Glorious Property Holdings Limited Overview
Glorious Property is a distressed, founder-controlled PRC developer whose brand once stood for large-scale, high-end residential communities in Shanghai. Its flagship is the Huangpu-riverfront Shanghai Bay (恒盛‧尚海灣) project in Xuhui District. The group also has a long tail of lower-value projects across the Yangtze River Delta, the Pan Bohai Rim and Northeast China. Its economic model has narrowed to selling residual inventory and car parks, delivering the last towers of legacy premium projects, and leasing a modest commercial portfolio. Meanwhile it carries more than RMB23.7 billion of borrowings (including accrued interest), all classified as current, and over RMB10.6 billion of overdue principal as at mid-2024. Equity has been negative since 2022 at the attributable level. The land bank carries an average land cost of only RMB1,446/sq.m. on paper. That low cost basis is the residual "value" thesis, but creditors hold liens over most assets. The near-term question is listing survival, not growth.
Company's own description
In its annual reports the company says it is principally engaged in property investment, development and management in the PRC. Its ESG report frames the business the same way (AR2023 ESG Overview). The condensed interim statements describe the group simply as engaged in PRC property development projects (IR2024 note 1). Management organises the business geographically into four operating segments: Shanghai Region, Yangtze River Delta (excluding Shanghai), Pan Bohai Rim and Northeast China. An "Others" line covers corporate support functions (IR2024 note 4).
Business model and revenue model
| Revenue stream | Nature | Weight (latest) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sale of properties (recognised at a point in time) | Residential units, villas, serviced apartments, shops, offices and car parks. Recognised on delivery. | RMB1,999.3M of RMB2,326.9M in H1 2024 (85.9%) | IR2024 |
| Interior decoration revenue (recognised over time) | Fit-out of sold Shanghai Bay units under separate decoration contracts | RMB327.5M in H1 2024 (14.1%); RMB423.5M in FY2023 | IR2024, AR2023 |
| Rental income (booked in "other income", not revenue) | Leasing of completed commercial and office space | RMB61.3M in FY2023; RMB17.8M in H1 2024 | AR2023, IR2024 |
| Property management | Mentioned in the ESG scope; not separately reported as revenue | — | AR2022 ESG |
Independent characterisation. Glorious is a pure-play, develop-to-sell homebuilder that has shrunk into a liquidation-style run-off. Revenue is extremely lumpy and comes almost entirely from one or two premium deliveries per year: Shanghai Bay Towers 15/16 and Beijing Royal Mansion Phase II in 2022–2024. New land acquisition stopped years ago. No new land was bought in 2022, 2023 or H1 2024 (AR2022, AR2023, IR2024). No new construction started in H1 2024 (IR2024). The model is no longer "land → presale → delivery → reinvest". It is now "harvest residual inventory to service a frozen debt stack". Rental income is immaterial against finance costs: RMB61M of rent compares with RMB2.49bn of gross finance costs in FY2023.
Value-chain position
Glorious acts as master developer. It acquires land use rights (historically at very low cost), plans projects, contracts out construction, markets presales and delivers units. Construction is outsourced. Historically a related contractor, Shanghai Ditong, carried out building work. Independent shareholders rejected the proposed annual caps for that relationship in December 2017, March 2018 and November 2018 (AR2022). The group does not own a construction arm, a property-management listco or a financing platform.
Customer types and end-markets
| Customer / market | Description |
|---|---|
| High-net-worth owner-occupiers in tier-1 cities | Shanghai Bay residential units achieved average recognised prices above RMB100,000/sq.m. (AR2023; IR2024 ASP RMB104,406/sq.m.). Beijing Royal Mansion averaged about RMB33,000–60,000/sq.m. |
| Mass-market buyers in tier-2/3 cities | Nantong, Hefei, Wuxi, Changchun, Harbin, Shenyang and Tianjin. Prices there run from about RMB1,100 to RMB6,600/sq.m. in recent deliveries, which reflects car-park-heavy mixes (IR2024). |
| Car-park purchasers | An increasing share of unit sales by volume (AR2023). |
| Commercial tenants | Retail, office and hotel. Commercial pipeline of about 2.0M sq.m. GFA: retail 67.4%, office 10.3%, hotel 22.3% (IR2024). |
| Mortgage-banking counterparties | The group guarantees buyers' mortgages until title deeds are issued. Outstanding guarantees were RMB3,795.3M at 30 June 2024 (IR2024). |
Strategy
Stated strategy themes (paraphrased from AR2023 Future Outlook and the IR2024 H2 outlook)
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Steady-development posture. Management commits to a prudent, survival-first business strategy that closely tracks macro policy direction.
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Management efficiency. Flatter management, top-down efficiency improvements, a unified sales management responsibility system, and tighter engineering and cost control.
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Delivery assurance. Prioritise completing and handing over sold homes, in line with the national "guarantee delivery" policy. Work with local governments and owners to secure support for handovers (IR2024).
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Monetise commercial assets. Lease office and retail space and step up sales of commercial units and car parks as a funding supplement.
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Deleveraging. Reduce total debt step by step through project sales, disposal of existing assets, and restructuring or replacement of non-performing debt. Optimise the debt structure and add long-term low-cost loans when possible (AR2023). The H1 2024 outlook adds the use of non-performing-asset disposals as a debt-resolution tool.
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Policy-window participation. Watch state-owned acquisition of housing inventory (收儲) and "rent and sell" policies as destocking channels (IR2024).
