Bingo Industries Limited Overview
BINGO is a vertically integrated recycling and waste management business, concentrated in Sydney and Melbourne, with a smaller and newer presence in South-East Queensland. Its core is building and demolition (B&D) waste. It owns the full value chain in that segment: skip and hook-lift bin collection, materials recovery and resource-recovery centres, and the post-collection landfill that takes residual waste. It has also moved into commercial and industrial (C&I) collection. The Dial-A-Dump acquisition in 2019 gave BINGO strategic NSW infrastructure, most importantly the Eastern Creek landfill and recycling precinct. That made it one of the few private-sector owners of putrescible-capable and residual landfill airspace in the Sydney basin. BINGO was a growth darling as a listed company between 2017 and 2021. Since going private in 2021 it has been hit by a criminal cartel conviction, a construction downturn and heavy leverage. Press reports in 2026 indicate its owner is running a sale process that could require lenders to accept losses.
What the company does. BINGO collects, processes, recycles and disposes of solid waste, mainly from the construction industry and commercial customers. The company describes itself as offering recycling and waste management solutions across B&D and C&I waste streams, covering collection, processing, separation and recycling (FY2019–FY2020 investor materials, as summarised by Kalkine, 2020). It markets a long-standing goal of a "waste-free Australia" (FY2019 results commentary, InClean, Aug 2019).
Business model and revenue model. Almost all revenue is service-based. There is no meaningful subscription, licensing or product-sale model, apart from the sale of recovered commodities.
Revenue definition. Bingo reported "net revenue", which excludes landfill levies passed through to state governments. Statutory revenue including levies is materially higher. This matters when comparing Bingo with peers.
Value chain position. BINGO is integrated from the customer's site (bin placement) to final disposal (landfill). In B&D waste, control of post-collection infrastructure, especially licensed recycling capacity and residual landfill airspace close to the city, is the main source of pricing power. The ACCC focused on exactly this when it reviewed the DADI acquisition.
Customer types. Residential renovators (skip hire), builders and construction contractors, demolition firms, civil and infrastructure contractors, commercial and industrial businesses, and other waste collectors that pay gate fees at BINGO facilities.
End markets. Residential construction, non-residential construction and civil infrastructure in NSW and Victoria, plus a South-East Queensland presence from 2022. Management cited NSW and Victorian construction activity of more than A$130bn when the FY2019 downgrade was announced (Stockhead, Feb 2019).
Independent characterisation. BINGO is effectively a leveraged bet on the east-coast construction cycle, cushioned by scarce disposal infrastructure. Its cyclicality is far higher than municipal-contract peers such as Cleanaway, because B&D volumes move with construction starts. The infrastructure (landfill airspace, licensed recycling centres) holds long-term value, but the operating business has proven volatile. Large earnings swings appeared in FY2019, 1H FY2021, and again under private ownership between 2023 and 2026.
Scale (latest disclosed). At the 2021 take-private: 15 recycling facilities, two landfills, and more than 350 collection trucks across NSW and Victoria (IPE Real Assets, Apr 2021). Network processing capacity was 4.6 million tonnes per annum at FY2020 (Waste Management Review, Aug 2020).
Strategy
Listed-era stated strategy (FY2019–FY2021). A five-year strategy built on the "waste-free Australia" vision. It had three pillars:
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optimising the NSW and Victorian network of assets;
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growing C&I collections, where Bingo was under-represented;
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capturing structural tailwinds from rising landfill levies, government recycling targets and infrastructure spending.
Network capacity rose from a 3.4 Mtpa target (exceeded in FY2019) to 4.6 Mtpa (FY2020). Management held out a medium-term EBITDA ambition of A$250m.
Private-era strategy (2021–2026), as reported
Medium-term targets and guidance. None published since 2021.
Products & Services
Product-level pricing is generally NPD. Skip-bin prices are quoted per job and per postcode online.
Collections
Post-Collections
Divested. Banksmeadow recycling facility (sold to CPE Capital, 2019, ACCC remedy).
Queensland (from 2022). United Waste Services: 37 vehicles and more than 3,500 skip and hook bins serving Brisbane and the Gold Coast (Waste Management Review, Jul 2022).
