Cosnine Co., Ltd. Overview
| Item | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Legal name | 주식회사 코스나인 / Cosnine Co., Ltd. | Korean Wikipedia; KRX disclosures |
| Former names | Chamtech (참테크) → Chamtech Global (참테크글로벌) → Crucial MS (크루셜엠스) → Samwoo MS (삼우엠스) → 9Complex (나인컴플렉스, from June 2019) → Cosnine (from 2020) | Korean Wikipedia; IB Tomato (2021); Saramin |
| Founding | Incorporation date given as 20 June 2001. Some media say the company was founded in 2000 as a telecom-equipment maker. The sources conflict and both are noted. | Korean Wikipedia; Saramin; Bloter (23 Apr 2025); IB Tomato |
| Founder | Lee Ki-hong (이기홍) | Korean Wikipedia |
| Incorporation jurisdiction | Republic of Korea (주식회사) | — |
| Headquarters address | 27 Hagunsandan 2-ro, Yangchon-eup, Gimpo-si, Gyeonggi-do, South Korea. The Gimpo land and buildings were sold in January 2025 (see Section 8). | Korean Wikipedia; Simply Wall St |
| Exchange / ticker | KOSDAQ: 082660 (A082660). Listed 5 Oct 2005; delisted 21 Sep 2026. | Korean Wikipedia; KRX/DART 8 Sep 2026 |
| ISIN | KRX standard construction gives KR7082660002, but this was not checked against a registry. | — |
| CUSIP | Not applicable (no US listing) | — |
| Fiscal year end | 31 December | KIND filings |
| Employees | 69–75 per aggregators (mid/late 2024) | Simply Wall St; Google Finance |
| Auditor (FY2025) | Daesung Accounting Corp. (대성회계법인). Opinion: disclaimer. | FY2025 annual report (KIND, 24 Mar 2026) |
| Auditor (FY2024) | The company received a disclaimer of opinion on 21 Mar 2025. | Cosinkorea (11 Apr 2025) |
| Interim reviewer (H1 FY2023) | Samdo Accounting Corp. (삼도회계법인). Review conclusion: unqualified. | Top Daily (16 Aug 2023) |
| Market capitalisation | Last pre-suspension value KRW 47.83bn, at KRW 480/share × 99.64M shares (7 Aug 2024). There is no current market value since delisting. | Google Finance; Simply Wall St |
| Shares outstanding | 99.64M (2024) | Google Finance; Simply Wall St |
| Website | www.cosnine.com | — |
| Corporate status flag | Startup database THE VC lists the company status as "closed" (폐업). This is not confirmed by a primary source. | thevc.kr |
Cosnine Co., Ltd. is a former KOSDAQ-listed South Korean contract cosmetics manufacturer. It produced skincare and colour cosmetics on an OEM/ODM/OCM basis from a CGMP- and ISO 22716-certified plant in Gimpo, Gyeonggi-do. The plant included an underground production line, which was a first for the Korean industry.
The listed shell traces back to Chamtech, a 2000s telecom-equipment and handset-case maker. It changed its name five times before absorbing the cosmetics maker Cosnine in December 2019 and adopting its name in 2020. Its best-known product heritage is the Gerissong horse-oil cream, reported at more than 30 million units sold.
After 2020 the company never earned an operating profit. Revenue shrank from about KRW 21bn (FY2020) to about KRW 9.7bn (FY2024). Governance failures followed: control contests, alleged embezzlement of KRW 9.08bn by former management, consecutive audit disclaimers, an abandoned court rehabilitation, and finally delisting in September 2026. Today it is best characterised as a distressed, delisted entity with no demonstrated going-concern value.
What the company does
At its operating peak, Cosnine was a contract development and manufacturing organisation (CDMO) for cosmetics. It operated under three engagement models:
OEM: manufacturing to the client's formula.
ODM: Cosnine develops and manufactures the product.
OCM: a broader service that includes concept and brand support.
Aggregator business descriptions (Simply Wall St, citing S&P Global data) list two product families:
Basic skincare: creams, serums, toners, essences, lotions, moisturisers, eye creams and sunscreens.
Make-up: foundations, CC/BB creams, concealers, blushes, eyeshadows, eyeliners, mascaras, lipsticks and lip glosses.
The company also stated:
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It had obtained quasi-drug (의약외품) manufacturing and sales authorisation.
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It held Halal certification.
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It held patents related to horse-oil (마유) formulations (Etoday, 2019).
