HC BoKwang Industry Co., Ltd. Overview
HC BoKwang Industry is a small-cap, single-region construction-materials producer and the materials arm of the Daegu-based HC Homecenter group. Its core asset is a permitted quarry complex in Gunwi, Daegu, of about 430,854 m². The company describes it as the largest aggregate-production base in the Daegu–Gyeongbuk region, located within roughly 30 km of Daegu's demand centres. From this quarry it produces KS-certified crushed aggregates and manufactured sand. It sells them externally and also feeds them into its own ascon (asphalt concrete) and remicon (ready-mixed concrete) plants. This vertical integration has historically produced operating margins of 18–22%, well above typical remicon peers. The model is entirely domestic and highly exposed to the regional construction cycle. Revenue fell from KRW 87.5bn (FY2022) to KRW 38.5bn (FY2025), and the company posted its first operating loss in the 2016–2025 data series. Its medium-term thesis depends on two things: renewal and expansion of the quarry permit, which currently runs to 2028, and the long-delayed Daegu–Gyeongbuk Integrated New Airport.
Company's own description (paraphrased from DART business-report summaries)
The company presents itself as a specialist aggregate producer. Its products are crushed aggregate for concrete, mixed aggregate for road pavement, recycled ascon, conventional ascon and remicon. It operates a 430,854 m² aggregate quarry in Gunwi, Daegu, and supplies KS-certified aggregates to Daegu and surrounding cities within about 30 km. It argues that tightening environmental rules make new quarries hard to develop, so its ability to add to and extend its quarry complex gives it a semi-permanent operating base.
For ascon, it describes itself as the first and only producer of recycled ascon in the Daegu area. It holds GR (Good Recycled) certification and notes that permitting requirements for this environmentally regulated activity create high entry barriers.
For remicon, it highlights the central Daegu location of its plant. The plant borders an urban expressway (Sincheon-daero), so it can deliver across the whole city, and it uses aggregate from the company's own quarry (Source: ValueLine company summary drawn from DART filings, 1Q26 update; KIRS report, July 2024).
Business model and revenue model
Revenue model: 100% product sales (aggregate, ascon, remicon, plus minor sand and other by-products). No subscription, licensing or recurring service revenue has been disclosed.
Value-chain position: Upstream extraction and processing (quarrying, crushing, screening, washing), plus midstream manufacturing of ascon and remicon. Upstream inputs it does not control are cement (bought from cement producers), bitumen/asphalt binder, electricity and fuel. Downstream, it relies on owner-operator mixer-truck and dump-truck haulage, with group logistics affiliate HC Logistics providing cement and aggregate transport at group level.
Customer types: Regional construction companies, public-works contractors (municipal and provincial road paving), other remicon and ascon producers (external aggregate sales), and group affiliates. HC Homecenter's IR deck states a strategy of raising aggregate supply to affiliates so that group remicon reaches over 50% market share.
End-markets: Residential construction (apartments), public infrastructure (roads, paving, civil works) and non-residential building in Daegu and northern Gyeongbuk.
Geography: 100% domestic. No export sales are recorded (ValueLine income-statement breakdown).
Independent characterisation
This is a regional quarry-backed materials business with an embedded logistics radius constraint. Aggregate, ascon and remicon are heavy, low-value-per-tonne products whose economics depend on haul distance; remicon must be placed within roughly 90 minutes of batching. Competitive advantage therefore comes from site location and permit scarcity rather than technology or brand.
The company's historical margin premium comes from:
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Owning a permitted quarry close to a metropolitan market.
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Captive consumption of its own aggregate in ascon and remicon, which lowers raw-material cost.
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Being the only recycled-ascon producer in Daegu.
The main weaknesses are:
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Total concentration in one regional market that has been in a construction downturn since 2022.
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A quarry permit expiring in 2028 that faces organised local opposition to its expansion and extension.
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Rising leverage and a large related-party and non-trade receivables balance.
Strategy
Stated strategy themes (paraphrased)
The company does not publish an investor-day presentation of its own. Strategy is articulated through the parent's IR deck (HC Homecenter IR 2025, Jul and Dec versions). Themes for the aggregate business (HC BoKwang Industry):
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Raise captive supply to group remicon. Increase aggregate supply to affiliates, targeting group remicon market share above 50% in Daegu–Gyeongbuk (current group share about 11.5% on 2024 production).
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Expand manufactured-sand output. Natural sand is scarce and its share of regional supply has fallen. The deck shows manufactured sand at about 40.9% of regional aggregate supply vs. about 0.8% natural sand in recent years.
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Maximise value added. Enter mortar (dry-mix) production at the parent level and develop an industrial complex.
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Position for regional megaprojects. The TK Integrated New Airport (construction estimated at KRW 11.4tn incl. the military airfield), an airport cluster (KRW 1tn), regional transport networks (KRW 7.2tn), new roads (about KRW 20tn), military-unit relocation (Chilgok to Gunwi around 2030) and Daegu redevelopment.
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Group target. Consolidated revenue of KRW 1tn by 2030 (parent level; FY2024 KRW 369.0bn).