Initiatives in the last 24 months
| Initiative | Detail | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Going-concern mitigation programme | Five measures: lender negotiations on modification, renewal, extension and replacement; new financing; accelerated presales and sales including car parks; faster receivables collection; cost and headcount control | Ongoing since FY2021; cited in AR2023 and IR2024 |
| Resumption plan | Publish all outstanding results and address audit modifications; demonstrate Rule 13.24 sufficiency of operations; appoint an approved registrar; disclose all material information | Required by RG2025. Additional guidance was issued in Aug 2025 and revised in May 2026. None completed as at Oct 2026. |
| Cost programme | Headcount cut from 628 to 343 (FY2021 to H1 2024); admin expenses down 47.8% YoY in H1 2024 | Achieved |
| ESG | Internal policies on carbon, energy, water and waste. Intensity targets held "stable" over 3–5 years. | Boilerplate; no quantified decarbonisation target |
| New business lines | One aggregator's "medical beauty" reference | — |
Medium-term targets and guidance
The company provides no numerical financial guidance. The only forward-looking operating data in filings are:
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2024 saleable resources of about 545,695 sq.m. across 14 projects (AR2023).
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Management's statement in IR2024 that transaction volumes would reasonably be expected to stay low for the next 12–18 months.
Products & Services
Glorious sells real estate, so the "products" are projects. The catalogue below lists every project in the FY2023 and H1 2024 land bank and delivery tables. Land bank and land cost figures are at 31 Dec 2023 (AR2023). Nantong Royal Bay shows 181,312 sq.m. in AR2023 but 381,814 sq.m. in IR2024; the source discrepancy is noted.
Shanghai Region
| Project | District | Use | Land bank (sq.m.) | Avg land cost (MYR Bn/sq.m.) | Interest | Status / flagship notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shanghai Bay (恒盛‧尚海灣) | Xuhui, Huangpu riverfront | Residential, serviced apartment, office, commercial | 279,867 | 611 | 100% | Flagship. Tower 15 delivered 2022; Tower 16 delivered 2023 (about 10,000+ sq.m.; RMB1,088.7M recognised). H1 2024 recognised ASP RMB104,406/sq.m. 23,417 sq.m. saleable in 2024. 47,832 sq.m. commercial under construction. |
| Sunshine Venice (陽光威尼斯) | Putuo | Residential, office, commercial | 83,422 | 554 | 100% | Residual sales. 31,315 sq.m. saleable in 2024. |
| Royal Lakefront (湖畔豪庭) | Fengxian | Residential, commercial | 112,290 | 1,870 | 100% | Residual sales; FY2023 ASP RMB8,157/sq.m. |
| Caohejing Project (漕河涇項目) | Xuhui | Office, hotel, commercial | 101,548 | 9,703 | 100% | 99,329 sq.m. under construction; saleable in 2024 per plan |
| Zhongcao Xincun Project (中漕新村) | Xuhui | Serviced apartment, commercial | 80,646 | 9,703 | 100% | Planning / development |
| Shanghai City Glorious (上海‧恒盛豪庭) | Shanghai | Residential | — | — | 100% | Tail inventory; 2,388 sq.m. saleable in 2024 |
| Chateau De Paris (陽光巴黎) | Shanghai | Residential | — | — | 100% | Tail inventory |
| Shanghai Park Avenue / Holiday Royal (馨雅名邸 etc.) | Shanghai | Residential | — | — | 100% | Tail inventory |
Yangtze River Delta
| Project | City / district | Use | Land bank (sq.m.) | Avg land cost | Interest | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nantong Glorious Chateau (南通‧恒盛莊園) | Nantong, Rugao Port New District | Residential, commercial | 869,029 | 460 | 100% | Largest Yangtze River Delta parcel; minimal sales |
| Nantong Glorious Plaza (南通‧恒盛廣場) | Nantong New District | Office, hotel, commercial | 297,486 | 348 | 70% | 209,982 sq.m. commercial under construction |
| Nantong Royal Bay (恒盛‧南通‧尚海灣) | Nantong, Chongchuan | Residential, office, commercial | 181,312 (AR2023) / 381,814 (IR2024) | 4,719 | 100% | RMB385.0M contracted sales in 2023. Impairment on land is the main part of the RMB745.4M FY2023 provision. |
| Hefei Bashangjie Project (合肥‧壩上街) | Hefei, Yaohai | Residential, hotel, office, commercial | 849,701 | 881 | 100% | Major delivery in 2021 (RMB1,169.6M); 86,828 sq.m. saleable in 2024 |
| Hefei Royal Garden (恒盛‧合肥‧皇家花園) | Hefei, Luyang | Residential, hotel, commercial | 20,000 | 1,207 | 100% | Car-park and tail sales |
| Nanjing Royal Bay (恒盛‧南京‧金陵灣) | Nanjing, Gulou | Residential, commercial | 35,730 | 6,013 | 60% JV (Glorious Jiangxu) | Launched H2 2023 (RMB438.2M sales). RMB199.8M in H1 2024 = 52.5% of group contracted sales. JV took a RMB531M impairment in 2023. |
| No.1 City Promotion (無錫) | Wuxi | Residential | — | — | 100% | 15,325 sq.m. saleable in 2024 |
| Nantong Villa Glorious | Nantong | Residential | — | — | 100% | Tail inventory |
Pan Bohai Rim
