Global Mastermind Holdings Limited Overview
Global Mastermind Holdings was a Hong Kong-based investment holding company. Over 25 years it moved from travel services and precious-metals trading into a small, licensed financial-services platform. By its final audited year (FY2023), revenue of HK$13.9m came almost entirely from three Hong Kong activities: securities brokerage and margin financing under SFC licences, a licensed money-lending book, and a small proprietary securities portfolio. A portfolio of Grade A office units in Shun Tak Centre provided rental income and served as collateral. From FY2020 to FY2022 the group was badly damaged by large expected-credit-loss provisions on a concentrated loan book, a HK$58.8m loss of cash through an unauthorised-transactions incident at a subsidiary, and the collapse of its Singapore travel business. A HK$100m secured loan from Kingston Finance Limited then went into default after the chairman and loan guarantor resigned in November 2024. The lender took possession of the office properties in September 2025, and the shares were delisted in March 2026.
Company's own description
Across its FY2020–FY2023 annual reports and its 2025 resumption updates, the company described itself as an investment holding company. Its subsidiaries provided and operated a travel business, a treasury management business, a money lending business, and securities, asset management and financial (corporate finance) advisory services (AR2022 Corporate Governance Report; quarterly resumption update 16 May 2025). In AR2022 the company said its vision was to provide high-quality services and help people and businesses thrive over the long term. It named two principal strategies: (i) growing recurring earnings, cash flow and capital return while strengthening its financial position, and (ii) attracting, retaining and developing talented employees.
The company reported six operating segments: Travel Business; Treasury Management Business; Money Lending Business; Brokerage Business; Asset Management Business; and Corporate Finance Advisory Business (consistent across aggregators that draw on FY2023 filings, e.g. Yahoo Finance, MarketScreener). In the FY2021–FY2022 annual reports, brokerage, asset management and corporate finance advisory were presented together as the "financial services business".
Business and revenue model
| Revenue stream | Model | Regulatory basis | Status at last disclosure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Money lending | Interest income on term loans to corporate and individual borrowers in Hong Kong. Loans were often large, few in number, and unsecured or secured on shares. | Money Lenders Ordinance (Cap. 163); lender entity Global Mastermind Financial Services Limited | Since early 2025, no new loans have been written; the business is in collection mode only (May 2025 and Nov 2025 updates) |
| Securities brokerage | Commission plus handling and settlement fees on client trades | SFC Type 1 licence (Global Mastermind Securities Limited, from 2017) | Still operating "normally" as of Nov 2025, per company |
| Margin and IPO financing | Interest on margin loans to brokerage clients | SFC Type 1 | Largest single revenue line in FY2023–FY2024 |
| Futures brokerage | Commission on futures dealing | SFC Type 2 licence (Global Mastermind Futures Limited, from 2018) | Revenue not separately disclosed |
| Corporate finance advisory | Advisory fees | SFC Type 6, licensed 11 Mar 2019 | Company said it won new mandates from mid-2024; revenue described as "minimal" |
| Asset management | Management fees on small AUM | SFC licence through Global Mastermind Asset Management Limited (licence type and year not confirmed in reviewed filings) | Minimal since 2024; passive strategy |
| Treasury management | Realised and unrealised gains on listed equities | — | Minimal since 2024 |
| Property holding | Rental income from Shun Tak Centre office units, partly let to related parties | — | Properties taken into possession by the mortgagee on 2 Sep 2025 |
| Travel | Hotel room and package-tour arrangement (Hong Kong until Dec 2018; Singapore via Safe2Travel Pte Ltd until Aug 2021; Malaysia JV) | Travel Agents Act (Singapore) | Ceased. The company said in 2025 it was "considering" a restart. |
Mix (independent characterisation): The revenue model was almost entirely interest income plus transaction fees. There was no product, subscription or licensing revenue. In FY2024 (unaudited), about 39% of revenue was margin-financing interest (HK$4.562m), about 30% was brokerage commission and handling fees (HK$3.441m), about 23% was money-lending interest (HK$2.675m), and the remaining ~8% came from advisory, asset management and treasury (derived from Announcement 31 Mar 2025).
Value chain position, customers and end-markets
GMH was a sub-scale, retail- and high-net-worth-oriented intermediary in the Hong Kong capital-markets and private-credit value chain. It sat at the distribution and credit-provision end, and it had no proprietary platform technology that was disclosed. The customer base was highly concentrated. In FY2022 the largest customer accounted for 18% of revenue and the top five for 55% (FY2021: 11% and 43%) (AR2022). Several connected persons, including the chairman, directors of subsidiaries, and substantial shareholder Eternity Investment Limited and its associates, were brokerage or margin clients (AR2020, AR2022 connected transactions).