The KIRS report (Jul 2024) framed the investment case around vertical integration (aggregate → remicon), remicon-led growth and TK New Airport demand from 2025 to 2029.
Initiatives in the last 24 months (Oct 2024 – Oct 2026)
| Initiative | Date | Detail | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quarry-complex expansion and extension | Filed Dec 2023; under review through 2024–26 | 430,854 m² → 870,106 m²; term 2028 → 2059; final authority Korea Forest Service | Pending. Strong resident opposition; no approval found in sources reviewed. |
| Phase-2 quarry development | Planned 2025 | 57,991 m²; KRW 2.5bn investment; 2.311m m³ | Status not disclosed. FY2025 capex was only KRW 2.0bn. |
| Corporate rebranding to "HC" | 27 Jun 2025 | Name change to HC BoKwang Industry, aligning with group identity; company cited enhancing corporate value and competitiveness | Completed |
| Dividend reset | 16 Mar 2026 | DPS cut to KRW 50 from KRW 150 | Completed |
| Group housing integration (parent-level) | Sep 2024 – Mar 2025 | HC Homecenter acquired 90% of Donghwa Housing for KRW 46.6bn, creating a captive remicon customer (IR claims about KRW 50bn per year of revenue uplift at group level) | Completed (parent) |
| — | Detail | — | — |
| Cost-reduction programmes with targets | None disclosed | — | — |
| ESG / sustainability commitments with targets | None disclosed | — | — |
| Company-level medium-term financial targets or guidance | None disclosed | — | — |
Products & Services
Pricing models are not publicly disclosed. Industry practice in Korea is per-m³ (remicon, aggregate) or per-tonne (ascon) pricing, negotiated regionally against published reference prices.
Aggregate segment
| Product | Description / specification | Target customer | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crushed aggregate for concrete (콘크리트용 부순골재) | KS-certified crushed stone, incl. 25mm grade | Remicon producers (own plant, group, third parties), precast makers | Parent IR cites 25mm aggregate reference price rising from ~KRW 10,500/m³ (2012) to ~KRW 16,500/m³ (3Q2025) |
| Manufactured sand (인공사 / 부순모래) | Machine-made fine aggregate replacing scarce natural sand | Remicon and mortar producers | IR cites price rising from ~KRW 11,200/m³ (2012) to ~KRW 20,000/m³ (3Q2025). Group strategy: expand manufactured-sand output. Sand was 3.46% of sales in Q1 2022. |
| Mixed aggregate for road pavement (도로포장용 혼합골재) | Graded base/sub-base aggregate | Road contractors, ascon plants | — |
| Recycled / circulating aggregate (순환골재) | Produced from construction waste via impact crusher | Ascon (recycled mix), civil fill | Supports recycled-ascon line |
| Gunwi quarry phase | Phase 1 | Phase 2 | Phase 3 | Phase 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Area (m2) | 167,789 | 57,991 | 61,342 | 28,113 |
| Development timing (planned) | 2,022 | 2,025 | 2,028 | 2,029 |
| Investment (KRW bn) | 33.1 | 2.5 | — | — |
| Extractable volume (thousand m3) | 9,141 | 2,311 | 2,488 | 770 |
| Estimated value (KRW bn) | 206.4 | 52.2 | 56.2 | 17.4 |
Quarry capacity and reserves (parent IR, Dec 2025): Individual development area 315,235 m² across four phases. Disclosed permitted quarry-complex area (company) is 430,854 m².
The IR deck sums the estimated value to "about KRW 330bn". The basis for this valuation (gross revenue at current prices vs. NPV) is not disclosed. Treat it as a gross resource value, not a balance-sheet or fair value. Phases 3 and 4 (2028–2029) extend beyond the current quarry-complex term (2028).
Ascon segment
| Product | Description | Target customer | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conventional ascon (일반 아스콘) | Hot-mix asphalt concrete | Daegu municipal and district paving, road contractors | GR-certified |
| Recycled ascon (재활용 아스콘) | Uses reclaimed asphalt pavement (폐아스콘) and recycled additives; indirect-heating recycling dryer, storage silos, weigh bins | Public paving (public procurement favours GR products) | Company claims first and only producer in Daegu |
Location: KIRS's history chart references an "ascon division, Nongong branch" (Nongong-eup, Dalseong-gun, Daegu). Current operating status and capacity are not publicly disclosed. The group-level ascon capacity of 320,000 t/yr (parent IR) covers all group ascon plants, not only this company.
Remicon segment
| Product | Description | Target customer | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ready-mixed concrete (레미콘) | Standard-strength ready-mix produced with in-house KS aggregate | Residential developers, general contractors, public works in Daegu | Plant acquired 2015 (ex-Gom Remicon), described as Daegu's largest at the time. Located on Yutongdanji-ro next to the Sincheon-daero expressway. |
Group-level remicon capacity is 1.82m m³/yr (parent IR), not company-specific. Company-specific remicon capacity and utilisation are not publicly disclosed in sources reviewed.