| Project | City / district | Use | Land bank (sq.m.) | Avg land cost | Interest | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tianjin Royal Bay Lakeside (恒盛‧尚海灣濱湖) | Tianjin, Tuanbohu | Residential, commercial | 1,567,303 | 1,225 | 70% | Largest single parcel in group (27.5% of land bank); undeveloped |
| Tianjin Royal Bay Seaside (恒盛‧尚海灣濱海) | Tianjin, Dagang | Residential, (hotel), commercial | 455,749 | 1,396 | 100% | 23,706 sq.m. saleable in 2024 |
| Tianjin Central City (恒盛‧中部新城) | Tianjin, Binhai New Area | Residential, commercial | 205,961 | 2,792 | 100% | — |
| Tianjin Sunshine Holiday | Tianjin | Residential | — | — | 100% | 34,500 sq.m. saleable in 2024 |
| Sunshine Bordeaux (恒盛‧波爾多小鎮) | Beijing, Daxing | Residential, commercial | 14,522 | 493 | 100% | 2,345 sq.m. saleable in 2024 |
| Royal Mansion (恒盛‧歐洲公館) | Beijing | Residential | — | — | 100% | Phase II delivered 2022 (RMB2,247.7M at about RMB59,766/sq.m.). Tail sales: RMB279.7M in 2023, RMB47.7M in H1 2024. |
Northeast China
| Project | City | Use | Land bank (sq.m.) | Avg land cost | Interest | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Changchun Villa Glorious (長春‧恒盛豪庭) | Changchun, High-tech District | Residential, commercial | 422,923 | 1,004 | 100% | Big 2021 delivery (RMB1,266.9M); 84,543 sq.m. saleable in 2024 |
| Sunny Town / Shenyang Glorious Plaza (恒盛‧陽光尚城) | Shenyang, Yuhong | Residential, commercial | 119,391 | 1,133 | 100% | 119,391 sq.m. commercial under construction |
| Harbin Royal Garden (恒盛‧哈爾濱‧皇家花園) | Harbin | Residential | — | — | 100% | 7,680 sq.m. saleable in 2024 |
| Dalian Villa Glorious | Dalian | Residential | — | — | 100% | Effectively sold out |
Services and other offerings
| Offering | Description | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Interior decoration | Fit-out contracts for Shanghai Bay buyers | RMB423.5M in FY2023; RMB327.5M in H1 2024 |
| Commercial leasing | Retail, office and hotel assets held as investment properties (carrying value RMB22,389.3M at 30 Jun 2024) | Rent RMB61.3M in FY2023 |
| Car-park sales | Inventory monetisation across all regions | Ongoing; dilutes reported ASP |
| Medical aesthetics ("medical beauty") | One aggregator (Simply Wall St) says the company is engaged in a medical-beauty business | Not corroborated in any company filing reviewed. |
Pricing model: unit sales at market price. Recognised ASPs range from about RMB1,100/sq.m. (Nantong and Harbin car parks) to more than RMB100,000/sq.m. (Shanghai Bay residential) (IR2024). The company has no R&D-led products, platforms or subscription offerings.
Financial Narrative
Data basis. FY2021–FY2023 figures come from audited annual reports (AR2022, AR2023). FY2019 and FY2020 income-statement lines are taken from AR2021/AR2022 highlights where available (FY2020 revenue, gross profit and attributable profit). FY2019 figures come from TipRanks aggregator data and are flagged. Blank cells mean "not publicly disclosed in sources reviewed". All figures are RMB M unless stated.
Income statement
Sources: AR2022 and AR2023 results tables. FY2020 comes from AR2021 highlights and FY2019 from TipRanks (aggregator). The FY2020 pre-tax figure is from TipRanks (aggregator).
Margins and growth
Revenue CAGR FY2019–FY2023 was –17.9% (calculated). FY2021–FY2023 CAGR was –10.8% (calculated).
Interim snapshot (unaudited)
Source: IR2024. Google Finance reports H1-period operating cash flow of CNY–52.6M on a quarterly basis. This conflicts with the company's stated net operating cash outflow of RMB105.2M for the half; the company figure is used.
Balance sheet
Sources: AR2022, AR2023. The 30 Jun 2023 total-asset figure of RMB49,018.7M from IR2024 is excluded from this table.
30 June 2024 balance sheet (IR2024, unaudited): total assets RMB43,716.6M; investment properties RMB22,389.3M; cash including restricted RMB150.6M; borrowings RMB23,699.4M (all current; RMB6,277.0M of it accrued interest); total liabilities RMB47,155.6M; total deficit RMB–3,439.0M; attributable deficit RMB–3,573.4M; net current liabilities RMB24,789.6M.
Debt quality and default metrics
Sources: AR2022, AR2023, IR2024. The drop in pledged property from RMB31.8bn to RMB14.0bn in FY2023 is not explained in the extracted text. Equity interests of subsidiaries and the JV are also pledged.
Cash flow
Capex is structurally minimal because the business holds no material PP&E (PP&E was RMB69.0M at 30 Jun 2024). H1 2024: new borrowings RMB31.5M, repayments RMB22.8M, operating cash outflow RMB105.2M (IR2024). No dividends were paid in any year reviewed, and no buybacks were made (IR2024 confirms none in H1 2024).
Ratios
Notes: ROE, ROIC and net debt/EBITDA are not meaningful because equity is negative from FY2022 (attributable) and FY2023 (total), and EBITDA is negative or unreliable. Debt/equity for FY2023 is not meaningful because equity is negative. The cash conversion cycle is not meaningful for a developer, and the inputs were not disclosed in a usable form. Ratios are calculated from AR2022 and AR2023 data.
