Dropbox

Employee trend

FY2022 opening figure is the company's headcount peak. Aggregated from Dropbox 10-K human-capital disclosures; the 2022 and 2023 figures are third-party compilations of those filings and should be treated as high-confidence but secondary.

Positioning statement (150 words)

Dropbox is the pioneer and, on registered users, still one of the largest independent file-sync-and-share platforms in the world — but it is no longer a growth company in its core market, and management has stopped pretending otherwise. Revenue peaked at 2.55 billion USD in FY2024 and declined 1.1 percent in FY2025. What Dropbox has instead become is an extraordinarily efficient cash machine: a 40.6 percent non-GAAP operating margin, 1.02 billion USD of unlevered free cash flow in FY2025, and a management team using cheap private credit to shrink the share count by roughly a third in three years. The strategic wager, now under incoming sole CEO Ashraf Alkarmi, is that Dropbox Dash — AI universal search across 30-plus workplace applications, embedded natively into the core Dropbox product — can convert 700 million registered users and eighteen million payers into a second growth curve before the FSS annuity erodes. The equity market is not yet paying for that option.

What the company does

Dropbox operates a cloud-based content collaboration platform. In its own framing in recent filings and releases, Dropbox is "the one place to keep life organized and keep work moving," with a stated mission "to design a more enlightened way of working." The platform allows individuals, families, teams and organisations to store, synchronise, share, secure, sign, track and — increasingly — search and reason over digital content across devices and across third-party applications.

Independently characterised, Dropbox is three businesses stacked on one distribution asset:

1. A mature, high-margin file-sync-and-share (FSS) annuity. This is the overwhelming majority of revenue. It is sold predominantly through a self-serve, low-touch motion to individuals, prosumers, freelancers and small teams, with a smaller direct-sales overlay for Business, Business Plus and Enterprise deployments. Growth is essentially zero; the economics are outstanding.
2. A document-workflow adjacency. Dropbox Sign (e-signature, from the 2019 HelloSign acquisition), DocSend (secure document sharing and analytics, acquired 2021) and, until wind-down, FormSwift (forms and agreements, acquired 2022). These are sold as add-ons to core plans or standalone. FormSwift is being wound down by the end of 2026.
3. An AI knowledge-work bet: Dropbox Dash. Universal, permission-aware search and an AI assistant that indexes content across Dropbox and more than thirty connected workplace applications. Dash is sold standalone to businesses and, since 2025–2026, is being embedded directly into the core Dropbox experience as the principal monetisation and retention lever.

Revenue model

Revenue is essentially 100 percent subscription. Dropbox's FY2023 10-K states plainly that the company derives its revenue from subscription fees from customers for access to its platform, that subscription pricing is generally fixed at contract inception, and that contracts therefore contain little variable consideration. There is no material perpetual-licence, hardware, professional-services or advertising revenue. Deferred revenue stood at 748.9 million USD at 30 June 2026 (729.7 million at 31 December 2025), reflecting the prepaid annual-plan mix.

The mechanical revenue identity is paying users multiplied by average revenue per paying user (ARPU). Both are close to flat, which is precisely the problem and precisely the reason the equity is cheap:

FY2024 and FY2025 ARPU are full-year averages; Q2 FY2026 is the quarterly figure. FY2024 Total ARR is implied from the disclosed 1.9 percent Q4 FY2025 decline. Source: Q4 FY2025 and Q2 FY2026 earnings releases.

The most important recent datapoint: Dropbox added 96,000 net paying users in Q2 FY2026, its third consecutive quarter of paying-user growth, after a multi-year period of erosion.

Value chain position and cost structure

Dropbox is unusual among SaaS companies in that it owns and operates the majority of its own storage infrastructure ("Magic Pocket," built out from 2015–2016) rather than renting hyperscaler storage. The economic consequence is that Dropbox's "capex" is largely financed through finance leases on servers rather than through the capital-expenditure line — 147.3 million USD of property and equipment acquired under finance leases in FY2025 versus only 21.0 million USD of reported capital expenditures. This is why reported free cash flow flatters the true capital intensity of the business and why gross margin is sensitive to datacenter refresh cycles: GAAP gross margin fell from 82.5 percent in FY2024 to 80.1 percent in FY2025 explicitly because of increased depreciation from the datacenter refresh.