Independent characterisation. By FY2022 the business was effectively a balance-sheet-funded lending vehicle with an attached small brokerage. It was financed largely by a single HK$100m, 8% non-bank loan and by shareholders' equity. Its credit losses were concentrated in fewer than ten borrowers. Its fee franchise was too small to cover listed-company overheads, and its only hard collateral was a block of office units whose value fell with Hong Kong's Grade A office market. The Exchange's 2024–2025 finding under Rule 17.26 was, in substance, a finding that none of these activities was viable or sustainable at a level that justified a listing.
Strategy
Stated strategy (paraphrased themes)
AR2022/AR2023: Grow recurring earnings, cash flow and capital return while strengthening the balance sheet. Attract and retain talent. Slow loan-book expansion and monitor credit closely. Maintain prudent cost control. Look for investment opportunities to diversify revenue. The company concluded that re-entering travel in Hong Kong would be costly and difficult given competition from online travel agents.
2025 resumption updates (May and Nov 2025): Put liquidity first. Freeze new lending and focus on recovering existing loans. Keep brokerage stable without upgrades. Consider expanding the capital-light corporate finance advisory business. Consider restarting travel as tourism recovers. Keep asset and treasury management passive.
Initiatives in the last 24 months
| Date | Initiative | Status / outcome |
|---|---|---|
| 3 May 2024 | Variation of the Customer J loan, extending it to 16 May 2026 (approved at EGM 15 Aug 2024) | Completed; recovery outcome not disclosed |
| 15 Aug 2024 | New share option scheme adopted | No grants known |
| 17 Oct 2024 | Review sought of the Exchange's Rule 17.26 decision | Unsuccessful; suspension on 19 Feb 2025 |
| 30 Apr 2025 | Conditional seventh supplemental agreement with Kingston Finance (loan extension) | Lapsed or failed; a further demand followed on 11 Aug 2025 |
| 2,025 | Plans to grow corporate finance advisory and potentially relaunch travel | No disclosed execution |
| 2,025 | Plan to settle audit fees and complete the FY2024 audit | Not achieved by the delisting |
Medium-term financial targets / guidance: None were ever published. ESG commitments: Limited to office green practices and a board gender-diversity target of at least one female director by end-FY2024 (AR2022). That target was briefly met in 2025 and then lost. Cost programmes: Directors waived emoluments from June 2021, and the company described "stricter policies for cost control" in FY2024; no quantified targets were given.
Products & Services
GMH did not market branded products. Its "portfolio" was a set of regulated financial services and a property holding. Each line is catalogued below with whatever was disclosed.
Money Lending Business
Term loans (corporate and individual): Description: bilateral loans by Global Mastermind Financial Services Limited, a licensed money lender. Specifications: at 31 Dec 2022 there were nine loans outstanding with gross receivables of HK$310.8m, of which seven (HK$265.6m gross) were stage 3 credit-impaired (AR2022). Illustrative terms: a HK$62.2m unsecured loan to an individual, Mr. Yuen Hoi Po, at 9% p.a., repayable on 10 Nov 2022. It exceeded the 8% assets-ratio threshold and had to be disclosed under GEM Rule 17.22 (AR2022). Customer J facility: original agreement dated 17 May 2022, varied on 3 May 2024 to mature on 16 May 2026, secured by a share charge from NPH Holdings Limited and guaranteed by China Healthwise Holdings Limited (EGM circular 24 Jun 2024). Target customers: Hong Kong SMEs and HNW individuals. Pricing: fixed interest; return on average loans was 9% in FY2021 and 5% in FY2022 (AR2022). Status: no new lending since early 2025.
Brokerage Business
- Hong Kong securities brokerage (Global Mastermind Securities Limited, SFC Type 1). Commission and handling/settlement fees. FY2024 combined commission and handling income: HK$3.441m (unaudited).
Margin financing: Average monthly margin loans outstanding were HK$71.0m in FY2022 (FY2021: HK$64.5m). Margin interest income was HK$4.562m in FY2024. Credit losses rose in FY2022, with a HK$13.2m ECL charge on margin receivables (AR2022).
IPO financing: Small; HK$60k in FY2020 and HK$35k in Q1 2021.
- Futures brokerage (Global Mastermind Futures Limited, SFC Type 2, from 2018). Revenue not separately disclosed.
Corporate Finance Advisory Business
Type 6 advisory (licensed from 11 Mar 2019): Fees peaked at HK$2.504m in FY2021, fell to HK$0.120m in FY2022, and were described as minimal in FY2024. Management said in 2025 that it had won new mandates and liked the segment's low capital requirement (Nov 2025 update).