Commentary on trends, inflections and drivers
Revenue is delivery-driven and binary. The FY2022 spike to RMB6,385.0M and the H1 2024 jump to RMB2,326.9M each reflect one or two premium completions: Shanghai Bay Towers 15/16 and Beijing Royal Mansion Phase II. In other years the group recognises only tail units and car parks. Recognised ASP swung from RMB9,421/sq.m. in FY2021 to RMB44,391 in FY2022, RMB27,025 in FY2023 and RMB57,945 in H1 2024 (AR2022, AR2023, IR2024). These are mix effects, not pricing power.
Gross margin is healthy when Shanghai delivers, but the business does not keep the profit. FY2022 posted a 62.8% gross margin and RMB4.0bn of gross profit, yet still lost RMB297M at the attributable level. RMB1.48bn of expensed finance costs, an RMB893M fair-value loss and RMB1.58bn of income tax absorbed it; land appreciation tax alone was RMB1,271.6M (AR2022). This is the core structural problem. Interest accrual (gross RMB2.0–2.7bn a year) exceeds the profit the remaining pipeline can generate in normal years.
Two impairment waves. FY2021 (RMB977.4M plus a RMB955.6M deposit write-off) and FY2023 (RMB745.4M, mainly Nantong Royal Bay land, plus a RMB531M impairment inside the Nanjing JV) show successive markdowns of tier-2/3 assets. Investment-property fair-value losses escalated from RMB213.8M to RMB893.3M to RMB1,457.5M over FY2021–FY2023 (AR2022, AR2023). Management attributes this to oversupply of commercial space.
Balance sheet erosion. Total equity fell from RMB424.6M (FY2021) to RMB127.2M (FY2022), RMB–2,822.0M (FY2023) and RMB–3,439.0M (H1 2024). Accrued interest within borrowings rose from RMB2.1bn to RMB6.3bn in 2.5 years while principal stayed flat at about RMB17.4bn. The lenders are effectively capitalising unpaid interest. This is a classic zombie-balance-sheet profile.
Liquidity. Unrestricted cash of RMB150–215M against RMB23.7bn of on-demand debt and RMB8.6bn of commitments leaves essentially no liquidity buffer. There are no unused facilities.
Cost discipline. Administrative expenses fell from RMB426.4M to RMB304.0M to RMB241.2M (FY2021–FY2023), and H1 2024 admin was RMB57.9M (IR2024). Headcount fell 45% from 628 to 343. These are real savings but immaterial against the finance-cost burden.
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Segment Overview
| Segment | Contents (projects) | Product types |
|---|---|---|
Shanghai Region | Shanghai Bay, Sunshine Venice, Royal Lakefront, Caohejing Project, Zhongcao Xincun Project; legacy Shanghai City Glorious, Chateau De Paris, Shanghai Park Avenue, Holiday Royal | Luxury riverfront residential, serviced apartments, office, hotel, retail |
Yangtze River Delta (ex-Shanghai) | Nantong Glorious Chateau, Nantong Glorious Plaza (70%), Nantong Royal Bay, Hefei Bashangjie, Hefei Royal Garden, Nanjing Royal Bay (60% JV, equity-accounted), Wuxi No.1 City Promotion, Nantong Villa Glorious | Mid-market residential, villas, commercial, hotel |
Pan Bohai Rim | Beijing Royal Mansion, Beijing Sunshine Bordeaux, Tianjin Royal Bay Seaside, Tianjin Royal Bay Lakeside (70%), Tianjin Central City, Tianjin Sunshine Holiday | Residential and commercial |
Northeast China | Changchun Villa Glorious, Shenyang Sunny Town / Shenyang Glorious Plaza, Harbin Royal Garden, Dalian Villa Glorious | Mass residential, commercial |
Others | Corporate support | — |
Segment revenue (CNY Mn)
| Segment revenue (CNY Mn) | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
Shanghai Region | 786.6 | 3,846.6 | 2,157.4 |
Yangtze River Delta | 1,253.0 | 120.8 | 66.0 |
Pan Bohai Rim | 0.0 | 2,247.7 | 280.5 |
Northeast China | 1,278.0 | 169.9 | 135.7 |
Total | 3,317.6 | 6,385.0 | 2,639.7 |
Segment share of revenue (%)
| Segment share of revenue (%) | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
Shanghai Region | 23.7 | 60.2 | 81.7 |
Yangtze River Delta | 37.8 | 1.9 | 2.5 |
Pan Bohai Rim | 0.0 | 35.2 | 10.6 |
Northeast China | 38.5 | 2.7 | 5.1 |
Segment revenue YoY growth (%)
| Segment revenue YoY growth (%) | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|
Shanghai Region | 389.0 | -43.9 |
Yangtze River Delta | -90.4 | -45.3 |
Pan Bohai Rim | — | -87.5 |
Northeast China | -86.7 | -20.1 |
Segment Revenue
| Segment | H1 2023 revenue | H1 2024 revenue | H1 2023 segment result | H1 2024 segment result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Shanghai Region | 390.2 | 2,218.3 | 129.9 | 866.3 |
Yangtze River Delta | 14.7 | 22.3 | -62.6 | -69.2 |
Pan Bohai Rim | 16.7 | 47.7 | -28.5 | -0.1 |
Northeast China | 60.7 | 38.5 | -28.6 | -50.4 |
Others | 0.0 | 0.0 | -12.2 | -2.6 |
Total | 482.3 | 2,326.9 | -2.0 | 744.0 |
Segment assets (before eliminations)
| Segment assets (before eliminations) | 30 Jun 2023 | 30 Jun 2024 |
|---|---|---|