Customers and end-markets

Dropbox's FY2023 10-K states that no customer accounted for more than 1 percent of revenue in 2023, 2022 or 2021 — an extreme degree of revenue diversification that is a genuine structural strength. Customers span individuals, families, teams and organisations from freelancers and small businesses to Fortune 100 companies, working across professional services, technology, media, education, industrials, consumer and retail, and financial services. Within enterprises, adoption is horizontal — sales, marketing, product, design, engineering, finance, legal and HR.

10.1 Stated strategy

Drew Houston, Q4 FY2025 earnings release, February 2026:

The company closed 2025 exceeding the high end of its revenue and operating margin guidance while demonstrating continued operating discipline. Management began reshaping how it invests in and evolves the business during 2025 and is starting to see results — strengthening the core FSS foundation while accelerating Dash, both as a standalone product and embedded across the core Dropbox experience. The 2026 plan is to build on this momentum by driving engagement and adoption of Dash and investing in future growth.

Ashraf Alkarmi, Q2 FY2026 earnings release, August 2026:

The return to growth in the core business is not a one-quarter event. Positive year-over-year revenue growth excluding FormSwift continued, 96,000 paying users were added for a third consecutive quarter of paying-user growth, non-GAAP operating margin exceeded guidance at over 39 percent, and 283.5 million USD of unlevered free cash flow was generated. The plan is to bring Dash intelligence directly into a smarter Dropbox that customers already trust, and to use the infrastructure built over nearly two decades to extend that value to the more than eighteen million paying customers already on Dropbox.

Houston on the succession rationale, May 2026: AI is changing what is possible, and customers are going to see a very different Dropbox — faster, smarter, and built around the way they actually work.

10.2 The strategic thesis, decoded

The four pillars are legible:

1. Stabilise then grow core FSS. Improve onboarding, self-serve conversion and retention rather than chase enterprise displacement of Microsoft and Google. Evidence of success: three consecutive quarters of net paying-user additions.
2. Embed Dash into the core rather than sell it separately. This is the most important strategic shift of the last twenty-four months. Selling Dash standalone put Dropbox into a head-on fight with Glean and Microsoft Copilot in a market where it lacks enterprise sales muscle. Embedding Dash into Dropbox converts it from a product Dropbox must sell into a feature that raises core ARPU and retention across eighteen million existing payers. The economics are dramatically better.
3. Harvest margin and return capital. 40.6 percent non-GAAP operating margin, 1.7 billion USD of FY2025 buybacks, a further 900 million USD authorised June 2026, and a share count down 31 percent from FY2021 to FY2025.
4. Wind down non-core. FormSwift de-invested from the start of 2025 and closing by end-2026; Dropbox Passwords discontinued; the San Francisco headquarters exited.

10.3 Initiatives announced in the last twenty-four months

10.4 Management's medium-term financial targets

Dropbox does not publish multi-year targets. Guidance is quarterly and annual only.

Zeros denote not guided. Consensus FY2026 revenue prior to the raise was approximately 2.51 billion USD; Q3 consensus approximately 626 million USD. Source: Q2 FY2026 investor presentation via TheFly, 6 August 2026.

The FY2026 revenue midpoint of 2,518 million USD implies essentially flat revenue versus FY2025's 2,521 million USD — with the constant-currency midpoint of 2,487 million USD implying a 1.3 percent underlying decline. Management is guiding to margin, not growth.

10.5 ESG and sustainability commitments

The 2026 proxy's Corporate Responsibility section addresses employee wellness and development, community engagement, business conduct and ethics, human and labour rights, AI principles and insider trading. It contains no emissions targets, no renewable-energy commitments and no climate metrics. See Section 20.

5.1 Core file sync and share

Dropbox (consumer/individual plans) Cloud storage, file synchronisation, personal cloud and client software for Windows, macOS and Linux desktops and iOS and Android mobile. The desktop client was at version 246.4.3513 / 248.3.3501 as of 8 April 2026. Localised into Chinese (traditional and simplified), English, French, German, Indonesian, Italian, Korean, Malaysian, Polish, Portuguese (European and Brazilian), Russian, Spanish (Castilian and Latin American) and Ukrainian.

• Dropbox Basic — free tier, 2 GB. Target: individual users; funnel top-of-mind for conversion.
• Dropbox Plus / Essentials — paid individual and prosumer tiers with expanded storage, longer version history, Dropbox Vault, Dropbox Transfer, Dropbox Backup and Dropbox Replay entitlements.

