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Badaro No. 19 Ship Investment Company

Company Profile Analysis

Ticker: 155900.KS바다로19호선박투자회사

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Badaro No. 19 Ship Investment Company - Company showcase

Year Founded & Workforce

2011

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Badaro No. 19 Ship Investment Company Overview

FieldDetailSource
Legal name바다로19호선박투자회사 (Badaro No. 19 Ship Investment Co., Ltd.)KRX KIND half-year report FY2021
Former namesNone identified—
Legal formShip Investment Company (SIC) under Korea's Ship Investment Company Act. A "paper company" with no employees; operations are outsourced to a licensed ship asset managerMoneypie wiki (DART excerpt)
Incorporation date29 September 2011, formed with KRW 20,000 initial capitalDART FY2020 Q3 report excerpt (Findata)
LicenceShip investment business licence granted by the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs (MLTM). The ministry announced approval on 31 Oct 2011; the financial statements give 1 Nov 2011KLNews, 2 Nov 2011; KRX KIND FY2021 H1
Licence amendments1st amendment 23 Feb 2012; 2nd amendment 3 Apr 2012DART excerpt (Findata)
Incorporation jurisdictionRepublic of Korea—
Headquarters addressInvesting.com lists Jeju-si, South Korea.Investing.com
Ship asset manager / promoterSegero Ship Finance Co., Ltd. (세계로선박금융㈜), www.globalmarifin.comKLNews 2011; DART excerpt
Asset custodianHana Bank (later KEB Hana Bank)KRX KIND FY2021 H1
Lead offering brokerMirae Asset SecuritiesAsia Economy, 23 Apr 2012
Exchange / tickerKOSPI (Korea Exchange), 155900. Listed 29 Jun 2012; delisted 22 Nov 2023KRX KIND FY2021 H1; Energy Economy News
ISINKR7155900004. Derived from the KRX code using the ISO 6166 check-digit algorithmDerived
CUSIPNot applicable (no US listing)—
Fiscal year end31 DecemberDART filings
Employees (latest, 3-yr trend)Zero. The SIC is a paper company administered by Segero Ship FinanceMoneypie wiki (DART excerpt)
External auditor——
Shares outstanding (pre-reduction)15,200,004 common sharesEnergy Economy News, 18 Oct 2023
Paid-in capitalApprox. KRW 76.0 bn (KRW 760 억원 reported as of 31 Dec 2021)JobKorea company page
IPO priceKRW 5,190 per share; offering size KRW 78.9 bnAsia Economy, 23 Apr 2012
Market capitalisationNot applicable (delisted). Last quoted value approx. KRW 47.6–48 bn at KRW 3,130 per shareGuruFocus; Stockopedia; Investing.com
Last enterprise value quotedKRW 30.54 bn, implying approx. KRW 17 bn net cash (derived) after the vessel salesGuruFocus
WebsiteNo standalone site. Disclosures were posted via Segero Ship Finance (www.globalmarifin.com) and DARTDART excerpt (Findata)

Badaro No. 19 Ship Investment Company was a single-purpose, closed-end Korean ship fund. It raised KRW 78.9 bn from retail and institutional investors in a 2012 public offering and used the money to buy two newbuild 57,000 DWT Supramax bulk carriers, PACIFIC DREAM and PACIFIC VISION. The ships were built at China's Jiangsu Hantong yard and sold to the fund through Samsung C&T. Both vessels went on long-term charter to Hyundai Merchant Marine, now HMM Co., Ltd. The fund paid charter income to shareholders as monthly distributions, which made it, for most of its life, the only monthly-paying stock on the Korean market, with trailing cash yields of roughly 11–14% between 2018 and 2021. A 2016 charter restructuring during HMM's debt crisis, together with a weak dry-bulk asset market, delayed the planned exit for years. The fund sold both vessels in 2023, returned KRW 3,156 per share through a capital reduction, and delisted. It was the last listed ship investment company in Korea.


