Global Corn Group Limited (formerly Global Sweeteners Holdings Limited)

Basis.

• FY2024–FY2025 figures are from [AR-FY25].

• FY2023 revenue, gross profit and net profit attributable are from [PR-FY23].

• FY2021–FY2023 detailed lines are from [S&P/SA], which uses S&P Global Market Intelligence standardisation.

• Where S&P and company figures differ, company figures are preferred and the discrepancy is noted. Example: FY2024 gross profit is HK$31.3M per the company against HK$32.4M per S&P.

Income statement (chartable)

Notes: - EBITDA (calc) = pre-tax income + finance costs + depreciation and amortisation.

• FY2021–FY2023 use D&A from [S&P/SA].

• FY2024 uses D&A of HK$28.5M and FY2025 uses HK$44.2M (PPE HK$40.2M plus right-of-use HK$4.0M) [AR-FY25].

• FY2021–FY2023 EPS are calculated using 1,527.586M shares; no dilutive instruments existed before May 2024. FY2024–FY2025 EPS are as reported [AR-FY25].

• FY2021 pre-tax income includes HK$128.3M of unusual gains; FY2023 pre-tax income is for continuing operations only [S&P/SA].

• FY2024 EBITDA includes HK$167.6M of debt-restructuring gain and HK$42.2M of disposal gain. Excluding these, FY2024 EBITDA is about -HK$89.6M (calc).

• FY2025 EBITDA includes a HK$35.7M non-cash gain on CB derivatives and a HK$10.6M loss on subsidiary deregistration. Adjusting for both, it is about -HK$55.0M (calc).

Revenue CAGR (calc):

• FY2021–FY2025: -9.4% p.a. (FY2021 basis may differ).

• FY2022–FY2025: +10.9% p.a.

Half-year income trend (chartable)

Sources: [IR-1H25; IR-1H26]: ### Balance sheet (chartable)

Sources: FY2024–FY2025 from [AR-FY25]; FY2021–FY2023 from [S&P/SA].

Notes:

• FY2021 debt includes HK$569.6M of current portion of long-term debt; all debt was classified current in every year.

• At FY2025 the company's own gearing ratio (debt including CBs, shareholder and related-party loans, divided by total assets) was 82.0%. It rose to 85.8% at 30 Jun 2026 [AR-FY25; IR-1H26].

Cash flow (chartable)

Source: [S&P/SA]: Notes:

• Accounting PPE additions were much larger than cash capex: HK$109.5M (FY2024) and HK$49.7M (FY2025) [AR-FY25]. The difference reflects machinery payables (HK$33.1M at 30 Jun 2025 [IR-1H25]) and non-cash settlement.

• FY2024 net debt issued reflects the RMB120M CB issue.

The company confirms no buybacks in FY2025 [AR-FY25]: 1H2025 company cash flow [IR-1H25] (HK$ M):

• Operating cash flow: -43.7

• Investing cash flow: -1.4

• Financing cash flow: +42.5, consisting of:

  • shareholder loans: +16.4

  • loans from shareholders' controlled entities: +20.7

  • share placement: +4.1

  • net change with former fellow subsidiaries: +1.3

Trailing twelve months to 30 Jun 2026 (TTM) [S&P/SA]: operating cash flow +HK$6.6M; free cash flow +HK$5.4M.

Ratios (chartable)

Sources: turnover days from [AR-FY25]; other inputs from tables above.

Not meaningful (blank or omitted):

• ROE and debt/equity, because equity was negative in every year.

• ROIC, because invested capital is negative.

• Net debt/EBITDA in years with negative EBITDA. The FY2024 figure is flattered by one-off gains.

At 30 Jun 2026: current ratio 0.11; quick ratio 0.08; receivable days 44; payable days 80; inventory days 20 [IR-1H26].

FY2025 cash conversion cycle check: 39 + 32 − 84 = −13 days (calc). FY2024: 41 + 21 − 83 = −21 days.

Commentary on trends, inflections and drivers

A collapse in scale.

• Revenue fell from ~HK$4.2bn (FY2013) to HK$2.9bn (FY2014), HK$1.96bn (FY2019) and HK$769M (FY2020) [AR-FY14; AR-FY20].

• It then fell to the HK$360–625M range from FY2022.

• This reflects three things:

  • the 2021 suspension of all upstream wet-milling;

  • the transfer of the Changchun operations in 2023;

  • concentration on one Shanghai downstream plant buying in starch.

Gross margin is structurally thin and volatile. Gross margin ranged between 3.4% and 10.3% at the half-year level over 2023–2026. It is driven by the spread between corn-starch cost and sugar-anchored sweetener prices.

• FY2025's 9.2% was achieved by cutting output and buying cheaper starch [AR-FY25].

• 1H2026 shows how fragile that was: margin fell to 3.5% as starch costs rose 3.1% and selling prices fell 3.4% [IR-1H26].

Below the gross line, three structural cost layers have consumed every dollar of gross profit since at least FY2021:

1. Idle-capacity and maintenance costs on suspended plants:

   • HK$66.9M in FY2024;

   • HK$52.2M in FY2025;

   • HK$23.9M in 1H2026.