Dropbox (team and business plans)

• Dropbox Business (Standard) — shared team storage pool, admin console, team folders.
• Dropbox Business Plus (formerly Advanced) — expanded storage pool, advanced admin controls, granular sharing permissions, tiered administration. Notably, Dropbox removed genuinely unlimited storage from the Advanced plan after 2023, replacing it with a pooled-storage mechanic — a change that materially reshaped enterprise renewal negotiations.
• Dropbox Enterprise — custom-priced tier for deployments above roughly 250 seats, differentiated primarily by SLA, support depth, security and governance features. Independent benchmark data indicates enterprise discounts on Business Plus typically run 15–35 percent off list, with custom Enterprise deals landing 25–40 percent below implied list and the deepest discounts on three-year commitments above 500 seats (VendorBenchmark, April 2026 — third-party, not company-disclosed).

Attached core features: Dropbox Vault (secured PIN-protected folder for sensitive documents), Dropbox Backup / Computer Backup (automatic folder-level device backup to cloud), Dropbox Transfer (large-file delivery with tracking), Dropbox Paper (collaborative document editor), Dropbox Capture (async screen and video capture), Dropbox Passwords (credential manager; subsequently discontinued as a standalone offering).

5.2 Dropbox Dash — the strategic product

5.3 Document workflow portfolio

5.4 Platform and ecosystem

• Dropbox API / Developer platform — programmatic access for third-party integrations; the substrate for the Microsoft Office, Slack, Zoom, Canva, Salesforce and Adobe integrations.
• Dropbox Ventures — 50 million USD venture initiative launched June 2023 to back AI startups, with financial support and mentorship. Portfolio disclosure is limited.
• Dropbox AI Principles — published governance framework covering privacy, transparency and bias limitation in AI features.
• Security and compliance posture — ISO 27001 certification of the primary information security management system and ISO 27701 certification of the primary privacy information management system, both independently examined annually; SOC 2 examination of incident-response policies and procedures.

All figures USD millions unless the row label states otherwise. Fiscal years end 31 December.

6.1 Income statement

Stock-based compensation for FY2021–FY2023 not verified in this research; FY2024 and FY2025 from the Q4 FY2025 earnings release. Income statement 2021–2024 from Fiscal.ai standardisation of Dropbox 10-K filings; FY2025 from the Q4 FY2025 earnings release. FY2021 net income of 335.8 million USD and FY2022 net income of 553.2 million USD are confirmed directly against the FY2022 10-K.

6.2 Margins and returns

Zeros denote figures not disclosed or not reconstructed for that year. Revenue CAGR FY2021–FY2025: 3.98 percent. Revenue CAGR FY2023–FY2025: 0.38 percent.

6.3 Balance sheet

Zeros denote figures not verified in this research for that period. FY2024, FY2025 and H1 FY2026 balance sheets from the Q4 FY2025 and Q2 FY2026 earnings releases. Total debt and net debt for FY2021–FY2023 from Fiscal.ai standardisation and include finance-lease obligations and convertible notes.

6.4 Cash flow

Zeros in the FY2021–FY2023 columns denote figures not verified in this research; zeros in the dividends row are true zeros — Dropbox has never paid a dividend.

6.5 Ratios

Return on equity, debt to equity and cash conversion cycle are not meaningful: Dropbox carries a stockholders' deficit of 2.19 billion USD, and as a prepaid-subscription business it collects cash before delivering service, producing a structurally negative working-capital cycle. ROIC computed as FY2025 NOPAT (689.1 × (1 − 0.1768) = 567.3) over invested capital (total debt 3,587 less equity deficit 1,797 = 1,790). The FY2025 current ratio of 0.63 is a reporting artefact — the 695.4 million USD convertible note due 2026 sat in current liabilities at year-end and was retired in H1 2026, restoring the ratio above 1.0. Zeros denote not computed or not meaningful.