The company's own description

In its periodic reports, the company describes itself as a performance-based ship investment company. It used publicly raised capital to buy two Supramax bulk carriers through overseas subsidiaries and placed them on time charter with a creditworthy domestic shipping operator. It aimed to recover investor principal by selling the ships and to capture any increase in vessel values. The original plan was to sell the ships in the second-hand market around the end of the tenth year after delivery (DART FY2020 Q3 report, excerpt via Findata). Elsewhere the filings describe the company as a "paper company" licensed under Article 13 of the Ship Investment Company Act. It earned returns for investors from charter hire on vessels bought with investor money (Moneypie wiki, DART excerpt).

Independent characterisation

Economically, the company was a tax-advantaged, unlevered, single-lessee ship-leasing vehicle. Its features were:

Asset base: Two identical 57,000 DWT Supramax bulk carriers, delivered 1 July 2013 (PACIFIC DREAM) and 28 August 2013 (PACIFIC VISION). The purchase price was USD 27.0 M per ship, or USD 54.0 M in total (DART FY2019 annual report excerpt).

Capital structure: The KIND FY2021 half-year report states that the SIC funded 100% of the vessel purchase price and incidental costs by issuing shares to domestic investors. There was no senior bank debt at the SIC level. The Panamanian subsidiaries were formally the vessel buyers and borrowers, but they borrowed from their parent SIC, not from external lenders.

Revenue model: 100% lease (charter) income from one counterparty, HMM. There were no product, subscription or licensing revenues.

  • Original charter: an 8-year time charter (TC), extendable by two 1-year options at the charterer's choice. It paid a guaranteed base hire of USD 8,200 per day per ship plus variable hire linked to the Baltic Supramax Index (BSI).

  • From 18 August 2016: converted to a bareboat charter (BBC) at a reduced rate running to the end of year 10 after delivery (DART FY2019 report excerpt).

  • Later extended so that the fund's term ran to 2028 (Orangeboard investor report, c. late 2021).

Downside protection: Samsung C&T provided residual value insurance guaranteeing USD 14 M per vessel before sale costs, for a premium of USD 1 M per vessel (DART excerpt).

FX management: A cross-currency swap with KEB Hana Bank covered USD 54 M against KRW 60.777 bn at a contracted rate of KRW 1,125.50 per USD. At maturity, USD 50 M was to be exchanged against KRW 56.275 bn, about 74% of investor principal. The vessels were pledged as collateral. A separate USD 8.1 M currency forward at the same rate ran between the subsidiary and the SIC (DART excerpts).

Value chain position: A passive tonnage provider (financial owner and lessor) sitting between the shipbuilder/seller (Samsung C&T, Jiangsu Hantong) and the operator/charterer (HMM). Technical and commercial operation sat with HMM, especially after the switch to bareboat terms.

Customer type and end-markets: One B2B customer, HMM. Indirectly, the fund was exposed to global seaborne minor-bulk and grain trades carried by Supramax tonnage (coal, grains, steel products, fertilisers, cement).

Distribution mechanics

Distributions were declared monthly. Each month's record date was the 27th, and payment followed about four weeks later, in the second half of the next month (Newstomato, c. June 2020). Typical monthly payments in 2016–2022 were KRW 27–32 per share. For example:

  • KRW 29 (total KRW 437.3 M) declared October 2016 (Etoday)

  • KRW 32 (total KRW 481.0 M) declared April 2019 (Etoday)

  • KRW 28 declared August 2019 (Etoday) and April 2022 (Edaily)

Strategy

Stated strategy

The fund's strategy was fixed at the outset rather than set by an evolving management agenda. Paraphrasing the filings, it aimed to:

  1. Earn stable charter income from a creditworthy Korean operator.

  2. Distribute that income monthly.

  3. Recover principal by selling the vessels, with residual value insurance as a floor.

  4. Capture upside if vessel values rose, through early sale.

The 2012 offering materials set a target of about 7% annual distributions and an 11-year-1-month life (Asia Economy, 2012).