Asset Management Business
- Discretionary management (Global Mastermind Asset Management Limited). Fees fell from HK$540k in FY2019 to HK$3k in FY2022 as AUM shrank. Management described a passive strategy from 2024.
Treasury Management Business
Proprietary listed-equity portfolio: Notable historical holding: Huobi Technology shares, partly sold in 2019 (4.1m shares, HK$18.8m) and 2020 (8.22m shares, HK$23.0m) (Announcement 3 Apr 2020). Return on FVTPL assets was +66% in FY2021 and -37% in FY2022 (AR2022). Minimal from 2024.
Property holding (investment properties)
- Office Units 3107, 3108 and 3109, 31/F, West Tower, Shun Tak Centre, Central. Book values at 31 Dec 2024 were HK$59.7m, HK$33.4m and HK$33.4m respectively, HK$126.5m in total. Units were leased partly to related parties: Walnut Capital Limited (74.99% owned by director Mung Bun Man, Alan) and Eurus Express Limited (owned by a family member of directors). The properties were mortgaged to the Singapore bank under the 2021 settlement and later to Kingston Finance Limited. The lender took possession on 2 Sep 2025 (Announcement 9 Sep 2025).
Travel Business (dormant)
Safe2Travel Pte Ltd (Singapore): Corporate and leisure travel management, including air tickets, hotels and packages. Disposed of on 30 Aug 2021. FY2019 travel income was HK$26.0m.
Malaysian travel JV: Fully impaired in 2020.
Hong Kong travel subsidiary: Disposed of in Dec 2018.
- Company stated in 2025 that it was considering resuming travel; no launch was disclosed.
Financial Narrative
Data basis. FY2020–FY2022 figures are audited (FY2020: disclaimer of opinion; FY2021–FY2022: qualified on comparatives). FY2023 revenue and loss before tax are audited figures as quoted in the 31 Mar 2025 announcement. FY2023 net loss is taken from data aggregators (MarketScreener, StockAnalysis: HK$34.14m) and is consistent with the audited loss before tax of HK$34.141m. FY2024 figures are unaudited. Blank cells = not publicly disclosed or not available in sources reviewed.
Income statement
Sources: AR2020; AR2022 five-year summary and MD&A; Announcement 31 Mar 2025; MarketScreener (FY2023 net loss).
Gross profit, operating income and EBITDA. GMH did not report gross profit; as a financial-services group it had no cost of sales. EBITDA was not reported. An approximation (loss from operations plus depreciation and amortisation) would be about -HK$145m in FY2020, -HK$162m in FY2021 and -HK$142m in FY2022. These figures are derived and indicative only.
Per-share data
Derivations: FY2020 uses 426.3m shares (post-consolidation equivalent of 4,262.9m pre-consolidation shares). FY2021 uses about 480.2m weighted shares, reflecting the 12 May 2021 conversion. FY2022–FY2023 use 510.8m shares. These EPS figures are analyst-derived from reported losses and share counts, not copied from the face of the statements. One aggregator (TipRanks) shows FY2023 EPS of -HK$0.062, which is a discrepancy against the -HK$0.067 derived here.
Margins and growth
Revenue CAGR: FY2020–FY2024 about -23.3% p.a. (HK$33.6m to HK$11.6m). FY2021–FY2024 about -39.9% p.a.
Balance sheet: notes and sources
Notes: The Kingston Finance loan is shown as HK$100m principal for FY2023 and FY2024; this matches the HK$100m principal in the January 2025 demand letter. FY2023 net debt is from MarketScreener. A TipRanks snapshot, likely at 30 Jun 2024, shows cash and marketable securities of HK$22.3m against debt of HK$100m. The FY2024 investment property figure is the sum of the three Shun Tak units' book values at 31 Dec 2024 (Announcement 9 Sep 2025). FY2020 investment property is the mortgaged carrying amount per AR2020. FY2021 intangibles and financial guarantee figures are from the 2022 interim comparatives. On 30 Sep 2023 the group had net current liabilities of HK$13.3m, and the Q3 2023 report flagged material uncertainty over going concern.
Cash flow
Operating cash flow, capex and free cash flow are therefore not publicly disclosed in sources reviewed. Qualitative evidence: (i) capex was negligible (PP&E of HK$3k–7k in 2022); (ii) no dividends were paid and no buybacks were made in any year (AR2022 Directors' Report: no purchases of listed securities); (iii) cash fell from HK$97.0m (FY2019) to HK$28.7m (FY2020), driven by the HK$58.8m loss of assets and the HK$20m CB redemption; (iv) by mid-2024 the group could not pay its audit fee.