Shanghai Region | 53,404.1 | 45,953.7 |
Yangtze River Delta | 22,566.8 | 19,566.7 |
Pan Bohai Rim | 3,579.4 | 4,385.2 |
Northeast China | 5,506.2 | 5,001.5 |
Others | 3,796.7 | 6,586.2 |
Income Statement and Per-Share Data
| Metric (CNY Mn) | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue | 5,810.0 | 2,807.7 | 3,317.6 | 6,385.0 | 2,639.7 |
Cost of sales | — | — | 4,408.7 | 2,374.2 | 1,806.3 |
Gross profit | 121.9 | 1,148.9 | -1,091.1 | 4,010.8 | 833.4 |
Selling & marketing expenses | — | — | 175.0 | 123.2 | 105.0 |
Administrative expenses | — | — | 426.4 | 304.0 | 241.2 |
Investment property fair value loss | — | — | 213.8 | 893.3 | 1,457.5 |
Property impairment in cost of sales | — | — | 977.4 | 0.0 | 745.4 |
Finance costs, net (expensed) | — | — | 2,073.9 | 1,478.5 | 2,102.0 |
Gross finance costs incurred | — | — | 2,719.9 | 2,043.3 | 2,492.0 |
EBIT proxy (pre-tax + net finance costs) | — | — | -2,868.5 | 2,759.7 | -1,297.3 |
Pre-tax profit (loss) | -572.9 | 620.3 | -4,942.4 | 1,281.2 | -3,399.3 |
Income tax (expense) credit | — | — | -221.4 | -1,578.7 | 450.1 |
Net profit (loss) for year | — | — | -5,163.8 | -297.5 | -2,949.2 |
Net profit (loss) attributable to owners | -992.3 | 81.0 | -5,150.0 | -297.4 | -2,949.2 |
Basic EPS (MYR Bn) | -0.13 | 0.01 | -0.66 | -0.04 | -0.38 |
Diluted EPS (MYR Bn) | -0.13 | 0.01 | -0.66 | -0.04 | -0.38 |
Dividend per share (MYR Bn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric (%) | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Gross margin | 2.1 | 40.9 | -32.9 | 62.8 | 31.6 |
EBIT proxy margin | — | — | -86.5 | 43.2 | -49.1 |
Pre-tax margin | -9.9 | 22.1 | -149.0 | 20.1 | -128.8 |
Net margin (attributable) | -17.1 | 2.9 | -155.2 | -4.7 | -111.7 |
Revenue growth YoY | — | -51.7 | 18.2 | 92.5 | -58.7 |
Income Statement and Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric (CNY Mn) | H1 2023 | H1 2024 |
|---|---|---|
Revenue | 482.3 | 2,326.9 |
Gross profit | 126.9 | 781.1 |
Gross margin (%) | 26.3 | 33.6 |
Finance costs, net | 542.8 | 881.9 |
Gross interest expense | 798.3 | 1,098.1 |
Pre-tax loss | -682.7 | -251.5 |
Income tax expense | -3.8 | -365.5 |
Loss attributable | -686.5 | -617.0 |
Basic EPS (MYR Bn) | -0.09 | -0.08 |
Operating cash flow | — | -105.2 |
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View Subscription PlansBalance Sheet
| Metric (CNY Mn) | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
Total assets | 49,889.2 | 48,494.1 | 44,828.1 |
Investment properties | — | — | 22,385.6 |
Properties under development | 14,713.9 | 12,663.6 | 10,633.1 |
Completed properties held for sale | 5,151.4 | 5,924.2 | 6,724.8 |
Current assets | 24,042.4 | 22,870.8 | 21,077.6 |
Cash and bank balances (unrestricted) | 191.6 | 72.3 | 214.6 |
Cash incl. restricted deposits | 598.3 | 390.7 | 241.9 |
Total borrowings (incl. accrued interest) | 20,084.0 | 20,963.7 | 22,663.4 |
Short-term / current borrowings | 20,084.0 | 20,963.7 | 22,663.4 |
Long-term borrowings | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
Principal before accrued interest | 17,940.7 | 17,710.5 | 17,353.7 |
Accrued interest within borrowings | 2,143.3 | 3,253.2 | 5,309.7 |
Net debt (company definition) | 18,810.2 | 19,852.5 | 21,622.3 |
Contract liabilities | 12,151.8 | 7,601.6 | 6,288.6 |
Current liabilities | 47,227.3 | 45,566.7 | 45,267.4 |
Total liabilities | 49,464.5 | 48,366.9 | 47,650.1 |
Total equity | 424.6 | 127.2 | -2,822.0 |
Equity attributable to owners | 290.1 | -7.2 | -2,956.4 |
Working capital (current assets − current liabilities) | -23,184.9 | -22,695.9 | -24,189.8 |
Accumulated losses | — | 8,911.9 | 11,872.3 |
Goodwill & intangibles | — | — | 1.8 |
Balance Sheet and Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric (CNY Mn) | FY2022 | FY2023 | H1 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
Overdue principal | 3,273.9 | 10,262.9 | 10,670.7 |
Overdue interest | 1,621.5 | 3,757.1 | 4,921.6 |
Other borrowings in default (paid but still in default), principal | 7,797.0 | 1,904.0 | 1,551.6 |
Cross-defaulted principal | 4,837.1 | 4,374.1 | 4,351.3 |
Bank facilities used | 17,666 | 19,193 | 20,048 |
Unused bank facilities | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Mortgage guarantees outstanding | 3,378.2 | 3,793.6 | 3,795.3 |
Capital commitments | 9,105.4 | 8,810.7 | 8,644.4 |
Effective interest rate (%) | 9.3 | 9.1 | — |
Assets pledged (property categories) | 31,829.8 | 14,039.4 | — |
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View Subscription PlansBalance Sheet — New borrowings drawn
| Metric (CNY Mn) | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
New borrowings drawn | — | 1,780.8 | 198.4 |
Borrowings repaid | — | 2,077.5 | 429.9 |