Strategic decisions over the life of the fund

DateInitiative / decisionRationaleSource
Feb–Apr 2012Restructured from a 4-ship private placement to a 2-ship public offeringFunding feasibilityKLNews 2011; DART excerpt
Aug 2016Accepted conversion of the TC to a BBC at reduced hireCounterparty preservation during HMM's 2016 restructuring; avoid charterer defaultDART FY2019 excerpt; Etoday 2016
20 Dec 2017Deferred the planned exit and continued operatingProjected IRR below the 7% hurdleDART excerpt
c. 2021Five-year charter extension; fund term moved to 2028Lock in hire during the market upcycleOrangeboard
Apr–Jun 2023Sold both vessels ahead of the 2028 termNot stated in sources reviewed. The analyst view is opportunistic monetisation while second-hand Supramax values were still elevated after the 2021–2022 peakEnergy Economy News
Nov 2023Capital return via compulsory paid capital reduction; delisting; dissolutionCompletion of investment life cycleEnergy Economy News

Activity in the last 24 months

There have been no strategic initiatives in the 24 months to October 2026. The entity has no ongoing operations.

Medium-term targets/guidance: None outstanding.

ESG commitments, transformation programmes, cost programmes: None disclosed.

Products & Services

The company had one "product": bareboat charter (originally time charter) of two Supramax bulk carriers to one charterer.

Investor-facing product terms (2012 offering):

Note on tax regimes: Energy Economy News (2023) describes the earliest SIC regime differently: dividends on up to KRW 300 M par were tax-exempt and dividends above that were taxed separately at 15.4%. That regime sunset in 2016. The two accounts describe different periods of the regime.

Product Portfolio

ItemPACIFIC DREAM (Vessel 1)PACIFIC VISION (Vessel 2)Source

Vessel type

Supramax bulk carrier

Supramax bulk carrier

DART FY2019 excerpt

Deadweight

About 57,000 DWT

About 57,000 DWT

DART; Asia Economy 2012

Builder

Jiangsu Hantong shipyard, China

Jiangsu Hantong shipyard, China

Moneypie (DART excerpt)

Seller to fund

Samsung C&T Corporation

Samsung C&T Corporation

DART excerpt

Purchase contract date

21 Dec 2011

21 Dec 2011

DART FY2019 excerpt

Purchase price

USD 27.0 M

USD 27.0 M

DART FY2019 excerpt

Delivery date

1 Jul 2013

28 Aug 2013

DART FY2019 excerpt

Owning entity

MIRAERO HMM NO.1 LTD (Panama)

MIRAERO HMM NO.2 LTD (Panama)

KRX KIND FY2021 H1

Original charter

8-yr TC + 2×1-yr charterer options; USD 8,200/day guaranteed hire + BSI-linked variable hire

Same

DART excerpt

Restructured charter (from 18 Aug 2016)

BBC to end of year 10, reduced hire, hire paid monthly in advance

Same

DART FY2019 excerpt

Further extension

Fund term extended to 2028 (c. 2021)

Same

Orangeboard

Residual value insurance

USD 14 M guaranteed (Samsung C&T); USD 1 M premium

Same

DART excerpt

Disposal

Sold Apr 2023

Sold Jun 2023

Energy Economy News

Sale price

———

“—” = not publicly disclosed.

TermDetailSource

Structure

Closed-end; no redemptions; liquidity only through exchange trading

Asia Economy 2012

Term

11 years 1 month (about 1.1 years construction plus up to 10 years operation)

Asia Economy 2012; DART

Target distribution

About 7% per year, paid monthly after delivery

Asia Economy 2012

Original exit plan

Sell both vessels 4.5 years after delivery. Early sale if expected net gain exceeded 10% of outstanding principal; continue operating if expected IRR was below 7%

DART excerpt

Tax treatment at launch

Under the Restriction of Special Taxation Act, until end-2013, dividends on up to KRW 100 M par were taxed at 5% and dividends above that at 14% (excluding local tax), separately from other income

Asia Economy 2012

Financial Narrative

Consolidated income statement (KRW 100M)

Source: FnGuide company snapshot (consolidated, IFRS), FY2018–FY2022.

Exact consolidated figures from filings

Source: KRX KIND half-year report FY2021, summary financial information. These reconcile to the FnGuide figures. The FY2019 annual report excerpt (Findata) gives FY2018 consolidated revenue of KRW 6,024.1 M and operating income of KRW 2,171.7 M.

Interim FY2021 (H1, consolidated): revenue KRW 4,305.1 M; operating income KRW 2,708.5 M; net income KRW 4,899.9 M, of which KRW 3,806.8 M came in Q2 (KRX KIND FY2021 H1).

Separate (standalone SIC) income statement

Sources: DART FY2019 annual report excerpt (FY2018–FY2019); KRX KIND FY2021 H1 (FY2019–FY2020); JobKorea company financials (FY2021).

