Charm Engineering Co., Ltd. Overview
Charm Engineering is a former leader in flat-panel display (FPD) repair equipment. The company localised laser repair systems in Korea in 2002 and, by its own account in 2020, held roughly 70% of the global display-repair equipment market. It has since become, in economic substance, a holding vehicle for a regional savings bank. In FY2025 Charm Savings Bank, based in Daegu, generated about 90% of consolidated revenue (KRW 53.4 bn of KRW 59.8 bn). Standalone (non-financial) sales fell to KRW 5.2 bn and domestic headcount to 26.
Control passed in 2022 to the Hanbit Asset Management Loan group, a debt-collection and NPL specialist. That group's apparent strategic interest is the savings bank, not the equipment business. Since 2023 the company has posted three consecutive years of heavy losses and completed two capital reductions. It is attempting a pivot into scrap-metal trading. KRX has ruled that it no longer meets listing standards, and continued listing now depends entirely on the court outcome.
Company's own description (FY2025 business report, as summarised by data providers)
The company describes itself as a manufacturer of repair equipment that fixes defects arising during display-panel production. Its tools use precision optics, lasers and ink modules and cover LCD, OLED, QD-OLED and micro-LED panels. Two operating segments are reported:
Domestic business: manufacture and sale of display-panel repair equipment.
Overseas business: supply of parts and equipment maintenance services to overseas customers of the repair systems, principally in mainland China and Vietnam.
(Source: MarketScreener/Zonebourse company description based on the latest annual report.)
Separately, the consolidated statements include the savings-bank (financial) business of Charm Savings Bank, which now dominates revenue. In July 2025 the articles of incorporation were amended to add ferrous and non-ferrous scrap processing and sales, and the company began recognising small amounts of scrap revenue in late 2025 (Dealsite, 3 Apr 2026).
Independent characterisation
On the evidence of FY2024–1H2026, Charm Engineering is best described as a financial holding shell with a residual equipment-service tail and an embryonic commodity-trading activity:
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Savings bank (dominant). Charm Savings Bank takes deposits and makes loans in the Daegu–Gyeongbuk operating region. Customer deposits grew from KRW 531.3 bn (FY2024) to KRW 700.3 bn (FY2025), and FY2025 net income was KRW 5.4 bn. Revenue is interest and fee income (Dealsite, 2 Apr 2026; ETF Shopping).
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Display repair equipment (legacy, collapsing). Capital equipment sold to panel makers was historically the core business. Customers included Chinese panel makers (CSOT, HKC, Visionox/"GVO" and BOE) and Korean panel makers. Non-financial revenue fell from KRW 18.3 bn (FY2024) to KRW 6.3 bn (FY2025) (Dealsite, 2 Apr 2026). The overseas parts-and-service activity in China and Vietnam is the main remaining recurring element.
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Scrap metal (new, unproven). The company reports the scrap business on a net revenue basis, which suggests a brokerage or intermediation model. It has disclosed no capex plan, describing the business as in "pilot operation," and standalone PP&E is close to nil (Dealsite, 3 Apr 2026).
Revenue model mix (FY2025, derived): about 89% financial-services income (savings bank), about 11% non-financial (equipment, parts and service, scrap). There is no subscription or licensing revenue.
Value-chain position: a Tier-1 capital-equipment supplier to panel fabs (legacy) and a regional deposit-taking lender (current).
Customer types / end markets: (i) display panel manufacturers in Korea, China and Vietnam (equipment); (ii) retail and SME borrowers and depositors in Daegu–Gyeongbuk (bank); (iii) scrap-metal buyers and sellers (new; counterparties not disclosed).
Strategy
The company publishes no investor-day material or English-language strategy statement. Strategic intent is inferred from filings and management statements to the press.
Medium-term financial targets / guidance: None publicly disclosed. ESG / sustainability commitments: None publicly disclosed.
Products & Services
Product-level pricing, launch years and specifications are not publicly disclosed unless stated. The catalogue below is compiled from the company's product listings on Komachine, the business description carried by Simply Wall St/StockHub/Investing.com, and press reports.