Saramin's registry summary lists three registered activities: cosmetics manufacturing; metal can and other packaging-container manufacturing; and cosmetics and toiletries wholesale.
Ancillary and attempted businesses
| Business | Description | Period | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| ITS / "Smart" business | Building and maintaining intelligent transport information systems | Legacy from earlier incarnations; still reported in 2020–2022 | Asia Economy (7 Oct 2020); Dealsite (20 Jul 2022) |
| China cosmetics distribution | Distribution and sales via the Shanghai subsidiary (Cosnine Shanghai) | c.2020–2024 | Dealsite (20 Jul 2022; 24 Jul 2024) |
| Lithium carbonate distribution and solar | Through subsidiary Green Energy Innovation, set up 21 Jul 2023. Letters of intent for lithium carbonate supply with Shandong Nanbeiji New Energy; supply talks with another Chinese group. | 2023 onward | Top Daily (16 Aug 2023) |
| AI, hydrogen, hotel/tourism | Articles of incorporation amended for these new businesses after the July 2024 change of control | 2024 (aspirational) | Dealsite (24 Jul 2024) |
| Mobile-phone cases (legacy) | Original handset-case manufacturing. The company exited because of poor results. | Pre-2019 | Asia Economy (7 Oct 2020); THE VC |
Revenue model
Revenue came mainly from product sales of contract-manufactured cosmetics, invoiced per unit or order to brand-owner clients. ITS maintenance contracts generated small service revenue. There was no subscription or licensing revenue of note.
Cosmetics accounted for:
94%: of revenue in H1 2020 (Asia Economy, 7 Oct 2020)
64.1%: of revenue in 2019, the year of the Cosnine merger (IB Tomato)
- about 95% of revenue in 2020 (IB Tomato)
Value-chain position and customers
Cosnine sat in the midstream manufacturing layer of the K-beauty value chain. Its position looked like this:
Upstream: raw-material and packaging suppliers.
Its own layer: formulation, filling and packaging.
Downstream: brand owners, who sell through road-shops, duty-free, e-commerce and export channels. Cosnine itself sold into China through its Shanghai unit.
Named counterparties in public sources:
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Chinese conglomerate Bunma Group (contract-manufacturing and distribution cooperation, 2022).
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Genomics company Clinomics (bio-based anti-ageing cosmetics MOU, 2023).
The company's customer list, customer concentration, and end-market split were not publicly disclosed in the sources reviewed.
Company self-description vs independent characterisation
Company's description. In its last public positioning, Cosnine described itself as a CGMP- and ISO-based cosmetics manufacturer building out OEM, ODM and OCM capabilities (medigatenews, 27 Jun 2023). In 2023, management said it expected a revenue rebound from:
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the end of Korea's indoor mask mandate, and
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China's reopening.
Management argued that simply returning to 2020 revenue would mean two to three times growth (Dealsite, 20 Jan 2023).
Independent characterisation. The evidence points to a sub-scale, chronically loss-making contract manufacturer:
Negative gross margins: FY2022 −24.75%, FY2023 −4.00%, FY2024 about −11.9%.
Little pricing power or utilisation: much of the plant was reportedly idle during COVID-19 (Dealsite, 20 Jul 2022).
Diversification without results: repeated moves into unrelated businesses (lithium, AI, hydrogen, hospitality) produced no disclosed revenue.
Fragile governance: The FY2025 annual report contains a disclaimer of opinion. FY2025 operating revenue is therefore not reliably verifiable.
Strategy
Stated strategy (themes, paraphrased)
The latest annual report's strategy section could not be retrieved; the report was filed under a disclaimer. Disclosed strategic themes over the last cycle were:
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Cosmetics recovery (2023). Use the end of the mask mandate and China's reopening. Pursue aggressive marketing of K-beauty basic and colour lines. Improve the production environment and introduce smart logistics (Dealsite, 20 Jan 2023).
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Diversification into new energy (2023). Lithium carbonate distribution to Korean conglomerates and a solar business via Green Energy Innovation (Top Daily, 16 Aug 2023).
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Post-change-of-control agenda (2024). Strengthen cosmetics while adding AI, hydrogen and hotel/tourism businesses (Dealsite, 24 Jul 2024). Market commentators doubted near-term results.
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Restructuring for survival (2024–2025). Pursue court rehabilitation. Sell the Gimpo real estate (KRW 14.0bn). Seek convertible-bond issuance or further asset sales to repay short-term debt (Cosinkorea, 11 Apr 2025). Run a pre-plan M&A through a third-party share allotment with Samjong KPMG as advisor (Bloter, 23 Apr 2025).