The standalone FY2021 operating income (KRW 17.5 bn) far exceeds standalone revenue. This indicates that items such as valuation gains or subsidiary-related income were classified within operating results at the SIC level. The FY2021 standalone figures come from an aggregator and were not checked against the filing.

Per-share data

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Financial Detail

Group Entities

EntityJurisdictionRoleOwnershipSource

Badaro No. 19 Ship Investment Co., Ltd.

Korea

Listed SIC. Raised equity and on-lent it to subsidiaries

Public shareholders

KRX KIND

MIRAERO HMM NO.1 LTD

Panama

Formal vessel buyer and borrower; bareboat lessor to HMM; party to ship management contracts

100% subsidiary

KRX KIND FY2021 H1; DART FY2019

MIRAERO HMM NO.2 LTD

Panama

Same as above, for the second vessel

100% subsidiary

KRX KIND FY2021 H1; DART FY2019

Segero Ship Finance Co., Ltd.

Korea

Licensed ship asset manager: set up and runs subsidiaries, handles disclosures. Must keep KRW 7 bn paid-in capital and at least 6 specialist staff

Third party (contracted)

Moneypie (DART excerpt)

Hana Bank / KEB Hana Bank

Korea

Asset custodian; currency swap counterparty

Third party

KRX KIND; DART excerpt

Samsung C&T Corporation

Korea

Vessel seller; residual value insurer

Third party

DART excerpts

HMM Co., Ltd. (formerly Hyundai Merchant Marine)

Korea

Sole charterer (TC, then BBC)

Third party

DART excerpts

Revenue by Segment (KRW) and Segment Margins & Growth (%)

Segment (KRW 100M, consolidated)FY2020FY2021FY2022

Vessel chartering revenue

77114116

Vessel chartering operating income

327773

Operating margin (%)

41.6167.6362.73

Share of total revenue (%)

100100100

Income Statement (KRW) and Margin Analysis (%)

MetricFY2018FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022

Revenue (KRW 100M)

606477114116

Operating income (KRW 100M)

2223327773

Net income (KRW 100M)

7454-27144113

Operating margin (%)

36.0535.5541.6167.6362.73

ROA (%)

15.5311.60-6.2932.9122.80

Income Statement

MetricFY2019FY2020

Revenue (KRW Mn)

6,440.07,744.8

Operating income (KRW Mn)

2,289.23,222.8

Net income (KRW Mn)

5,449.0-2,707.7

Income Statement (FY2018–FY2021)

MetricFY2018FY2019FY2020FY2021

Revenue (KRW Mn)

5,957.56,406.26,297.66,653.6

Operating income (KRW Mn)

4,381.33,940.5653.817,530.5

Net income (KRW Mn)

7,231.76,684.6-3,373.922,982.3

Per-Share Data and Returns & Leverage Ratios (%)

MetricFY2018FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022

EPS consolidated derived (KRW)

487358-178947743

DPS cash (KRW)

354352343340—

Cash dividend yield on avg price (%)

12.2312.0814.5011.47—

Key Financials (KRW) and Returns & Leverage Ratios (%)

MetricFY2018FY2019FY2020FY2021

Total cash distributed derived (KRW 100M)

53.853.552.151.7

Payout ratio vs consolidated EPS derived (%)

7398—36

Financial Analysis

ItemDetailSource

Paid-in capital

About KRW 76.0 bn as of 31 Dec 2021 (15.2 M shares × KRW 5,000 par, derived)

JobKorea

Senior bank debt

None at SIC level. Vessel purchases were 100% equity-funded via the share issue

KRX KIND FY2021 H1

Derivatives

KRW/USD cross-currency swap with KEB Hana Bank (USD 54 M notional; USD 50 M exchange at maturity); USD 8.1 M forward

DART excerpts

Collateral

Both vessels (USD 54 M) pledged to KEB Hana Bank against the swap

Moneypie (DART excerpt)

Net cash at exit

About KRW 17 bn (derived: market cap KRW 47.58 bn less EV KRW 30.54 bn, as quoted around the final trading period)

GuruFocus

Balance Sheet (KRW)

MetricFY2018FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022

Implied avg total assets derived (KRW 100M)