Launch / version years
| Line | Year |
|---|---|
| Aggregate (Gunwi) | Since incorporation (2004); site operations predate it |
| Remicon | 2,015 |
| Ascon | Launch year not publicly disclosed |
| Capacity expansion | 2,021 |
| Phase-1 quarry area | 2,022 |
Financial Narrative
Basis: consolidated K-IFRS. Sources: S&P Global Market Intelligence via StockAnalysis.com (data updated 14 Aug 2026) and DART business reports via ETF Shopping. EPS uses DART figures. TTM = twelve months to 30 Jun 2026.
Income statement
Notes:
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FY2021 net income is KRW 10.1bn per S&P (incl. KRW 0.32bn minority adjustment) and KRW 9.8bn per DART-based ETF Shopping. FY2021 EPS is KRW 278 per S&P vs. KRW 269 per DART; the DART figure is shown.
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FY2023 DPS = KRW 150 interim (record date 30 Sep 2023) + KRW 150 final.
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FY2025 gross profit is KRW 3.7bn (S&P) vs. KRW 3.9bn (DART); a classification difference.
Five-year revenue CAGR
Quarterly trend
Source: DART quarterly filings via ETF Shopping.
TTM to Jun 2026 (S&P): revenue KRW 42.9bn, operating income KRW −2.4bn, EBITDA KRW 6.4bn, net income KRW 0.3bn.
Balance sheet
Latest balance sheet (30 Jun 2026, S&P)
Analyst flag — non-trade receivables. Total receivables minus trade receivables rose from about KRW 3.3bn (FY2021) to about KRW 36.1bn (FY2024), KRW 37.3bn (FY2025) and about KRW 55.3bn (Jun 2026), all derived.
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The nature of this balance (e.g. loans, deposits, receivables from affiliates or investment-partnership-related items) is not identified in the sources reviewed.
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In FY2025 the company booked a KRW 2.9bn bad-debt provision (S&P cash-flow add-back), up from KRW 0.1bn in FY2024.
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Interest and investment income rose to KRW 2.5bn in FY2025, consistent with an interest-bearing financial asset.
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Combined with net debt of KRW 46.9bn, this is the single most important item to verify in the DART notes (related-party transactions and financial-instrument footnotes).
Analyst flag — other long-term assets. These rose from KRW 3.3bn (FY2022) to KRW 26.2bn (FY2023), in the same year as KRW 23.9bn of capex and the scheduled phase-1 quarry development (KRW 33.1bn investment per parent IR). The composition is not publicly disclosed in sources reviewed.
Cash flow
TTM to Jun 2026: OCF KRW 7.0bn, capex KRW −0.7bn, FCF KRW 6.2bn, dividends paid KRW −1.8bn.
FY2025 OCF of KRW 14.2bn despite a net loss reflects:
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D&A of KRW 8.9bn;
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a KRW 5.6bn release of trade receivables as revenue fell;
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non-cash provisions of KRW 2.9bn.
This working-capital release is not repeatable at current revenue levels.
Ratios
Derived from the tables above. Year-end balances are used unless stated; ROE, ROA and asset turnover use average balances from FY2022 onward.
Notes:
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FY2025 payout is not meaningful because of the net loss; FY2025 DPS was KRW 50.
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Payout ratios are DART-based (ETF Shopping).
Commentary on trends, inflections and drivers
Revenue. Revenue peaked in FY2022 (KRW 87.5bn). FY2021–22 growth came from remicon share gains in Daegu and a strong regional housing cycle. FY2023 held almost flat in value (−2.3%) as price increases offset volume. The inflection came in FY2024 (−25.3%) and deepened in FY2025 (−39.7%). This tracks the Daegu–Gyeongbuk construction downturn: the parent's IR deck estimates the regional remicon market fell from about 16.1m m³ (2022) to about 11.6m m³. Nationally, remicon shipments fell from 141.3m m³ (2022) to 135.8m m³ (2023), about 112–114m m³ (2024), and below 100m m³ in 2025. Sources conflict on 2025: about 93m m³ provisional (Herald Business, Apr 2026) vs. 97.66m m³ (Korea Ready-Mixed Concrete Industry Association via Bizhankook). The remicon line, previously 55% of sales, absorbed most of the decline.
Profitability. Margins were structurally high: EBITDA margin of 28–33% in FY2021–FY2024. The drivers were captive aggregate supply and a fixed-cost quarry with D&A of about KRW 9bn per year. That same fixed-cost base produced severe operating deleverage in FY2025. Gross profit fell 77% on a 40% revenue decline, and operating margin went from +13.4% to −12.9%. The Q2 2026 recovery (OP margin about 16% on KRW 15.0bn revenue) shows the operating leverage works in both directions. It came with a shift toward ascon (43% of 1H26 revenue), consistent with public paving demand.
Below the line. Non-operating items supported results:
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Gains on investment disposals of KRW 2.2bn (FY2023) and KRW 3.1bn (FY2025).
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Interest and investment income of KRW 2.5bn (FY2025).