Initiatives register (last ~24 months)
| Date | Initiative | Type | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 2024 | Change of control to SMG Youngmin Songdo; board overhaul; new business purposes | Governance / diversification | No disclosed revenue from new businesses |
| 28 Oct 2024 | Improvement plan to KRX; rehabilitation petition | Restructuring | Rehabilitation commenced 26 Nov 2024; abolished 12 Aug 2025 |
| Jan 2025 | Sale of Gimpo land and buildings (KRW 14.0bn) | Asset disposal | Completed |
| Mar–Apr 2025 | Pre-plan M&A (third-party allotment) | Capital raising / sale | Failed (court, Aug 2025) |
| 4 Aug 2025 | Company applies to abolish rehabilitation, saying liquidation was more advantageous | Wind-down | Granted 12 Aug 2025 |
| 1 Dec 2025 | Injunction against delisting | Legal defence | Dismissed; delisted 21 Sep 2026 |
Medium-term targets and guidance
No medium-term financial targets or guidance are publicly disclosed for the current period.
Historical aspirations went unmet:
2016: the pre-merger CEO targeted KRW 100bn of revenue quickly and KRW 200bn within five years (Etoday, 21 Sep 2016). Actual peak revenue was about KRW 21bn in FY2020.
2022: the company said Bunma Group cooperation would bring sharp revenue growth and a likely profit from Q3 2022 (Dealsite, 20 Jul 2022). FY2022 posted an operating loss of about KRW 7.7bn.
ESG and cost programmes
No sustainability commitments or formal cost-reduction targets were identified. The company claimed a 20% cut in administrative expenses in H1 2023 (Top Daily, 16 Aug 2023).
Products & Services
The table below uses aggregator descriptions and press disclosures. Pricing was not disclosed for any line.
Cosmetics — contract manufacturing (OEM/ODM/OCM)
| Product category | Description | Target customer | Launch / latest | Pricing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Skin creams and moisturisers | Basic skincare emulsions and creams, including horse-oil (mayu) creams | Brand owners (domestic and China) | — | — |
| Serums and essences | Treatment-type skincare | Brand owners | — | — |
| Toners and lotions | Basic skincare liquids | Brand owners | — | — |
| Eye creams | Targeted skincare | Brand owners | — | — |
| Sunscreens | Sun care. May fall under quasi-drug authorisation; this is not confirmed per SKU. | Brand owners | — | — |
| Foundations, CC and BB creams, concealers | Base make-up | Brand owners | — | — |
| Blushes, eyeshadows, eyeliners, mascaras | Colour make-up | Brand owners | — | — |
| Lipsticks and lip glosses | Lip colour | Brand owners | — | — |
Category list source: Simply Wall St (S&P Global description).
Flagship and heritage products
| Product | Description | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Gerissong 9 Complex (게리쏭 9컴플렉스) horse-oil cream | Hit product of the pre-merger Cosnine. Reported cumulative sales of more than 30 million units; the company continued producing it. Supported by horse-oil-related patents. | Etoday (2019); Etoday (21 Sep 2016) |
| Bio-based anti-ageing cosmetics (with Clinomics) | Joint R&D under the June 2023 MOU, using Clinomics genomics-derived anti-ageing research | Medigatenews (27 Jun 2023) |
Quality and regulatory credentials
| Credential | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| CGMP (Korea MFDS) | Post-certification renewal assessment rated "compliant" (c.2019) | Etoday (2019) |
| ISO 22716 | International cosmetics GMP standard | Etoday (2019) |
| Halal certification | Obtained | Etoday (2019) |
| Quasi-drug manufacturing and sales authorisation | Obtained | Etoday (2019) |
Non-cosmetics offerings
| Offering | Description | Status |
|---|---|---|
| ITS construction and maintenance | Intelligent transport information systems | Legacy; revenue not disclosed |
| Lithium carbonate distribution | Sourcing from Chinese suppliers for sale to Korean conglomerates | Announced 2023; revenue not disclosed |
| Solar business | Via Green Energy Innovation | Announced 2023; revenue not disclosed |
Financial Narrative
Income statement (FY2020–FY2024)
Sources and notes:
FY2020–FY2023: revenue and cost of sales from Hankyung Markets (consolidated). Operating income, EBITDA and net income are derived from Hankyung's reported margins (operating margin, EBITDA margin, net margin) multiplied by revenue.
