 | 51.7 |
Payout ratio vs consolidated EPS derived (%) | 73 | 98 | — | 36 |
Financial Analysis
| Item | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
Paid-in capital | About KRW 76.0 bn as of 31 Dec 2021 (15.2 M shares × KRW 5,000 par, derived) | JobKorea |
Senior bank debt | None at SIC level. Vessel purchases were 100% equity-funded via the share issue | KRX KIND FY2021 H1 |
Derivatives | KRW/USD cross-currency swap with KEB Hana Bank (USD 54 M notional; USD 50 M exchange at maturity); USD 8.1 M forward | DART excerpts |
Collateral | Both vessels (USD 54 M) pledged to KEB Hana Bank against the swap | Moneypie (DART excerpt) |
Net cash at exit | About KRW 17 bn (derived: market cap KRW 47.58 bn less EV KRW 30.54 bn, as quoted around the final trading period) | GuruFocus |
Balance Sheet (KRW)
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Implied avg total assets derived (KRW 100M) | 476 | 466 | 429 | 438 | 496 |
Financial Analysis — ROA
| Ratio | Assessment |
|---|---|
ROA | Reported in 6.1 |
Debt/equity | Effectively nil senior debt |
Net debt/EBITDA | Net cash position |
Interest coverage | Not meaningful (no interest-bearing senior debt) |
Asset turnover | About 0.13–0.27x (derived from revenue ÷ implied average assets) |
Cash conversion cycle | Not meaningful: hire was collected monthly in advance under the BBC (DART FY2019 excerpt) |
Revenue by Region (KRW)
| Region (KRW 100M, by charterer domicile) | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|---|
South Korea | 77 | 114 | 116 |
Rest of world | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Share Price History
| Date | Price (KRW) | Context | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Apr 2012 | 5,190 | IPO price | Asia Economy |
26 May 2016 | 3,175 | Day of HMM hire-review disclosure | Money Today |
c. Jun 2020 | 2,620 | Trailing distribution yield about 13.4% | Newstomato |
Final trading period (Nov 2023) | 3,130–3,135 | 52-week range at delisting, anchored to the KRW 3,156 redemption | Investing.com |
1 Nov 2023 | 3,156 | Capital reduction payout per share | Energy Economy News |
Per-Share Data and Returns & Leverage Ratios (%) (FY2018–FY2021)
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cash DPS (KRW) | 354 | 352 | 343 | 340 |
Cash dividend yield (%) | 12.23 | 12.08 | 14.50 | 11.47 |
Valuation Snapshot
| Multiple | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
Market cap | KRW 47.58 bn | GuruFocus |
Enterprise value | KRW 30.54 bn | GuruFocus |
P/E | about 4.2x | Market cap ÷ FY2022 net income of KRW 11.3 bn |
EV/Sales | about 2.6x | EV ÷ FY2022 revenue of KRW 11.6 bn |
EV/EBIT | about 4.2x | EV ÷ FY2022 operating income of KRW 7.3 bn |
Capital Markets
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
Analyst consensus | None. No sell-side coverage identified. |
Buyback authorisations | None. The November 2023 compulsory capital reduction was the only share retirement. |
Credit ratings (Moody's/S&P/Fitch) | Not rated |
Debt maturity profile | No external senior debt. The currency swap with KEB Hana Bank was tied to the vessel holding period (maturity exchange of USD 50 M). |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance and consensus
None. The company has no ongoing operations, no guidance and no analyst coverage. The remaining corporate steps are completion of dissolution and liquidation registration and any residual distribution to the four remaining shares. Their status was not publicly confirmed as of 15 October 2026.
Bull-case arguments (retrospective, grounded in data)
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The structure protected investors from total loss where peers failed. Equity-only funding, a USD 14 M per-vessel insured floor and a currency swap meant that even through HMM's 2016 crisis the fund kept paying monthly distributions. In contrast, the Korea 05–07 funds were delisted after their shares fell more than 90%.
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Income delivery was consistent. Distributions held at KRW 340–354 per share from FY2018 to FY2021. That is 6.6–6.8% annually on the original KRW 5,190 issue price, close to the 7% target, and 11–14% for secondary-market buyers.
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Exit timing captured late-cycle values. The vessels were sold in Q2 2023 after a 2021–2022 upcycle in which consolidated revenue nearly doubled (KRW 64 억원 in FY2019 to KRW 116 억원 in FY2022). Investors received KRW 3,156 per share, above the final traded price of about KRW 3,130.
Bear-case arguments (retrospective, grounded in data)
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Principal impairment. The terminal capital return was 39% below the issue price. Recovering principal depended on distributions, and those were cut in real terms by the 2016 hire reduction.
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Single-counterparty dependence decided the outcome. One charterer's distress forced a permanent conversion from TC to BBC and removed the BSI-linked upside designed into the product.
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Plan slippage. The planned 4.5-year exit (about 2018) became a roughly 10-year hold. The fund failed its own 7% IRR test in 2017.
Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
| Monitorable | Where to check |
|---|---|
| Registration of dissolution and liquidation completion | Korean commercial registry; DART |
| Any final residual distribution to the remaining four shares | DART |
| Segero Ship Finance's handling of final accounts | DART |
| Any policy revival of SIC tax incentives (relevant to the asset class, not this entity) | MOF/MOLIT announcements |
Concluding analyst verdict
Badaro No. 19 Ship Investment Company should be judged as a completed investment, not a going concern. Its listed life ran from June 2012 to November 2023 and ended in an orderly wind-down. That is a better outcome than several earlier Korean public ship funds, which were delisted amid charterer insolvency and auditor disclaimers.
