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China Oceanwide Holdings Limited

Company Profile Analysis

Ticker: 0715.HK中泛控股有限公司

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Year Founded & Workforce

1990

56 Employees

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China Oceanwide Holdings Limited Overview

China Oceanwide Holdings Limited was the Hong Kong-listed overseas investment and financing platform of Lu Zhiqiang's Oceanwide conglomerate. It was created when Oceanwide Holdings bought Li Ka-shing's Hutchison Harbour Ring in late 2014. Between 2015 and 2017 it was loaded with US dollar trophy development assets: the Oceanwide Plaza mixed-use towers in downtown Los Angeles, a Lower Manhattan Seaport site, resort and master-plan land at Ko Olina and Kapolei on Oahu, and a 2×150 MW coal-fired power project in Medan, Indonesia. Its only cash-generating assets were two Shanghai office and commercial buildings, which brought in roughly HK$90–110M a year. Development was funded largely by intra-group debt and project-level loans. China tightened controls on capital outflows, COVID-19 hit, the Los Angeles general contractor terminated, and the parent defaulted; together these left the group unable to finish anything. Between 2021 and 2023 its assets were placed in receivership one after another, and the company was wound up in 2023 and delisted in 2025. Today it is a liquidation estate, not an operating company.


The company's own description (paraphrased from Annual Report 2022, Report of the Directors). The company itself is an investment holding company. Its subsidiaries carried on real estate development in the United States and energy-sector development in Indonesia, as well as finance investment and other activities. Before the Shanghai properties were deconsolidated in April 2022, the description also included property investment in the PRC. The AR2020 Chairman's Statement described the company as the platform for the controlling shareholder's overseas core businesses since 2015. That platform invested in first-tier North American real estate, core-Shanghai property investment and other US-dollar or "US-dollar-concept" assets.

Business model. The intended model was a hybrid of three strands:

Build-to-sell and build-to-hold real estate development: In Los Angeles the plan was condominium sales plus a hotel, retail, LED advertising and parking held for income. Management's model projected about US$1.5bn of net sales proceeds and about US$120M a year of stabilised recurring revenue from the fourth year after completion (AR2022 MD&A).

Rental income: from Shanghai investment properties.

Contracted power sales: under a Build-Own-Operate (BOO) power purchase agreement (PPA) with Indonesia's state utility PLN. The tariff had a take-or-pay capacity component plus a dispatch-based energy component, over a 30-year operating term.

  • Treasury and finance investment, mainly bonds and listed equities, which was largely wound down by 2020.

Revenue model mix (realised). Realised revenue was almost entirely rental income. Property Investment provided 78.3% of revenue in FY2019, 93.7% in FY2020, 99.6% in FY2021 and 99.7% in FY2022. The rest was dividend and interest income in Finance Investment and Others. No development, condominium-sale or power revenue was ever recognised, because no project was ever completed. There were no subscription, licensing or service revenues.

Value-chain position. The company acted as owner-developer and capital allocator. It contracted out construction (Lendlease (US) Construction was general contractor in Los Angeles until it terminated in September 2020) and design (for example, Foster + Partners on related group projects). It relied on brand partners for operations: a Park Hyatt flag in Los Angeles and an Atlantis (Kerzner) agreement for Ko Olina, signed December 2016.

Customer types and end-markets.

  • Office and retail tenants in central Shanghai (Huangpu district).

  • Planned luxury condominium buyers in Los Angeles. AR2022 described the targets as buyers aged 35–50, empty-nesters, celebrities and athletes, and international buyers.

  • Hotel and tourism guests in Los Angeles and Hawaii.

  • PLN as the single offtaker for power.

Independent characterisation. In substance the company was a leveraged, related-party-funded development pipeline with only a thin layer of income. In FY2022 its HK$28.0M of revenue set against about HK$11.9bn of interest-bearing debt (external plus intra-group). Value depended entirely on completing projects or selling them in an orderly way, and on continued funding from a mainland parent that was itself insolvent by 2022. It is best analysed as a case study in the distressed unwind of Chinese outbound real estate from 2016 to 2023, not as a going concern.

Strategy

Stated strategy, FY2015–FY2020 (themes from AR2020). The company would serve as the overseas core platform. It would invest in prime first-tier North American real estate and core-Shanghai property investment, and build diversified "US-dollar" assets. Projects would be partly for sale and partly held for income. Liquidity management, cost control and disposal of unprofitable assets were emphasised from 2020.

Stated strategy, FY2021–FY2023 (themes from AR2022). The priority shifted to survival:

  1. Dispose of assets to cut debt, leverage and recurring finance costs.

  2. Sell the Hawaii land to repay the noteholder.

  3. Hand the New York project to its lender in exchange for release of the parent guarantee and withdrawal of the Bermuda petition.

  4. Sell or joint-venture the Los Angeles project. The proceeds were earmarked to:

    • settle Los Angeles liens and litigation;

    • repay most external debt;

    • redeem the Shanghai properties from receivership and reconsolidate them;

    • fund day-to-day operations.

  5. Introduce strategic investors, streamline operations and "explore new areas of development."

Management stated its expectation that the group's financial difficulties would be resolved by the end of 2023. That expectation was not met.

Initiatives in the last 24 months (Oct 2024 – Oct 2026). No company-led initiatives exist. Activity is liquidator- and court-driven:

  • Realisation of Hawaii oceanfront lots (CBRE sale, Jan 2025).

