BP P.l.c

Income statement

Supplementary bp-defined measures (verified for FY2024/FY2025 only)

Per-share data

FY2021–FY2023 EPS figures are derived from compiled filings data and are approximate to the nearest 0.1 cent; FY2024 and FY2025 are as reported in bp's Form 6-K. Dividends for FY2021–FY2023 are the sum of the four quarterly announcements.

Margins and growth

Revenue CAGR FY2021–FY2025: +4.7%. Underlying RC profit CAGR FY2021–FY2025: -12.6%.

Balance sheet

At 30 June 2026 total assets stood at $294,627m, bp shareholders' equity at $58,428m, total equity at $76,420m and net debt at $22,251m, with gearing of 22.6% and gearing including leases of 31.8%. Total non-current-plus-current finance debt was $58,337m.

The equity erosion is stark: bp shareholders' equity fell from $75.5bn at end-2021 to $53.1bn at end-2025 — a 30% reduction — driven by $32.7bn of cumulative buybacks over 2021–2025, sustained dividends and a run of impairments. Goodwill fell $4.6bn in 2025 alone, from $14,888m to $10,300m, principally reflecting the reclassification of $2,713m of Castrol goodwill (arising on the 2000 Burmah Castrol acquisition) into assets held for sale, plus impairment.

Cash flow

Operating cash flow has declined in each of the last three years — from $40.9bn in FY2022 to $24.5bn in FY2025, a 40% fall. FY2025 OCF included a $2.9bn adjusted working-capital build. In 1H 2026 the pattern inverted violently: a $6.0bn working-capital build in 1Q on rising prices depressed OCF to $2.9bn, then 2Q delivered $10.9bn after a build of only $1.0bn, giving $13.7bn for the half against $9.1bn in 1H 2025.

Ratios

Cash conversion cycle is not separately disclosed by bp and is not meaningfully computable for an integrated energy trader whose receivables, payables and inventory balances are dominated by commodity price movements and trading positions rather than by operating terms.

Trend commentary and inflections

The 2022 peak and the long descent. FY2022 was an anomaly, not a baseline: $241.4bn of revenue and $27.7bn of underlying RC profit on war-driven prices, yet a $2,487m headline loss because of the ~$24bn Rosneft exit charge. Every subsequent year has been a step down in underlying profit — $13.8bn, $8.9bn, $7.5bn — while headline attributable profit has collapsed to almost nothing ($381m in FY2024, $55m in FY2025) as impairments accumulated.

The impairment cycle is the defining feature of 2024–2026. FY2024 carried $5.1bn of pre-tax asset impairments; FY2025 carried $5.4bn plus a further $1.1bn recognised through equity-accounted earnings, with 4Q 2025 alone taking $3.5bn — $3,157m relating primarily to Lightsource bp and Archaea, and $1,007m through equity-accounted earnings on Archaea and offshore wind. A further $1,248m of net impairment was taken in 1H 2026, of which $525m related to the transition businesses. bp is writing off, in cash-flow-neutral but equity-destroying instalments, the capital deployed under the 2020 strategy. Management's own 2Q 2026 language — "we have written off too much value" — is an explicit acknowledgment.

Tax is a persistent, under-appreciated drag. The underlying effective tax rate was 41% in FY2024 and 42% in FY2025, against a group ETR on reported profit of 82–83% in both years. The distortion comes from the geographic mix — high-rate Middle East and North Sea profits, low-rate or loss-making downstream jurisdictions — compounded by the UK Energy Profits Levy, which takes the headline rate on North Sea profits to 78% and whose extension to 31 March 2030 produced a $539m non-cash deferred charge in 1Q 2025. A German corporate tax rate reduction enacted in July 2025 produced a further $233m deferred charge in 3Q 2025. Guidance for FY2026 has been revised down to 35–40% (from ~40%), reflecting a 33% underlying ETR in 1H 2026.

Deleveraging is now the organising financial principle. Net debt has barely moved — $23.0bn to $22.2bn to $22.3bn across end-2024, end-2025 and mid-2026 — despite the disposal programme, because proceeds have been absorbed by dividends, buybacks, Gulf of America settlement payments and working capital. The February 2026 decision to suspend buybacks and retire the 30–40%-of-OCF distribution guidance was the admission that the balance sheet could not simultaneously fund the reset and the returns. In 2Q 2026 bp reported that the combined total of net debt, hybrid bonds and securities, leases and Gulf of America settlement liabilities fell by $6.9bn — more than 11% — including a €2.5bn ($2.9bn) perpetual hybrid redemption and $1.1bn of Gulf of America settlement payments.

Cost reduction is the one target being consistently beaten. Cumulative structural cost reduction since 2023 reached $3,543m by 30 June 2026 ($2,761m across 2024–2025, plus $782m in 1H 2026 alone). The target has been raised twice: to $5.5–6.5bn by end-2027 at FY2025 results, then to $6.5–7.5bn following the Gelsenkirchen agreement. Underlying operating expenditure in 1H 2026 was $10,702m against $10,761m in 1H 2025 — essentially flat despite inflation, portfolio growth and exchange movements, which together added $723m and were more than offset by the $782m of structural reduction.