FPD Repair Equipment (Domestic segment)
| Product | Description / capability | Target customer | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Laser Repair – LCD | Laser cutting and welding to repair open and short defects in TFT-LCD array circuits | LCD panel fabs (Gen-8+) | Flagship legacy product; World-Class Product designation in 2011 |
| Laser Repair – OLED / QD-OLED | Precision laser repair for OLED backplanes and QD-OLED | OLED fabs (Korea, China) | Large-volume China OLED shipments in 2020 (CSOT, HKC, Visionox) |
| Laser Repair – TSP | Repair of touch-screen-panel electrode defects | Touch panel makers | Listed in product catalogue |
| Laser Repair – Mini/Micro-LED | Laser repair of defective LED chips and wiring; the company planned a total process line (chip removal, transfer, bonding, post-bond inspection) | Mini-LED backlight makers; micro-LED developers | First micro-LED repair unit delivered in 2019; total-process development targeted for end-2020 |
| Laser Repair – Mask | Laser repair of photomask/FMM defects | Mask makers / panel fabs | Listed in business description |
| Ink Repair (Metal / Insulator) | Direct-write conductive or insulating ink deposition to repair open lines | LCD/OLED fabs | Catalogue |
| Tape Polishing Repair | Mechanical polishing of particles and protrusions | Panel fabs | Catalogue |
| Laser Trimmer | Laser trimming of circuit elements | Panel / electronics makers | Catalogue |
| Short Repair / Short Cut Repair | Removal of electrical shorts | Panel / PCB makers | Catalogue |
| TSP Metal Ink Open Repair | Ink-based repair of open circuits on touch panels | TSP makers | Catalogue |
| Review System | Optical defect review prior to repair | Panel fabs | Catalogue |
| Inspection / Analysis System | Defect inspection and analysis equipment | Panel fabs | Catalogue |
| Post-process Cell Inspection (foldable) | Cell-level inspection for foldable OLED panels | Foldable OLED fabs | Development announced in 2020 |
Adjacent equipment lines (historical catalogue)
| Product | Description | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Laser Wheel Patterning | Laser patterning (light-guide-plate segment) | Legacy catalogue |
| Ink-Jet Patterning System | Ink-jet direct patterning | Legacy catalogue |
| PCB Metal Ink Open Repair | Open-circuit repair for printed circuit boards | Legacy catalogue |
| Solar Cell Scriber | Laser scribing for solar cells | Legacy catalogue |
| Solar Cell Edge Isolation System | Laser edge isolation for solar cells | Legacy catalogue |
| Semiconductor equipment | Semiconductor equipment line listed in catalogue; specific products not disclosed | — |
| Medical devices | Category listed in catalogue | — |
| Software | Equipment software | — |
Overseas Parts & Maintenance (Overseas segment)
Supply of spare parts and maintenance services for the installed base of repair systems in China (through Charm Trading Shanghai) and Vietnam (through Charm Trading Vietnam). Pricing model is not disclosed, presumably per-part and per-service contract. The installed base was more than 2,000 units by 2020 (The Elec).
Financial services (Charm Savings Bank)
Deposit products and loans for retail and SME customers in the Daegu–Gyeongbuk operating zone. As of the 2020 report, the bank operated only from its Daegu head office (Asia Economy, 4 Sep 2020). Product-level detail is not publicly disclosed in sources reviewed.
Scrap metal (new)
Processing and sales of ferrous and non-ferrous scrap. Revenue is recognised on a net basis; there is no disclosed processing plant, investment budget or named customers (Dealsite, 3 Apr 2026).
Financial Narrative
All figures consolidated, K-IFRS, from DART business reports as compiled by ETF Shopping and Butler.works. FY2020 is shown in commentary for context.
Income statement
Margins and growth are analyst-computed. The FY2021 growth rate uses FY2020 revenue of KRW 168.7 bn. Revenue CAGR FY2021–FY2025 = –20.6% per year. Cumulative net loss FY2023–FY2025 = KRW 64.5 bn, which agrees with Dealsite's three-year cumulative loss figure of KRW 64.5 bn.
Simply Wall St's trailing-twelve-month data to 30 Sep 2025 shows revenue of KRW 60.1 bn, cost of revenue of KRW 53.4 bn and gross profit of KRW 6.7 bn, an 11.1% gross margin. Trailing EPS is reported inconsistently: –KRW 997 (Simply Wall St, TTM Sep 2025) against –KRW 1,289 (Investing.com, March 2026). The gap reflects the different measurement dates and the March 2025 share consolidation. Dividends: none paid in the period; dividend yield shown as nil (Butler.works).