Against these, interest expense nearly tripled from KRW 1.5bn (FY2023) to KRW 3.7bn (FY2025). FY2025 pre-tax loss (KRW −2.9bn) was therefore smaller than the operating loss (KRW −5.0bn).
Balance sheet. The company moved from essentially no net debt (FY2021) to KRW 41.4bn (FY2025) and KRW 46.9bn (Jun 2026). This happened while equity was broadly flat and FCF stayed positive in most years. The debt build-up funded the FY2023 quarry capex (KRW 23.9bn), dividends (KRW 31.0bn cumulatively FY2021–25) and the sharp rise in non-trade receivables (+KRW 33bn FY2023→FY2024). At FY2025, 77% of non-lease debt was current (KRW 39.6bn of KRW 44.1bn), pushing the current ratio from 4.06 to 1.41. By June 2026 part had been termed out (current KRW 30.6bn, long-term KRW 12.5bn).
Cash conversion. The CCC lengthened to about 207 days in FY2025, driven by days inventory. Inventory stayed at about KRW 15bn while cost of sales fell 27%. This is consistent with stockpiled aggregate at the quarry.
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Segment Overview
| Segment | Contents | Products |
|---|---|---|
Aggregate | Quarrying, crushing, screening at Gunwi; external sales and captive transfer | Crushed stone (incl. 25mm), manufactured sand (인공사), mixed road-base aggregate, recycled (circulating) aggregate |
Ascon | Hot-mix asphalt plant(s) supplying Daegu road paving | Conventional ascon, GR-certified recycled ascon |
Remicon | Central-Daegu batching plant (Yutongdanji-ro, ex-Gom Remicon) | Ready-mixed concrete in standard strengths, using in-house KS aggregate |
Revenue by Segment (%)
| Segment (% of revenue) | FY2023 | 1H2026 |
|---|---|---|
Remicon | 55.0 | 25 |
Aggregate | 33.4 | 31 |
Ascon | 11.6 | 43 |
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View Subscription PlansSegment revenue (KRW Bn, derived)
| Segment revenue (KRW Bn, derived) | FY2023 | 1H2026 |
|---|---|---|
Remicon | 47.0 | 5.7 |
Aggregate | 28.5 | 7.1 |
Ascon | 9.9 | 9.8 |
Revenue by Segment
| Aggregate business metric | FY2018 | FY2020 | FY2022 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Aggregate revenue (KRW Bn) | 15.2 | 19.7 | 28.2 | 21.2 |
Aggregate production (thousand m3) | 1,211 | 1,755 | 2,247 | 1,508 |
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View Subscription PlansGroup Entities
| Entity | Relationship | Stake | Latest total assets | Latest net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
HC BoKwang Co., Ltd. ((주)에이치씨보광) | Subsidiary | 100% | KRW 4.29bn | KRW 0.16bn |
Murim-Bluewave No.1 New Technology Investment Partnership | Investee (equity-method) | 20.77% | KRW 3.26bn | KRW −0.067bn |
Income Statement and Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (KRW Bn) | 71.9 | 87.5 | 85.5 | 63.9 | 38.5 |
Revenue growth (%) | 26.4 | 21.7 | -2.3 | -25.3 | -39.7 |
Cost of revenue (KRW Bn) | 52.4 | 64.7 | 59.4 | 47.8 | 34.8 |
Gross profit (KRW Bn) | 19.5 | 22.7 | 26.0 | 16.1 | 3.7 |
SG&A (KRW Bn) | 5.3 | 6.1 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 4.6 |
Operating income (KRW Bn) | 13.5 | 15.4 | 18.9 | 8.6 | -5.0 |
D&A (KRW Bn) | 8.2 | 9.0 | 9.2 | 9.1 | 8.9 |
EBITDA (KRW Bn) | 21.6 | 24.3 | 28.1 | 17.7 | 4.0 |
Interest expense (KRW Bn) | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 3.5 | 3.7 |
Interest & investment income (KRW Bn) | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 2.0 | 2.5 |
Gain on sale of investments (KRW Bn) | 0.2 | 0.2 | 2.2 | 0.8 | 3.1 |
Pre-tax income (KRW Bn) | 13.0 | 15.5 | 20.8 | 6.7 | -2.9 |
Income tax (KRW Bn) | 3.2 | 3.5 | 4.2 | 1.5 | -0.4 |
Net income (KRW Bn) | 10.1 | 12.1 | 16.7 | 5.2 | -2.5 |
EPS basic (KRW) | 269 | 332 | 459 | 144 | -69 |
EPS diluted (KRW) | 269 | 332 | 459 | 144 | -69 |
DPS declared for fiscal year (KRW) | 150 | 150 | 300 | 150 | 50 |
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View Subscription PlansCAGR by Period
| Period | CAGR |
|---|---|
FY2021–FY2025 | −14.5% (derived) |
FY2020–FY2025 | −7.5% (FY2020 revenue KRW 56.9bn, DART) |
Margin (%)