Product Portfolio
| Offering | Description | Target customer | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
Skip bin hire ("Bingo Bins") | Skip bins of several sizes for general, mixed heavy, green and soil/dirt waste | Households, renovators, small builders | Online booking; per-hire pricing |
Hook-lift / roll-on roll-off bins | Large-capacity bins for construction and demolition sites | Builders, demolition contractors | Per-lift pricing |
Commercial waste (C&I) | Front-lift and rear-lift general waste and recycling | Offices, retail, hospitality, industrial | Contract pricing; a growth focus from FY2020 (Livewire) |
Cardboard and paper recycling | Dedicated cardboard/paper streams | Retail, warehouses | Contract |
Liquid and bulk packaged waste | Liquid and packaged waste handling | Industrial | Listed on company materials (BINGO, 2021) |
Hazardous waste and contaminated soil | Handling of hazardous waste, contaminated soils, asbestos-affected material | Civil and demolition contractors | Highly regulated; pricing NPD |
| Facility / product | Description | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Patons Lane Recycling Centre & Landfill (Erskine Park, NSW) | Integrated recycling plus residual landfill | Operating from FY2020 | Stockhead (2019); Bingo results |
Eastern Creek recycling and landfill precinct (ex-DADI, NSW) | Major Western Sydney landfill/recycling precinct | Acquired 2019 | DADI deal coverage |
West Melbourne Recycling Centre (Vic) | Redeveloped B&D recycling centre (more than A$20m investment) | Operating | InClean (Aug 2019) |
Other NSW and Vic recycling centres | 15 recycling facilities in total at 2021 | Operating (current count NPD) | IPE (Apr 2021) |
Public drop-off ("Find your nearest recycling centre") | Retail tipping for public and trades | Operating | Company website |
Recovered products | Recycled road base, crusher dust, budget fill, aggregates, turf underlay, scrap metal, timber, cardboard | Sold to civil/landscaping markets | Guardian Australia via CB Insights |
Financial Narrative
Data constraint. The last five publicly reported fiscal years run FY2016 to FY2020; 1H FY2021 is the last interim. The table below shows FY2017–FY2021 so the period ends at the take-private.
Income statement (A$m unless stated)
Sources: FY2018 revenue and FY2019 figures from Kalkine (2020) and InClean (Aug 2019). FY2018 EBITDA from Stockhead (Feb 2019). FY2020 from Waste Management Review (Aug 2020). Margins and growth rates are calculated by the analyst from these figures. FY2018–FY2020 net revenue CAGR is 26.6% (calculated).
Half-year data points
Sources: FNN, Livewire, Kalkine (Feb 2020); MarketScreener (Feb 2021).
Guidance and expectations around the buyout
Balance sheet and cash flow (A$m)
Additional point: net debt was A$321.1m at 31 Dec 2019, with leverage of 2.0x (Kalkine, 2020). Total assets, goodwill, working capital, operating cash flow, capex and free cash flow are NPD in the sources retrieved. Capex was heavy: the network upgrade program is cited at about A$140m (Motley Fool, Jul 2019), and the reconfiguration plan targeted about A$80m of non-core sale proceeds in FY2020 (InClean, Aug 2019).
Private-era indicators (press-reported, unaudited)
Dividends. The FY2019 payout ratio was about 90% of reported NPAT (Kalkine, 2019). The 1H FY2021 interim dividend was cut. A fully franked special dividend paid 28 July 2021 formed part of the scheme consideration. Per-share figures were not reliably retrieved.
Buybacks. An on-market buyback was announced 28 Feb 2019, with tranche updates in Feb and Oct 2020. Amounts are NPD here.
Ratios. ROE, ROA, ROIC, current ratio, interest coverage and cash conversion cycle are NPD and not computed to avoid inaccuracy. Management stated in 2019 that ROCE should improve steadily after the network spend (InClean, Aug 2019).
Commentary.