Ratios
Not meaningful or not disclosed: ROIC, net debt/EBITDA (EBITDA negative), interest coverage (EBIT negative), and cash conversion cycle (no inventory or payables cycle).
Commentary on trends, inflections and drivers
FY2020 (loss HK$267.1m). Three shocks came together. COVID-19 cut travel income by 86% to HK$3.5m and led to a HK$93.7m ECL charge on travel trade receivables, mostly Singapore corporate accounts. Three loans moved to stage 3, driving a HK$59.3m loan ECL charge. The Solution Apex incidents produced a HK$58.8m write-off. Moore Stephens disclaimed its audit opinion because it could not obtain evidence on the nature and substance of the Solution Apex payments.
FY2021 (loss HK$183.1m). Underlying revenue rebounded by 60% on brokerage activity and treasury gains. However, a HK$96.3m non-cash fair-value loss when the 2020 CB converted, together with a HK$76.3m loan ECL charge, kept the group deep in loss. The conversion cut borrowings from HK$190m to HK$100m but brought Heng Tai Finance in as a 16.5% shareholder at an effective HK$0.71 per share.
FY2022 (loss HK$162.8m). The loan book deteriorated decisively. Seven of nine loans were stage 3, and the ECL charge reached HK$113.0m, including full write-downs of HK$45.1m on one loan and HK$47.9m across three others. Interest income halved because no interest was accrued on impaired loans. Deferred tax assets were derecognised, producing a HK$12.4m tax charge. Equity nearly halved to HK$179.2m, and gearing rose to 56%.
FY2023 (loss about HK$34.1m). This was an inflection by subtraction. Losses narrowed by 79% mainly because ECL charges fell sharply (there were even reversals in H1 2023), and there was no further CB charge. Revenue still fell 47% to HK$13.9m as the loan book ran off. Liquidity was precarious, with net current liabilities at 30 Sep 2023.
FY2024 (unaudited loss before tax HK$52.9m). Revenue fell a further 16% to HK$11.6m. Brokerage and margin lines grew slightly, but money lending halved. A HK$28.8m fair-value loss on the Shun Tak office units drove the deeper loss. A chairman-driven event of default on the HK$100m loan turned a solvency problem into a liquidity crisis.
Unlock Company Financials
Unlock this company profile to view its financial data.
View Subscription PlansFinancial Detail
Segment Overview
| Segment | Contents | Principal operating entities (where disclosed) |
|---|---|---|
Money Lending Business | Licensed money lending in Hong Kong | Global Mastermind Financial Services Limited |
Brokerage Business | Securities and futures brokerage, margin and IPO financing | Global Mastermind Securities Limited; Global Mastermind Futures Limited |
Asset Management Business | Discretionary asset management | Global Mastermind Asset Management Limited |
Corporate Finance Advisory Business | Type 6 corporate finance advice | Entity name not confirmed in reviewed filings |
Treasury Management Business | Investment in listed securities | Subsidiaries including a BVI vehicle (長悅) used for securities trading (English name not confirmed) |
Travel Business | Hotel booking and package tours (dormant after 2021) | Formerly Safe2Travel Pte Ltd (Singapore, disposed of Aug 2021); Malaysian JV (impaired to nil in 2020) |
Property holding (not a separate reporting segment) | Office units held as investment properties | Famous Flamingo Limited; Hope Master Investments Limited |
Segment revenue (HKD Mn)
| Segment revenue (HKD Mn) | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Money lending interest (HKD Mn) | 29.636 | 27.885 | 13.402 | 5.348 | 2.675 |
Financial services total (HKD Mn) | 15.630 | 20.402 | 12.850 | — | — |
of which margin and IPO financing interest (HKD Mn) | 6.464 | 6.197 | 6.883 | 4.483 | 4.562 |
of which brokerage commission (HKD Mn) | 2.918 | 4.636 | 2.057 | — | — |
of which handling and settlement income (HKD Mn) | 5.359 | 6.991 | 3.787 | — | — |
of which commission plus handling combined (HKD Mn) | 8.277 | 11.627 | 5.844 | 3.050 | 3.441 |
of which asset management fees (HKD Mn) | 0.151 | 0.074 | 0.003 | — | — |
of which corporate finance advisory fees (HKD Mn) | 0.738 | 2.504 | 0.120 | — | — |
Treasury net realised gain or loss in revenue (HKD Mn) | -11.637 | 5.389 | 0.010 | — | — |
Travel services income, ceased or discontinued (HKD Mn) | 3.521 | 0.457 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Total revenue, continuing, as restated (HKD Mn) | 33.629 | 53.676 | 26.262 | 13.894 | 11.631 |