Dividends paid | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Share buybacks | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Financial Ratios (x) and Margin Analysis (%)
| Ratio | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
Current ratio (x) | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.47 |
Debt / total equity (x) | 47.3 | 164.8 | — |
Interest coverage, EBIT proxy / gross finance costs (x) | -1.05 | 1.35 | -0.52 |
ROA, attributable / average assets (%) | — | -0.60 | -6.32 |
Asset turnover (x) | — | 0.130 | 0.057 |
Cash / current borrowings (%) | 2.98 | 1.86 | 1.07 |
Revenue by city tier (% of total)
| Revenue by city tier (% of total) | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|
Tier-1 cities (Shanghai, Beijing) | 95.4 | 92.3 |
Tier-2/3 cities | 4.6 | 7.7 |
Contracted sales (CNY Mn)
| Contracted sales (CNY Mn) | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
Shanghai Region | 4,718.2 | 1,065.4 | 579.6 |
Yangtze River Delta | 799.6 | 496.1 | 842.9 |
Pan Bohai Rim | 523.2 | 83.6 | 80.1 |
Northeast China | 797.1 | 434.4 | 183.4 |
Total | 6,838.0 | 2,079.5 | 1,686.0 |
Contracted sales growth (%)
| Contracted sales growth (%) | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|
Shanghai Region | -77.4 | -45.6 |
Yangtze River Delta | -37.9 | 69.9 |
Pan Bohai Rim | -84.0 | -4.2 |
Northeast China | -45.5 | -57.8 |
Total | -69.6 | -18.9 |
Geographic Revenue
| GFA sold (sq.m.) | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
Shanghai Region | 101,410 | 28,474 | 13,571 |
Yangtze River Delta | 73,777 | 32,904 | 28,065 |
Pan Bohai Rim | 45,224 | 9,583 | 9,023 |
Northeast China | 114,201 | 71,559 | 33,095 |
Total | 334,612 | 142,520 | 83,754 |
Price Metric Details
| Price metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
Last close before suspension (HKD) | 0.010 | Google Finance; etnet |
52-week range before suspension (HKD) | 0.010 – 0.058 (Google); 0.010 – 0.076 (Google, alternate snapshot) | Google Finance |
IPO indicative price range (HK$, Oct 2009) | 4.00 – 5.30 | Wikipedia / Bloomberg |
Annualised return since listing (%) | -31.73 | Lixinger |
Price at 2014 privatisation rejection (HKD) | About 1.16–1.24 | The Edge; SCMP |
Valuation Snapshot
| Multiple | Value | Comment |
|---|---|---|
EV/Sales | About 10x (calculated) | EV of about RMB23.6bn (net debt RMB22.7bn plus market cap of about RMB71M) ÷ FY2023 revenue of RMB2,639.7M |
P/S | About 0.03x | TipRanks / Simply Wall St |
Capital Markets
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
Analyst consensus | No sell-side coverage identified |
Dividend history | No dividends paid FY2019–FY2023 or H1 2024 (AR2023; IR2024) |
Dividend policy | Board resolved no final dividend for FY2023 and no interim dividend for H1 2024 |
Buyback authorisation | No repurchases in H1 2024 (IR2024) |
Credit ratings (Moody's / S&P / Fitch) | No current ratings identified. Historical USD notes are reported as redeemed by Cbonds. No US$ bonds are outstanding in the latest borrowings breakdown, aside from RMB54.8M of unlisted bonds (IR2024). |
Debt Maturity Profile
| Maturity bucket (CNY Mn) | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | H1 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
On demand or within 1 year | 20,084.0 | 20,963.7 | 22,663.4 | 23,699.4 |
1 to 2 years | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
2 to 5 years | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Over 5 years | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance
There is no quantitative guidance. Management expects transaction volumes to remain low for 12–18 months from mid-2024 (IR2024). Its stated priorities are delivery assurance, monetising commercial and car-park inventory, and debt restructuring through asset disposals (AR2023; IR2024).
Consensus expectations
None. There is no sell-side coverage.
Bull case (grounded in data)
-
Asset value exceeds market cap by orders of magnitude. Total assets of RMB43.7bn against a market cap of about HK$78M (IR2024; Google Finance). Even after creditor recoveries, a restructuring that converts debt into assets could leave some residual value. The very low land cost of RMB1,446/sq.m. limits how far book values can be written down.
-
The Shanghai assets are saleable to SOEs. Caohejing and Zhongcao Xincun in Xuhui (182,194 sq.m. combined, AR2023) and remaining Shanghai Bay commercial space are the kind of tier-1 assets state-owned developers still buy. A block sale could fund a negotiated resolution with secured banks.
-
Controller incentive to preserve the listing. The controlling shareholder tried to buy out minorities three times (2013–2016). This signals an assessment that underlying value exceeds the trading price, and could lead to a white-knight or take-private outcome if the listing is at risk.