| Margin (%) | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Gross margin | 27.2 | 26.0 | 30.4 | 25.2 | 9.7 |
Operating margin | 18.7 | 17.6 | 22.1 | 13.4 | -12.9 |
EBITDA margin | 30.1 | 27.8 | 32.8 | 27.7 | 10.3 |
Net margin | 14.1 | 13.8 | 19.5 | 8.2 | -6.5 |
Effective tax rate | 24.5 | 22.3 | 20.0 | 21.7 | 12.7 |
Revenue History
| Quarter | Revenue | YoY growth (%) | Operating income | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Q1 2024 | 15.3 | — | 1.9 | 2.0 |
Q2 2024 | 19.9 | — | 4.0 | 5.7 |
Q3 2024 | 13.8 | — | 1.6 | -0.6 |
Q4 2024 | 14.8 | — | 1.4 | -1.8 |
Q1 2025 | 8.2 | -46.0 | -1.7 | -1.8 |
Q2 2025 | 10.2 | -48.9 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
Q3 2025 | 9.0 | -34.7 | -0.5 | 0.0 |
Q4 2025 | 11.0 | -25.7 | -2.7 | -1.0 |
Q1 2026 | 7.9 | -4.6 | -1.5 | -1.5 |
Q2 2026 | 15.0 | 46.9 | 2.4 | 2.8 |
Balance Sheet and Per-Share Data
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total assets | 146.1 | 146.0 | 165.7 | 179.1 | 175.3 |
Cash & equivalents | 26.6 | 14.7 | 16.4 | 13.0 | 9.4 |
Cash & short-term investments | 27.3 | 15.5 | 17.4 | 14.1 | 9.8 |
Trade accounts receivable | 16.1 | 19.6 | 18.1 | 14.9 | 6.2 |
Total receivables incl. other | 19.4 | 23.2 | 25.8 | 51.0 | 43.5 |
Inventory | 14.2 | 14.5 | 14.4 | 14.7 | 15.0 |
Property, plant & equipment | 69.6 | 66.1 | 62.5 | 60.0 | 57.8 |
Land (within PP&E) | 29.2 | 29.2 | 29.5 | 30.8 | 30.7 |
Other long-term assets | 4.1 | 3.3 | 26.2 | 27.1 | 28.3 |
Long-term investments | 4.6 | 19.0 | 15.2 | 8.8 | 7.0 |
Goodwill & intangibles | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
Short-term debt incl. current LTD (KRW Bn) | 3.5 | 8.6 | 7.3 | 9.0 | 39.6 |
Long-term debt (KRW Bn) | 12.6 | 4.2 | 19.8 | 33.4 | 4.5 |
Lease liabilities (KRW Bn) | 11.6 | 13.2 | 12.2 | 7.5 | 7.0 |
Total debt incl. leases (KRW Bn) | 27.8 | 26.1 | 39.3 | 49.8 | 51.2 |
Net debt (KRW Bn) | 0.5 | 10.5 | 21.9 | 35.7 | 41.4 |
Total liabilities (KRW Bn) | 60.4 | 57.1 | 70.5 | 79.4 | 83.3 |
Shareholders' equity (KRW Bn) | 85.7 | 88.9 | 95.2 | 99.7 | 91.9 |
Working capital (KRW Bn) | 44.7 | 29.8 | 35.5 | 60.2 | 20.5 |
Book value per share (KRW) | 2,321 | 2,447 | 2,619 | 2,745 | 2,530 |
Financial Analysis
| Item | KRW Bn |
|---|---|
Total assets | 178.6 |
Cash & equivalents | 1.3 (cash + short-term investments 4.3) |
Total receivables | 64.5 (trade 9.2) |
Short-term borrowings + current LTD | 30.6 |
Long-term debt | 12.5 |
Total debt incl. leases | 51.2 |
Net debt | 46.9 |
Equity | 91.4 (BVPS KRW 2,516) |
Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Operating cash flow | 18.1 | 18.7 | 25.5 | 15.1 | 14.2 |
Capital expenditure | -1.4 | -0.9 | -23.9 | -4.8 | -2.0 |
Free cash flow | 16.7 | 17.7 | 1.6 | 10.3 | 12.2 |
Free cash flow margin (%) | 23.3 | 20.3 | 1.9 | 16.1 | 31.6 |
Net investment in securities | 4.1 | -15.7 | 6.6 | 7.1 | 3.9 |
Net debt issued (repaid) | -9.0 | -7.7 | 9.2 | 12.6 | -5.7 |
Dividends paid | -3.6 | -5.5 | -10.9 | -5.5 | -5.5 |
Share buybacks | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
Cash interest paid | 2.0 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 1.0 |
Cash taxes paid | 1.2 | 5.3 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 1.2 |
Returns & Leverage Ratios (%) and Financial Ratios (x)
| Ratio | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ROE (%) | 11.8 | 13.8 | 18.1 | 5.4 | -2.6 |
ROA (%) | 6.9 | 8.3 | 10.7 | 3.0 | -1.4 |
ROIC, after-tax, year-end invested capital (%) | 11.8 | 12.0 | 12.9 | 5.0 | -2.9 |
Current ratio (x) | 3.35 | 2.27 | 2.60 | 4.06 | 1.41 |
Total debt / equity (x) | 0.32 | 0.29 | 0.41 | 0.50 | 0.56 |
Total liabilities / equity (%) | 70.4 | 64.2 | 74.1 | 79.6 | 90.6 |
Net debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.02 | 0.43 | 0.78 | 2.02 | 10.4 |
Interest coverage, EBIT / interest (x) | 13.8 | 13.9 | 12.6 | 2.4 | -1.3 |
Asset turnover (x) | 0.49 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.37 | 0.22 |
Days sales outstanding (trade AR) | 81.7 | 81.8 | 77.1 | 85.3 | 58.8 |