Quarterly trend (most recent 10 quarters)
(Source: ETF Shopping, compiled from DART quarterly, semi-annual and annual reports.)
1H2026 revenue of KRW 56.4 bn is already 94% of full-year FY2025 revenue (2Q26 YoY +83.8%; 1Q26 YoY +124.1%). The quarterly data do not show the composition.
Cash flow
Operating cash flow, capex, free cash flow, dividends paid and buybacks are not publicly disclosed in sources reviewed. Its main disclosed use of funds was a KRW 10.0 bn capital injection into Charm Savings Bank. No buybacks were identified; treasury shares are 0.49% of shares outstanding (Butler.works).
Commentary — trends, inflections and drivers
FY2020–FY2022 (late-cycle plateau). Revenue held at KRW 150–170 bn on Chinese OLED and large-LCD fab investment (CSOT, HKC, Visionox, BOE), but operating margins were already thin at 0.8–4.1%. The savings bank provided earnings ballast. In FY2020 it paid a KRW 5.1 bn interim dividend to the parent (Asia Economy, 3 Nov 2020).
FY2023 (structural break). Revenue fell 55% to KRW 76.3 bn and operating income swung to a KRW 28.1 bn loss. The drivers were the end of the China display capex wave, the change of control to a financial-sector owner with no stated commitment to the equipment business, and deep headcount reductions (163 to 109 staff).
FY2024 (trough). The operating loss widened to KRW 35.8 bn on KRW 64.9 bn of revenue. Losses increased every quarter, reaching –KRW 15.3 bn in 4Q24.
FY2025 (shrink to the bank). Non-financial revenue collapsed to KRW 6.3 bn and the domestic workforce was cut to 26. The operating loss narrowed to KRW 7.5 bn because there was less equipment business left to lose money on, not because operations improved. One quarter (2Q25) was profitable at KRW 8.7 bn OP; the cause is not disclosed and may reflect one-off items.
1H2026. Revenue jumped to KRW 56.4 bn for the half, with 1Q26 profitable (OP KRW 5.4 bn) and 2Q26 slightly loss-making. Debt-to-equity was repaired to 77.1% mainly by external capital (rights issue and hybrid), not retained earnings (Dealsite, 28 Jul 2026).
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View Subscription PlansFinancial Detail
Group Structure
| Level | Entity | Relationship | Stake | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Ultimate parent | Hanbit Asset Management Loan (한빛자산관리대부) | Owned by Chairman Yang Eun-hyuk (80%) and spouse Lee Seo-yeon (20%) | 100% of HB Holdings Group | Leading Korean NPL debt-collection company |
Intermediate holdco | HB Holdings Group Co., Ltd. | Largest shareholder of Charm | 46.20% directly after the Jan 2026 issue | Also controls HB Savings Bank (Seoul) |
Concert party | HBC New Technology Investment Fund No.1 | Fund 97.6% owned by HB Holdings Group | 18.85% at end-2025 (diluted by later issuance) | GP: HB Capital |
Listed company | Charm Engineering Co., Ltd. | — | — | Concert-party total 60.82% per the April 2026 filing |
Subsidiary | Charm Savings Bank Co., Ltd. | Consolidated | 95.6% | Assets KRW 802.2 bn; NI KRW 5.41 bn (latest FY) |
Subsidiary | Charm Trading Shanghai | Consolidated | 100% | Assets KRW 4.98 bn; NI –KRW 1.07 bn |
Subsidiary | Charm Trading Vietnam | Consolidated | 100% | Assets KRW 0.018 bn; NI –KRW 0.024 bn |
Revenue by Segment
| Segment | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|
Financial services – Charm Savings Bank (KRW Bn) | 46.6 | 53.4 |
Non-financial – equipment, parts and service, scrap (KRW Bn) | 18.3 | 6.3 |
Consolidated revenue (KRW Bn) | 64.9 | 59.8 |
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View Subscription PlansRevenue by Segment (%) and Segment Margins & Growth (%)
| Segment metric | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|
Financial share of revenue (%) | 71.8 | 89.3 |
Non-financial share of revenue (%) | 28.2 | 10.5 |
Non-financial revenue YoY growth (%) | 0 | -65.6 |
Income Statement and Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (KRW Bn) | 150.6 | 170.6 | 76.3 | 64.9 | 59.8 |
Operating income (KRW Bn) | 2.6 | 1.3 | -28.1 | -35.8 | -7.5 |
