CAPE-ES No.4 Special Purpose Acquisition Company Overview
CAPE-ES No.4 Special Purpose Acquisition Company was a KOSDAQ-listed blank-check vehicle created in January 2020 by Cape Investment & Securities, the Seoul brokerage formerly known as LIG Investment & Securities, apparently in partnership with a venture investor (the "ES" in the name). Like all Korean SPACs, it had no operating business, products, or revenue; its only purpose was to raise public capital, hold the bulk of it in trust, and merge with an unlisted Korean company that would thereby obtain a KOSDAQ listing. It was the fourth vehicle in the Cape-ES series; an earlier vehicle, Cape-ES SPAC, completed a merger with chemicals maker Chemtros in 2017. No. 4 listed in March 2020 at the start of the COVID-19 market shock, traded speculatively in 2021, but never announced a merger. It was designated for management-issue status in September 2022 and delisted later in 2022, one of nine KOSDAQ SPACs removed that year.
What the company did. CAPE-ES No.4 was a special purpose acquisition company. Under the Korean framework, a SPAC is a nominal company listed through a public offering whose sole business purpose is a merger with an unlisted company (Newsis, 18 Jul 2022; Asia Economy, 24 Jun 2020). The SPAC raises capital from public investors, deposits the overwhelming majority (90% or more) of the offering proceeds with an outside custodian, and must complete a merger within three years of listing or be delisted, at which point the trust funds and accrued interest are returned to investors (Bizhankook, 23 Dec 2022).
Business model and revenue model. The company had no product, service, subscription, or licensing revenue. Its only income would have been interest earned on the escrowed offering proceeds, offset by listing maintenance, administrative, audit, and deal-search costs. Product/service/subscription/licensing mix: 0% / 0% / 0% / 0% — not applicable.
Value-chain position. The SPAC sat between (a) public retail and institutional investors seeking a principal-protected way to gain exposure to pre-IPO companies and (b) small and mid-sized unlisted Korean companies seeking a listing route that avoids a conventional IPO book-build. Korean SPAC sponsors are typically securities firms (which earn underwriting fees and hold founder shares) sometimes alongside venture or private-equity investors.
Customer types and end-markets. Not applicable in the conventional sense. The "counterparties" were (i) public shareholders and (ii) prospective merger targets.
Third-party databases classify it under "All Other Financial Investment Activities" and "Management of Companies and Enterprises" (EMIS).
Independent characterization. CAPE-ES No.4 is best characterized as a failed SPAC: a vehicle that completed its IPO but did not generate a merger before its regulatory clock ran out. Its life (2020–2022) coincided with a volatile period: an IPO into the March 2020 COVID-19 selloff, a speculative retail rally in Korean small caps and SPACs in 2021, and a rate-hiking cycle in 2022 that cooled appetite for small-cap listings and widened valuation gaps between SPAC shareholders and unlisted targets.
Strategy
Stated strategy. The vehicle's strategy, by legal construction, was to identify an unlisted Korean company and complete a merger that would give it a KOSDAQ listing. The specific target sectors stated in its prospectus/articles were not publicly disclosed in the sources reviewed.
Initiatives in the last 24 months. None. The company has been delisted since 2022.
Initiatives during its life (2020–2022). No merger agreement, letter of intent, or preliminary review application was identified in any source reviewed. The KRX notice of 7 September 2022 confirms that, as of that date, no preliminary review application had been filed (Edaily).
Why the strategy failed (evidence-based assessment).
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Market-wide factors cited for SPAC failures include valuation gaps between unlisted targets demanding high prices and SPAC shareholders applying conservative valuations, which frequently cause merger negotiations to collapse (KB Think/Yonhap Infomax, 25 Aug 2026, describing the structural problem).
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The SPAC paradox: when a SPAC's share price rises before a deal, the vehicle becomes less competitive in attracting targets, and early institutional holders have an incentive to sell (Meritz Securities analyst Park Beom-ji, quoted by Newsis, 18 Jul 2022). CAPE-ES No.4's 2021 speculative spikes fit this pattern, though no causal link to its failure is documented.
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2022's global rate hikes chilled the Korean equity market (Bizhankook, 23 Dec 2022), reducing target companies' appetite to list at acceptable valuations.
Medium-term targets/guidance. None (no operating business).
Products & Services
Not applicable. CAPE-ES No.4 offered no products, brands, platforms, or services. Its sole "offering" to the market was the listed share itself, which carried:
Product Portfolio
| Feature | Description | Status |
|---|---|---|
Listed common share | KOSDAQ code 347140; par value KRW 100 | Verified (Seoul Economic Daily; Eugene) |
Trust-backed downside | Korean SPACs place 90%+ of offering proceeds with an outside custodian; on delisting, investors receive public offering proceeds plus deposited interest | Verified as framework (Bizhankook, 23 Dec 2022) |
Merger optionality | Upside if a high-quality target is merged; capital gains possible | Framework (Asia Economy, 19 Feb 2020) |
Offer price | — | — |
Offering size | — | — |
Trust interest rate | Not publicly disclosed in sources reviewed; for context, SPACs listed in 2019–2020 commonly carried deposit rates around 1.44–1.91% at listing, later reset lower | Newsis, 18 Jul 2022 (market context only) |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Financial Narrative
Data availability. The company existed only from January 2020 to its 2022 delisting and dissolution, so a five-year history is impossible; at most three fiscal periods (FY2020, FY2021, a partial FY2022) existed. The only verified balance-sheet data point is the pre-IPO position at the 16 January 2020 KRX filing: equity KRW 592 million and total liabilities KRW 407 million (Seoul Economic Daily, 8 Mar 2020). EMIS reports total-asset growth of 0.31% for its most recent financial year (2021) without disclosing the absolute figure.