Days inventory outstanding | 99.2 | 81.6 | 88.2 | 112.0 | 157.9 |
Days payables outstanding | 12.0 | 12.0 | 11.0 | 4.6 | 9.9 |
Cash conversion cycle (days) | 168.9 | 151.4 | 154.3 | 192.7 | 206.8 |
Dividend payout ratio (%) | 54 | 45 | 65 | 104 | — |
Region revenue (KRW Bn)
| Region revenue (KRW Bn) | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
South Korea (Daegu–Gyeongbuk) | 71.9 | 87.5 | 85.5 | 63.9 | 38.5 |
Rest of world | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Region growth (%)
| Region growth (%) | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
South Korea (Daegu–Gyeongbuk) | 26.4 | 21.7 | -2.3 | -25.3 | -39.7 |
Capital Markets
| Measure | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
Last close (15 Oct 2026) | KRW 2,475 (−12.85% on the day) | StockAnalysis.com; ETF Shopping |
1-month return | +17.3% | ETF Shopping |
6-month return | −37.3% | ETF Shopping |
1-year return | −17.8% | ETF Shopping |
52-week range | KRW 1,725 – 4,260 | ETF Shopping. Other vendors show KRW 1,600–4,555 (Google Finance, Aug 2026) and KRW 1,862–4,555 (StockHub, Jul 2026); windows differ. |
3-year return | Not precisely verified. Reference: KRW 7,110 on 3 Aug 2022 (Financial News) implies about −65% to Oct 2026 (about 3.2 years). | Derived |
Beta (1Y) | −0.57 | TradingView (low statistical significance given theme-driven trading) |
Share Price History
| Date | Price (KRW) | Context |
|---|---|---|
11 Apr 2016 | 9,160 | Before the 2016 bonus issues; about 3,053 adjusted for the cumulative 3x share count (derived) |
3 Aug 2022 | 7,110 | China sand-export theme |
1 Jul 2026 | 2,665 | +30% day |
24 Jul 2026 | 1,906 | — |
18 Aug 2026 | 2,110 | — |
8 Oct 2026 | 2,180 | — |
15 Oct 2026 | 2,475 | — |
Valuation Multiples
| Multiple | HC BoKwang (TTM Jun 2026) | HC BoKwang (FY2025) | Hanil Cement | Eugene Corp | HC Homecenter |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
P/E (x) | 282 | negative | 11.8 | negative | n/m |
EV/EBITDA (x) | 21.3 | 34.4 | — | — | — |
EV/Sales (x) | 3.19 | 3.55 | — | — | — |
P/B (x) | 0.98 | 0.98 | 0.65 | 0.27 | 0.40 |
Dividend yield (%) | 2.0 | 2.0 | 6.1 | 5.6 | — |
DPS by fiscal year (KRW)
| DPS by fiscal year (KRW) | FY2016 | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Interim | 200 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 150 | 0 | 0 |
Final | 100 | 115 | 50 | 50 | 100 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 50 |
Total | 300 | 165 | 50 | 50 | 100 | 150 | 150 | 300 | 150 | 50 |
Capital Markets — Buyback authorisation
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
Buyback authorisation | None active. Negligible treasury stock (KRW 1.6m book value). No buybacks FY2021–FY2025. |
Credit ratings | None. No Moody's, S&P or Fitch ratings; no domestic bond rating found. Debt appears to be bank borrowing. |
Debt maturity profile (KRW Bn) | FY2024 |
Current (≤1 year) borrowings | 9.0 |
Non-current borrowings | 33.4 |
Lease liabilities | 7.5 |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance and consensus
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
| Company guidance | None published |
| Consensus | None (no coverage) |
| Parent's group target | KRW 1tn consolidated revenue by 2030 (HC Homecenter IR 2025), with no company-level breakdown |
Bull case
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Operating rebound under way. Q2 2026 revenue rose 46.9% YoY to KRW 15.0bn with OP of KRW 2.4bn (16% margin). Because of high fixed-cost leverage (D&A about KRW 9bn per year), a return to FY2024-level revenue (KRW 63.9bn) would restore double-digit operating margins.
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Scarce, location-advantaged reserve. About 14.7m m³ of phased reserves within about 30 km of Daegu. Manufactured-sand prices are up about 80% since 2012 and aggregate is scarce in other regions. If the 2059 extension is approved, the quarry's gross resource value (about KRW 330bn per the parent IR, basis undisclosed) far exceeds the market cap of about KRW 90bn.
