Guoan International Limited Overview
Guoan International Limited was a small-cap Hong Kong holding company, majority owned by Beijing-based conglomerate CITIC Guoan Group, that attempted to transform a low-margin legacy business — mobile handset trading and after-sales repair under a single dominant supplier — into a diversified financial-services platform. The pivotal step was the HK$420 million acquisition of Yicko Securities Limited, a 1992-founded SFC-licensed broker, funded with HK$120 million cash and HK$300 million of convertible bonds issued to the vendors. Completed in February 2019, the deal added brokerage profits but loaded a thin balance sheet with debt and HK$299 million of goodwill. When the bonds fell due in 2020–2021 the company could not repay, a new board alleged serious irregularities in the acquisition, the bondholders petitioned for winding-up, and the parent group itself entered restructuring. The company was wound up in February 2022 and delisted in Hong Kong (2022) and Singapore (2023). It is today a liquidation estate, not an operating enterprise.
Current state. Since the winding-up order of 28 February 2022, the company has been under the control of court-appointed joint official liquidators whose mandate is to investigate the company's financial position, realise assets, and adjudicate creditor claims. The company has no publicly disclosed ongoing operating business at the listed-company level. Whether any subsidiaries (including Yicko Securities Limited) continue to trade, have been sold, or have entered their own insolvency processes is not publicly disclosed in sources located.
Company's own description (latest available, FY2019). In its unaudited FY2019 results the company described itself as an investment holding company whose subsidiaries engaged in trading of telecommunications and other products, repair services for telecommunications products, investment in financial assets, securities brokerage operations, and money lending. Its MD&A grouped these as financial services, trading, and maintenance services (FY2019 unaudited results, Note 1 and MD&A).
Business model and revenue model (FY2019, last disclosed).
Source: FY2019 unaudited results, Note 5.
Value chain position. In telecom, the group sat downstream as a distributor/trader and after-sales service operator dependent on one principal handset supplier, which in the 2017 period accounted for 86.3% of purchases (top five suppliers: 98.7%) (2017 AR, Report of the Directors). The supplier is unnamed in filings; the 2017 ESG report describes the supplier's mobile phone warranty terms and sustainability programme. In financial services, Yicko operated as a small independent broker licensed for SFC Type 1 (dealing in securities), Type 4 (advising on securities) and Type 9 (asset management), providing broking, margin financing, IPO and secondary placing/underwriting, and asset management (FY2019 results, Note 16).
Customer types and end markets. Customer concentration was high: in the 15 months to Dec 2017 the largest customer contributed 52.5% of sales and the top five 64.2% (2017 AR). In FY2019, three customers each exceeded 10% of revenue (HK$26.6 M, HK$23.6 M and HK$23.1 M) (FY2019 results, Note 4(e)). End markets were Hong Kong retail and corporate customers (handset users, B2B electronics buyers, retail and margin brokerage clients, small-cap issuers raising equity), plus a single Southeast Asian customer in FY2019.
Independent characterisation. Functionally, Guoan International was a controlled subsidiary platform used by a mainland conglomerate as a Hong Kong/Singapore-listed vehicle. Its organic businesses were sub-scale and loss-making; its one transformative acquisition was financed in a way the business could not service; and its governance failed to detect (or chose not to disclose) related-party and accounting issues in the target's guaranteed profit. Today it should be analysed as an insolvency estate, where the relevant questions are asset recovery, creditor ranking, and litigation outcomes rather than growth or valuation.
Strategy
Historical stated strategy (2017 AR, 2019 results — paraphrased themes).
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Use the parent's international experience and the dual Hong Kong/Singapore listing as a platform to diversify beyond telecom trading and repair.
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Expand into brokerage and financial services (money lending licence 2016; Yicko acquisition 2018–2019) to capture Greater Bay Area and Belt and Road capital-market opportunities.
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Prioritise investments that create synergies with CITIC Guoan Group's businesses.
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Maintain conservative cash management and "stringent risk management" in evaluating new business.
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For trading and repair: prudent strategy, portfolio review, and cost control amid margin erosion (FY2019 MD&A).