476466429438496

Financial Analysis — ROA

RatioAssessment

ROA

Reported in 6.1

Debt/equity

Effectively nil senior debt

Net debt/EBITDA

Net cash position

Interest coverage

Not meaningful (no interest-bearing senior debt)

Asset turnover

About 0.13–0.27x (derived from revenue ÷ implied average assets)

Cash conversion cycle

Not meaningful: hire was collected monthly in advance under the BBC (DART FY2019 excerpt)

Revenue by Region (KRW)

Region (KRW 100M, by charterer domicile)FY2020FY2021FY2022

South Korea

77114116

Rest of world

000

Share Price History

DatePrice (KRW)ContextSource

Apr 2012

5,190

IPO price

Asia Economy

26 May 2016

3,175

Day of HMM hire-review disclosure

Money Today

c. Jun 2020

2,620

Trailing distribution yield about 13.4%

Newstomato

Final trading period (Nov 2023)

3,130–3,135

52-week range at delisting, anchored to the KRW 3,156 redemption

Investing.com

1 Nov 2023

3,156

Capital reduction payout per share

Energy Economy News

Per-Share Data and Returns & Leverage Ratios (%) (FY2018–FY2021)

MetricFY2018FY2019FY2020FY2021

Cash DPS (KRW)

354352343340

Cash dividend yield (%)

12.2312.0814.5011.47

Valuation Snapshot

MultipleValueBasis

Market cap

KRW 47.58 bn

GuruFocus

Enterprise value

KRW 30.54 bn

GuruFocus

P/E

about 4.2x

Market cap ÷ FY2022 net income of KRW 11.3 bn

EV/Sales

about 2.6x

EV ÷ FY2022 revenue of KRW 11.6 bn

EV/EBIT

about 4.2x

EV ÷ FY2022 operating income of KRW 7.3 bn

Capital Markets

ItemStatus

Analyst consensus

None. No sell-side coverage identified.

Buyback authorisations

None. The November 2023 compulsory capital reduction was the only share retirement.

Credit ratings (Moody's/S&P/Fitch)

Not rated

Debt maturity profile

No external senior debt. The currency swap with KEB Hana Bank was tied to the vessel holding period (maturity exchange of USD 50 M).

Analyst Conclusions

Management guidance and consensus

None. The company has no ongoing operations, no guidance and no analyst coverage. The remaining corporate steps are completion of dissolution and liquidation registration and any residual distribution to the four remaining shares. Their status was not publicly confirmed as of 15 October 2026.

Bull-case arguments (retrospective, grounded in data)

  1. The structure protected investors from total loss where peers failed. Equity-only funding, a USD 14 M per-vessel insured floor and a currency swap meant that even through HMM's 2016 crisis the fund kept paying monthly distributions. In contrast, the Korea 05–07 funds were delisted after their shares fell more than 90%.

  2. Income delivery was consistent. Distributions held at KRW 340–354 per share from FY2018 to FY2021. That is 6.6–6.8% annually on the original KRW 5,190 issue price, close to the 7% target, and 11–14% for secondary-market buyers.

  3. Exit timing captured late-cycle values. The vessels were sold in Q2 2023 after a 2021–2022 upcycle in which consolidated revenue nearly doubled (KRW 64 억원 in FY2019 to KRW 116 억원 in FY2022). Investors received KRW 3,156 per share, above the final traded price of about KRW 3,130.

Bear-case arguments (retrospective, grounded in data)

  1. Principal impairment. The terminal capital return was 39% below the issue price. Recovering principal depended on distributions, and those were cut in real terms by the 2016 hire reduction.

  2. Single-counterparty dependence decided the outcome. One charterer's distress forced a permanent conversion from TC to BBC and removed the BSI-linked upside designed into the product.

  3. Plan slippage. The planned 4.5-year exit (about 2018) became a roughly 10-year hold. The fund failed its own 7% IRR test in 2017.

Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)

MonitorableWhere to check
Registration of dissolution and liquidation completionKorean commercial registry; DART
Any final residual distribution to the remaining four sharesDART
Segero Ship Finance's handling of final accountsDART
Any policy revival of SIC tax incentives (relevant to the asset class, not this entity)MOF/MOLIT announcements

Concluding analyst verdict

Badaro No. 19 Ship Investment Company should be judged as a completed investment, not a going concern. Its listed life ran from June 2012 to November 2023 and ended in an orderly wind-down. That is a better outcome than several earlier Korean public ship funds, which were delisted amid charterer insolvency and auditor disclaimers.

The fund's design held up. All-equity funding removed refinancing risk. Samsung C&T's residual value insurance gave a hard floor on principal. A long-dated currency swap matched dollar assets to won capital. Together these let the vehicle absorb a severe shock: the 2016 restructuring of its only charterer, Hyundai Merchant Marine, which turned a BSI-linked time charter into a fixed bareboat charter at reduced hire. Distributions continued every month, and the stock became the only monthly-paying equity on the Korean exchange.

Structure could not overcome concentration and timing. Two identical ships, one charterer and an entry near the top of the 2011 newbuilding cycle meant the fund depended on factors outside its control. It missed its own 7% IRR test in 2017 and deferred exit for more than five years. When it finally sold in 2023, original subscribers recovered KRW 3,156 of their KRW 5,190 in capital. Their overall outcome depended on about a decade of distributions, whose full cumulative total is not publicly disclosed. FY2018–FY2021 alone returned KRW 1,389 per share.

For Korean capital markets, the delisting closed a policy experiment. Once dividend tax incentives sunset in 2016, no new private SICs were launched, and retail-accessible ship finance moved towards state-backed vehicles. The main lesson is that downside-protection features can preserve a fund through a counterparty crisis, but they do not replace diversification across charterers, assets and entry points.

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Executive Leadership

Executive Leadership Team

NameTitleTenurePrior roles / educationSource

Park Hyun-joo (박현주)

Representative Director (CEO)

From 22 Apr 2019

—

Etoday, 22 Apr 2019; Findata; JobKorea

Lee Jae-boong (이재붕)

Representative Director (CEO)

Until 22 Apr 2019 (resigned for personal reasons)

—

Etoday, 22 Apr 2019

Shin Sang-ik (신상익)

Statutory auditor (감사), per officer table in filing excerpt

—

Konkuk University; Korea Development Bank 1977–1984; KDB Capital 1984–1993; auditor at Segero Ship Finance from 2012

Moneypie wiki (DART excerpt)

“—” = not publicly disclosed.

Directors' Remuneration

ItemDetail

Board composition

SIC boards are statutorily small, and directors must meet the qualification rules in Article 20 of the Ship Investment Company Act. The KIND FY2021 H1 report notes the specialist personnel had no disqualifying conditions under that article. Full board list, independence and committees are not publicly disclosed in sources reviewed.

Proxy compensation (salary/bonus/stock/total)

Not publicly disclosed. As a paper company, the SIC's cost base was mainly management fees paid to Segero Ship Finance.

Institutional ownership, top 10 holders

Not publicly disclosed in sources reviewed. Energy Economy News (2023) characterises the stock as popular with income-seeking institutional investors.

Trading liquidity

Investing.com showed average 3-month volume of about 264,640 shares around the final trading period

Competitive Landscape

Competitor Detail

#ComparableTypeRelevanceData verified
1

Korea No. 5, 6, 7 Ship Investment Companies

Listed Korean SICs (chartered to Korea Line)

Same structure. Delisted in 2013 after auditor disclaimers, the first public ship fund delistings. Their shares had fallen more than 90% from listing.

Seoul Shinmun 2013

2

Badaro No. 14 Ship Investment Co.

Segero-managed SIC (Capesize newbuild, about KRW 72 bn)

Sister fund in the same series; 60% Calyon Bank loan; 7:3 profit sharing

KIDD 2010

3

Badaro No. 17 Ship Investment Co.

Segero-managed SIC (four 82k DWT bulkers, about KRW 165 bn, chartered to Cargill)

Sister fund

KIDD 2010

4

Asia Pacific No. 16 Ship Investment Co.