Media cross-checks: operating losses were reported as KRW 5.3bn (2021), KRW 7.7bn (2022) and KRW 6.5bn (2023) by Dealsite and Cosinkorea. These match the derived values.
FY2024: from the FY2025 annual report comparatives (KIND). These appear to be separate-entity statements. Cosinkorea reported a consolidated FY2024 operating loss of about KRW 8.3bn.
FY2023 basis difference: the FY2025 report's FY2023 separate comparatives show operating loss KRW −6,114M, pre-tax KRW −6,043M and net KRW −6,063M. Consolidated net loss (derived) is KRW −5,878M.
Dividends: none paid (Stockopedia: no current dividend). FY2020–FY2022 zero values reflect accumulated deficits and losses; no dividend was identified in any source.
FY2025: full-year audited figures are not reliable because of the disclaimer. Aggregated quarterly data (Google Finance) show revenue of KRW 1,680M (Q1), KRW 1,870M (Q2) and KRW 1,340M (Q3). That is KRW 4,890M for the first nine months. Quarterly operating losses were KRW −2,110M, −1,630M and −1,490M.
Margins and growth
Notes:
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FY2020–FY2023 ratios as reported by Hankyung Markets.
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FY2024 ratios are computed from the FY2025 annual report comparatives.
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Revenue CAGR FY2020–FY2024 is −17.5% a year (computed: (9,741 / 21,016)^(1/4) − 1).
Balance sheet (available data points)
Notes:
FY2023 equity (derived): the KRW 9.08bn embezzlement was disclosed as 26.19% of FY2023 equity, which implies equity of about KRW 34.7bn.
FY2024 total assets (derived): the KRW 14.0bn Gimpo sale was disclosed as 26.87% of total assets, which implies about KRW 52.1bn.
FY2024 short-term borrowings: KRW 12.0bn (Cosinkorea).
Accumulated deficit and capital impairment: KRW 82.1bn deficit and 55% impairment at end-2024 (Bloter, 23 Apr 2025). Cosinkorea separately reported impairment above 50%.
Data integrity flag. At 30 June 2024, equity was reported at KRW 32.4bn, with cash exceeding debt. By year-end 2024 there was a capital impairment above 50% and KRW 12.0bn of short-term borrowings.
The deterioration in six months coincides with:
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the embezzlement findings,
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an FY2024 net loss of KRW 19.4bn, and
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"other losses" of KRW 9.4bn in FY2024 (FY2025 annual report comparatives).
The auditor's disclaimer means none of these balances is assured.
Goodwill and intangibles, working capital, net debt and the long-term debt split were not publicly disclosed in the sources reviewed. For context, KRW 5.4bn of goodwill arose from the 2019 Cotis and Cosnine acquisitions, of which KRW 2.5bn was impaired in H1 2020 (Asia Economy).
Cash flow
Cash-flow statements were not publicly disclosed in retrievable form. Disclosed funding events instead show a business financed externally:
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third-party share allotments (KRW 5bn in 2020; a 2024 rights issue of undisclosed size),
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convertible bonds (series 20 and 21 were being re-sold in 2023), and
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asset sales (Gimpo plant, KRW 14.0bn, January 2025).
In H1 2023, the company reported repaying KRW 13.9bn of current borrowings that carried a 9.5% interest rate (Top Daily, 16 Aug 2023).
Ratios
Notes:
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ROE and ROA from Hankyung Markets.
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FY2024 interest expense of about KRW 300M from Cosinkorea.
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Debt to equity: Simply Wall St reported 25.0% at 30 June 2024, down from 285.6% five years earlier. These are point estimates, not fiscal year-end values.
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ROIC, current ratio, net debt/EBITDA, interest coverage, asset turnover and cash conversion cycle were not publicly disclosed. Net debt/EBITDA and interest coverage are not meaningful with negative EBITDA.
Commentary on trends and drivers
Revenue collapse after 2020. Revenue peaked in FY2020 at about KRW 21.0bn. It fell 40% in FY2021 and 28% in FY2022, then stabilised near KRW 9.6–9.7bn in FY2023–FY2024. Three drivers explain the decline:
Mask-related demand: management linked the downturn to COVID-19 and mask mandates, which hurt colour cosmetics in particular (Dealsite, 20 Jan 2023).
Idle capacity: much of the production capacity sat unused.