  • Oceanwide Plaza Chapter 11: a creditor settlement in early 2026; a purchase and sale agreement dated 16 Feb 2026 with KPC Square; plan confirmation on 20 Jul 2026.

  • The HKEX resumption process, which failed and led to delisting on 24 Apr 2025.

ESG, cost programmes and medium-term targets: none announced. Guidance was never given beyond the Los Angeles project model (US$1.5bn net sales and about US$120M a year of stabilised recurring revenue) and the Medan 30-year operating case.

Products & Services

As a holding company, its "products" were individual real assets. Each is catalogued below with the latest disclosed status.

Property Investment

AssetDescription / specificationTarget customerYearPricing / economicsLatest status
Harbour Ring Plaza, Shanghai36-storey office/commercial tower at Xizang Road / Yan'an Road near People's Square; completed 1998Office and retail tenantsAcquired with listed vehicle 2014Rental; combined two-building revenue HK$110.9M in FY2021; about 95% occupancy at end-2020COPH in receivership since 14 Feb 2022; lenders pursuing a sale. Final disposition not publicly disclosed
Harbour Ring Huangpu Centre, Shanghai22-storey office/commercial building on Fengyang Road; completed 1996Office and retail tenantsAs aboveAs aboveAs above

Real Estate Development (United States)

AssetSpecificationPositioning / brandFunds invested (USD Mn)Latest status
Oceanwide Plaza, Los Angeles (1101 S. Flower St., opposite Crypto.com Arena)Site about 18,662 sqm; gross floor area about 138,249 sqm. Planned: about 164 hotel-branded condos (35,000 sqm), about 340 boutique condos (45,000 sqm), about 15,000 sqm retail, 184-key Park Hyatt, about 3,700 sqm LED signage, about 468 parking stalls. Construction began 2H2014; topped out 2018; MEP over 85% completeLuxury mixed-use; "largest LED sign on the US West Coast"1,166.4 (FY2020); 1,199.3 (FY2022)Suspended since 2019/2020. Involuntary bankruptcy Feb 2024. Plan of liquidation confirmed 20 Jul 2026 for sale to KPC Square (KPC Group / Lendlease JV) at about US$470M headline (US$70M cash + US$400M credit bid), reported as about US$517M of cash and credit. Closing expected in following months
New York Seaport project (80 South Street / 163 Front Street, Lower Manhattan)Site about 1,367 sqm; developable about 75,975 sqm; City Planning Commission certification obtainedHigh-end hotel plus residential tower408.3 (FY2020); 410.5 (FY2022)Receivership 2 May 2022. Forbearance agreements Aug and Dec 2022; plan was a deed-in-lieu-style transfer to the lender in exchange for release of the US$175.4M parent guarantee. Final disposition not publicly disclosed
Hawaii Ko Olina No. 1 Land (Oahu)Three parcels, about 106,311 sqm"Atlantis" resort with about 800 keys plus about 524 branded residences (Kerzner agreement Dec 2016)306.7 (FY2020); 306.0 (FY2022)In receivership. In Jan 2025 CBRE announced the sale of the last two undeveloped on-beach Ko Olina lots for Oceanwide Resort HI LLC to New Age Ko Olina; price not disclosed in the release
Hawaii Ko Olina No. 2 Land (Oahu)About 70,000 sqm; planned gross floor area about 92,292 sqmTwo luxury-branded hotels plus condominiums218.6 (FY2020); 221.3 (FY2022)HK$575.1M impaired FY2022. A sale of two parcels for US$134M was reported in Aug 2023 (KITV4), expected to complete Sep 2023. see the overlap note in Section 11
Hawaii Kapolei West (Oahu)About 2,045,481 sqm (about 484–505 acres)Master-planned residential/commercial community125.2 (FY2020)Sold Dec 2022 for US$95.0M (company figure); loss HK$202.7M

Energy

AssetSpecificationOfftakeFunds invested (USD Mn)Latest status
Medan Project (PT Mabar Elektrindo), Medan industrial zone, North Sumatra2 × 150 MW net coal-fired steam units; over 70% overall complete, design almost complete, site works about 50%BOO; PPA with PT PLN (Persero); two-part tariff (take-or-pay capacity plus energy); 30-year operating term364.5 (FY2020); 367.2 (FY2022)Suspended. Management targeted completion two years after restart (model completion year 2026; pre-tax discount rate 11.89%). Disposition under liquidation not publicly disclosed

Finance Investment and Others

HoldingStatus
Bonds and listed equitiesLargely sold before FY2021; no listed equity securities held at 31 Dec 2021 or 2022
China Huiyuan Juice Group sharesDelisted Jan 2021; fully provided for
Invested notesHK$168.1M early-redeemed in 2020

Financial Narrative

FY2023 onward was never published. Sources: Annual Reports 2020 and 2022 (Chairman's Statement, MD&A); profit warnings; etnet balance-sheet extract. All figures HK$M unless stated.

Income statement

Items not separately disclosed in the material reviewed:

  • EBITDA is therefore proxied by EBIT/LBIT. Google Finance reported 1H2023 EBITDA of –HK$34.65M.