Bear case (grounded in data)
-
The arithmetic is insolvent. A total deficit of RMB3.44bn plus RMB10.24bn of income tax payable that ranks ahead of equity in practice. Accrued interest grows about RMB2bn a year. Equity holders are structurally out of the money (IR2024).
-
Delisting looks likely. Four sets of results are outstanding and the 18-month deadline passed on 30 Sep 2026 without resumption (RG2025; etnet). Board non-compliance is unremedied. Once the shares are cancelled, minority liquidity disappears.
-
The remaining pipeline is low-value. 88.2% of land bank is in tier-2/3 cities (IR2024). Impairments are recurring (RMB745M group plus RMB531M JV in FY2023). Commercial fair-value losses are accelerating. The Shanghai Bay "cash cow" has largely been harvested.
Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
| Catalyst | What to watch |
|---|---|
| Listing Committee decision on cancellation | HKEX announcement after the expiry of the 30 Sep 2026 deadline; any review application by the company |
| Publication of FY2024 audited results | Auditor identity, type of audit opinion, size of FY2024 loss, and any deconsolidation of subsidiaries |
| Lender enforcement or court orders | Seizure or auction of pledged project companies; any PRC court enforcement orders |
| Winding-up petitions | Further HK or Cayman petitions; provisional liquidator appointments |
| Board reconstitution | Appointment of INEDs to restore Rules 3.10 and 3.21 compliance |
| Asset disposals | Any sale of Caohejing, Zhongcao Xincun or Tianjin land to SOEs |
| Controlling-shareholder action | Any offer, capital injection or debt purchase by Zhang Zhi Rong-related entities |
Concluding analyst verdict
Glorious Property Holdings is no longer an operating growth story. It is a distressed-asset situation sitting inside a listed shell that may be close to delisting. The company's last audited accounts (FY2023) show negative total equity of RMB2.82bn, all RMB22.66bn of borrowings classified as current, and RMB10.26bn of principal overdue. The unaudited mid-2024 position was worse on every one of those measures: a RMB3.44bn deficit, RMB23.70bn of debt and RMB10.67bn overdue.
The defining economic fact is that interest accrual of roughly RMB2.0–2.7bn a year exceeds the profit the remaining pipeline can generate. Only exceptional Shanghai Bay deliveries ever produced positive pre-tax income, and even FY2022's 62.8% gross margin ended in a net loss after finance costs and land appreciation tax.
The investment debate has been overtaken by process. Trading has been suspended since 1 April 2025. The FY2024, H1 2025, FY2025 and H1 2026 results are all unpublished. Two independent directors have left without replacements, and the HK share registrar mandate lapsed. The Exchange's 18-month remedial window closed on 30 September 2026. As at 10 October 2026 we could not find a cancellation decision. However, the company had not met any of the substantive resumption conditions in public filings, and the base case should be cancellation of the listing.
Residual optionality exists. The group holds about 5.7M sq.m. of land at a nominal RMB1,446/sq.m. cost and a RMB22.4bn investment-property book. Prime Xuhui sites remain unsold, and the controlling shareholder has repeatedly shown interest in taking the company private. These assets are almost entirely pledged to secured lenders, though, and tax payables rank ahead of shareholders.
Verdict: Uninvestable for public-equity holders. The shares should be treated as having near-zero recoverable value. They are relevant mainly to secured creditors, potential SOE asset acquirers and distressed-debt specialists. Monitor the Listing Committee decision, the FY2024 audit opinion and any controller-led restructuring.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Board of Directors
| Name | Title | Joined group | Age (per AR2023) | Background and education | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Ding Xiang Yang (丁向陽) | Chairman (since 5 Jun 2018), Executive Director; Nomination and Corporate Governance Committee chair | 18 Mar 2001 | 56 | More than 10 years in enterprise management at China Eastern Airlines. LLB (1989) and LLM (2002), Fudan University. Brother-in-law of controlling shareholder Zhang Zhi Rong. | AR2023 |
Lu Juan (陸娟) | Executive Director (since 6 Sep 2022); Deputy Financial Controller (since Aug 2022) | May 2008 | 47 | Financial controller of the Nantong project company from 2013. Accounting degree from Dongbei University of Finance & Economics. Senior accountant. | AR2023 |
Yan Zhi Rong (嚴志榮) | Executive Director (construction and budgets) | 8 Dec 1996 | 62 | Former deputy GM of a Shanghai Materials Bureau property subsidiary (1989–96). Diploma from Suzhou Industrial College; EMBA from Southeast University (2018). Qualified engineer. | AR2023 |
Zheng Qun Guo (鄭群國) | Chief Executive Officer | 2008 | 54 | GM of Shanghai Hongye Property since 2008, Executive VP since May 2017. Shanghai College of Metallurgy (1991). | AR2023 |
Leung Yin Fai (梁燕輝) | Company Secretary (since 30 Sep 2021) | 2021 | 59 | Director of K E Corporate Services. FCCA, FCPA (Aust.), HKICPA member. M.Com, University of New South Wales. | AR2023 |