2. Finance costs, which rose 62% in FY2025 to HK$56.0M, partly from 18.74% effective-rate imputed interest on the CBs.

3. Accounting effects of the CBs: day-one-loss amortisation and derivative revaluation [AR-FY25; IR-1H26].

The only profitable years were accounting-driven.

• FY2023 profit of HK$289.5M came from the HK$477M Dihao deconsolidation gain [PR-FY23].

• FY2024 profit of HK$66.6M came from HK$209.8M of restructuring and disposal gains [AR-FY25].

• Underlying operating losses were never eliminated.

Inflection to watch. The June 2026 Jinzhou liquidation is the most important balance-sheet event since 2023.

• Management states that once a formal liquidator is appointed, Jinzhou Yuancheng (and Jinzhou Dacheng) will be deconsolidated, and their liabilities, including the RMB212.5M Transferred Loans plus interest, will leave the group balance sheet [IR-1H26].

• Press coverage cited net liabilities of the two subsidiaries of RMB379M (etnet, 2 Jun 2026). That is roughly HK$410–420M at recent exchange rates (analyst illustrative conversion, not a company figure).

• If deconsolidated at those values, a large deconsolidation gain and a substantial reduction in reported net liabilities would be expected. This is not guaranteed and is not yet reflected in the accounts.

Management guidance

No quantitative revenue, margin or earnings guidance is provided. Management's qualitative outlook is as follows [IR-1H26]:

• Consolidate existing business through tighter operations and cost control.

• Advance the Jinzhou liquidations.

• Seek strategic cooperation where appropriate and protect core Jinzhou assets for a possible upstream restart.

• Use new bank facilities for strategic raw-material purchasing.

The directors conclude that working capital is sufficient for 12 months from 30 Jun 2026, provided their measures succeed.

Consensus

None available.

Bull case (grounded in data)

1. Deconsolidation reset. The Jinzhou liquidation could remove ~RMB379M of subsidiary net liabilities and ~HK$50–70M a year of idle-capacity costs (HK$66.9M in FY2024; HK$52.2M in FY2025).

   • This could move group equity toward break-even and recast the group as a lean Shanghai converter [AR-FY25; IR-1H26; etnet].

2. Proven margin potential. The Shanghai plant earned a 9.6% gross margin in 1H2025 and 9.2% in FY2025.

   • At ~HK$500M of revenue, a sustained 9% margin produces ~HK$45M of gross profit. That would roughly cover the post-restructuring selling and administrative base (FY2025: HK$86.7M before cuts; 1H2026 annualised: ~HK$78M) once Jinzhou-related costs disappear (calc) [AR-FY25; IR-1H26].

3. Aligned, solvent-appearing backers. The controlling shareholders have lent HK$97.9M, provided supply on credit, and renewed support three times.

   • They also hold RMB78M of CBs that could be converted into equity at HK$0.10, reducing debt [IR-1H26].

Bear case (grounded in data)

1. The core business still loses money. Excluding Jinzhou idle costs, 1H2026 gross profit of HK$9.3M did not cover selling and administrative costs of HK$39.1M or finance costs of HK$27.2M [IR-1H26].

2. Liquidation risk. If the liquidation is slow, contested, or leaves guarantee or counter-guarantee exposures, the expected balance-sheet relief may not arrive.

   • The original restructuring already failed after 14 months [AR-FY25; IR-1H26].

3. Dilution and value-transfer risk. Full CB conversion would expand issued shares by ~49% at HK$0.10 (calc).

   • Related-party supply, financing and offtake mean minority shareholders bear transfer-pricing and governance risk.

   • Equity value is negative on book [IR-1H25; IR-1H26].

Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)

Analyst verdict

Global Corn Group is a distressed micro-cap whose equity is best understood as an option on a balance-sheet restructuring, not as a claim on a viable operating franchise.

The operating facts are stark. Between FY2021 and 1H2026 the group did not record a single year of positive operating income. Its only profitable years, FY2023 and FY2024, were produced by deconsolidation and debt-forgiveness gains totalling more than HK$680 million. It ended June 2026 with net liabilities of HK$436.7 million, net current liabilities of HK$909.9 million, and a current ratio of 0.11. Its auditor has disclaimed an opinion.

The single surviving asset, the Shanghai conversion plant, can earn high-single-digit gross margins when starch is cheap and sugar is firm. Neither condition holds in 2026: China's sugar output is rising toward 13 million tonnes and the FAO sugar index is near multi-year lows.

The investment debate therefore hinges almost entirely on two near-term events. The first is the June 2026 decision to liquidate the Jinzhou subsidiaries. If completed cleanly, it should strip out roughly RMB379 million of reported subsidiary net liabilities and the idle-capacity drag that has consumed HK$50–70 million a year. That would plausibly restore positive book equity and give the auditor grounds to lift the disclaimer.

The second is the treatment of the RMB87 million of convertible bonds maturing in mid-2027. Most are held by the controlling shareholders, whose continued willingness to lend, supply and not demand repayment is the company's real going-concern backstop.

Even in a successful scenario, minority holders face heavy dilution at HK$0.10 conversion, persistent related-party exposure, and a sub-scale, sugar-capped business with no disclosed R&D or growth pipeline.

For institutional portfolios, the appropriate stance is avoidance until a clean FY2026 audit opinion and post-deconsolidation balance sheet are published.