Revenue CAGR FY2019–FY2022: –37.2%: Breakdown of "other net losses":

FY2020: impairments HK$617.8M; foreign-exchange loss HK$42.7M (on RMB debt); expected credit losses (ECL) HK$10.7M; less a HK$0.8M convertible-note redemption gain.

FY2021: impairments HK$4,098.4M; Los Angeles litigation provision HK$71.6M; foreign-exchange loss HK$32.0M; ECL HK$8.6M.

FY2022: impairment HK$575.1M; Kapolei disposal loss HK$202.7M; foreign-exchange loss HK$2.7M; ECL HK$1.7M.

FY2022 also: carried a separate HK$453.6M loss on deconsolidated subsidiaries and related financial guarantee contracts.

Margins and returns (derived)

ROA, ROIC and asset turnover cannot be computed reliably for every year because total assets were verified only for FY2020 (HK$25,129.2M) and 1H2023 (HK$16,590M). For FY2020, ROA ≈ –3.7% and asset turnover ≈ 0.004x.

Balance sheet and leverage

Definitional notes:

  • FY2019–2020 cash includes liquid funds and listed investments. FY2021–2022 is unsecured, unrestricted cash only.

  • Reported gearing is total bank and other borrowings ÷ total equity for FY2019–2020, and external borrowings ÷ total equity for FY2021–2022. Both exclude parent loans.

  • FY2022 also carried HK$114.8M due to the immediate holding company (interest-free). That amount is excluded from the table.

Other balance-sheet items:

Debt profile, FY2022: all external loans were in default at 31 Dec 2022.

  • Hawaii-secured: HK$998.4M principal plus interest.

  • Los Angeles-secured: HK$1,183.9M.

  • Fellow-subsidiary unsecured: HK$594.8M.

  • Convertible notes: HK$616.8M.

  • Deconsolidated New York loan: HK$1,456.3M.

  • Deconsolidated Shanghai loan: HK$1,525.4M.

  • Total external principal plus interest: HK$6,375.7M, against pledged assets with a carrying value of HK$15,966.3M.

  • Deposits, payables and accruals: a further HK$2,211.3M.

Debt split by maturity: FY2022 debt was all short-term (repayable within one year or in default). FY2020 split: HK$5,575.6M due within one year; HK$302.4M due in one to two years; HK$712.9M due in two to five years; plus the parent loan due in one to two years.

Goodwill and intangibles: not material / not publicly disclosed.

Working capital: negative and not separately quantified.

1H2023 (Google Finance, unaudited interim): - Total assets HK$16.59bn; total liabilities HK$15.62bn.

  • Total equity HK$971.7M; attributable equity HK$584.3M (etnet).

  • Cash and short-term investments HK$1.17M.

  • Loss attributable HK$703.9M (vs HK$728.8M in 1H2022, per MT Newswires). Google Finance shows –HK$352.0M of net income for the "Jun 2023" period, which appears to be a quarterly split. Discrepancy noted; the HK$703.9M company-reported figure is preferred.

Cash flow

Additional cash-flow items:

Capex: (properties under development additions) was not separately extracted; free cash flow is not publicly disclosed in comparable form.

FY2022 investing inflow: was driven by the Kapolei West disposal proceeds.

FY2022 financing outflow: was the repayment of loan principal and interest out of those proceeds.

Convertible notes: HK$26.5M were repurchased in FY2020. This was the only capital-return-type transaction.

Trend commentary

  1. Revenue never scaled. Rent of about HK$90–110M a year was the ceiling. FY2022 revenue fell 75% when Shanghai was deconsolidated.

  2. Equity was erased by impairments, not operating losses. Recurring LBIT grew only from HK$64M to HK$166M. Cumulative "other net losses" over FY2020–FY2022, however, were about HK$5.66bn. Attributable equity fell 88%, from HK$10.13bn (FY2019) to HK$1.25bn (FY2022), and to HK$0.58bn by June 2023.

  3. The funding model inverted. Operating cash burn of about HK$180–450M a year was covered by new loans (FY2019–2021). Once credit closed, asset sales went to creditors (FY2022) and the company could not meet its guarantees.

  4. Related-party dependence. The parent loan rose from HK$6.8bn to HK$8.9bn, about 75% of interest-bearing debt by FY2022. The parent's own collapse (liability-to-asset ratio of 99.2% at end-2022, per Caixin) removed the backstop.

  5. The inflection was FY2021. The New York and Los Angeles impairments, the Hawaii receivership and the parent defaults mark the transition from going concern to distressed estate.

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Financial Detail

Segment Overview

SegmentContentsStatus at last report (FY2022)

Property Investment

Harbour Ring Plaza (36 storeys, completed 1998) and Harbour Ring Huangpu Centre (22 storeys, completed 1996), Huangpu district, Shanghai, held via China Oceanwide Property Holdings Ltd (COPH)

Receivership from 14 Feb 2022; deconsolidated 1 Apr 2022; no income after that date

Real Estate Development

Los Angeles Oceanwide Plaza; New York Seaport project; Hawaii Ko Olina No. 1 and No. 2 Land; Hawaii Kapolei West

New York deconsolidated 1 May 2022; Kapolei sold Dec 2022; Hawaii in receivership since Jul 2021 but still consolidated; Los Angeles suspended

Energy

Medan 2×150 MW coal-fired steam power plants (PT Mabar Elektrindo), Indonesia

Construction suspended; no revenue

Finance Investment and Others

Bonds, listed equities and funds; head-office costs

No income-generating investments left; Huiyuan Juice stake fully provided for

Segment revenue (HKD Mn)