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TK airport and military relocation optionality. Over KRW 11tn of airport works sited next to the company's quarry; any shift to a nationally funded project would be a step-change catalyst.
Bear case
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Permit cliff. The quarry-complex term ends in 2028 and the expansion and extension faces unanimous recorded local opposition. Denial or a materially scaled-back approval would impair the core asset and the phase-3/4 reserves scheduled for 2028–2029.
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Balance-sheet deterioration and opacity. Net debt is KRW 46.9bn against TTM EBITDA of KRW 6.4bn (about 7.3x). About KRW 55bn of non-trade receivables are undisclosed in nature, with provisioning already begun (KRW 2.9bn in FY2025). Minority shareholders own about 30% of a company whose cash flows and balance sheet can be influenced by a controlling group that is itself loss-making (9M2025 OP KRW −13.2bn).
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Airport delay and regional housing slump. The 2027 budget omitted support. Daegu's start dates have slipped repeatedly (initially February 2026), and national remicon demand is at multi-decade lows. The FY2025 earnings base could persist for several years.
Key catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
-
Korea Forest Service decision on the Gunwi quarry-complex designation change (expansion to 870,106 m², extension to 2059).
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TK New Airport financing: passage of the special-act amendment converting it to a national project; any 2027 supplementary funding or Daegu–Gyeongbuk joint borrowing.
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Q3 2026 results (due by mid-November 2026): whether the Q2 recovery in ascon and aggregate holds.
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FY2026 business report (March 2027): related-party loan and receivable footnotes, debt maturities, segment revenue and margins.
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FY2026 dividend decision (expected around March 2027).
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Daegu housing starts and the unsold-inventory trend; regional public paving budgets.
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Any further controlling-group share purchases (stake rose to 69.23% in August 2026) or group restructuring involving the listed subsidiary.
Analyst verdict
HC BoKwang Industry is best understood as a regional resource asset wrapped in a cyclical, controlled small-cap. Its economics rest on one permitted quarry close to Daegu. Through FY2023 that quarry delivered an unusual combination of 20%+ operating margins and strong free cash flow for a materials producer. The FY2024–FY2025 collapse showed the other side of that model. Fixed-cost operating leverage, single-region exposure and a remicon mix tied to Daegu housing produced a 56% revenue decline from peak and the first operating loss in the 2016–2025 series.
The Q2 2026 rebound is real but narrow: one quarter, led by ascon for public paving. The company has not yet shown that FY2026 as a whole will return to profit.
Two binary variables dominate valuation more than near-term earnings do:
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Renewal and expansion of the quarry designation beyond 2028.
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Whether, and how fast, the TK New Airport proceeds.
The first faces documented, organised local opposition. The second was stalled for funding as of September 2026. At about 1.0x book and about 21x TTM EV/EBITDA, the share price embeds meaningful optionality on both. It sits at a premium to national cement and remicon peers (P/B 0.3–0.65x) despite inferior scale and liquidity.
The balance-sheet trajectory is the near-term concern that, in this analyst's view, the market under-discusses. Net debt rose from roughly zero to KRW 46.9bn in four and a half years while capex was modest outside FY2023. Non-trade receivables of about KRW 55bn are larger than the company's FY2025 revenue, and their counterparty and recoverability are not disclosed in sources reviewed. Until the FY2025/FY2026 DART notes clarify these items, and until the permit outcome is known, the evidence supports a cautious, event-driven stance. Upside is credible if both regional catalysts land. Downside is material if either fails or if related-party balances prove impaired. Investors should also expect continued theme-driven price swings of 20–30% that bear little relation to fundamentals.
Principal sources consulted
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DART filings (FY2021–FY2025 business reports; Q1 2024–Q2 2026 periodic reports; dividend decision 16 Mar 2026; bonus-issue decisions 2016; bulk-holding reports Jul–Aug 2026), accessed via ETF Shopping (etfshopping.com/stock/225530), Butler.works and ValueLine.
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S&P Global Market Intelligence financial data via StockAnalysis.com (income statement, balance sheet and cash flow; updated 14 Aug 2026).
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HC Homecenter Co., Ltd., Investor Relations 2025 (ver. 202507 and ver. 202512).
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Korea IR Council (KIRS) company report on Bokwang Industry, 16 July 2024.
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NICE/Naver AI company report on HC Homecenter, 13 April 2026.
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TradingView; Simply Wall St; Google Finance; StockHub (identifiers, employees, price ranges).
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News: Hankyung (2016); Newsis (2021, 2025); Financial News (2022); Seoul Shinmun/Twig24 (2024, 2026); Kyungbuk Maeil (2024, 2025, 2026); Maeil Shinmun (2024, 2026); Munhwa Ilbo (2024); Herald Business (2026); Bizhankook (2026); Gwangju Ilbo (2026); MTN (2026); Hankyung Eureka (2026); Hana Securities construction weekly (Nov 2025).