Revenue by Segment (%) and Segment Margins & Growth (%)
| Metric (%) | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Money lending share of total revenue (%) | 88.1 | 52.0 | 51.0 | 38.5 | 23.0 |
Margin financing share of total revenue (%) | 19.2 | 11.5 | 26.2 | 32.3 | 39.2 |
Commission plus handling share of total revenue (%) | 24.6 | 21.7 | 22.3 | 22.0 | 29.6 |
Money lending revenue YoY growth (%) | 1.9 | -5.9 | -51.9 | -60.1 | -50.0 |
Total revenue YoY growth (%) | — | 59.6 | -51.1 | -47.1 | -16.3 |
Results by Segment
| Segment result (HKD Mn) | FY2021 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|
Money lending segment result (HKD Mn) | -60.075 | -119.797 |
Treasury management segment result (HKD Mn) | 14.380 | -6.840 |
Financial services segment result (HKD Mn) | -2.580 | -11.920 |
Margin Analysis
| Metric (HKD Mn) | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue, continuing, restated (HKD Mn) | 33.629 | 53.676 | 26.262 | 13.894 | 11.631 |
Loss from operations (HKD Mn) | -154.561 | -164.238 | -142.418 | — | — |
Finance costs (HKD Mn) | -16.450 | -9.677 | -8.000 | — | — |
Loss before tax, continuing (HKD Mn) | -171.011 | -173.915 | -150.418 | -34.141 | -52.872 |
Income tax credit or expense (HKD Mn) | 9.769 | -1.721 | -12.398 | — | — |
Loss from continuing operations (HKD Mn) | -161.242 | -175.636 | -162.816 | — | — |
Loss from discontinued operation (HKD Mn) | -105.842 | -7.462 | 0 | 0 | — |
Net loss for the year (HKD Mn) | -267.084 | -183.098 | -162.816 | -34.140 | — |
Net loss attributable to owners (HKD Mn) | -267.084 | -183.091 | -162.815 | -34.140 | — |
Staff costs (HKD Mn) | 41.967 | 17.311 | 15.303 | — | — |
ECL on loan receivables (HKD Mn) | 59.320 | 76.314 | 112.975 | — | — |
ECL on margin receivables (HKD Mn) | — | 7.149 | 13.232 | — | — |
Fair value change on investment properties (HKD Mn) | -17.800 | 3.900 | -5.000 | — | -28.800 |
Dividends per share (HKD) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Per-share metric (HKD)
| Per-share metric (HKD) | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Basic EPS, consolidation-adjusted, derived (HKD) | -0.627 | -0.381 | -0.319 | -0.067 | — |
Diluted EPS (HKD) | -0.627 | -0.381 | -0.319 | -0.067 | — |
Dividend per share (HKD) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Book value per share, derived (HKD) | 0.820 | 0.669 | 0.351 | — | — |
Margin / growth metric (%)
| Margin / growth metric (%) | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Pre-tax margin, continuing (%) | -508.5 | -324.0 | -572.8 | -245.7 | -454.6 |
Net margin (%) | -794.2 | -341.1 | -620.0 | -245.7 | — |
Revenue YoY growth (%) | — | 59.6 | -51.1 | -47.1 | -16.3 |
Balance Sheet
| Balance sheet item (HKD Mn) | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total assets (HKD Mn) | 600.973 | 478.459 | 310.795 | — | — |
Total liabilities (HKD Mn) | 251.353 | 136.488 | 131.640 | — | — |
Total equity (HKD Mn) | 349.620 | 341.971 | 179.155 | — | — |
Bank balances and cash (HKD Mn) | 28.721 | 33.657 | 31.193 | — | — |
Total borrowings (HKD Mn) | 190.233 | 100.000 | 100.000 | 100.000 | 100.000 |
of which other borrowing, Kingston Finance, 8% (HKD Mn) | 100.000 | 100.000 | 100.000 | 100.000 | 100.000 |
of which convertible bonds (HKD Mn) | 60.000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
of which bank borrowings, Singapore (HKD Mn) | 30.233 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Net debt, derived (HKD Mn) | 161.512 | 66.343 | 68.807 | 69.820 | — |
Net current assets, working capital (HKD Mn) | 32.355 | 161.563 | 16.493 | — | — |
Investment properties (HKD Mn) | 163.300 | 167.200 | 162.200 | — | 126.500 |
Gross loan and interest receivables before ECL (HKD Mn) | 331.366 | 322.021 | 310.824 | — | — |
Goodwill and intangibles (HKD Mn) | — | 0.795 | — | — | — |
Financial guarantee liability, Safe2Travel (HKD Mn) | — | 7.209 | — | — | — |
Cash flow item (HKD Mn)
| Cash flow item (HKD Mn) | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Dividends paid (HKD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Share buybacks (HKD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Convertible bond redemption in cash (HKD Mn) | 20.000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Returns & Leverage Ratios (%) and Financial Ratios (x)