FY2017–FY2019: growth with falling margins: Revenue compounded through acquisitions and new capacity. However, the underlying EBITDA margin fell from about 31% to about 26% in FY2019 as Sydney construction volumes softened and new facilities ramped up. That caused the February 2019 de-rating.
FY2020: the inflection: A full year of DADI, synergies (targeted at A$15m annualised over two years), Patons Lane and West Melbourne lifted underlying EBITDA 41% to A$152.1m and the margin back above 31%. That was despite COVID-19 and a miss against the A$159–164m guidance.
1H FY2021: renewed weakness: Profit fell 41%, which set the stage for the opportunistic take-private bid.
Under private ownership: severe deterioration: S&P's FY2026 EBITDA estimate of A$100–110m is about 30–35% below FY2020's audited A$152.1m and less than half the A$250m medium-term target used to justify the buyout. Debt of A$800m–1bn against that EBITDA is distressed leverage. The A$30m cartel fine (2024) added to the cash pressure.
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View Subscription PlansFinancial Detail
Segment Overview
| Segment | Contents | Services |
|---|---|---|
Collections | Skip bins, hook-lift bins, C&I front-lift/rear-lift, bulk bins; NSW, Vic, and SEQ from FY2023 | Bin hire, scheduled C&I collection, demolition and excavation collection |
Post-Collections | Recycling and resource-recovery centres; Patons Lane landfill; Eastern Creek (ex-DADI) | Gate fees, sorting and recovery, recovered-material sales, residual disposal |
Revenue by Segment
| Segment (AUD Mn) | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|---|
Group net revenue | 303.8 | 402.2 | 486.7 |
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View Subscription PlansSegment Margins & Growth (%)
| Metric | 1H FY2020 | Source |
|---|---|---|
Collections revenue growth vs prior period (%) | 21 | Livewire (Feb 2020) |
Collections EBITDA margin (%) | 19 | Livewire (Feb 2020) |
Income Statement and Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|---|
Net revenue (AUD Mn) | 303.8 | 402.2 | 486.7 |
Underlying EBITDA (AUD Mn) | 93.7 | 106.1 | 152.1 |
Underlying NPATA (AUD Mn) | — | 58.9 | — |
Statutory NPAT (AUD Mn) | — | 22.3 | 66.0 |
Underlying EBITDA margin (%) | 30.8 | 26.4 | 31.3 |
Statutory net margin (%) | — | 5.5 | 13.6 |
Net revenue growth (%) | — | 32.4 | 21.0 |
Underlying EBITDA growth (%) | — | 13.2 | 41.0 |
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View Subscription PlansIncome Statement and Per-Share Data
| Metric | 1H FY2020 | 1H FY2021 |
|---|---|---|
Net revenue (AUD Mn) | 271.2 | — |
Underlying EBITDA incl. property gain (AUD Mn) | 82.0 | — |
Underlying EBITDA excl. property gain (AUD Mn) | 78.8 | — |
Underlying NPAT (AUD Mn) | 28.0 | — |
Statutory EPS (cents) | 5.8 | — |
Profit change vs prior period (%) | — | -41 |
Valuation Snapshot
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
FY2020 underlying EBITDA guidance (AUD Mn) | 159–164 (actual 152.1, below guidance after the COVID Q4) | Livewire (Feb 2020) |
FY2022 consensus EBITDA at bid (AUD Mn) | 169 | Montgomery (Jan 2021) |
Management medium-term EBITDA target (AUD Mn) | 250 | Montgomery (Jan 2021) |
Bid EV / FY2022 consensus EBITDA (x) | about 15 | Montgomery (Jan 2021) |
FY2026 EBITDA estimate, S&P (AUD Mn) | 100–110 (cut from up to 120) | AFR (Jan 2026) |
Key Financials and Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2019 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|
Net bank debt (AUD Mn) | — | 308 |
Net debt change vs prior year (%) | 102 | — |
Valuation Snapshot — Total debt
| Metric | Value | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Total debt (AUD Mn) | 800–1,000 | Mar 2026 | DataRoom via MarketScreener |
Shareholder loans / lifeline (AUD Mn) | about 100 | Sep 2024 | AFR headline |
Undrawn headroom from 2024 shareholder loans (AUD Mn) | 60 | Jan 2026 | AFR (Jan 2026) |
Secondary debt price (cents per A$1) | about 80 | 2025 | AFR via CB Insights |
Implied leverage at FY2026E EBITDA (x) | about 7.3–10.0 | Analyst calculation | 800–1,000 ÷ 100–110 |
Revenue by Region
| Region (AUD Mn) | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|---|
Total Australia net revenue | 303.8 | 402.2 | 486.7 |
Region Overview