6.6 Commentary on trends, inflections and drivers

Revenue. The growth arc is unambiguous and unflattering: 12.8 percent in FY2021, 7.7 percent, 7.6 percent, then a collapse to 1.9 percent in FY2024 and outright contraction of 1.1 percent in FY2025. The FY2021–FY2022 growth was substantially pandemic-cohort and acquisition-assisted (FormSwift closed Q4 2022). The FY2025 decline is roughly 130 basis points attributable to FormSwift de-investment; excluding it, revenue grew 0.2 percent. H1 FY2026 shows the inflection: Q1 +0.8 percent, Q2 +0.9 percent as reported and +1.7 percent excluding FormSwift, with three consecutive quarters of net paying-user additions. This is stabilisation, not growth. Constant-currency Q2 FY2026 growth excluding FormSwift was only 0.1 percent — the reported acceleration is mostly a weak-dollar effect.

Gross margin. The 240-basis-point GAAP compression from 82.5 percent in FY2024 to 80.1 percent in FY2025 is the single most important operational disclosure in the FY2025 accounts. It is driven by increased depreciation from the datacenter refresh cycle, and it is partly a base effect: effective 1 January 2024 Dropbox extended the estimated useful life of certain infrastructure server and component assets from four to five years, producing a 30.5 million USD depreciation benefit in FY2024 that does not repeat. Q2 FY2026 GAAP gross margin of 80.2 percent was flat year over year, but non-GAAP gross margin slipped to 81.6 percent from 82.2 percent as AI compute costs began to bite. Management guides FY2026 non-GAAP gross margin to approximately 81.5 percent. Gross margin is now a structural headwind, not a tailwind.

Operating leverage. The FY2025 GAAP operating margin of 27.3 percent, up from 19.1 percent, and non-GAAP of 40.6 percent, up from 36.4 percent, are not the product of revenue growth — revenue fell. They are the product of a 183 million USD (20 percent) reduction in R&D and a 91 million USD (20 percent) reduction in sales and marketing, following the October 2024 workforce reduction of 528 roles. FY2024 also carried 47.2 million USD of workforce-reduction expense that did not repeat. This is cost-out margin expansion. It is real, it is durable, and it is finite.

R&D. Absolute R&D spend fell from 936.5 million USD in FY2023 to 732.0 million USD in FY2025 — a 22 percent cut — while R&D intensity dropped from 37.4 percent to 29.0 percent of revenue. Management's narrative is that spend was reallocated from FSS maintenance to Dash. The counter-reading is that a company betting its future on AI has cut its R&D budget by over 200 million USD in two years while Microsoft, Google and Glean have raised theirs. Note that H1 FY2026 R&D rose to 372.3 million USD from 362.8 million USD, and Q2 FY2026 carried further workforce-reduction expense within R&D from "a strategic reorganization to unify the Company's product organization" — the cutting is not finished.

Tax. FY2021 and FY2022 effective tax rates are meaningless for run-rate purposes. FY2022's negative 187 percent rate reflects a one-time 420.2 million USD benefit from releasing the valuation allowance on US federal and certain state deferred tax assets in Q4 2022; FY2021 included a 38.1 million USD Irish valuation-allowance release. The normalised rate has settled at 11.3 percent in FY2024 and 17.7 percent in FY2025, and the rising trend was explicitly cited as a driver of the Q4 FY2025 non-GAAP net income decline. Deferred tax assets of 403 million USD at H1 FY2026 are being consumed at roughly 50 million USD per year.

Below the line. The most consequential change in the FY2025 income statement is the swing in net interest from +13.9 million USD income in FY2024 to −78.6 million USD expense in FY2025, and to −86.7 million USD in H1 FY2026 alone. The levered recapitalisation has permanently inserted an annualised interest burden approaching 175 million USD. This is why GAAP net income of 95.8 million USD in Q2 FY2026 fell 24 percent year over year despite stable operating income, and why interest coverage has deteriorated from 8.8x in FY2025 to roughly 3.9x on H1 FY2026 run-rate.

Cash generation. Operating cash flow has compounded steadily from 730 million USD to 952 million USD across five years and free cash flow margin has expanded to 36.9 percent. But reported capex of 21 million USD understates true capital intensity by roughly seven times: 147.3 million USD of servers were acquired under finance leases in FY2025, with 128.6 million USD of finance-lease principal repaid. A more honest owner-earnings figure deducts finance-lease principal: 951.8 − 21.0 − 128.6 = approximately 802 million USD. Unlevered free cash flow of 1.016 billion USD flatters further by adding back 84.7 million USD of after-tax cash interest — a real cost that shareholders bear.