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Status | Background | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Prof. Liu Tao (劉濤) | INED from 17 Sep 2015 and Audit Committee chair. Resigned 24 Jul 2024. | Associate Professor of Accounting, Antai College, Shanghai Jiao Tong University | AR2023; IR2024 |
Dr Xue Wenjun (薛文君) | INED and Audit Committee chair from 24 Jul 2024 | — | IR2024 |
Dr Hu Jinxing (胡金星) | INED and Remuneration Committee chair. Resigned effective 31 Jul 2025, triggering Rule 3.10/3.21 non-compliance. | Associate Professor, East China Normal University; real-estate policy scholar | AR2023; HKEX announcement Jul 2025 |
Han Ping (韓平) | INED since 2009 (re-elected by separate resolution after 9 years, Sep 2022) | Deputy GM of Jiangsu Huaxia Construction Project Management; registered cost engineer | AR2023 |
Unnamed | An INED resignation was announced 24 Apr 2026, with renewed non-compliance. The identity is not confirmed in sources reviewed. | — | etnet announcement index |
Governance Overview
| Attribute | Status (latest verifiable) |
|---|---|
Board size | 6 at FY2023 (3 executive, 3 INED). Fell below Listing Rule minimums after the 2025 and 2026 INED departures. |
Independence | 50% at FY2023. Currently non-compliant per the 24 Apr 2026 announcement. |
Chair / CEO separation | Separated: Ding is Chair, Zheng Qun Guo is CEO. In 2018 Ding held both roles (AR2018). |
Committees | Audit, Remuneration, Nomination, Corporate Governance, Finance (AR2023) |
Related-party ties | The Chairman is the brother-in-law of the controlling shareholder (AR2023) |
Gender diversity | 1 of 3 executive directors female (Lu Juan); 1 of 3 INEDs female (Prof. Liu, now replaced by Dr Xue) |
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Stake | Source / date |
|---|---|---|
Zhang Zhi Rong (張志熔), ultimate controlling shareholder, via controlled vehicles | About 68.4% (2014). | Bloomberg via The Edge, Feb 2014; AR2023 describes him as ultimate controlling shareholder |
Southbound Stock Connect holdings | About 0.18% of issued shares (HK$143,300) at 30 Jun 2026 | Lixinger |
Free float / other public | Remainder, about 30% | Inferred |
Top 10 institutional holders | Not publicly disclosed. Institutional ownership is negligible at a HK$78M market capitalisation. | — |
Board & Management Changes
| Date | Change |
|---|---|
6 Sep 2022 | Xia Jing Hua (ED, long-time CFO) resigns; Lu Juan appointed ED |
30 Nov 2022 | Crowe (HK) CPA appointed auditor |
24 Jul 2024 | Prof. Liu Tao resigns; Dr Xue Wenjun appointed INED and Audit Committee chair |
31 Jul 2025 | Dr Hu Jinxing resigns; INED count and Audit Committee fall below minimum |
24 Apr 2026 | Further INED resignation and committee reconstitution; non-compliance announced |
Competitive Landscape
Competitors by Segment
| Segment / market | Competitors (listed) | Relative positioning of Glorious |
|---|---|---|
Shanghai luxury residential | Shimao Group (0813.HK), Shanghai Industrial Urban Development (0563.HK), Greenland Holdings (600606.SS) / Greenland HK (0337.HK), Yanlord Land (Z25.SI), China Overseas Land & Investment (0688.HK), C&D International (1908.HK) | Niche single-project player (Shanghai Bay). It cannot replenish land, while SOEs such as COLI and C&D can. |
Yangtze River Delta mass market | China Vanke (2202.HK), Country Garden (2007.HK), Sunac China (1918.HK), Seazen Group (1030.HK), Greentown China (3900.HK) | Sub-scale. Recent tier-2/3 ASPs are depressed by inventory and car parks. |
Pan Bohai / Beijing–Tianjin | Sino-Ocean (3377.HK), Hopson Development (0754.HK), Beijing Capital Land, COLI | Holds 2.24M sq.m. of low-cost Tianjin land bank but has no development capacity |
Northeast China | Evergrande (in liquidation), Vanke, local SOEs | Marginal |
HK-listed distressed small-cap developers (peer set for capital markets) | Glory Sun Land (0299.HK), Xiwang Property (2088.HK), SRE Group (1207.HK), Skyfame Realty (0059.HK) | Comparable distressed profile: suspension and resumption guidance in 2025–2026 |
Peer Comparison FY2023
| Benchmark | Glorious FY2023 | Comment |
|---|---|---|
Revenue (CNY Mn) | 2,639.7 | Among the smallest of the HK-listed PRC developer universe |
Revenue growth (%) | -58.7 | — |
Gross margin (%) | 31.6 | Higher than many distressed peers because of Shanghai luxury mix |
Net margin (%) | -111.7 | Finance-cost-driven |
R&D intensity (%) | 0 | Industry norm |
Contracted sales (CNY Mn) | 1,686.0 | Too small to register in national rankings, such as CRIC's top-100 lists. |
Competitive Advantages & Vulnerabilities
| Advantages (evidence) | Vulnerabilities (evidence) |
|---|---|
Very low average land cost of MYR Bn1,446/sq.m. (AR2023) | Debt in default; no access to new financing (no unused facilities) |
Prime Shanghai Bay riverfront asset with ASP above MYR Bn100,000/sq.m. (IR2024) | The Shanghai pipeline is nearly exhausted (23,417 sq.m. saleable in 2024) |
Large Tianjin and Nantong land holdings provide optionality on a recovery | 88.2% of land bank in tier-2/3 cities (IR2024), which are the weakest markets |
MYR Bn22.4bn investment-property portfolio | Fair-value losses compounding; heavily pledged |
Long-tenured operating team (directors since 1996 and 2001) | Governance non-compliance, auditor delays, suspension |
Recent Developments
No contract wins, product launches or guidance revisions occurred in this period. The newsflow consists entirely of compliance, governance and delisting-process items.