KSF Ship Finance-managed SIC (one 57k DWT bulker, about KRW 34 bn, chartered to STX Pan Ocean)

Same vessel class and builder (Jiangsu Hantong)

KIDD 2010

5

Hi Gold Ocean No. 12

Publicly subscribed ship fund (Hi Investment & Securities), KRW 66.3 bn raised in May 2013

Competed for the same retail and institutional income capital

Newstomato 2013

6

KAMCO Global Ship Funds 1–27

Government restructuring ship funds

Bought tonnage from distressed Korean operators after 2009

KLNews 2011

7

Geobukseon (거북선) No. 5–7

Funds for coast guard vessel newbuilds

Same SIC framework

KLNews 2011

8

Korea Ocean Business Corporation (KOBC)

State shipping finance agency

Displaced private SIC financing after 2018

General knowledge (structure only)

9

SFL Corporation (formerly Ship Finance International)

Global listed ship lessor

International analogue for charter-based shipping income

Structure only; figures not compiled

10

Taylor Maritime / Tufton-type listed shipping investment vehicles

Listed shipping income funds

International analogue for dry bulk income vehicles

Structure only; figures not compiled

Competitor Detail (Annual)

MetricBadaro No. 19 (FY2022)

Revenue

KRW 11.6 bn

Revenue growth

+1.8%

Operating margin

62.7%

R&D intensity

0%

Company Snapshot

$6.6M

Revenue

2011

Founded

Investing.com lists Jeju, South Korea

Headquarters

SWOT Analysis

Strengths

  • Unlevered funding. The SIC raised 100% of the vessel purchase price and incidental costs through equity (KRX KIND FY2021 H1). This removed refinancing risk that sank leveraged peers.
  • Residual value floor. Samsung C&T's insurance guaranteed USD 14 M per vessel (DART excerpt), protecting about 52% of the original USD 27 M cost.
  • FX hedge. A USD 54 M cross-currency swap at KRW 1,125.50 with KEB Hana Bank (DART excerpt) reduced won/dollar mismatch on principal.
  • Consistent distributions. Cash DPS stayed in a narrow KRW 340–354 band from FY2018 to FY2021, with yields of 11.5–14.5% (k5.co.kr).
  • Rising profitability late in the cycle. Operating margin rose from 35.6% (FY2019) to 67.6% (FY2021) (FnGuide).
  • Investor liquidity. The KOSPI listing provided exit liquidity for a closed-end vehicle (Asia Economy 2012). Average 3-month volume was about 265k shares near the end (Investing.com).

Weaknesses

  • Total counterparty concentration. 100% of revenue came from HMM (DART filings).
  • Two-asset portfolio. Two identical 2013-built Chinese Supramaxes meant no age, type or yard diversification.
  • Restructured hire. The 2016 BBC conversion cut revenue to about KRW 6 bn a year (FnGuide FY2018–FY2019).
  • Missed exit target. The original 4.5-year exit was abandoned on 20 Dec 2017 because projected IRR was below 7% (DART excerpt).
  • Volatile reported earnings. Net income swung from +KRW 5.4 bn (FY2019) to −KRW 2.7 bn (FY2020) to +KRW 14.4 bn (FY2021) (KRX KIND; FnGuide). This obscured underlying performance.
  • Capital loss on exit. The terminal capital return of KRW 3,156 per share was 39% below the KRW 5,190 issue price (derived from Energy Economy News and Asia Economy).

Opportunities

  • Charter extension in the upcycle. The c. 2021 extension to 2028 (Orangeboard) locked in income through the freight boom.
  • Elevated resale values in 2022–2023. These enabled the early exit in Apr–Jun 2023 (Energy Economy News).
  • Upside through BSI-linked hire. Variable hire under the original TC could have added income in strong markets (DART excerpt), but the 2016 BBC conversion removed it.
  • Early-sale trigger. The fund could sell early if expected net gain exceeded 10% of principal (DART excerpt).
  • Yield scarcity. As Korea's only monthly-paying stock, the fund attracted income investors (Energy Economy News).
  • Possible tax-incentive revival. Industry lobbied for restored SIC tax benefits (Energy Economy News), though no policy change followed.

Threats

  • Charterer distress. HMM's 2016 hire reduction request (Etoday, 26 May 2016) materialised as the BBC conversion.
  • Sector precedent. The Korea 05–07 ship funds were delisted in 2013 after charterer Korea Line's restructuring (Seoul Shinmun).
  • Asset value erosion. By 2020 the market price exceeded per-share residual guarantee value (Newstomato).
  • Tax incentive sunset in 2016, which reduced demand for SIC shares (Energy Economy News).
  • FX volatility. This drove net losses in FY2020 (analyst inference from the reported swing).
  • Regulatory decarbonisation pressure. IMO EEXI/CII rules from 2023 weigh on the resale value of older conventional bulkers. This is general industry context; no company-specific disclosure was found.