China: the China distribution channel weakened (Dealsite, 24 Jul 2024).
The hoped-for 2023 reopening rebound was marginal: FY2023 revenue rose only 6.8%.
Structural negative gross margin. Gross margin turned negative in FY2022 (−24.75%) and stayed negative. A cosmetics manufacturer whose cost of sales exceeds revenue for three consecutive years is running below break-even utilisation. Fixed plant costs cannot be absorbed at about KRW 10bn of annual sales. By contrast, large ODM peers report positive double-digit gross margins.
Operating loss as a multiple of revenue. Operating losses equalled 68–86% of revenue in FY2022–FY2024. SG&A was KRW 6.9bn on KRW 9.7bn of revenue in FY2024 (FY2025 annual report comparatives). The company ran losses for eight consecutive years from 2017 to 2024 (Bloter, 23 Apr 2025). Dealsite described the run as seven consecutive years of losses by mid-2024.
Below-the-line volatility. In FY2024, the net loss of KRW 19.4bn was more than twice the operating loss. The gap came from:
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other losses of KRW 9.4bn, and
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finance costs of KRW 8.0bn, against finance income of KRW 5.9bn.
FY2023 finance income of KRW 12.0bn and finance costs of KRW 8.4bn point to large derivative or convertible-bond valuation swings.
Inflection points:
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FY2020: the cosmetics pivot lifted revenue.
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FY2021: governance conflict and the collapse in demand.
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FY2024: embezzlement, audit disclaimer and rehabilitation.
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FY2025: liquidation-value finding by the court.
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Segment / Line Details
| Segment / line | Contents | Status |
|---|---|---|
Cosmetics manufacturing and sales | OEM/ODM/OCM skincare and make-up; own-brand heritage products (Gerissong horse-oil line) | Core; about 94–95% of revenue in 2020 |
Smart / ITS | Build and maintenance of intelligent transport information systems | Minor; residual share of revenue |
China distribution | Cosnine Shanghai: distribution of cosmetics in China | Reported as weakening by 2024 |
New energy (Green Energy Innovation) | Lithium carbonate distribution, solar | Launched 2023; no disclosed revenue |
Revenue by Segment
| Segment | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cosmetics revenue (KRW Mn, Dealsite series) | 7,300 | 19,200 | 10,700 | — |
Cosmetics revenue (KRW Mn, IB Tomato series) | — | 21,400 | — | — |
Total revenue (KRW Mn, consolidated) | — | 21,016 | 12,545 | 8,998 |
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View Subscription PlansGroup Entities
| Entity | Relationship | Function | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
Cosnine Co., Ltd. | Parent (former KOSDAQ issuer) | Cosmetics manufacturing | Delisted 21 Sep 2026 |
Cosnine Shanghai Co., Ltd. | Subsidiary | China cosmetics distribution | Reported in difficulty (Dealsite, 24 Jul 2024); current status not disclosed |
Green Energy Innovation (그린에너지이노베이션) | Subsidiary (est. 21 Jul 2023) | Lithium carbonate distribution, solar | Current status not disclosed |
Tianjin Samwoo MS | Former subsidiary | Handset cases (China) | Divested c.2020 |
Cotis Co. | Merged Jul 2019 | Cosmetics-related | Absorbed |
Cosnine (pre-merger) | Merged 16 Dec 2019 | Cosmetics manufacturing | Absorbed |
City Package (시티패키지) | Merged (June; year not stated in source) | Packaging | Absorbed |
Income Statement and Per-Share Data
| Metric | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (KRW Mn) | 21,016 | 12,545 | 8,998 | 9,608 | 9,741 |
Cost of sales (KRW Mn) | 18,179 | 11,255 | 11,226 | 9,992 | 10,900 |
Gross profit (KRW Mn) | 2,837 | 1,290 | -2,228 | -384 | -1,159 |
Operating income (KRW Mn) | -1,818 | -5,263 | -7,693 | -6,529 | -8,088 |
EBITDA (KRW Mn, derived) | -273 | -3,711 | -6,291 | -5,266 | — |
Pre-tax income (KRW Mn) | — | — | — | -6,043 | -19,397 |
Net income (KRW Mn) | -11,471 | -17,040 | -10,768 | -5,878 | -19,406 |
Basic EPS (KRW) | — | — | — | -77 | -209 |
Dividends per share (KRW) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Gross margin (%) | 13.50 | 10.28 | -24.75 | -4.00 | -11.90 |
Operating margin (%) | -8.65 | -41.95 | -85.50 | -67.95 | -83.03 |
EBITDA margin (%) | -1.30 | -29.58 | -69.91 | -54.81 | — |
Net margin (%) | -54.58 | -135.83 | -119.67 | -61.18 | -199.22 |