| Ratio | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|---|
ROE on average equity, derived (%) | -55.3 | -52.9 | -62.5 |
ROA on average assets, derived (%) | -35.2 | -33.9 | -41.3 |
Current ratio, reported (x) | 1.1 | 2.2 | 1.1 |
Gearing, borrowings / owners' equity, reported (%) | 54 | 29 | 56 |
Asset turnover, derived (x) | 0.04 | 0.10 | 0.07 |
Return on average loan receivables, reported (%) | — | 9 | 5 |
Geographic revenue (HKD Mn)
| Geographic revenue (HKD Mn) | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Hong Kong, all continuing activities (HKD Mn) | 33.629 | 53.676 | 26.262 | 13.894 | 11.631 |
Singapore travel, discontinued (HKD Mn) | 3.521 | 0.457 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Malaysia, equity-accounted JV, not in revenue (HKD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Geographic growth (%)
| Geographic growth (%) | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Hong Kong revenue YoY (%) | — | 59.6 | -51.1 | -47.1 | -16.3 |
Singapore revenue YoY (%) | -86.5 | — | -100.0 | — | — |
Segment × Geography, FY2022 Details
| Segment × geography, FY2022 (HKD Mn) | Hong Kong | Singapore | Malaysia |
|---|---|---|---|
Money lending | 13.402 | 0 | 0 |
Financial services | 12.850 | 0 | 0 |
Treasury | 0.010 | 0 | 0 |
Travel | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Capital Markets
| Item | Value | Note / source |
|---|---|---|
Last traded price | About HK$0.022 | Before the 19 Feb 2025 suspension (Investing.com; Stockopedia shows HK$0.02) |
Implied market value at last trade | About HK$11.2m | 510.8m shares (Yahoo Finance HK$11.24m) |
Enterprise value (aggregators) | HK$89.9m – HK$94.6m | Yahoo Finance; TipRanks |
P/B at last trade, derived | About 0.08x | Using derived FY2023 equity of about HK$145m (FY2022 equity HK$179.2m less FY2023 loss) |
EV/Sales, FY2023, derived | About 6.5x | EV about HK$90m / revenue HK$13.9m |
Current status | Delisted; no exchange price | From 16 Mar 2026 |
Share price reference (HK$, consolidation-adjusted)
| Share price reference (HK$, consolidation-adjusted) | FY2021 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|
Effective CB conversion price (HKD) | 0.71 | — |
Last traded price before suspension (HKD) | — | 0.022 |
Capital Markets — Dividend history
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
Dividend history | No dividends in any year FY2016–FY2024 (five-year summaries) |
Dividend policy | Discretionary, with no fixed payout (adopted 31 Dec 2018) |
Buyback authorisations | General repurchase mandates were sought at AGMs (e.g. 18 Jun 2024). No repurchases were executed (AR2022). |
Credit ratings | None (Moody's, S&P and Fitch do not rate the company) |
Analyst consensus | None. No sell-side coverage was identified (Stockopedia and TipRanks show no estimates). |
Capital Instruments
| Instrument | Principal | Rate | Maturity history | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Kingston Finance Limited term loan (dated 16 May 2019) | HK$100.0m | 8% p.a. (plus default interest) | Extended repeatedly: to 12 Nov 2021 (2020 extension), 10 Nov 2023 (per AR2022), and further via supplemental agreements up to the conditional seventh (30 Apr 2025) | In default since Nov 2024; HK$101.76m demanded on 11 Aug 2025; security enforced on 2 Sep 2025 |
2020 CB | HK$60.0m | 8% p.a. | Due 11 Nov 2022 | Converted 12 May 2021 |
2018 CB | HK$80.0m | — | — | HK$20m redeemed and HK$60m rolled into the 2020 CB (Nov 2020) |
Singapore bank borrowings (Safe2Travel) | HK$30.2m (end-2020) | — | 17 monthly instalments from Mar 2021 | Settled or derecognised on the 2021 disposal; residual guarantee liability |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance
No financial guidance was ever issued. The final management statements, in the 18 Nov 2025 resumption update, focused on improving liquidity, collecting the loan book, keeping brokerage stable, expanding advisory opportunistically and possibly restarting travel. None of these was quantified.
Consensus
None. There is no analyst coverage, and the company is delisted.
Bull case (as it might have been argued before delisting)
-
Collateral cover. At 31 Dec 2024 the repossessed units had a book value of HK$126.5m against a debt of about HK$101.8m. If the mortgagee sells near book value, a surplus of up to about HK$25m could return to the company.