Going-concern measures announced (FY2019 results, Note 3): (i) extending the HK$100 M 1st Tranche CB to 28 Nov 2020; (ii) negotiating settlement of the remaining HK$200 M of CBs; (iii) placing the office buildings (c.HK$299.8 M carrying value) for sale; (iv) cost control; (v) a financial support undertaking from Road Shine for 12 months from 31 Dec 2019.
Initiatives in the last 24 months (Oct 2024–Oct 2026): None. The company has been in official liquidation throughout; no strategic initiatives, partnerships, ESG commitments, or guidance have been announced in sources located. Medium-term financial targets: none ever published.
Resumption guidance (2021, not achieved). The Stock Exchange required, among other things, an appropriate independent investigation into the Yicko acquisition with assessment of its impact and remedial action, and the withdrawal or dismissal of the winding-up petition (or order), alongside standard conditions (HKEX announcements 29 Dec 2021; 3 Aug 2022). The company failed to meet these by 29 Sep 2022.
Products & Services
The company's catalogue was narrow. All items below were discontinued, transferred, or are of unknown status following liquidation (not publicly disclosed).
Segment A — Trading of telecommunications and other products
Mobile handset distribution: Resale of mobile phones supplied by one principal manufacturer, which provided a standard one-year warranty (up to two years for certain products or promotions) (2017 AR ESG report). Target customers: Hong Kong B2B buyers and channel partners. Pricing: not disclosed. Brand: supplier unnamed in filings.
Electronic parts trading: Introduced during FY2017, lifting trading revenue 111.5% period-on-period to HK$18.4 M (2017 AR). By FY2019 the segment covered electronic products and parts and grew to HK$130.1 M, but margins eroded and the segment was loss-making; management said it was weighing options for certain product lines (FY2019 MD&A).
Southeast Asia sales: HK$23.6 M of FY2019 revenue was derived from Southeast Asia (a single >10% customer), the group's only non-Hong Kong revenue (FY2019 Note 4(d),(e)).
Segment B — Repair services for telecommunications products
Maintenance/after-sales centre: Handset repair operations in Hong Kong. The 2017 ESG report notes 3–5 customer complaints per day resolved by further repair, and a system to erase and separately store customer phone data before maintenance, then delete after restoration. FY2019 revenue fell 34.3% to HK$42.5 M because social unrest caused road blockages around the centre in 2H2019 (FY2019 MD&A).
Segment C — Investments in financial assets
Proprietary portfolio: Listed securities held for trading (HK$1.2 M at end-2019) and unlisted club debentures (fair value loss of HK$1.0 M in FY2019) (FY2019 results).
Segment D — Money lending
Licensed money lending (since 2016): Loan receivables of c.HK$10.0 M at end-2017 (2017 AR KAM); HK$13.0 M at end-2018; nil at end-2019 (FY2019 balance sheet). Interest income HK$1.24 M (FY2018), HK$0.66 M (FY2019).
Segment E — Securities brokerage (Yicko Securities Limited, founded 1992)
Securities and stock option broking: commission income HK$6.4 M (10 months FY2019).
Placing and underwriting: for Main Board and GEM IPOs, placements, rights issues and open offers; HK$8.8 M (FY2019).
Margin financing: margin client receivables HK$125.1 M secured by pledged securities with fair value HK$536.6 M; interest income HK$10.8 M (FY2019 Note 14).
Asset management (Type 9): HK$4.8 M (FY2019).
Advisory (Type 4): HK$0.9 M (FY2019).
Scale indicator: total Yicko turnover on SEHK of about HK$9 billion in 2019 per exchange participant records (FY2019 MD&A).
Other income
Property licensing: Surplus space at the Admiralty Centre office was licensed to third parties; rental income HK$1.1 M (FY2018), HK$1.8 M (FY2019) (FY2019 Note 6). The buildings (carrying value c.HK$299.8 M) were put up for sale in 2020 as a going-concern measure (FY2019 Note 3).
Financial Narrative
Data limitations. Five consecutive years of comparable audited data do not exist. The table uses the five most recent periods with any disclosed data: FY2016 (12 months to 30 Sep 2016, from 2017 AR comparatives), FY2017 (15 months to 31 Dec 2017, audited), FY2018 (audited), FY2019 (unaudited), and 1H2019 is shown separately. FY2020 onward: not publicly disclosed. Blank cells = not disclosed in sources located.