Revenue growth YoY (%) | — | -40.31 | -28.27 | 6.78 | 1.38 |
Balance Sheet and Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|
Total assets (KRW Mn) | — | 52,103 |
Total equity (KRW Mn) | 34,670 | — |
Short-term borrowings (KRW Mn) | — | 12,000 |
Accumulated deficit (KRW Mn) | — | 82,100 |
Capital impairment ratio (%) | — | 55 |
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View Subscription PlansFinancial Analysis
| Item (KRW Mn) | Value |
|---|---|
Total assets | 49,460 |
Total liabilities | 17,040 |
Shareholders' equity | 32,410 |
Total debt | 8,110 |
Cash | 14,450 |
Net cash | 6,340 |
Short-term assets | 21,100 |
Short-term liabilities | 16,800 |
Long-term liabilities | 251 |
Financial Analysis (Annual)
| Metric | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Dividends paid (KRW Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Returns & Leverage Ratios (%) and Key Financials
| Ratio | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ROE (%) | -60.36 | -82.08 | -46.91 | -20.25 | — |
ROA (%) | -16.43 | -27.92 | -21.45 | -11.72 | — |
Interest expense (KRW Mn) | — | — | — | — | 300 |
Revenue by Region
| Region | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
Total (KRW Mn) | 8,998 | 9,608 | 9,741 |
Capital Markets
| Item | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
Last price before suspension | KRW 480 (7 Aug 2024) | Google Finance; Stockopedia |
Market cap at suspension | KRW 47.83bn | Google Finance; Simply Wall St |
52-week range (to Aug 2024) | KRW 256–630 per Simply Wall St; KRW 437–485 per Google Finance (sources conflict) | Simply Wall St; Google Finance |
Liquidation trading | 10–18 Sep 2026 (7 sessions) | KRX/DART |
Delisting date | 21 Sep 2026 | KRX/DART |
Share Price & Returns
| Period | Return (%) |
|---|---|
1 year | -20.13 |
3 years | -64.58 |
5 years | -82.22 |
Since IPO | -98.83 |
Valuation Multiples
| Multiple | Cosnine |
|---|---|
P/E (TTM) | -2.30 |
P/S (TTM) | 4.7 |
P/B | 10.21 |
Capital Markets — Dividend history / policy
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
Dividend history / policy | No dividends paid (Stockopedia) |
Buyback authorisations | None identified |
Credit ratings (Moody's / S&P / Fitch) | Not rated |
Debt maturity profile | Not publicly disclosed. KRW 12.0bn of short-term borrowings at end-2024. CB series 20 and 21 existed in 2023. |
Dilution | Shares outstanding grew about 15% in the year to 2024 (Simply Wall St) |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance and consensus
There is no current management guidance and no consensus. The last forward-looking statements came in 2022–2023 (China cooperation, mask-mandate recovery, lithium distribution), and none was delivered.
Bull case (low probability)
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Asset recovery. The court's finding that liquidation value exceeds going-concern value implies residual asset value. Remaining equipment, IP (horse-oil patents, Gerissong know-how) and receivables could deliver some recovery to creditors. Equity recovery is unlikely given the 55% capital impairment.
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Legal recoveries. Successful prosecution and civil recovery of the alleged KRW 9.08bn embezzlement (about 26% of FY2023 equity) could add value to the estate.
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Strategic buyer for assets. A distressed acquirer could buy the certified manufacturing know-how cheaply. Peers such as IcuRe show that turnarounds of small ODMs are possible (IcuRe moved to its first operating profit in nine years in Q1 2026 after restructuring).
Bear case (base case)
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Terminal wind-down. The court abolished rehabilitation on 12 August 2025 because liquidation was worth more than continuing operations. Delisting followed on 21 September 2026. Under Korean insolvency law, the next step after abolition may be bankruptcy proceedings; their commencement is not publicly confirmed.
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No operating economics. Gross margins were negative for three consecutive years. The owned plant was sold in January 2025. Nine-month FY2025 revenue was only about KRW 4.9bn (aggregator, unaudited).
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Uninvestable reporting. Disclaimers of opinion for FY2024 and FY2025 mean no figure from 2024 onward is assured. That deters any counterparty, lender or investor.
Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
| Monitorable | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Any bankruptcy or liquidation filing / court declaration | Defines creditor and shareholder outcomes |
| Outcome of the criminal case against former management (KRW 9.08bn) | Potential estate recovery |
| Sale of residual assets (equipment, IP, subsidiaries) | Liquidation proceeds |
| Minority shareholder litigation | Possible claims against former directors or controlling shareholders |
| Status of Cosnine Shanghai and Green Energy Innovation | Hidden liabilities or assets |
| Any OTC trading arrangement or shareholder notice | Liquidity for former shareholders |
Analyst verdict
Cosnine is a case study in how a fragile listed shell, repeated reinvention and weak governance can destroy value in a sector that was otherwise booming.
The listed entity began as Chamtech in the early 2000s. It moved through telecom equipment and handset cases under four names before absorbing the cosmetics maker Cosnine in December 2019. The pivot briefly lifted revenue to about KRW 21bn in FY2020, with cosmetics about 95% of sales. That was the high-water mark.
The business never reached break-even utilisation. Revenue more than halved by FY2022, and gross margin turned negative and stayed there. Operating losses equalled roughly 70–85% of revenue in FY2022–FY2024.
Governance compounded the operating weakness:
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a 2022 proxy fight with its own largest shareholder,
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an internal-control failure and caution designation,
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an alleged KRW 9.08bn embezzlement by former management,
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disclosure violations and an unpaid fine,
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two consecutive audit disclaimers.
The January 2025 sale of the Gimpo plant real estate raised KRW 14bn but removed the company's core physical asset. The court-supervised M&A, run with Samjong KPMG, found no investor. The Seoul Rehabilitation Court then concluded in August 2025 that the company was worth more liquidated than operating. Delisting followed on 21 September 2026 after the company's injunction was dismissed.
The contrast with the industry is stark. Kolmar Korea and Cosmax each set record revenue of about KRW 2.4–2.7tn in FY2025 on global indie-brand demand. Cosnine shows that participation in a growth market is no substitute for scale, utilisation and credible stewardship.
For any stakeholder, the relevant questions now concern estate recovery rather than enterprise value: the outcome of the embezzlement case, the realisation of residual assets, and the treatment of creditors. Equity holders should assume minimal recovery. Absent a primary-source development such as an audited statement, a confirmed asset buyer, or a court outcome, the entity should be treated as non-operating and in wind-down.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Board of Directors
| Name | Role | Tenure / dates | Background | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Kim Bo-hyung (김보형) | Representative Director (CEO), per Korean Wikipedia | Joined board Jul 2024 | Director at IS E-commerce, a domestic and overseas shopping purchase-agency company | Korean Wikipedia; Dealsite (24 Jul 2024) |
Woo Jeong-min (우정민) | Listed as representative by THE VC | Dates not disclosed | — | thevc.kr |
Jeong Hye-yoon (정혜윤) | Inside director | From Jul 2024 | CEO of J Cosmedic (cosmetics industry) | Dealsite (24 Jul 2024) |
Cho Woo-jin (조우진) | Inside director | From Jul 2024 | Head of duty-free business, Hwacheong Group | Dealsite (24 Jul 2024) |
Shin Ho-sang (신호상) | Outside director | From Jul 2024 | Director, FKTU Scholarship & Culture Foundation | Dealsite (24 Jul 2024) |
Park Sung-jin (박성진) | Outside director | From Jul 2024 | CEO, Fandom Korea | Dealsite (24 Jul 2024) |