Segment revenue (HKD Mn)FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022

Property Investment

88.593.7110.927.9

Real Estate Development

0.00.00.00.0

Energy

0.00.00.00.0

Finance Investment and Others

24.66.30.40.09

Total revenue

113.0100.0111.328.0

Segment EBIT (HKD Mn)

Segment EBIT (HKD Mn)FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022

Property Investment

67.073.085.320.1

Real Estate Development

-74.7-706.3-3,974.5-902.0

Energy

-34.8-42.4-364.2-18.2

Finance Investment and Others

-5.4-68.6-68.4-48.2

Group EBIT / (LBIT)

-47.9-744.3-4,321.8-948.2

Segment Margins & Growth (%) and Revenue by Segment (%)

Metric (%)FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022

Property Investment EBIT margin

75.777.976.972.0

Property Investment revenue YoY growth

0.05.918.4-74.8

Property Investment share of group revenue

78.393.799.699.7

Finance and Others share of group revenue

21.86.30.40.3

Income Statement and Margin Analysis (%)

Metric (HKD Mn)FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022

Revenue

113.0100.0111.328.0

Revenue YoY growth (%)

0.0-11.511.3-74.8

Recurring EBIT / (LBIT) excl. other net gains/losses

-64.3-73.9-111.3-166.0

Other net gains / (losses)

16.4-670.4-4,210.6-782.2

Reported EBIT / (LBIT)

-47.9-744.3-4,321.8-948.2

Net loss attributable to shareholders

-58.0-926.6-5,359.8-2,420.1

Basic EPS (HK cents)

-0.36-5.74-33.20-14.99

Dividend per share (HK cents)

0000

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Margin Analysis (%)

Ratio (%)FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022

EBIT margin

-42.4-744.3-3,883.0-3,386.4

Net margin (attributable loss / revenue)

-51.3-926.6-4,815.6-8,643.2

ROE (attributable loss / year-end attributable equity)

-0.6-10.1-138.9-193.7

Balance Sheet and Margin Analysis (%)

Metric (HKD Mn)FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022

Equity attributable to shareholders

10,132.99,129.33,858.61,249.2

Bank and other loans incl. convertible notes

5,363.16,590.95,752.53,019.5

Amount due to intermediate holding company

6,805.46,579.68,505.18,856.2

Total interest-bearing debt incl. intra-group

12,168.513,170.514,257.611,875.7

Unrestricted cash (and liquid funds)

70.437.615.74.9

Net debt incl. intra-group

12,098.113,132.914,241.911,870.8

Reported gearing ratio (%)

50.869.2135.3184.4

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Cash Flow

Metric (HKD Mn)FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022

Net cash from operating activities

-448.9-311.0-231.0-181.1

Net cash from investing activities

-333.973.7-10.5681.3

Net cash from financing activities

217.5201.5221.4-510.1

Dividends paid

0000

Share buybacks

0000

Financial Analysis

RatioFY2020FY2022Comment

Debt / equity (incl. parent loans, on attributable equity)

1.44x9.51x

Derived

Revenue by Region

Region (HKD Mn)FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022

PRC (Mainland China)

88.7694.11111.028.02

Indonesia

11.120.0170.0060.002

Hong Kong and other (derived residual)

13.15.90.30.0

Total

113.0100.0111.328.0

Region growth (%)

Region growth (%)FY2020FY2021FY2022

PRC

6.017.9-74.8

Indonesia

-99.8-64.7-66.7

Segment Overview — Property Investment

SegmentPRCUnited StatesIndonesiaHong Kong

Property Investment

All revenue

———

Real Estate Development

—

All assets (no revenue)

——

Energy

——

All assets (no revenue)

—

Finance Investment and Others

Minor

—

Interest on loans to Medan minority shareholders (FY2019)

Treasury income and head office

Share price (HKD)

Share price (HKD)FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022

Implied year-end share price

0.2650.1350.0500.024

Period Performance Details

Period performance (to last trade, 22 Sep 2023, at HK$0.025)Return

From 31 Dec 2022 (HK$0.024)

about +4%

From 31 Dec 2020 (HK$0.135)

about -81%

From 30 Jun 2019 (HK$0.445)

about -94%

From 2014 offer price (HK$0.5973)

about -96%

From 24 Apr 2025

Delisted; no market

Analyst Conclusions

Management guidance. None is current; the last guidance (AR2022) targeted resolution by end-2023 and was not achieved. Consensus: none.

Liquidation monitorables (next 12 months):

  1. Whether the KPC Square purchase of Oceanwide Plaza closes within its six-month window (roughly by January 2027).

  2. The distribution waterfall from the Los Angeles proceeds: EB-5 and senior lenders first, then Lendlease and other lienholders, then any residual for Oceanwide Plaza LLC's parent chain.

  3. Any liquidator reports or court filings in Bermuda and Hong Kong on claims against related parties.

  4. The fate of the Medan project and of Shanghai receivership surpluses.

  5. Cross-border recognition and coordination between the Bermuda and Hong Kong estates.

Bull case (for creditors / estate recoveries, not for equity):

  1. The Los Angeles sale at about US$517M of total consideration validates residual value. An approved plan with the city and county on side reduces execution risk.