6.1 Income statement (HK$ M)
Sources: 2017 AR MD&A; FY2019 unaudited results.
6.2 Margins and growth
Revenue CAGR FY2016→FY2019 (ignoring the 15-month distortion): c.26% per year, almost entirely from trading volume and the acquired brokerage; organic repair revenue declined. Note FY2017's 15-month length overstates that period relative to a 12-month basis.
6.3 Interim snapshot (1H2019 vs 1H2018, HK$ M)
Source: Interim Results 1H2019 (SGX, 30 Aug 2019). Net current liabilities were c.HK$92.9 M at 30 Jun 2019.
6.4 Balance sheet (HK$ M, period end)
Short-/long-term debt split at 31 Dec 2019: current = HK$160.0 M borrowings + HK$99.7 M CB + HK$3.6 M parent loan + HK$3.6 M leases; non-current = HK$186.4 M CB + HK$1.5 M leases. HK$259.7 M of borrowings and CBs fell due within one year (FY2019 Note 3(b)).
Disclosed items: capex (additions to PP&E) HK$0.9 M (FY2018) and HK$0.16 M (FY2019); net cash outflow on the Yicko acquisition HK$111.7 M (FY2019); acquisition-related costs HK$3.2 M expensed (FY2019); no dividends paid; no buybacks (FY2019 results). Operating cash flow and free cash flow: not publicly disclosed in sources located.
6.6 Ratios
ROIC and cash conversion cycle: not meaningful / not computable from disclosed data. Net debt/EBITDA not meaningful (negative EBITDA).
Commentary. Three inflections dominate. First, the FY2017 purchase of the Admiralty Centre office (c.HK$323.9 M), funded by a rights issue that also repaid Road Shine's HK$336.2 M loan, converted a cash-light trading company into a property-heavy one whose depreciation and administration costs drove losses (2017 AR attributes the wider FY2017 loss to office amortisation and administrative expenses). Second, the Yicko acquisition doubled reported revenue and delivered a HK$25.2 M segment profit in ten months, but finance costs jumped from HK$0.25 M to HK$25.6 M (HK$17.4 M on the convertible bonds alone), fully offsetting the brokerage contribution and leaving the net loss essentially unchanged at c.HK$46.6 M. Third, the balance sheet swung from net current assets of HK$9.8 M to net current liabilities of HK$117.5 M, with HK$299 M of goodwill representing 95% of book equity — making equity value contingent on a single small broker. Separately, the group carried legacy trade receivables over 12 months old of HK$139.3 M that were almost entirely provided for (allowance HK$139.5 M), indicating historical credit losses from the pre-2015 era (FY2019 Note 14). The auditor's anticipated going-concern emphasis of matter and the subsequent CB defaults were the logical outcome.