Court-appointed custodian (관리인) | Rehabilitation custodian | 26 Nov 2024 – 12 Aug 2025 | Name not disclosed in sources | Cosinkorea (14 Aug 2025) |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Former role | Tenure | Notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Baek Gwang-yeol (백광열) | CEO, later co-CEO | Jun 2019 – Jul 2024 | Re-appointed at the June 2022 EGM. Named with four others in the Nov 2024 KRW 9.08bn embezzlement complaint. Age 52 (aggregator). Held 1.78% (aggregator, 2024). | Saramin; Dealsite; Simply Wall St |
Lee Dong-wook (이동욱) | Vice President | c.2022 | Led the Bunma Group cooperation | Dealsite (20 & 22 Jul 2022) |
Moon Sung-hyuk (문성혁) | Outside director | Resigned Jul 2024 | Voluntary resignation | Dealsite (24 Jul 2024) |
Choi Young-kwon (최영권) | Inside director (IcuRe nominee) | From c.2021 | Then CEO of IcuRe. Later indicted at IcuRe in a separate breach-of-trust case (2025). | Dealsite (22 Jul 2024); Hankyung (30 Jun 2026) |
Kim Hyung-tae (김형태) | CEO of pre-merger Cosnine | c.2016 | Set the KRW 200bn five-year revenue target | Etoday (21 Sep 2016) |
"Chairman Lee" (이모 회장) | Chairman (surname only disclosed) | 2,024 | Filed the July 2024 complaint against Baek | Dealsite (12 Nov 2024) |
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Shares | Stake (%) | Date / source |
|---|---|---|---|
SMG Youngmin Songdo Co., Ltd. | 8,020,000 | 8.05 | Simply Wall St (2024). Dealsite reported 8.3% on the July 2024 change of control. |
Bioline Value Investment Union | 3,640,219 | 3.65 | Simply Wall St (2024). Dealsite reported 3.8% after the 2024 rights issue. |
IcuRe Pharmaceutical | 2,760,000 | 2.77 | Simply Wall St (2024). Possibly stale; see discrepancy note below. |
Baek Gwang-yeol (former CEO) | 1,772,000 | 1.78 | Simply Wall St (2024) |
General public | 83,447,606 | 83.7 | Simply Wall St (2024) |
Minority shareholder coalition (ACT platform) | — | 6.59 | 185 shareholders pooled votes (Dealsite, 12 Nov 2024) |
Competitive Landscape
Key Competitors
| Competitor | Segment overlap | Scale indicator | Relative positioning vs Cosnine | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Kolmar Korea (한국콜마) | Full-range skincare / make-up ODM | FY2025 revenue KRW 2,722.4bn; operating profit KRW 239.6bn | #1–2 domestic ODM; about 280× Cosnine's FY2024 revenue | Kukinews (26 Feb 2026) |
Cosmax (코스맥스) | Full-range ODM, global plants | FY2025 revenue KRW 2,398.8bn (+10.7%); operating profit KRW 195.8bn | #1–2 domestic ODM; China, US and Southeast Asia plants | Kukinews (26 Feb 2026) |
Cosmecca Korea (코스메카코리아) | Skincare / make-up ODM (Korea, US via Englewood Lab, China) | Q3 2025 revenue KRW 182.4bn | Industry #3 | Hanwha Investment (7 Nov 2025); Alphadistill |
C&C International (씨앤씨인터내셔널) | Colour cosmetics (lip, point make-up) ODM | Top-4 ODM by 2024 revenue | Direct overlap in colour cosmetics | Cosinkorea (24 Apr 2025) |
IcuRe (아이큐어) | Cosmetics ODM plus TDDS pharma | 2025 revenue KRW 82.8bn; Q1 2026 separate revenue KRW 32.1bn with first operating profit in 9 years | Former Cosnine strategic investor; small-cap ODM peer | Hankyung (10 May 2026; 30 Jun 2026) |
Yuhan Cosmetic (유한코스메틱, formerly Coson) | Skincare ODM backed by Yuhan Corp. | — | Small-cap peer that also went through rehabilitation; renamed Oct 2025 | Hankyung (27 Oct 2025); Dailypharm |
ENCOS (엔코스) | Emerging ODM | — | Cited as a fast-growing new ODM | Alphadistill |
SD Biotechnologies (에스디생명공학) | Cosmetics / health foods | Heavy losses (KRW 34.8bn in 2021, 38.0bn in 2022) | Distressed peer with an audit disclaimer | Asia Economy (28 Mar 2023) |
Clinomics / Celestra (셀레스트라) | Bio-cosmetics (adjacent) | Audit disclaimer for FY2024 | Former partner; distressed | iNews24 (2025) |
Peer Comparison FY2025
| Metric | Cosnine (FY2024) | Kolmar Korea (FY2024) | Cosmax (FY2024) | IcuRe (FY2025) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (KRW Bn) | 9.7 | 2,452.1 | 2,166.1 | 82.8 |
Revenue growth YoY (%) | 1.4 | 14.0 | 21.9 | 65.6 |
Operating profit (KRW Bn) | -8.1 | 195.6 | 175.4 | — |
Operating margin (%) | -83.0 | 8.0 | 8.1 | — |
Recent Developments
The window covers April 2025 to October 2026. All identified items are listed, plus two context items from early 2025.