  2. Hawaii assets have been substantially monetised: US$95M for Kapolei, US$134M reported for Ko Olina No. 2, plus the 2025 on-beach lot sale. This shows the liquidators can realise land.

  3. The US$367.2M Medan investment is over 70% complete under a 30-year PPA, which may attract a strategic buyer.

Bear case:

  1. Recoveries fall far below invested capital. In Los Angeles, about US$517M of consideration compares with about US$1.2bn invested, and much of the price is a credit bid that cycles back to senior creditors.

  2. Guarantee and intra-group claims are enormous: HK$8.9bn owed to an insolvent parent and HK$3.0bn of guarantees. Unsecured recovery at the parent-company level is likely minimal.

  3. Equity is functionally extinguished: delisted, no published accounts since 1H2023 and attributable equity of HK$0.58bn in June 2023 before further write-downs.

Analyst verdict. China Oceanwide Holdings is no longer an investable equity. It is a two-jurisdiction liquidation estate whose remaining value sits in a handful of real assets controlled by receivers and courts. The record of FY2019–FY2022 is unambiguous. Revenue never exceeded about HK$113M, and it came almost entirely from two Shanghai buildings. Meanwhile the company carried about HK$12–14bn of interest-bearing debt, roughly three-quarters of it owed to its own parent.

The development thesis was large, brand-anchored projects in Los Angeles, New York and Hawaii, plus a coal IPP in Indonesia. It required a decade of patient, cheap capital from Beijing. That capital stopped in 2017–2019 as China curbed outbound investment, and stopped entirely once Oceanwide Holdings itself became insolvent. COVID-19, the termination by Lendlease and US rate hikes then turned a funding gap into an equity wipe-out. About HK$5.3bn of impairments took attributable equity from HK$10.1bn to HK$1.2bn in three years.

The 2023 winding-up orders and the 2025 delisting were the logical end-points. The governance lesson is equally clear. A board almost entirely composed of parent-group executives, with combined chair and CEO roles, provided no independent check on concentration and related-party funding risk.

From here, the key event is the closing of the Oceanwide Plaza sale. The headline price of about US$470–517M against about US$1.2bn invested tells creditors what to expect: senior and EB-5 lenders are largely made whole, contractors are partially covered, and little is likely to flow upstream to the Bermuda parent. Former shareholders should assume a zero recovery; the estate's priorities are secured creditors, guarantee claimants and the intra-group creditor. For practitioners, the case is a reference point for valuing stalled Chinese outbound real estate. Replacement cost and "trophy" status proved to be poor anchors, and realised values have clustered at roughly 40–50% of invested capital, reached only after years of carrying cost and reputational damage.


Principal sources:

  • China Oceanwide Holdings Annual Reports 2020 and 2022 (HKEXnews); profit warnings of 28 Jan 2022, 24 Jun 2022 and 24 Feb 2023; announcements of 25 Aug, 22/25 Sep, 25 Oct and 7 Nov 2023.

  • HKEX regulatory announcement of 17 Apr 2025.

  • G-Resources and Wan Kei announcements (Oct 2023).

  • Yicai Global (2022–2024); Caixin (2023); Bloomberg / Bloomberg Law (2014, 2021, 2026); Bisnow (2023, 2026).

  • Hilco Global / GlobeNewswire (Feb and Jul 2026); Commercial Observer (Jul 2026); Greenberg Traurig (Aug 2026).

  • KITV4 and Honolulu Star-Advertiser (2021–2023); CBRE (Jan 2025); Mingtiandi; ACN Newswire (Dec 2014); Guantao Law Firm.

  • Google Finance; etnet; MarketScreener/Zonebourse; Simply Wall St; Wikipedia (Oceanwide Holdings; Hutchison Harbour Ring; Oceanwide Plaza).

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Executive Leadership

Board of Directors

NameRoleTenureAge (AR2022)Prior / concurrent rolesEducation

LIU Guosheng

Executive Director; Chairman and CEO from 6 Sep 2022

ED since Nov 2014

54

Deputy chairman, president and CFO of Oceanwide Holdings; PRC senior accountant

BEcon, Hangzhou Institute of Electronic Industry (1991); MEcon, Wuhan University (2008)

LIU Hongwei

Executive Director; Deputy Chairman (from Jan 2020)

Since Nov 2014

56

ED of China Tonghai International Financial (952.HK); VP and director of China Oceanwide Holdings Group; former Oceanwide Holdings supervisor

BEng, Dalian Fisheries University (1989); Master of Management, Massey University (2006)

LIU Bing

Executive Director

Since Nov 2014

65

NED of China Tonghai International Financial; former vice chairman of Minsheng Holdings (2017–2020)

MBA, Sacred Heart University (1989)

ZHAO Yingwei

Non-executive Director

Since Nov 2014

52

Chairman of the supervisory committee of Oceanwide Holdings and of Minsheng Holdings; ED, EVP and CFO of China Oceanwide Holdings Group

BEcon, Renmin University (1997); MEng, Beihang University (2013)

LIU Jipeng

INED; Audit Committee chair

Since Nov 2014

67

Dean, Capital Finance Institute, China University of Political Science and Law; INED of China Minsheng Banking

BEcon, Beijing College of Economics (1983); MEcon, CASS Graduate School (1986)