Income statement (KRW million)
Note on dividends: Korean SPACs do not pay ordinary dividends during their search period; trust proceeds are returned only on liquidation. Zero is recorded on that structural basis; no dividend declarations were identified.
Margins
Margins are mathematically undefined for an entity with no revenue.
Balance sheet (KRW million)
Goodwill and intangibles are recorded as zero because a SPAC that has made no acquisition carries none; this is structural, not drawn from a filing.
Pre-IPO reference point (single date)
Cash flow (KRW million)
Capex and buybacks are structurally zero for a Korean SPAC; no buyback disclosures were identified.
Ratios
Commentary. The economically relevant "financials" of a SPAC are (1) the trust balance per share, which sets the floor value for public shareholders, and (2) the sponsor's cost of running the vehicle, which is lost if no merger occurs. Neither was publicly disclosed in the sources reviewed. The rate environment matters: SPACs listed in 2019–2020 locked in low deposit rates that were later reset lower during the rate-cutting period (Newsis, 18 Jul 2022), so the liquidation return to public holders of 2020-vintage SPACs was modest, in contrast to 2022-vintage SPACs that later benefited from deposit rates as high as 3.25% (Nate News, 31 Mar 2025).
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View Subscription PlansFinancial Detail
Segment Overview
| Segment | Contents |
|---|---|
Single activity: business combination search | Escrowed offering proceeds; merger target search |
Financial Analysis
| Metric | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|---|
Dividends per share (KRW) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Financial Analysis — Goodwill & intangibles
| Metric | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|---|
Goodwill & intangibles (KRW Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Valuation Snapshot
| Metric | Value | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Equity (KRW Mn) | 592 | At 16 Jan 2020 KRX filing | Seoul Economic Daily |
Total liabilities (KRW Mn) | 407 | At 16 Jan 2020 KRX filing | Seoul Economic Daily |
Implied total assets (KRW Mn) | 999 | Derived (592 + 407) | Calculation |
Financial Analysis — Capex
| Metric | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|---|
Capex (KRW Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Dividends paid (KRW Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Buybacks (KRW Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Financial Analysis — ROE / ROA / ROIC
| Ratio | Assessment |
|---|---|
ROE / ROA / ROIC | Not publicly disclosed; economically, returns were limited to trust interest less costs, likely near zero or negative |
Current ratio | Not publicly disclosed; SPAC assets are overwhelmingly liquid trust deposits |
Debt/equity, net debt/EBITDA, interest coverage | Not meaningful; no operating debt identified |
Asset turnover, cash conversion cycle | Not applicable (no revenue, no inventory, no receivables cycle) |
Geographic Revenue
| Region | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|---|
Outside Korea - revenue (KRW Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Share Price History
| Date | Price (KRW) | Change | Volume (shares) | Implied market cap (KRW Mn) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
27 Apr 2021 (intraday) | 2,905 | +670 (+29.98%) | 4,070,843 | 8,741 | Etoday (price derived: 670 ÷ 0.2998 ≈ 2,235 prior close; +670 = 2,905) |
21 May 2021 (close) | 2,225 | +30 (+1.35%) | — | 6,695 | Etoday |
24 May 2021 (close) | 2,330 | +105 (+4.51%) | — | 7,011 | Etoday |
25 May 2021 (close) | 2,300 | −30 (−1.30%) | — | 6,921 | Etoday |
26 May 2021 (10:00) | 2,990 | +690 (+30.00%) | 3,855,938 | 8,997 | Etoday |
Share Price and Market Valuation
| Metric | 21-May-2021 | 24-May-2021 | 25-May-2021 | 26-May-2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Share price (KRW) | 2,225 | 2,330 | 2,300 | 2,990 |
Implied market cap (KRW Mn) | 6,695 | 7,011 | 6,921 | 8,997 |
Capital Markets
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
Analyst consensus | None (no coverage) |
Dividend history and policy | No dividends; liquidation distribution only |
Buyback authorizations | None identified |
Credit ratings (Moody's / S&P / Fitch) | Not rated |
Debt maturity profile | No debt identified |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance. None; the company no longer exists as a listed entity.
Consensus growth expectations. None.
Bull-case arguments (as they stood during the company's life)
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Experienced sponsor: the Cape-ES series had already delivered a KRX-approved merger (Chemtros, 2017), suggesting the sponsor could source and execute a deal.