Net income (KRW Bn) | -1.1 | -2.3 | -26.0 | -24.9 | -13.6 |
Revenue YoY growth (%) | -10.7 | 13.3 | -55.3 | -14.9 | -7.9 |
Operating margin (%) | 1.7 | 0.8 | -36.8 | -55.2 | -12.5 |
Net margin (%) | -0.7 | -1.3 | -34.1 | -38.4 | -22.7 |
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View Subscription PlansRevenue History
| Quarter | Filing date | Revenue (KRW Bn) | Operating income (KRW Bn) | Net income (KRW Bn) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
1Q24 | 14 May 2024 | 19.6 | -0.7 | 0.6 |
2Q24 | 14 Aug 2024 | 17.3 | -8.0 | -4.6 |
3Q24 | 14 Nov 2024 | 14.5 | -11.8 | -10.9 |
4Q24 | 18 Mar 2025 | 13.5 | -15.3 | -10.1 |
1Q25 | 15 May 2025 | 10.1 | -8.8 | -7.2 |
2Q25 | 14 Aug 2025 | 18.4 | 8.7 | 2.9 |
3Q25 | 14 Nov 2025 | 18.2 | -6.0 | -6.2 |
4Q25 | 18 Mar 2026 | 13.2 | -1.5 | -3.0 |
1Q26 | 15 May 2026 | 22.6 | 5.4 | 4.2 |
2Q26 | 14 Aug 2026 | 33.8 | -2.5 | -0.9 |
Financial Analysis
| Item | Value | Date / basis | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Consolidated total assets | About KRW 800 bn (described as "KRW 800 bn-class") | FY2025 | Dealsite (2 Apr 2026) |
Charm Savings Bank total assets | KRW 802.2 bn | Latest FY (2025) | ETF Shopping |
Charm Savings Bank customer deposits | KRW 531.3 bn → KRW 700.3 bn (+31.8%) | FY2024 → FY2025 | Dealsite |
PP&E (consolidated) | KRW 47.5 bn → KRW 23.4 bn | FY2024 → FY2025 | Dealsite |
Assets held for sale | KRW 15.1 bn (newly classified; factory and land) | FY2025 | Dealsite |
Standalone PP&E | Described as effectively zero | FY2025 / early 2026 | Dealsite (3 Apr 2026) |
Share capital | KRW 42.9 bn → KRW 8.9 bn (first reduction) → about KRW 2.6 bn (second reduction, May 2026) | Mar 2025 / May 2026 | Dealsite |
Accumulated deficit (consolidated) | KRW 65.3 bn | FY2025 | Dealsite |
Accumulated deficit (standalone) | KRW 62.0 bn (FY2022); KRW 80.7 bn (FY2023); KRW 98.4 bn (FY2024); KRW 72.7 bn after first reduction; KRW 82.6 bn (FY2025) | Various | Dealsite |
Standalone debt-to-equity | 148.3% (Dealsite, 2 Apr 2026) vs. 143.8% (Dealsite, 28 Jul 2026). The two articles from the same outlet disagree | FY2025 | Dealsite |
Standalone debt-to-equity | 77.1% | 31 Mar 2026 | Dealsite (28 Jul 2026) |
Hybrid capital | KRW 10.0 bn perpetual, 7.0% coupon, classified as equity | Issued 27 Mar 2026 | Dealsite |
Financial Analysis — ROE
| Ratio | Value | Basis | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
ROE | –2.90% (one snapshot) / –7.95% (later snapshot) | TTM, aggregator | StockHub (two versions) |
P/B | 0.28 / 0.19 (conflicting) | At last price KRW 5,330 | Butler.works / StockHub |
Standalone debt/equity | 143.8–148.3% (FY2025); 77.1% (1Q26) | Standalone | Dealsite |
Payroll / standalone revenue | 15.4% (FY2021) → 68.4% (FY2025) | Standalone | ETF Shopping |
ROA, ROIC, current ratio, net debt/EBITDA, interest coverage, asset turnover, cash conversion cycle | Not publicly disclosed / not meaningful for a bank-dominated consolidated balance sheet | — | — |
Busine Overview
| Business | Geography | Evidence | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|
Savings bank | South Korea – Daegu–Gyeongbuk operating zone | Single-branch Daegu bank (2020); regional zoning under the Mutual Savings Bank Act | Growing (deposits +31.8% in FY2025) |
Equipment sales | South Korea; China (CSOT, HKC, Visionox, BOE) | 2020 press reports | Sharp decline since FY2023 |
Parts & maintenance | Mainland China; Vietnam | FY2025 segment description | Shrinking; Charm Trading Shanghai loss-making (NI –KRW 1.07 bn) |
Scrap metal | Presumably domestic (not disclosed) | Dealsite | New; size not disclosed |
Valuation Snapshot
| Metric | Value | Note / source |
|---|---|---|
Last traded price | KRW 5,330 | Suspended (StockHub; Butler.works) |
Pre-second-reduction price | KRW 1,065 (21 Mar 2026) | Investing.com |
Implied consolidation ratio (second reduction) | About 5:1 | Analyst-derived: about 21.8 mn shares (KRW 23.2 bn / KRW 1,065) to about 4.37 mn shares (KRW 23.3 bn / KRW 5,330). Official ratio not confirmed |