| Region | Role | Trend |
|---|---|---|
NSW (Sydney) | Core, and the largest by far after DADI. Includes Eastern Creek, Patons Lane, Auburn HQ | Growth to FY2020. Exposed to the Sydney apartment/construction downturn and to cartel fallout |
Victoria (Melbourne) | Second hub; West Melbourne centre | Growth investment from FY2019; current performance NPD |
Queensland (Brisbane / Gold Coast) | Entry via United Waste Services in July 2022 | Newest region; small (37 trucks at acquisition) |
Key Events
| Event | Price | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
IPO | 1.85 | 2017 | matrixbcg (secondary) |
Record low | 1.20 | Feb 2019 | Stockhead |
52-week high (2019) | 3.22 | 2019 | Kalkine |
1H FY2020 result trading | 3.34 | Feb 2020 | FNN |
Post-bid trading | 3.28 | Jan 2021 | Bloomberg |
Scheme cash consideration | 3.45 | Aug 2021 | BINGO |
Valuation Snapshot — Price return, IPO to A$3.45
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
Price return, IPO to A$3.45 (%) | 86.5 |
Approximate CAGR, 2017–2021 (%) | about 15–16 (analyst calculation, excluding dividends) |
Capital Markets
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
Credit ratings | S&P is reported to cover the credit (it provided the FY2026 EBITDA estimate). Rating and outlook NPD |
Debt maturity profile | NPD |
Dividend policy | Listed era: payout of about 90% of NPAT (FY2019). Private: NPD |
Buybacks | Listed era only (2019–2020) |
Analyst Conclusions
Guidance. None published. The best available external estimate is S&P's FY2026 EBITDA of A$100–110m (Jan 2026).
Bull case
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Valuable hard assets. Strategic Sydney landfill and recycling assets are near-irreplaceable and attract strategic buyers such as SGH and building-materials operators.
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Earnings recovery. A construction recovery plus an operations-led CEO could lift EBITDA back toward the FY2020 level of A$152m.
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Cleaner balance sheet. A debt haircut through a sale would leave a new owner with a sustainable capital structure.
Bear case
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Distressed leverage. Leverage of about 7–10x EBITDA, with debt trading at a discount.
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Permanent value loss. Implied EV roughly halved since 2021, and EBITDA well below the A$250m buyout thesis.
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Regulatory and reputational overhang, plus a narrow exposure to the construction cycle.
Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
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Outcome of the MA Moelis sale process, including whether there is a binding bid.
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Lender recovery levels.
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Any ACCC review of a strategic acquirer.
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FY2026 actual EBITDA.
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NSW and Victorian construction activity.
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EPA actions on recovered materials.
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Leadership stability.
Analyst verdict. BINGO is a case study in how good infrastructure can sit inside a fragile capital structure. As a listed company it built a genuinely strategic asset base. The DADI acquisition gave it scarce Western Sydney disposal capacity, and by FY2020 it was earning more than 30% EBITDA margins on almost A$490m of net revenue. Macquarie paid about A$2.3bn of equity value in 2021, roughly 15x forward EBITDA, on the assumption that the business would grow toward a A$250m EBITDA medium-term target. That assumption has failed badly.
Four things went wrong at once. The founder-CEO's 2019 price-fixing conduct produced a A$30m criminal fine and a leadership vacuum. East-coast construction volumes fell. Interest rates rose against a heavily geared balance sheet. And three CEOs passed through in three years. By January 2026, S&P expected only A$100–110m of EBITDA. That is well below the last audited FY2020 figure, set against reported debt of A$800m–1bn.