YAN Fashan

INED; Remuneration Committee chair

Since Nov 2014

71

Professor, Fudan University School of Economics; independent director of Oceanwide Holdings and Zhongtai Securities

MEcon (1981) and PhD (1998), Fudan

LO Wa Kei Roy

INED; Nomination Committee chair

Since Nov 2014; resigned 28 Sep 2023

51

Managing director of SHINEWING (HK) CPA; Shanghai CPPCC member; INED of several HK-listed companies

BBA, HKU (1993); MPA, PolyU (2000)

HAN Xiaosheng

Former Chairman and CEO

Dec 2014 – 6 Sep 2022

64 (AR2020)

Former ED and CEO of Oceanwide Holdings (2015–2019); chairman of China Tonghai International Financial

Master's, Renmin University; DMgtSci, HUST (2018)

ZHANG Xifang

Former Executive Director

—

48 (AR2020)

Vice chairman and CEO of Oceanwide Holdings; former State Grid finance executive

BEcon, CUFE; MBA, Tsinghua

Executive Leadership Team

NameRoleSince

WAN Wing Sze May

Chief Financial Officer (FCPA, HKICPA)

Mar 2015 (joined 2004)

SHI Yuehong

Risk Control Director

Dec 2014 (listed in AR2020; not in AR2022)

LAM Wai Yee Sophie

Company Secretary and Authorised Representative

—

Major Shareholders

HolderShares%

Oceanwide Holdings group in aggregate (via China Oceanwide Group)

12,097,721,17874.94

— Oceanwide Holdings International Co., Ltd (beneficial)

11,346,221,17870.28

— Oceanwide Holdings International Finance Ltd

751,500,0004.66

Haitong International Financial Products (Singapore), security interest over pledged shares

9,414,077,10858.32

Haitong International group, total interest incl. 723,239,075 underlying shares

10,137,316,18362.80

Public float (implied)

about 4.04bn

about 25.06

Competitive Landscape

Competitors by Segment

SegmentPeerRelevance

Shanghai office investment

Hang Lung Properties

Prime Shanghai landlord (Plaza 66); much larger, investment-grade

Shanghai office investment

Swire Properties

Prime China office/mall owner

Shanghai office investment

Shui On Land

Shanghai Xintiandi/Hongqiao office portfolios

Shanghai office investment

Hongkong Land

Shanghai West Bund and other China commercial assets

US luxury mixed-use (Chinese outbound)

Greenland Holdings (Metropolis, Los Angeles)

Directly comparable Chinese developer in downtown LA

US luxury mixed-use (Chinese outbound)

Shenzhen Hazens (Hollywood/LA projects)

Comparable stalled Chinese LA developer

US luxury mixed-use (Chinese outbound)

Dalian Wanda (One Beverly Hills, later exited)

Chinese outbound luxury project in LA

US luxury mixed-use (Chinese outbound)

Xinyuan Real Estate (New York)

Chinese developer in NYC condominiums

Hawaii resort land

Disney Aulani / Ko Olina resort operators; other Ko Olina hotel landowners

Competing for the same scarce lagoon-front sites and resort demand

Indonesia IPP

Other coal/gas IPPs selling to PLN, e.g. Chinese-sponsored Sumatra IPPs

Same single offtaker; coal pipeline under policy pressure

Competitor Detail

MetricChina Oceanwide (715)

Revenue FY2022

HK$28.0M

Revenue growth FY2022

-74.8%

EBIT margin FY2022

-3,386%

R&D intensity

0%

Recent Developments

The strict 18-month window (Apr 2025 – Oct 2026) contains limited entity-level news because the company is delisted and in liquidation. To reach a useful register, Part A covers that window and Part B covers the immediately preceding period that set up the current state.*

Part A — Apr 2025 to Oct 2026

DateEventSignificance
17 Apr 2025HKEX announces cancellation of listing under Rule 6.01A(1)Shareholders lose any trading market
24 Apr 2025Listing cancelled at 9:00 amEnd of public company status
2025 (H1–H2)Creditor-priority litigation in the Oceanwide Plaza Chapter 11 places the EB-5 lender (LA Downtown Investment) ahead of contractorsShapes the waterfall; equity recovery remote
Mar–Aug 2025City of Los Angeles graffiti and security costs continue (about US$3.8–4M allocated/billed in 2024)Adds municipal claims and reputational damage
2 Feb 2026Creditors reach a bankruptcy-exit settlement for Oceanwide Plaza (Bloomberg / The Real Deal)Unlocks a sale
16 Feb 2026PSA signed with KPC Square LLCDefined exit price
23 Feb 2026Hilco Global announces the US$470M sale (US$70M cash + US$400M credit bid)Public disclosure of terms
Feb 2026LA Mayor, City Attorney and councilmember support the salePolitical backing ahead of the 2028 Olympics
9 Apr 2026Overbid deadlineNo higher qualified bid displaced KPC
Mid-2026AA Group submits an alternative US$500M acquisition / US$1.2bn development proposal including a 300 MW data centreNot selected; shows residual market interest
Jun–Jul 2026City and County of LA raise, then withdraw, objections (financing, feasibility, unpaid taxes)Removes the last confirmation obstacle
20 Jul 2026Bankruptcy Court confirms the Oceanwide Plaza revised combined disclosure statement and plan of liquidationSale cleared; graffiti removal within 30 days
21 Jul 2026Bloomberg Law reports about US$517M of cash and credit, plus about US$800M of completion costImplies a recovery of under half the about US$1.2bn invested
Jul 2026Six-month closing window set; backup buyer if KPC fails to closeClosing risk persists into early 2027
Aug 2026Greenberg Traurig (KPC counsel) publicises the dealConfirms the buyer's legal team and the about US$800M completion plan