52-week range | KRW 864 – 5,330 (unadjusted for the consolidation) | StockHub |
Market cap | KRW 23.3 bn | Butler.works |
P/E | Not meaningful (losses) | — |
P/B | 0.28 (Butler.works) vs. 0.19 (StockHub) – conflicting | — |
EV/EBITDA, EV/Sales | Not meaningful (bank-dominated balance sheet; EBITDA not disclosed) | — |
1/3/5-year total return | Not computable reliably because of two share consolidations and the suspension | — |
Analyst consensus | None (zero reports) | StockHub |
Dividend history / policy | No dividends in FY2021–FY2025 | Butler.works |
Buyback authorisations | None identified; treasury shares 0.49% | Butler.works |
Debt maturity profile | Not publicly disclosed; KRW 10.0 bn perpetual hybrid (7.0%, deferrable coupon) issued March 2026 | Dealsite |
Capital Markets Data
| Metric | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
Share capital (KRW Bn) | 42.9 | 8.9 | 2.6 |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance
No formal financial guidance has been issued. Management has stated publicly that it expects FY2026 scrap revenue to exceed FY2025 and has no near-term M&A plan (Dealsite, 3 Apr 2026). It also said the delisting concerns could be resolved through explanation to KRX (Dealsite, 2 Apr 2026), an expectation not borne out by the June–July decisions.
Consensus
None. No sell-side coverage exists.
Bull case
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Court relief and re-rating to book. If the injunction and main suit succeed, the stock trades at P/B 0.19–0.28 against a profitable bank subsidiary. Re-rating towards the 2022 transaction valuation (KRW 75.0 bn for 85.8% of the bank) would imply substantial upside.
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Bank-driven earnings recovery. 1H2026 revenue of KRW 56.4 bn and a profitable 1Q26 suggest the consolidated loss could narrow sharply as equipment losses fall away.
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Value-crystallising restructuring. A transparent sale of Charm Savings Bank to HB Holdings at a fair price, with proceeds held at Charm, could deliver cash value to minority holders.
Bear case
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Delisting stands. KRX's findings were upheld twice internally (1 June and 15 July 2026). Minority shareholders could be left with illiquid unlisted shares.
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Shell with no operating engine. Standalone revenue is KRW 5.2 bn, staff number 26, PP&E is near zero and scrap is booked on a net basis. Survival depends entirely on the bank and parent support.
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Weakening sponsor and expropriation risk. HB Holdings is loss-making, has run down its cash and increased its borrowing. The group's historical pattern raises the risk that the bank is separated on terms unfavourable to minority holders.
Key catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
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Seoul Southern District Court ruling on the 16 July 2026 injunction, and any main-suit filing.
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KRX handling of suspended issuers after the 2 October 2026 rulings, and any revision of the listing rules.
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3Q26 report (due about mid-November 2026) and FY2026 audit opinion (March 2027).
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Completion and use of proceeds from the KRW 15.1 bn factory and land sale.
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Any filing on the transfer of Charm Savings Bank shares to HB Holdings.
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Charm Savings Bank asset quality, BIS ratio and deposit growth.
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Further HB Holdings capital support or hybrid issuance.
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Scrap business disclosures (volumes, gross vs. net revenue, capex).