-
Licensed platform value. An operating SFC Type 1, 2 and 6 brokerage, which the company said was still "normally operating" in November 2025, could have some private-market value to a buyer seeking licences.
-
Loan recoveries. Stage 3 balances of about HK$265m gross (end-2022) were heavily provisioned, so any recovery would flow directly to equity.
Bear case
-
No listed equity. The shares cannot be traded on any exchange after 16 Mar 2026, and the company no longer has to publish disclosures, so minority shareholders have almost no information or liquidity.
-
Forced-sale haircut. Mortgagee sales in a weak Grade A office market, where the units had already lost HK$28.8m in FY2024, could wipe out any surplus once default interest and enforcement costs are deducted.
-
Operating viability rejected. The Exchange found that none of the businesses was substantive, viable and sustainable. Revenue had fallen to HK$11.6m (unaudited FY2024) against listed-company overheads and an unpaid audit fee.
Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
-
Outcome of the Kingston Finance mortgagee sale of Units 3107–3109 and any surplus or shortfall.
-
Any Cayman winding-up petition or creditor action. None was identified up to this date.
-
Status of the SFC licences held by Global Mastermind Securities and Global Mastermind Futures, including any licence suspension or revocation, and protection of client assets.
-
Any voluntary communication to shareholders through the company website, which is the only remaining channel.
-
Recovery proceeds from the loan book and from the Solution Apex actions.
Analyst verdict
Global Mastermind Holdings shows how a sub-scale GEM issuer can fail through concentrated credit exposure, related-party dependence and weak governance. Over FY2016–FY2024 it moved from travel into a licensed brokerage and money-lending model. That model never produced a profit, and losses were reported in every year in the five-year summaries from FY2013 onwards. The decisive damage came in FY2020–FY2022. About HK$249m of loan ECL charges, a HK$58.8m unauthorised cash loss at a subsidiary, a HK$93.7m write-down of travel receivables and a HK$96.3m convertible-bond fair-value charge together reduced equity from HK$616.9m (FY2019) to HK$179.2m (FY2022).
The FY2023 narrowing of the loss to about HK$34m reflected smaller provisions, not a recovering business: revenue fell 47% that year. By then, the group's survival depended on a single HK$100m, 8% loan guaranteed personally by its chairman. When he resigned on 13 November 2024, the guarantee-linked event of default turned a slow decline into a fast collapse. Within ten months the company could not fund its audit, its shares were suspended, its board fell below the minimum required, and its lender took possession of its only hard assets.
From an investment perspective there is no listed security left to analyse, so recommendations such as "Buy" or "Sell" are not applicable. For holders of the residual, unlisted equity, the realistic value is the possible surplus from the mortgagee sale plus any recoveries, less creditor claims, SFC wind-down costs and legacy guarantees. Because no audited accounts exist after FY2023 and no disclosure obligation remains, that value cannot be estimated reliably. We regard the equity as impaired with highly uncertain residual value. Stakeholders should treat any future corporate action, such as a privatisation offer, liquidation or asset sale, as the only realistic route to recovery, and should take professional advice as the Exchange recommended.
DATA NOTES, DISCREPANCIES & SOURCES
Primary sources (HKEXnews / company): Annual Reports 2015, 2017, 2018, 2020 and 2022; Interim Report 2018 and 2022; Q1 2021, Q3 2021, Q1 2022, Q1 2023 and Q3 2023 reports; inside-information announcements of 24 Mar 2023, 9 Aug 2023, 3 Nov 2023 and 20 Mar 2024; announcements of 3 Apr 2020, 26 Mar 2021, 12 Apr 2021, 3 May 2024, 27 May 2024, 11 Jun 2024, 15 Aug 2024, 28 Jan 2025, 31 Mar 2025, 16 May 2025, 6–7 Aug 2025, 9 Sep 2025, 4 Nov 2025, 7 Nov 2025, 18 Nov 2025 and 11 Mar 2026; EGM circular of 24 Jun 2024; Form G company information sheets (Aug 2025); HKEX regulatory announcement "Cancellation of listing — Global Mastermind Holdings Limited" (11 Mar 2026).
Secondary sources (used only where flagged): Morningstar AU, Yahoo Finance, Stockopedia, MarketScreener, StockAnalysis, Simply Wall St, TipRanks, Investing.com, Alpha Spread, China Healthwise corporate website (director biographies), irasia.com announcement index, Tiger Brokers news (11 Mar 2026; 7 Nov 2025).
For identification purposes only: 環球大通集團有限公司 is the Chinese name used in filings.
Unlock Company Financials
Unlock this company profile to view its financial data.