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Segment Overview
| Segment | Contents | Products / services |
|---|---|---|
Trading of telecommunications and other products | Handset and electronic products/parts trading | Mobile phones from the principal supplier; electronic components (introduced FY2017) |
Provision of repair services for telecommunications products | After-sales maintenance centre | Handset repair, data-erasure and restoration protocols |
Investments in financial assets | Proprietary listed securities and club debentures | Listed equities held for trading |
Money lending business | Licensed money lender | Loan financing |
Provision of securities brokerage services operation | Yicko Securities (from 1 Mar 2019) | Broking, margin finance, placing/underwriting, asset management, advisory |
Segment revenue (HKD Mn)
| Segment revenue (HKD Mn) | FY2016 | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Trading of telecom and other products | 8.7 | 18.4 | 43.409 | 130.116 |
Repair services for telecom products | 94.7 | 97.4 | 64.678 | 42.548 |
Investments in financial assets | — | — | 0.385 | 0.495 |
Money lending | — | — | 1.240 | 0.657 |
Securities brokerage services | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33.978 |
Total revenue | 103.4 | 116.0 | 109.712 | 207.794 |
Revenue by Segment and Segment Assets & Liabilities
| Segment result (HKD Mn) | FY2018 | FY2019 |
|---|---|---|
Trading of telecom and other products | -4.500 | -6.836 |
Repair services for telecom products | -11.134 | -4.402 |
Investments in financial assets | -0.864 | 0.516 |
Money lending | 1.209 | 0.625 |
Securities brokerage services | 0 | 25.174 |
Total segment result | -15.289 | 15.077 |
Segment Revenue
| Segment | FY2018 margin | FY2019 margin | FY2019 YoY revenue growth | FY2019 % of revenue |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Trading | -10.4% | -5.3% | +199.7% | 62.6% |
Repair | -17.2% | -10.3% | -34.2% | 20.5% |
Investments | -224% | +104% | +28.6% | 0.2% |
Money lending | 97.5% | 95.1% | -47.0% | 0.3% |
Brokerage | — | 74.1% | n/a (new) | 16.4% |
Income Statement and Per-Share Data
| Metric (HKD Mn) | FY2016 | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue | 103.4 | 116.0 | 109.712 | 207.794 |
Cost of sales | — | — | -86.630 | -161.032 |
Gross profit | 27.7 | 30.16 | 23.082 | 46.762 |
Administrative expenses | — | — | -66.814 | -68.153 |
Operating loss before finance costs (derived) | — | — | -43.590 | -18.125 |
Depreciation and amortisation | — | — | 10.810 | 14.295 |
EBITDA (derived) | — | — | -32.780 | -3.830 |
Finance costs | — | — | -0.251 | -25.649 |
Loss before tax | — | — | -43.841 | -43.774 |
Net loss for the period | -25.3 | -45.89 | -43.837 | -46.588 |
Net loss attributable to owners | — | — | -43.690 | -45.417 |
EPS basic and diluted (HK cents) | — | — | -0.56 | -0.59 |
Dividend per share (HKD) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric (%) | FY2016 | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gross margin | 26.8 | 26.0 | 21.0 | 22.5 |
Operating margin (derived) | — | — | -39.7 | -8.7 |
EBITDA margin (derived) | — | — | -29.9 | -1.8 |
Net margin | -24.5 | -39.6 | -40.0 | -22.4 |
Income Statement
| Metric (HKD Mn) | 1H2018 | 1H2019 |
|---|---|---|
Revenue | 43.633 | 88.958 |
Administrative expenses | -30.928 | -36.524 |
Loss before tax | -18.833 | -24.749 |
Net loss | -18.803 | -25.334 |
Balance Sheet
| Metric (HKD Mn) | FY2016 | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Total assets | — | — | 460.348 | 1,030.778 |
Non-current assets | 9.3 | 338.9 | 349.286 | 624.200 |
Cash and equivalents (house accounts) | 52.9 | 73.5 | 34.199 | 47.833 |
Client segregated cash | 0 | 0 | 0 | 121.789 |
Bank and other borrowings | 4.5 | 4.5 | 34.500 | 160.000 |
Convertible bonds (current + non-current) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 286.103 |
Loan from ultimate holding company | — | — | 3.556 | 3.556 |
Total debt excl. leases (derived) | — | — | 38.056 | 449.659 |
Net debt (derived) | — | — | 3.857 | 401.826 |
Total liabilities | — | — | 101.863 | 714.924 |
Total equity | — | — | 358.485 | 315.854 |
Goodwill | 0 | 0 | 0 | 299.121 |
Net current assets (liabilities) | — | — | 9.803 | -117.539 |
Cash Flow
| Metric (HKD Mn) | FY2018 | FY2019 |
|---|---|---|
Capex | 0.903 | 0.158 |
Acquisition cash outflow (net) | 0 | 111.666 |
Dividends paid | 0 | 0 |
Buybacks | 0 | 0 |
Returns & Leverage Ratios (%) and Financial Ratios (x)
| Ratio | FY2016 | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ROE (net loss / closing equity, %) | — | — | -12.2 | -14.7 |
ROA (net loss / closing assets, %) | — | — | -9.5 | -4.5 |
Current ratio (x, company-reported) | 0.86 | 1.77 | 1.10 | 0.78 |
Gearing (borrowings / total assets, %, company-reported) | 69.5 | 1.9 | 8.3 | 44.1 |
Debt / equity (x, derived) | — | — | 0.11 | 1.42 |
Interest coverage (EBIT / finance costs, x, derived) | — | — | -173.7 | -0.71 |