Analyst verdict
Charm Engineering is no longer, in substance, the display-equipment company its name implies. Between FY2021 and FY2025 consolidated revenue fell from KRW 150.6 bn to KRW 59.8 bn. Non-financial revenue contracted to KRW 6.3 bn and the domestic workforce from 239 to 26, while the group lost a cumulative KRW 64.5 bn over three years. What remains of economic value is a 95.6% stake in Charm Savings Bank, a single-branch Daegu lender with KRW 802 bn of assets and modest but positive earnings. The listed company is a thinly capitalised intermediate holding layer, recapitalised repeatedly by a controlling group whose own finances are deteriorating.
The scrap-metal pivot is the company's stated route back to an operating identity. On the available evidence (net-basis revenue, no capex plan, no plant and assets being sold) it does not yet constitute a credible operating business. KRX appears to have reached the same view: it twice ruled that the company fails the listing-eligibility test.
For external stakeholders, the investment case reduces to a binary legal event plus a governance judgment. If the court suspends the delisting, the stock offers optionality against a deep discount to book, but it also faces the separate KOSPI market-cap floor. Absent clear minority protections, the value attributable to minority holders is uncertain. If the delisting stands, minority holders face illiquidity and dependence on the controlling group's restructuring choices.
On balance, the risk profile is highly speculative and governance-sensitive. Counterparties, suppliers and investors should treat Charm Engineering primarily as a proxy for Charm Savings Bank under Hanbit-group control and monitor the court outcome and any bank-transfer filings closely. The equipment business should no longer be viewed as a going concern of scale.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Role | Tenure | Background | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Ahn Kyung-hwan (안경환) | CEO / Representative Director | Since late March 2026 (post-AGM) | CEO of ES Cube, a camping and outdoor equipment maker and Hanbit-group affiliate | Dealsite (2 Apr 2026) |
Lee Kyung-hee (이경희) | Former CEO | Until March 2026 | — | Simply Wall St; Incruit |
Shin Hee-min (신희민) | Inside director | Since late March 2022 | About 20 years at the Financial Supervisory Service; key Hanbit-group executive involved in the ES Cube transaction | Dealsite (17 Aug 2022) |
Kim Kyu-dong (김규동) | Former CEO | Until the 2022 change of control | Son of former largest shareholder Kim In-han | Dealsite |
Han In-soo (한인수) | Founder / former CEO | Returned December 2014; contested in 2015 | Founder | eToday (2015) |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Directors' Remuneration
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
Average pay per director/auditor (4 persons) | KRW 42.17 mn |
Average employee salary | KRW 136.65 mn (inflated by severance and payroll on a 26-person base) |
Total payroll | KRW 3.55 bn |
Individuals paid more than KRW 500 mn (individually disclosed) | None reported |
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Stake | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
HB Holdings Group Co., Ltd. | 30.64% → 46.20% (after the 27 Jan 2026 issue) | End-2025 → Jan 2026 | ETF Shopping; Dealsite |
HBC New Technology Investment Fund No.1 | 18.85% (pre-dilution) | End-2025 | ETF Shopping |
Concert party total | 49.48% → 60.82% | End-2025 → 13 Apr 2026 filing | ETF Shopping |
National Pension Service | 0.11% | End-2022 | ETF Shopping |
Minority shareholders (7,342 holders) | About 45% | End-2025 | ETF Shopping |
Treasury shares | 0.49% | Latest | Butler.works |
Competitive Landscape
Key Competitors
| Competitor | Country | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
Orbotech (part of KLA) | Israel / US | Incumbent FPD repair and AOI supplier that Charm displaced in Korea in the 2000s (The Elec) |
OLFT | Japan | Incumbent repair-equipment supplier cited by The Elec |
V-Technology | Japan | FPD inspection, repair and exposure equipment |
NTN Corporation (precision equipment unit) | Japan | LCD ink-repair systems |
Cowin DST | Korea | Laser repair / laser processing for displays |
AP Systems | Korea | Display laser equipment (LLO, ELA) |
Philoptics | Korea | Display and semiconductor laser processing equipment |
DE&T | Korea | Display inspection and aging equipment |
HB Technology | Korea | Display AOI / inspection (unrelated to the HB Holdings group) |
Chinese domestic equipment makers | China | Substitution risk for China fab repair demand |