The credible paths now are a sale, a lender-led restructuring, or both. Reporting in March 2026 suggests offers will fall short of the debt, which implies a haircut for lenders and a likely wipe-out or severe impairment of the 2021 equity, including any remaining scrip holders.
For a strategic buyer, the investment case rests on the underlying assets, not the recent earnings. Licensed landfill and recycling capacity in Sydney is hard to replicate. If the business is bought with a reset capital structure and run by an operator with construction-materials logistics, it could plausibly recover toward mid-cycle margins. The key uncertainties are the size of the debt write-down, any competition clearance a strategic acquirer would need, and how long construction stays weak.
Verdict: distressed but asset-backed. Equity value is impaired. Value for a new owner depends on entry price and execution. Status of the 2026 sale is unconfirmed as of this research; monitor for an announcement.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Title | Since | Background | Compensation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Kevin Gluskie | CEO | 3 Feb 2025 | Former Executive Director, Asia Pacific at Heidelberg Materials (Singapore); about 30 years leading multi-site industrial businesses in Australia and Asia | NPD |
CFO | NPD (the previous CFO left around Sep 2024, per AFR) | NPD | NPD | NPD |
Other executives | NPD in this research | — | — | — |
Executive Leadership Team — Tony Tartak
| Name | Role | Tenure | Exit context |
|---|---|---|---|
Tony Tartak | Founder | 2005– | Founder; father of Daniel |
Daniel Tartak | MD & CEO | to around 2021–22 (exact exit date NPD) | Stayed on after the 2021 take-private. Charged Aug 2022 and pleaded guilty Oct 2022. In Feb 2024 he received an intensive correction order (2 years, 400 hours of community service), a A$100k fine and a 5-year ban from managing corporations |
Chris Jeffrey | CEO | about 2022/23–2024 | In Feb 2024 publicly said the company was materially different from 2019. Reported to have departed around Sep 2024 with the CFO |
Ian Malouf | Non-executive director (listed era) | 2019–2021 | DADI founder; large shareholder |
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Stake | Source |
|---|---|---|
Macquarie Asset Management-managed funds and co-investors (via Recycle and Resource Holdings Ltd) | Controlling / about 100% (excluding any scrip-electing holders) | BINGO (Aug 2021) |
PSP Investments (co-investor) | NPD; named by a secondary source only | matrixbcg |
Daniel Tartak | Expected to remain a substantial shareholder after 2021 (per IPE). Current holding NPD | IPE (Apr 2021) |
Ian Malouf | Scrip election probable in 2021. Current holding NPD | Bloomberg (Jan 2021) |
Competitive Landscape
Key Competitors
| Competitor | Segment overlap | Positioning vs Bingo |
|---|---|---|
Cleanaway Waste Management (ASX:CWY) | Collections, C&I, landfill, post-collection (NSW/Vic/Qld) | National market leader; larger, more diversified, with municipal contracts. Used as the valuation benchmark (about 10x EBITDA per AFR) |
Veolia ANZ (including former Suez Australia assets) | C&I, landfill, resource recovery | Global major |
Remondis Australia | C&I, municipal, recycling | Large private German-owned operator |
JJ Richards & Sons | Collections (NSW/Qld) | Large family-owned collector |
Aussie Skips | Skip bins and B&D recycling, Sydney | Direct B&D rival; cartel co-offender (fined A$3.5m) |
Benedict Recycling | B&D recycling, Sydney | Named alongside Bingo in recycled-soil reporting |
KLF Holdings | B&D recycling / soil, NSW | Named in recycled-soil reporting |
Repurpose It | B&D / soil recycling, Victoria | Named by CB Insights as a competitor |
Alex Fraser (Heidelberg Materials) | Recycled aggregates, Vic/Qld | Construction-materials adjacency |
Bettergrow, Polytrade, ResourceCo | Specialised recycling | Niche competitors |
Competitor Detail
| Metric | Bingo FY2020 |
|---|---|
Revenue (AUD Mn) | 486.7 |
EBITDA margin (%) | 31.3 |
Recent Developments
Disclosure for a private company is sparse. Earlier context items are included and labelled.