Part B — Context, Feb 2022 to Mar 2025

DateEventSignificance
14 Feb 2022Shanghai holdco receivershipLoss of the only income asset
2 May 2022New York holdco receivershipLoss of the New York asset
13 May 2022US$92.9M Kapolei sale falls through; shares fall up to 8.5%Failed deleveraging
9 Jun 2022Bermuda winding-up petition (US$175.4M)Start of the liquidation path
6 Sep 2022Liu Guosheng becomes Chairman and CEOLeadership change
Dec 2022Kapolei West sale completed (US$95.0M)Partial noteholder repayment
24 Feb 2023FY2022 profit warning (revenue about HK$28M; loss about HK$2.3bn)Confirms collapse
28 Feb 2023HK High Court dismisses a winding-up petition against China Oceanwide Group Ltd (described by MT Newswires as a unit; AR2022 defines it as the intermediate holding company)Temporary relief at group level
31 Mar 2023FY2022 results; target to resolve difficulties by end-2023Last audited accounts
Jun 2023Oceanwide Plaza foreclosed upon and listed for sale (secondary sources)Loss of control of the Los Angeles project
10 Jul 2023Lendlease statutory demand under C(WUMP)O s.327(4)(a)Hong Kong insolvency trigger
25 Aug 2023Lendlease (US) Construction HK winding-up petition served (about US$28.4M)Second front
30 Aug 20231H2023 interim results: loss HK$703.9MLast published financials
22 Sep 2023Bermuda winding-up order; Teneo appointedLiquidation
25 Sep 2023Shares suspended—
28 Sep 2023INED Lo Wa Kei Roy resignsBoard unwinds
25 Oct 2023HK petition hearing adjourned to 20 Dec 2023—
20 Dec 2023HK High Court winding-up order; Official Receiver appointedDual-jurisdiction liquidation
7 Feb 2024Parent Oceanwide Holdings delisted from SZSE (price below CNY1)Parent backstop gone
13 Feb 2024Involuntary bankruptcy filing, Oceanwide Plaza LLCUS court process begins
Jul 2024Stalking-horse bid for Oceanwide Plaza falls throughDelay
10 Oct 2024HKEX additional resumption guidance (publish all outstanding results; replace company secretary)Conditions never met
15 Jan 2025CBRE announces the sale of the last two on-beach Ko Olina lots to New Age Ko OlinaHawaii exit substantially complete
Mar 2025Liquidators disclose cessation of the remaining executive directors' service contractsGovernance vacuum formalised

Company Snapshot

$3.6M

Revenue

56

Employees

1990

Founded

Bermuda

Headquarters

SWOT Analysis

Strengths

  • Trophy Los Angeles site. Full block opposite Crypto.com Arena with about 138,249 sqm of gross floor area. A buyer bid about US$517M despite the graffiti and liens (Bloomberg Law, Jul 2026).
  • Structurally advanced Los Angeles construction. Topped out in 2018 with MEP over 85% complete (AR2022). The buyer's executive described the buildings as structurally sound (WSJ via Ground News).
  • Scarce Hawaii assets. The last two undeveloped on-beach Ko Olina lots (CBRE, Jan 2025) proved saleable even in receivership.
  • High-margin Shanghai income. EBIT margins of 72–78% (FY2019–FY2022) with about 95% occupancy (end-2020).
  • Contracted energy economics. The Medan PPA had a take-or-pay capacity tariff and a 30-year term (AR2022).
  • Pledged-asset cover. Carrying value of HK$15,966M against HK$6,376M of external debt at end-2022 (AR2022), although carrying values later proved overstated.

Weaknesses

  • Negligible revenue. HK$28.0M in FY2022 against HK$11.9bn of interest-bearing debt.
  • Every external loan was in default at 31 Dec 2022 (AR2022).
  • Cash of HK$4.9M at FY2022, and about HK$1.2M by June 2023 (Google Finance).
  • Parent dependence. HK$8,856M was due to the intermediate holdco, which was itself insolvent (parent liability-to-asset ratio 99.2%; Caixin, May 2023).
  • Governance conflicts. All executive directors and the NED held parent or ultimate-group roles (AR2022 Rule 8.10 disclosure).
  • Cumulative impairments of about HK$5.3bn over FY2020–FY2022 show that the original valuations were over-optimistic.

Opportunities

  • Close the Oceanwide Plaza sale (US$470–517M) within the six-month window.
  • Pursue estate claims against related parties (parent and fellow subsidiaries) through the liquidators.
  • Recover value from the Medan project through a sale to a strategic IPP investor (US$367.2M invested).
  • Realise any surplus from the Shanghai receivership after secured debt of HK$1,525.4M.
  • Use 2028 Olympics-driven demand for downtown LA hospitality to support buyer financing.
  • Settle the New York guarantee claim (US$175.4M) through the estate.