Asset turnover (revenue / closing assets, x) | — | — | 0.24 | 0.20 |
Region revenue (HKD Mn)
| Region revenue (HKD Mn) | FY2018 | FY2019 |
|---|---|---|
Hong Kong | 109.712 | 184.228 |
Southeast Asia | 0 | 23.566 |
Total | 109.712 | 207.794 |
Capital Markets
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
Listing | None (HKEX cancelled 14 Nov 2022; SGX removed 18 May 2023) |
Share price performance (1/3/5-year) | Not applicable; shares untraded since 30 Mar 2021 suspension |
Last indicated price | HK$0.050 per aggregator |
Valuation multiples (P/E, EV/EBITDA, EV/Sales, P/B) | Not meaningful (negative earnings; delisted; liquidation) |
Analyst consensus | None — no known coverage |
Dividends | None declared for FY2016–FY2019 |
Buybacks | None (FY2017–FY2019) |
Share Count (M) and Per-Share Data
| Metric | FY2016 | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Dividend per share (HKD) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Shares in issue (M) | — | — | 7,749 | 7,749 |
Book value per share (HK cents, derived) | — | — | 4.63 | 4.08 |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance: None; management has been displaced by liquidators. Consensus: None.
Bull-case arguments (for creditors; there is no credible equity bull case)
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The Admiralty Centre property (carrying value c.HK$299.8 M at end-2019) provides a tangible recovery pool, potentially sufficient to repay secured lenders and contribute to unsecured claims.
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Yicko was profitable (HK$21.2 M net profit in ten months of 2019) with an over-collateralised margin book; if preserved, it could be sold as a licensed going concern.
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Documented irregularities (inflated guaranteed profit, HK$15.5 M pre-completion dividend) give the liquidators potential claims against vendors/guarantors to offset bondholder claims.
Bear-case arguments
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Goodwill of HK$299.1 M is likely worthless in liquidation, and equity of HK$315.9 M at end-2019 already depended on it; ordinary shareholders are effectively wiped out.
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Hong Kong commercial property values and brokerage activity have been weak since 2021, likely compressing realisations versus 2019 book values (general market context).
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The parent CITIC Guoan Group's reorganisation removes any prospect of shareholder rescue, and missing records hamper recovery litigation.
Monitorables (next 12 months): any liquidators' public notices (e.g., Cayman Gazette notices to creditors, dividend declarations); any SFC/Police enforcement outcomes on the Yicko transaction; the fate of Yicko Securities' SFC licence (SFC public register); disposal records for the Admiralty Centre property; outcomes in the CITIC Guoan Group reorganisation affecting intercompany claims.
Concluding analyst verdict. Guoan International Limited is not an investable company; it is an insolvency estate. The case is nonetheless instructive. A parent-controlled small cap with a structurally declining handset trading and repair business attempted to buy growth through a HK$420 million acquisition of a small broker, financing most of it with short-dated convertible bonds issued to the very vendors whose profit guarantee underpinned the valuation. The brokerage was genuinely profitable, but its contribution was consumed by the new interest bill, and the balance sheet swung into net current liabilities with goodwill representing almost all of equity. When the bonds fell due in 2020–2021 the company could not pay, and its reconstituted board then alleged that the guaranteed profit had been flattered by commissions paid by the company itself and its controlling shareholder, by reclassified payables, and by a related-party share sale with conflicting records — and that the vendors stripped a dividend exceeding the target's profit the day before completion. The auditor could not verify the acquisition accounting; the parent entered its own court-led reorganisation; the bondholders obtained judgment and a winding-up order; and the company was delisted in Hong Kong in November 2022 and in Singapore in May 2023. For shareholders, the realistic recovery expectation is nil: unsecured bondholders alone held claims of at least HK$200 million plus interest against a balance sheet whose principal tangible asset was a mortgaged office. For creditors, outcomes hinge on property realisations, the residual value (if any) of Yicko, and whether claims against the vendors can be pursued despite record gaps. Absent new public filings by the liquidators, no further assessment can be made. The dossier's classification: Delisted / In Liquidation — No Rating; equity value presumed zero.