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Title / role | Tenure | Background | Age | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Kim Yoon-soo (김윤수) | CEO / Representative Director | Appointment date not publicly disclosed in sources reviewed | — | — | DART corporate overview via ETF Shopping; TradingView |
Park Byeong-jun (박병준) | Chairman, HC Homecenter group; shareholder of HC BoKwang (5.49%) | Group CEO from 2013 (parent); chairman thereafter | Leads the group's M&A strategy (remicon plants in Gunwi, Uiseong, Gyeongsan; Donghwa Housing) | 54 in Sep 2024 | Maeil Shinmun, 25 Sep 2024; DART via ETF Shopping |
Park Byeong-yun (박병윤) | CEO, HC Homecenter (parent); former CEO of Bokwang Industry; shareholder (3.63%) | Parent CEO since 2017 | Also CEO of Bokwang Ascon and HC Gunwi Industry; Kyungpook National University business graduate school | — | HC Homecenter IR 2025 |
Kim Su-ho (김수호) | Vice Chairman, management, HC Homecenter group | — | Executive at Bokwang Industry; CEO of HC Investment; lawyer at Logos Law; Seoul National University law | — | HC Homecenter IR 2025 |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Directors' Remuneration
| Item | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
Directors and auditors | 6 persons; average pay KRW 140m each (FY2025) | DART via ETF Shopping |
Average employee pay | KRW 42.98m (3.2x ratio) | DART via ETF Shopping |
Individual compensation | Not disclosed; no individual exceeded the KRW 500m disclosure threshold | DART via ETF Shopping |
Salary / bonus / stock split | Not publicly disclosed. No equity-compensation plan disclosed. | — |
Major Shareholders
| Shareholder | Relationship | Stake (%) |
|---|---|---|
HC Homecenter Co., Ltd. | Largest shareholder | 40.73 |
Park Byeong-jun | Related party | 5.49 |
Park Byeong-yun | Related party | 3.63 |
Park Jin-mo | Related party | 3.46 |
Park Se-hyun | Related party | 2.64 |
Kim Dong-hyun | Related party | 2.64 |
Park Jin-yeop | Related party | 2.56 |
Park Myung-hee | Related party | 2.25 |
HC Partners Co., Ltd. | Related party | 2.24 |
Park So-i | Related party | 2.11 |
Kim A-young | Related party | 0.87 |
Total controlling group | — | 68.68 |
Minority shareholders (7,246 holders) | — | 29.97 |
Controlling-group stake (%) | FY2021 | FY2022 |
HC Homecenter + related parties | 68.46 | 68.48 |
Competitive Landscape
Key Competitors
| Competitor | Segment overlap | Scale / data | Relative positioning |
|---|---|---|---|
Hanil Cement (KOSPI 300720) | Remicon (2 regional plants); cement supplier | FY2025 revenue KRW 1,423.9bn, OP KRW 132.7bn, NI KRW 81.1bn (DART via Bullstory/Butler) | National cement/remicon major; supplier and competitor |
Youngjin Remicon | Remicon (2 regional plants) | Not publicly disclosed (unlisted) | Regional competitor |
Yoonsung (윤성) | Ascon (2 regional plants) | — | Regional ascon competitor |
Eugene Corp (KOSDAQ 023410) | Remicon, aggregate (national) | FY2025 revenue KRW 1,332.7bn, OP KRW 32.4bn, NI KRW −24.5bn (DART via Butler/Bullstory) | Korea's largest remicon group; limited presence in Daegu not quantified |
Sampyo Industry | Remicon, aggregate (national, quarry operator) | — | Korea's largest quarry operator by volume (Seoul Shinmun, 2021); mainly Seoul metro area |
Ssangyong C&E | Cement | — | Upstream cement supplier to regional remicon |
Asia Cement / Sungshin Cement | Cement, some remicon | — | Upstream suppliers; limited direct overlap |
HLB Global (aggregate, sea sand) | Aggregate | — | Different geography (Gangwon) |
Other Daegu–Gyeongbuk remicon producers (~150 plants) | Remicon | — | Fragmented local competition |
Non-group regional quarries | Aggregate | — | Constrained by permitting |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Peer Comparison FY2025
| Metric | HC BoKwang Industry | Hanil Cement | Eugene Corp | HC Homecenter (parent, consol.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (KRW Bn) | 38.5 | 1,423.9 | 1,332.7 | 298.8 |
Revenue growth (%) | -39.7 | -18.2 | -4.4 | -19.0 |
Operating margin (%) | -12.9 | 9.3 | 2.4 | -6.2 |
Net margin (%) | -6.5 | 5.7 | -1.8 | — |
Competitive Advantages & Vulnerabilities
| Advantages | Vulnerabilities |
|---|---|
Permitted quarry close to a metro market, in a sector where new permits are hard to obtain | Permit term ends in 2028 and the extension faces organised opposition |
Captive aggregate cost advantage in remicon and ascon | Small scale: FY2025 revenue about 3% of Hanil Cement's |
Group offtake from 8+ remicon affiliates | Single-region exposure |
Only recycled-ascon producer in Daegu | Remicon economics squeezed by cement prices and haulage-fee bargaining |
| — | Related-party dependence (group as customer and controlling shareholder) |