Balance sheet. Stockholders' equity has gone from a 752 million USD deficit at FY2024 to a 2,188 million USD deficit at H1 FY2026. This is entirely engineered: 1.71 billion USD of buybacks in FY2025 alone, funded with 500 million USD of new term-loan proceeds and operating cash. Total debt rose from 2.03 billion USD at FY2023 to 3.98 billion USD at H1 FY2026. Net debt to EBITDA has risen from 2.25x to roughly 3.0x. Goodwill of 457 million USD and intangibles of 22 million USD constitute 17 percent of total assets and represent accumulated acquisition value that has not obviously produced a growth engine.

Management guidance

Zeros denote not guided. Guidance raised 6 August 2026 from a prior FY2026 revenue range of 2,500–2,510 million USD and prior non-GAAP operating margin of 39.5–40.0 percent.

Consensus expectations

Eight covering analysts rate DBX Sell with a twelve-month target of 30.67 USD, implying 11.8 percent downside from 34.79 USD. Consensus FY2026 revenue prior to the August raise was approximately 2.51 billion USD; Q3 consensus approximately 626 million USD. Forward P/E of approximately 11.0x reflects an expectation of continued aggressive buybacks rather than earnings growth. Analysts flagged three specific monitorables coming out of Q2: the adoption and monetisation rate of AI features within the existing user base; the operational handoff to Alkarmi and any resulting changes to product or go-to-market execution; and whether onboarding and retention improvements can sustain positive user growth.

Bull case

1. The core has genuinely turned, and it is cheap optionality on top of a cash annuity. Three consecutive quarters of paying-user growth culminating in 96,000 net additions in Q2 FY2026, revenue growth ex-FormSwift of 1.7 percent, ARPU up sequentially to 139.68 USD from 138.32 USD, and guidance raised twice. Buying at 7.8x price to free cash flow means paying nothing for a Dash success scenario. If Dash-driven ARPU expansion adds even 300 basis points to growth, the multiple re-rates on both numerator and denominator.
2. The buyback is a mathematical machine. Share count is down 43 percent since FY2021 and 17 percent in the last twelve months alone. With approximately 930 million USD of annual free cash flow, 900 million USD of fresh authorisation, and a 7.56 billion USD market capitalisation, Dropbox can retire roughly 12 percent of the float every year. Flat revenue plus a 12 percent annual share-count reduction produces low-teens EPS growth indefinitely — which is more than most of the software complex will deliver.
3. The Box precedent de-risks the AI monetisation thesis. Box took Enterprise Advanced from launch to 10 percent of revenue inside one fiscal year in the same category with a smaller installed base. Dropbox has 18.19 million payers and 700 million registered users; the arithmetic of embedding Dash into core and capturing even a modest ARPU uplift across that base is compelling. The ChatGPT distribution deal validates that Dropbox's permission-aware context layer has independent value.

Bear case

1. The growth is an FX illusion and the underlying business is still shrinking. Q2 FY2026 revenue grew 1.7 percent ex-FormSwift as reported but 0.1 percent in constant currency. FY2026 constant-currency guidance of 2,482–2,492 million USD against FY2025 revenue of 2,521 million USD implies a 1.3 percent underlying decline. Management is guiding to a shrinking business and being rewarded for it because the dollar weakened.
2. The margin expansion is spent and the direction has reversed. FY2025's 40.6 percent non-GAAP operating margin came from cutting R&D by 20 percent and sales and marketing by 20 percent. There is nothing left to cut without gutting the Dash bet — and indeed H1 FY2026 R&D rose. Meanwhile gross margin is compressing from both the datacenter refresh and AI compute costs, with Q2 non-GAAP gross margin down to 81.6 percent from 82.2 percent and the CFO explicitly flagging infrastructure efficiency as a swing factor. Q2 GAAP operating margin already fell to 26.1 percent from 26.9 percent.
3. The leverage converts a slow decline into a fast one. Total debt of 3,975 million USD against a 2,188 million USD equity deficit; net leverage at 3.0x; interest expense running at roughly 175 million USD annualised versus 13.9 million USD of income two years ago; interest coverage down from 8.8x to approximately 3.9x. Q2 GAAP net income fell 24 percent year over year on flat operating income purely because of interest. Every dollar of buyback is now partly borrowed. If revenue declines 3–5 percent annually — entirely plausible against Microsoft and Google bundling Copilot and Gemini — the free cash flow that services the debt and funds the buyback compresses at exactly the moment the balance sheet needs it most. Eight analysts rate this Sell for a reason.