Management guidance

For 2026, bp guides to reported upstream production of 2,180–2,270 mboe/d, capital expenditure of $13.5–14.0bn, divestment and other proceeds of $8–9bn (including ~$6bn from Castrol), DD&A of $17.0–17.5bn, an underlying ETR of 35–40%, refining throughput of 1,360–1,410 mb/d, an OB&C charge of ~$1.0bn and Gulf of America settlement payments of ~$1.6bn pre-tax. For 3Q 2026 specifically, production of 2,100–2,250 mboe/d, throughput of 1,300–1,360 mb/d, a "significantly lower" customers result on lagged base-oil costs at Castrol and a weaker midstream contribution, and income taxes paid roughly $1bn higher than 2Q on instalment timing. The 2027 primary targets — adjusted free cash flow CAGR above 20% from 2024, ROACE above 16%, net debt of $14–18bn and structural cost reductions of $6.5–7.5bn — remain in force at revised planning prices of $70/bbl Brent, $4/mmBtu Henry Hub and $10.8/bbl RIM in 2024 real terms.

Consensus

Nineteen covering analysts rate bp a consensus Buy with an average price target of $47.60 per ADS, implying ~12% upside. Three-year consensus revenue growth is 2.05% and EPS growth 9.90%. RBC's Biraj Borkhataria captured the prevailing tone after 2Q 2026: "The devil is in the detail. BP will need to 'walk the talk' consistently over the coming quarters to re-build investor confidence."

Bull case

1. Balance sheet inflection is now visible, not promised. The combined total of net debt, hybrids, leases and Gulf of America settlement liabilities fell $6.9bn — more than 11% — in a single quarter, and the ~$6bn Castrol receipt has not yet landed. With buybacks suspended and 2026 capex cut to $13.5–14.0bn, essentially all incremental cash goes to deleveraging. Reaching the $14–18bn net debt range would remove the principal reason bp trades at a discount to Shell.

2. The upstream option value is real and cheap. Bumerangue's initial ~8 billion barrels of liquids in place sits in a 100%-owned block acquired on favourable commercial terms, alongside two Namibian discoveries, operated Walvis Basin acreage, 51 new Gulf of America lease blocks and two remaining major projects from the 2025–2027 tranche. At 4.19x EV/EBITDA, the market is ascribing close to zero value to any of it.

3. Earnings power has been demonstrated, not modelled. 1H 2026 underlying RC profit of $8.9bn against $3.7bn a year earlier, with $5.4bn from refining and trading alone, proves the integrated model converts volatility into profit. If the reset holds and the cost programme lands, the 8.37x forward multiple is too cheap for a business with this operating leverage.

Bear case

1. The 2026 earnings are borrowed from geopolitics. Brent averaged $103.85/bbl in 2Q 2026 and the refining indicator margin $29.6/bbl against planning assumptions of $70/bbl and $10.8/bbl. bp's own impairment testing assumes Middle East disruption resolves before year-end. At the rule of thumb of $450m per $1/bbl of RIM, mean reversion in refining alone removes roughly $8bn of annualised pre-tax profit.

2. The company is shrinking faster than it is improving. North Sea, Archaea, Castrol (65%), Gelsenkirchen, Netherlands retail, Austria retail, US onshore wind, Culzean, Bay du Nord, 10% of Pan American, 5% of Browse and 57% of Kirkuk are all out or going. Post-completion, bp will have five refineries, no UK production, no biogas, a minority in Castrol from which it expects no income for years, and roughly 2.2 mmboe/d. The 2027 ROACE target becomes easier to hit on a smaller capital base — but the absolute earnings pool is diminished, and the disposal proceeds guidance has already been cut from $9–10bn to $8–9bn.

3. Governance is the unpriced risk. Three CEOs and three chairs in under three years; a chair removed for conduct with no public explanation; two board resolutions defeated at the AGM; a shareholder resolution excluded and legally challenged; and a permanent chair still to be appointed. A CEO four months into the job with a five-point plan is asking for patience from a shareholder base that has already funded two strategic reversals. Any further leadership shock, or evidence that 2Q's 18 tier 1 and tier 2 process safety events signal a real deterioration in operating discipline, would reset the equity story again.

Catalysts and monitorables — next twelve months

Analyst verdict

BP in August 2026 is a company whose financial statements and whose narrative point in opposite directions, and the discipline is to hold both.

The narrative is genuinely improving. Operational metrics are the best in bp's modern history. Exploration has been rebuilt — twelve discoveries in 2025, a 90% reserves replacement ratio, and in Bumerangue a find bp itself calls its largest in twenty-five years. Costs are coming out ahead of schedule, $3.5bn cumulatively by mid-2026 against a target raised twice. The portfolio is being cut with a decisiveness the company has not shown since 2010. Meg O'Neill's first-quarter statement was unusually free of corporate euphemism: costs and liabilities are not resilient in a low price environment, too much value has been written off, delivery has been inconsistent.

The statements are less flattering. Profit attributable to shareholders was $55m on $189bn of revenue in FY2025. Shareholders' equity has fallen 30% in four years. Net debt has barely moved in eighteen months despite a $20bn disposal programme, which is why buybacks are suspended and bp is now the only Western supermajor not repurchasing stock. The 1H 2026 earnings surge is a gift from Middle East supply disruption that bp's own impairment testing assumes will end this year.

Then there is governance. Three chief executives and three chairs in under three years, a chair dismissed for conduct with no public explanation, two board resolutions defeated at the AGM, and a shareholder resolution excluded and litigated. This is not a company that has earned the benefit of the doubt.

The reset is directionally right and being executed with more urgency than at any point since 2020. But the equity is being asked to underwrite a third strategy in six years, delivered by a leadership team four months old, funded by earnings that are unlikely to repeat. The upside is real; the sequencing risk is severe. Judge it on 3Q 2026 and on the Castrol receipt, not on 2Q.

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Prepared 16 August 2026 from publicly available sources. All figures are in US dollars and relate to fiscal years ending 31 December unless otherwise stated. Where sources conflict, both figures have been presented and the discrepancy noted.