View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Board of Directors
| Name | Role | Tenure | Background (disclosed) |
|---|---|---|---|
Mung Kin Keung (蒙建強) | Executive Director | From 19 Jun 2014 | Aged 62 in AR2022. Chairman of affiliated Global Mastermind Capital Limited (905.HK, later Walnut Capital Limited). Father of Mung Bun Man, Alan. |
Ng Ngam (吳岩) | Executive Director | Appointed in 2025 (on board by 16 May 2025) | — |
Cheung Kwok Wai, Elton (張國偉) | Chairman, ED, compliance officer; also described as managing director at resignation | 16 Dec 2016 to 13 Nov 2024 (chairman date per AR2022; China Healthwise dates the chairmanship from 24 Jul 2020) | Aged 57 in AR2022. Master's in Accounting and Finance, Lancaster University. ED of Eternity Investment (764.HK) since Feb 2011. Vice-chairman and ED of China Healthwise (348.HK) since Oct 2019. Personally guaranteed the HK$100m Kingston loan and the 2020 CB. His resignation triggered the loan default. |
Mung Bun Man, Alan (蒙品文) | ED, Managing Director | Until 2025 (left between 16 May and 9 Sep 2025) | Chaired the CG Committee; owned 74.99% of Walnut Capital Limited, a tenant of group properties |
Tse Ke Li | ED | Resigned 15 Jan 2021 | — |
Zhou Danqing (周丹青) | ED and later company secretary | 2025 (resigned during 2025) | — |
Wong Chun Hung (黃俊雄, romanisation unconfirmed) | Non-executive Director | Appointed 2023 | Shown on board Aug 2023 to Jun 2024 |
Law Kwok Ho, Kenward | INED; Audit Committee chair | Until c. Nov 2024 | — |
Fung Wai Ching | INED; Nomination Committee chair | 23 Jun 2014 to 4 Nov 2025 | Also INED of China Healthwise |
Lai Hok Lim | INED; Remuneration Committee chair | 24 Jul 2020 to 19 Nov 2024 | — |
Tsai Yung Chieh, David | INED | Resigned 24 Jul 2020 | — |
Lau Mei Ying (劉美盈) | INED | 2024/2025 to Aug 2025 | The board's only female director |
Yiu To Wa (姚道華) | INED | 2024/2025 to 2025 | — |
Chu Man Ting | Company Secretary | From 1 May 2020 (still in role mid-2024) | HKICPA member |
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Shares | % of issued | Nature |
|---|---|---|---|
Eternity Investment Limited (764.HK), via Eternity Finance Group Limited (81,932,000) and Max Winner Investments Limited (12,565,000) | 94,497,000 | 18.50 | Corporate; the chairman held an indirect 15.29% of Eternity |
Heng Tai Consumables Group Limited (197.HK), via Heng Tai Finance Limited | 84,507,042 | 16.54 | Received on conversion of the 2020 CB |
Excellent Mind Investments Limited (60% Mung Kin Keung / 40% Mung Bun Man) | 532,000,000 pre-consolidation (12.48%) at 31 Dec 2020 | not a disclosed holder at 31 Dec 2022 | Directors reported no interests at end-2022, which implies disposal |
Competitive Landscape
Competitors by Segment
| Segment | Named competitors / comparables | Relative positioning |
|---|---|---|
Retail securities brokerage | Bright Smart Securities & Commodities Group (1428.HK); Emperor Capital Group (717.HK); Get Nice Holdings (64.HK); Futu Holdings (FUTU); UP Fintech/Tiger Brokers (TIGR) | GMH was sub-scale, with combined commission and handling income of about HK$3.4m in FY2024; it had no proprietary app and could not compete on price or technology |
Margin financing | Same brokers as above, plus bank-affiliated brokers | GMH margin book of about HK$70m average (FY2022); credit losses in FY2022 |
Money lending (listed peers) | Eternity Investment (764.HK, related party); China Healthwise (348.HK, related); First Credit Finance Group (8215.HK, also delisted in Nov 2025 after Rule 17.26 proceedings); Hong Kong Finance Investment Holding Group (1273.HK) | GMH's book was concentrated, with seven of nine loans impaired at end-2022 |
Corporate finance advisory | Numerous boutique Type 6 houses | Negligible share |
Travel (historical) | Online travel agencies (Trip.com, Expedia, Agoda) and Singapore TMCs | GMH's own AR2022 cited online-agency dominance as the reason not to re-enter |
Competitor Detail
| Metric | GMH FY2023 |
|---|---|
Revenue (HKD Mn) | 13.9 |
Revenue growth (%) | -47.1 |
Pre-tax margin (%) | -245.7 |
R&D intensity (%) | 0 |
Recent Developments
--