The fund's design held up. All-equity funding removed refinancing risk. Samsung C&T's residual value insurance gave a hard floor on principal. A long-dated currency swap matched dollar assets to won capital. Together these let the vehicle absorb a severe shock: the 2016 restructuring of its only charterer, Hyundai Merchant Marine, which turned a BSI-linked time charter into a fixed bareboat charter at reduced hire. Distributions continued every month, and the stock became the only monthly-paying equity on the Korean exchange.
Structure could not overcome concentration and timing. Two identical ships, one charterer and an entry near the top of the 2011 newbuilding cycle meant the fund depended on factors outside its control. It missed its own 7% IRR test in 2017 and deferred exit for more than five years. When it finally sold in 2023, original subscribers recovered KRW 3,156 of their KRW 5,190 in capital. Their overall outcome depended on about a decade of distributions, whose full cumulative total is not publicly disclosed. FY2018–FY2021 alone returned KRW 1,389 per share.
For Korean capital markets, the delisting closed a policy experiment. Once dividend tax incentives sunset in 2016, no new private SICs were launched, and retail-accessible ship finance moved towards state-backed vehicles. The main lesson is that downside-protection features can preserve a fund through a counterparty crisis, but they do not replace diversification across charterers, assets and entry points.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Title | Tenure | Prior roles / education | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Park Hyun-joo (박현주) | Representative Director (CEO) | From 22 Apr 2019 | — | Etoday, 22 Apr 2019; Findata; JobKorea |
Lee Jae-boong (이재붕) | Representative Director (CEO) | Until 22 Apr 2019 (resigned for personal reasons) | — | Etoday, 22 Apr 2019 |
Shin Sang-ik (신상익) | Statutory auditor (감사), per officer table in filing excerpt | — | Konkuk University; Korea Development Bank 1977–1984; KDB Capital 1984–1993; auditor at Segero Ship Finance from 2012 | Moneypie wiki (DART excerpt) |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Directors' Remuneration
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
Board composition | SIC boards are statutorily small, and directors must meet the qualification rules in Article 20 of the Ship Investment Company Act. The KIND FY2021 H1 report notes the specialist personnel had no disqualifying conditions under that article. Full board list, independence and committees are not publicly disclosed in sources reviewed. |
Proxy compensation (salary/bonus/stock/total) | Not publicly disclosed. As a paper company, the SIC's cost base was mainly management fees paid to Segero Ship Finance. |
Institutional ownership, top 10 holders | Not publicly disclosed in sources reviewed. Energy Economy News (2023) characterises the stock as popular with income-seeking institutional investors. |
Trading liquidity | Investing.com showed average 3-month volume of about 264,640 shares around the final trading period |
Competitive Landscape
Competitor Detail
| # | Comparable | Type | Relevance | Data verified |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Korea No. 5, 6, 7 Ship Investment Companies | Listed Korean SICs (chartered to Korea Line) | Same structure. Delisted in 2013 after auditor disclaimers, the first public ship fund delistings. Their shares had fallen more than 90% from listing. | Seoul Shinmun 2013 |
| 2 | Badaro No. 14 Ship Investment Co. | Segero-managed SIC (Capesize newbuild, about KRW 72 bn) | Sister fund in the same series; 60% Calyon Bank loan; 7:3 profit sharing | KIDD 2010 |
| 3 | Badaro No. 17 Ship Investment Co. | Segero-managed SIC (four 82k DWT bulkers, about KRW 165 bn, chartered to Cargill) | Sister fund | KIDD 2010 |
| 4 | Asia Pacific No. 16 Ship Investment Co. | KSF Ship Finance-managed SIC (one 57k DWT bulker, about KRW 34 bn, chartered to STX Pan Ocean) | Same vessel class and builder (Jiangsu Hantong) | KIDD 2010 |
| 5 | Hi Gold Ocean No. 12 | Publicly subscribed ship fund (Hi Investment & Securities), KRW 66.3 bn raised in May 2013 | Competed for the same retail and institutional income capital | Newstomato 2013 |
| 6 | KAMCO Global Ship Funds 1–27 | Government restructuring ship funds | Bought tonnage from distressed Korean operators after 2009 | KLNews 2011 |
| 7 | Geobukseon (거북선) No. 5–7 | Funds for coast guard vessel newbuilds | Same SIC framework | KLNews 2011 |
| 8 | Korea Ocean Business Corporation (KOBC) | State shipping finance agency | Displaced private SIC financing after 2018 | General knowledge (structure only) |
| 9 | SFL Corporation (formerly Ship Finance International) | Global listed ship lessor | International analogue for charter-based shipping income | Structure only; figures not compiled |
| 10 | Taylor Maritime / Tufton-type listed shipping investment vehicles | Listed shipping income funds | International analogue for dry bulk income vehicles | Structure only; figures not compiled |
Competitor Detail (Annual)
| Metric | Badaro No. 19 (FY2022) |
|---|---|
Revenue | KRW 11.6 bn |
Revenue growth | +1.8% |
Operating margin | 62.7% |
R&D intensity | 0% |