Sources (primary): HKEXnews — 2017 Annual Report (ltn20180430031.pdf); Inside information announcements of 30 Mar 2021, 10 Jun 2021, 2 Jul 2021, 3 Sep 2021, 14 Sep 2021, 15 Oct 2021, 29 Dec 2021, 30 Jan 2022, 1 Mar 2022, 29 Apr 2022, 14 Jun 2022, 3 Aug 2022, 10 Oct 2022, 31 Oct 2022; SEHK announcement 9 Nov 2022; SGXNet — Unaudited annual results FY2019 (31 Mar 2020), Interim results 1H2019 (30 Aug 2019), Change in ISIN (3 Oct 2017), Board meeting notice (17 Aug 2020), Retirement of auditors (29 Oct 2021), Delisting notice (16 May 2023); HKEXnews — New Provenance Everlasting Holdings change in director's information (3 Mar 2022). Secondary: Webull HK quote page (00143); Owler company page (announcement titles only).
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Board of Directors
| Name | Role | Appointed | Age (2018) | Background (per 2017 AR) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
HUANG Zhen Qian | Executive Director | 11 Mar 2016 | 57 | GM of CITIC Networks Ltd Shenzhen Branch (2000–2015); deputy MD of Guoan (HK) Holdings since 2009 |
SO Haw Herman | Executive Director | 3 Feb 2016 | 35 | MBA (HKUST); ex-China Construction Bank (Asia); former ED of Gold Tat Group International (8266) 2011–2015 |
DU Jun | Chairman, Non-executive Director | 11 Mar 2016 | 49 | MEcon, Shaanxi College of Finance and Economics; Beijing Securities from 1996; joined CITIC Guoan 2005; deputy GM 2015 (capital operations) |
LI Xiang Yu | Non-executive Director | 11 Mar 2016 | 50 | BEcon, Renmin University; senior accountant; CITIC Guoan from 2000; deputy GM 2015 (finance) |
CUI Ming Hong | Non-executive Director | 11 Mar 2016 | 53 | Physics, Capital Normal University; CITIC Guoan from 1998; deputy GM 2015 (strategy) |
YANG Li Ming | Non-executive Director | 11 Mar 2016 | 60 | PLA engineering institute; CITIC Guoan from 1993; general officer from 2011 |
WONG Chun Man | INED, Audit Committee chair | 11 Mar 2016 | 42 | BBA (CUHK); AICPA, CFA; ex-PwC senior auditor; finance director Neo Media |
TSE Yung Hoi, BBS | INED, Remuneration Committee chair | 11 Mar 2016 | 65 | Fudan University; Chairman of BOCI-Prudential Asset Management; FSDC council member |
NG Man Kung | INED | 11 Mar 2016 | 66 | 28+ years banking; former vice-chairman and CE of Chiyu Banking Corporation |
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Shares | Stake | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Road Shine Developments Limited (beneficial owner; deemed interest of Guoan (HK) Holdings and CITIC Guoan Group) | 4,123,816,337 | 53.218% | 2017 AR |
CITIC Guoan Group (as cited in FY2019 MD&A) | — | 53.79% | FY2019 results |
Directors' interests | Nil (31 Dec 2017) | 0% | 2017 AR |
Other holders ≥5% | None recorded (31 Dec 2017) | — | 2017 AR |
Competitive Landscape
Competitor Detail
| Metric | Guoan International (FY2019) |
|---|---|
Revenue (HKD Mn) | 207.8 |
Revenue growth (%) | 89.4 |
Gross margin (%) | 22.5 |
Net margin (%) | -22.4 |
R&D intensity (%) | 0 |
Recent Developments
As an unlisted Cayman company in official liquidation, it has no continuing disclosure obligation to HKEX or SGX, and liquidators' reports to creditors are generally not public.
For context, the final register of material public events (outside the window) is set out below.