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Key Developments

DateApproachDevelopment
April 2025 – October 2026*18-month window** No material developments were found. The company was delisted in November 2023, and searches of Korean financial press found no subsequent disclosures. The completion of liquidation registration was not publicly reported in sources reviewed.

Financial Performance

Explore key financial metrics, segmented revenue, balance sheet health, and performance trends.

Revenue

3 charts
Revenue by Segment (KRW): Vessel chartering revenue rose from KRW 77 in FY2020 to KRW 116 in FY2022.
Badaro No. 19 Ship Investment Company — Revenue by Segment (KRW)
Series (KRW)FY2020FY2021FY2022
Vessel chartering revenue77114116
Vessel chartering operating income327773

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Sources

Sources

  1. Energy Economy News, "바다로19호 상폐 예고…선박투자회사, 역사의 뒤안길로," 18 Oct 2023 (m.ekn.kr)
  2. KRX KIND, Badaro No. 19 half-year report FY2021 (filed 12 Aug 2021) (kind.krx.co.kr)
  3. Findata (DART mirror), FY2019 annual report, rcept_no 20200330004322 (findata.co.kr)
  4. Findata (DART mirror), Q3 FY2020 report, rcept_no 20201106000134 (findata.co.kr)
  5. Moneypie Wiki, 바다로19호 (DART excerpts) (moneypie.net)
  6. FnGuide company snapshot, A155900 (comp.fnguide.com)
  7. k5.co.kr, 바다로19호 company and dividend page (k5.co.kr)
  8. JobKorea company financials, 바다로19호선박투자회사 (jobkorea.co.kr)
  9. Asia Economy, "미래에셋證, 월지급식 '바다로19호' 선박펀드 출시," 23 Apr 2012 (asiae.co.kr)
  10. KLNews (물류신문), "국토부, 바다로 19호 선박펀드 인가," Nov 2011 (klnews.co.kr)
  11. MOLIT press release on Badaro No. 19 licence (molit.go.kr)
  12. Etoday, HMM charter hire review request, 26 May 2016 (etoday.co.kr)
  13. Money Today, same event, 26 May 2016 (news.mt.co.kr)
  14. Etoday, distribution and CEO change, 22 Apr 2019 (etoday.co.kr)
  15. Etoday, distribution KRW 29 (Oct 2016) (etoday.co.kr)
  16. Etoday, distribution KRW 28 (Aug 2019) (etoday.co.kr)
  17. Edaily, distribution KRW 29 (May 2016) (edaily.co.kr)
  18. Edaily, distribution KRW 28 (Apr 2022) (edaily.co.kr)
  19. Edaily, KRW 30.1 bn bulk carrier acquisition (2013) (edaily.co.kr)
  20. Newstomato, Badaro No. 19 yield and residual guarantee analysis (c. Jun 2020) (newstomato.com)
  21. Orangeboard investor report on Badaro No. 19 (orangeboard.co.kr)
  22. Seoul Shinmun, ship fund delisting risk, 19 Mar 2013 (m.seoul.co.kr)
  23. Newstomato, ship fund demand and first delistings, May 2013 (newstomato.com)
  24. KIDD (Industry Daily), Badaro No. 14 licence, Feb 2010 (kidd.co.kr)
  25. KIDD (Industry Daily), Badaro No. 17 / Asia Pacific No. 16 licences, Oct 2010 (kidd.co.kr)
  26. MOLIT legislative notice, Ship Investment Company Act amendment, 2011 (molit.go.kr)
  27. Kyobo Scholar, ship finance risk study abstract (scholar.kyobobook.co.kr)
  28. Investing.com, Badaro No19 (155900) (uk.investing.com)
  29. Stockopedia, 155900 share price (stockopedia.com)
  30. GuruFocus, XKRX:155900 summary (sgp.gurufocus.com)
  31. Wikipedia, HMM (company) (en.wikipedia.org)

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