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Retail demand: trading volume exceeding shares outstanding in April and May 2021 showed the shares could attract liquidity if a deal emerged.
Bear-case arguments (which proved correct)
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Clock risk: no merger application by 16 Sep 2022 led to designation and delisting (Edaily; Bizhankook).
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Macro timing: 2022 rate increases depressed small-cap listings and valuations (Bizhankook).
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Premium risk: buyers at the 2021 peaks (KRW 2,905–2,990) paid well above typical SPAC trust values; on liquidation, any premium over trust value was lost.
Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months). For the entity itself: none, other than confirming the final liquidation distribution in DART dissolution filings. For the sponsor and sector:
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Any new Cape-sponsored SPACs and their sector focus.
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KRX rule changes, including the KOSDAQ listing-maintenance market-cap threshold rising to KRW 30bn and the court-ordered pause on market-cap delistings (StockHub; iNews24).
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Continued high SPAC liquidation counts (22 year-to-date in 2026 per StockHub).
Concluding analyst verdict. CAPE-ES No.4 Special Purpose Acquisition Company is a closed case: a Korean SPAC that listed on KOSDAQ on 24 March 2020, never announced a business combination, received a KRX warning on 7 September 2022 that it faced management-issue designation, and was delisted later that year as one of nine SPACs removed from Korean markets in 2022 for failing to find a partner. There is no successor operating company and no current security to analyze.
The vehicle's history illustrates the core economics of Korean SPACs. For original subscribers, the structure largely worked as designed: capital was held with a custodian and, under the standard framework, returned with interest on liquidation, though the 2020 vintage's low deposit rates meant a modest return. For secondary buyers who entered during the 2021 speculative spikes, when shares traded up to KRW 2,990 and daily volume exceeded the entire share count, the outcome depended on the gap between their purchase price and the trust value per share — a figure not disclosed in the sources reviewed, but one that was very likely below those peak prices given common KOSDAQ SPAC structures. For the sponsor, Cape Investment & Securities, the failure meant forgone merger economics, though its predecessor vehicle had previously completed a merger.
The more durable lesson is sector-level. The Korean SPAC market has since deteriorated further: survival mergers fell to a single case in 2024, and liquidations reached 24 in 2025 and 22 by August 2026. Valuation gaps, rate levels, weak post-merger trading, and tougher review standards are recurring causes.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Executive Leadership Team
| Person | Role | Relevance | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Lim Tae-soon (임태순) | CEO and Vice Chairman, Cape Investment & Securities | Led the 2016 acquisition of LIG Investment & Securities as head of Cape Investment; acquired control of listed parent Cape in 2020 via Tempus Investment | TheVC; Namu Wiki |
Competitive Landscape
Competitor Detail
| SPAC | Code | Listing / event | Outcome | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
SK No.6 SPAC | 340,350 | Listed 11 Mar 2020 (same month as CAPE-ES No.4) | Delisted 2022 without merger | Eugene IPO review; Bizhankook |
Hana Financial No.14 SPAC | — | — | Delisted 2022 without merger | Bizhankook |
Hi No.5 SPAC | — | — | Delisted 2022 without merger | Bizhankook; Newsis |
KB No.18 SPAC | — | — | Delisted 2022 without merger | Bizhankook |
KB No.19 SPAC | — | — | Delisted 2022 without merger | Bizhankook |
Sangsangin-IAN No.2 SPAC | — | — | Delisted 2022 without merger | Bizhankook |
eBest-IAN SPAC No.1 | — | — | Delisted 2022 without merger | Bizhankook |
eBest SPAC No.5 | — | Delisting decided 13 Dec 2022; final delisting 26 Dec 2022 | Delisted 2022 without merger | Bizhankook |
Hana Financial No.11 SPAC | — | KRX approval Feb 2020 for merger with Kainosmed | Merger completed (listing scheduled 6 May 2020) | Asia Economy, 19 Feb 2020 |
Kyobo No.9, Mirae Asset Daewoo SPAC No.4, Shinhan No.6, IBK No.12 | — | All set 52-week highs in Feb 2020 | — | Asia Economy, 19 Feb 2020 |
KB No.20, Hana Financial No.15, Shinyoung SPAC No.6 | — | New listings Jan–Feb 2020 | — | Asia Economy, 19 Feb 2020 |
Peer Comparison FY2022
| Metric | CAPE-ES No.4 | SK No.6 SPAC | Hana Financial No.11 SPAC | Cape-ES SPAC (predecessor) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Listing | 24 Mar 2020 | 11 Mar 2020 | Pre-2020 | Pre-2017 |
Merger achieved | No | No | Yes (Kainosmed) | Yes (Chemtros, approved 2017) |
Outcome | Delisted 2022 | Delisted 2022 | Merged | Merged |
Recent Developments
*Last 18 months (Apr 2025 – Oct 2026). No company-specific developments: the entity was delisted in 2022. Relevant market developments affecting the sponsor and Korean SPAC sector are listed for context.