Threats

  • The KPC closing fails, forcing a backup-buyer process (KPC was given a six-month window).
  • Senior and EB-5 lender priority absorbs Los Angeles proceeds, leaving the parent company little residual value (2025 priority ruling).
  • Indonesian coal-power policy shifts impair Medan's value.
  • Cross-border recognition conflicts between the Bermuda and Hong Kong liquidations.
  • Statutory/municipal claims (LA County back taxes, City graffiti costs) rank ahead of the estate.
  • Equity recovery is effectively nil after delisting; the last market cap was about HK$400M against a liquidation shortfall.

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Key Developments

DateEventSignificance
17 Apr 2025HKEX announces cancellation of listing under Rule 6.01A(1)Shareholders lose any trading market
24 Apr 2025Listing cancelled at 9:00 amEnd of public company status
2025 (H1–H2)Creditor-priority litigation in the Oceanwide Plaza Chapter 11 places the EB-5 lender (LA Downtown Investment) ahead of contractorsShapes the waterfall; equity recovery remote
Mar–Aug 2025City of Los Angeles graffiti and security costs continue (about US$3.8–4M allocated/billed in 2024)Adds municipal claims and reputational damage
2 Feb 2026Creditors reach a bankruptcy-exit settlement for Oceanwide Plaza (Bloomberg / The Real Deal)Unlocks a sale
16 Feb 2026PSA signed with KPC Square LLCDefined exit price
23 Feb 2026Hilco Global announces the US$470M sale (US$70M cash + US$400M credit bid)Public disclosure of terms
Feb 2026LA Mayor, City Attorney and councilmember support the salePolitical backing ahead of the 2028 Olympics
9 Apr 2026Overbid deadlineNo higher qualified bid displaced KPC
Mid-2026AA Group submits an alternative US$500M acquisition / US$1.2bn development proposal including a 300 MW data centreNot selected; shows residual market interest
Jun–Jul 2026City and County of LA raise, then withdraw, objections (financing, feasibility, unpaid taxes)Removes the last confirmation obstacle
20 Jul 2026Bankruptcy Court confirms the Oceanwide Plaza revised combined disclosure statement and plan of liquidationSale cleared; graffiti removal within 30 days
21 Jul 2026Bloomberg Law reports about US$517M of cash and credit, plus about US$800M of completion costImplies a recovery of under half the about US$1.2bn invested
Jul 2026Six-month closing window set; backup buyer if KPC fails to closeClosing risk persists into early 2027
Aug 2026Greenberg Traurig (KPC counsel) publicises the dealConfirms the buyer's legal team and the about US$800M completion plan
14 Feb 2022Shanghai holdco receivershipLoss of the only income asset
2 May 2022New York holdco receivershipLoss of the New York asset
13 May 2022US$92.9M Kapolei sale falls through; shares fall up to 8.5%Failed deleveraging
9 Jun 2022Bermuda winding-up petition (US$175.4M)Start of the liquidation path
6 Sep 2022Liu Guosheng becomes Chairman and CEOLeadership change
Dec 2022Kapolei West sale completed (US$95.0M)Partial noteholder repayment
24 Feb 2023FY2022 profit warning (revenue about HK$28M; loss about HK$2.3bn)Confirms collapse
28 Feb 2023HK High Court dismisses a winding-up petition against China Oceanwide Group Ltd (described by MT Newswires as a unit; AR2022 defines it as the intermediate holding company)Temporary relief at group level
31 Mar 2023FY2022 results; target to resolve difficulties by end-2023Last audited accounts
Jun 2023Oceanwide Plaza foreclosed upon and listed for sale (secondary sources)Loss of control of the Los Angeles project
10 Jul 2023Lendlease statutory demand under C(WUMP)O s.327(4)(a)Hong Kong insolvency trigger
25 Aug 2023Lendlease (US) Construction HK winding-up petition served (about US$28.4M)Second front
30 Aug 20231H2023 interim results: loss HK$703.9MLast published financials
22 Sep 2023Bermuda winding-up order; Teneo appointedLiquidation
25 Sep 2023Shares suspended—
28 Sep 2023INED Lo Wa Kei Roy resignsBoard unwinds
25 Oct 2023HK petition hearing adjourned to 20 Dec 2023—
20 Dec 2023HK High Court winding-up order; Official Receiver appointedDual-jurisdiction liquidation
7 Feb 2024Parent Oceanwide Holdings delisted from SZSE (price below CNY1)Parent backstop gone
13 Feb 2024Involuntary bankruptcy filing, Oceanwide Plaza LLCUS court process begins
Jul 2024Stalking-horse bid for Oceanwide Plaza falls throughDelay
10 Oct 2024HKEX additional resumption guidance (publish all outstanding results; replace company secretary)Conditions never met
15 Jan 2025CBRE announces the sale of the last two on-beach Ko Olina lots to New Age Ko OlinaHawaii exit substantially complete
Mar 2025Liquidators disclose cessation of the remaining executive directors' service contractsGovernance vacuum formalised

Financial Performance

Explore key financial metrics, segmented revenue, balance sheet health, and performance trends.

Revenue

3 charts
Revenue by Segment: Total revenue fell from HKD 113 Mn in FY2019 to HKD 28 Mn in FY2022.
China Oceanwide Holdings Limited — Revenue by Segment
Series (HKD Mn)FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022
Total revenue113100111.328
Property Investment88.593.7110.927.9
Finance Investment and Others24.66.30.40.1

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