Catalysts and monitorables, next twelve months

Analyst verdict (300 words)

Dropbox is a well-run liquidation of a great franchise, and whether that sentence is an insult depends entirely on the price.

The operational facts are not in dispute. Revenue peaked in FY2024 at 2,548 million USD and has declined since. Guidance for FY2026 implies a further 1.3 percent constant-currency contraction. Management has responded with genuine discipline — a 32 percent headcount reduction from peak, a 22 percent R&D cut, a complete headquarters exit — producing a 40.6 percent non-GAAP operating margin and 1.02 billion USD of unlevered free cash flow. It has then converted that cash, plus 2 billion USD of incremental Blackstone debt, into a 43 percent reduction in the share count. The result is 33 percent EPS growth in a year revenue fell.

That machine works until it doesn't. Interest expense has gone from a 13.9 million USD credit to roughly a 175 million USD charge in two years; coverage has halved to 3.9x; the equity deficit has tripled to 2.19 billion USD. The company has traded balance-sheet resilience for per-share arithmetic at precisely the moment Microsoft and Google are bundling Copilot and Gemini into the suites Dropbox's customers already own.

Against that, the Dash bet is real and getting cheaper to run. Embedding Dash into core rather than selling it standalone is the correct strategic call — it sidesteps Dropbox's enterprise sales weakness and monetises eighteen million existing payers. Box has proven the AI upsell can reach 10 percent of revenue in a year. The ChatGPT distribution deal is a genuine validation. And three consecutive quarters of paying-user growth is the first good news in three years.

Verdict: a credible value proposition with an uncomfortable amount of financial leverage attached to a business in secular decline. Eight analysts rating it Sell at 30.67 USD against a 34.79 USD price are not obviously wrong. The asymmetry is real, but so is the debt. Watch constant-currency growth, and watch gross margin.

APPENDIX: DATA QUALITY NOTES

Items flagged as not publicly disclosed: Segment-level revenue, income and margins (single-segment reporter); Dash standalone revenue or ARR; Dropbox Sign, DocSend and Replay individual revenue; country-level revenue below the US/International split; patent portfolio size and recent grant counts; specific datacenter site locations; itemised office list by city; workforce diversity metrics; Dropbox Ventures portfolio companies; the precise number of users affected by the April 2024 Dropbox Sign breach.

Items flagged as not verified in this research: FY2021–FY2023 total assets, total liabilities, equity and detailed balance-sheet line items; FY2021–FY2023 buyback amounts and stock-based compensation; the complete FY2025 Summary Compensation Table for all named executive officers other than Timothy Regan; Co-Founder Grant FY2025 status; Houston's FY2025 total compensation; CEO pay ratio; precise top-ten institutional stake percentages; public credit ratings from Moody's, S&P or Fitch; MSCI, Sustainalytics and CDP ESG ratings; one-, three- and five-year total shareholder returns; peer valuation multiples; Box and DocuSign detailed margin and R&D data; current procedural status of the Dropbox Sign breach litigation; the market size and Dropbox's market share in cloud content collaboration and enterprise AI search.

Source conflicts noted: (a) Institutional ownership percentage ranges from 56.4 percent to 92.6 percent across WallStreetZen, Macroaxis and TickerGate, driven by differing treatment of Class B shares in the denominator. (b) Drew Houston's shareholding is reported as 8.71 million shares (WallStreetZen) and as 83.93 million shares (Simply Wall St), almost certainly a Class A versus total-economic-ownership distinction. (c) A claim that Berkshire Hathaway purchased approximately 50 million Dropbox shares in 2024 appears in one secondary source and could not be corroborated against any primary filing; it should be treated as unverified. (d) Employee-count figures for FY2022 and FY2023 are third-party compilations of 10-K human-capital disclosures rather than direct filing reads.

Company field discrepancy: The source request specified the company as "dropbox headquarters address." This dossier resolves that to Dropbox, Inc., and states the headquarters address at 1800 Owens Street, San Francisco, California 94158, in Sections 1 and 8, together with the material fact that the company has sublet the entire building and was reported in February 2026 to be preparing to vacate it.

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