Intelligent Group Limited

Sources and conventions. FY2023–FY2025 come primarily from the FY2025 and FY2023 20-Fs. FY2021–FY2022 net income and cash come from the F-1/A cash-flow statement. All figures are in HK$ millions unless the row label says otherwise.

Income statement

Notes to 6.1

• FY2025 net loss of HK$18,175,575, SBC of HK$18,706,734 and G&A of HK$30,198,088 are from the FY2025 20-F. FY2024 net loss of HK$425,709 is from the same filing's statement of equity.

• FY2023–FY2025 staff costs are as stated in the FY2025 20-F. A second passage in that filing cites FY2024 staff costs of HK$5.77M and FY2023 of HK$3.16M, apparently on a broader definition. This discrepancy is unresolved.

• FY2025 operating loss is derived from roic.ai's -108.2% operating margin applied to filed revenue.

• Split-adjusted EPS for FY2021–FY2024 is computed on 656,250 weighted shares (13.125M pre-split divided by 20). FY2025 EPS is the aggregator value (Stocktaper/TipRanks), consistent with about 1.02M weighted post-split shares.

• Aggregators show pre-IPO dividends per share in some years (roic.ai: about 4 in "2020" and 4.09 in "2022"). No dividend has been paid since the IPO.

Margins and growth

• Revenue CAGR FY2021–FY2025: -4.8% a year.

• Revenue CAGR FY2023–FY2025: -5.1% a year.

• Excluding the non-cash HK$18.7M SBC charge, FY2025 would have been roughly break-even: net result of about +HK$0.53M.

Interim P&L (six months to 31 May)

H1 FY2025 direct cost is derived from the 246% increase reported for H1 FY2026. Sources: 6-Ks of 1 Nov 2024, 2 Sep 2025 and Oct 2026.

Balance sheet

Notes to 6.4

• Sources: FY2025 20-F consolidated balance sheets; FY2023 20-F; F-1/A cash-flow statement.

• FY2025 total assets in U.S. dollars are US$12.25M and equity is US$11.59M.

• At 30 November 2025 the equity components were: additional paid-in capital HK$104.59M; accumulated deficit HK$(10.85)M; other reserve or adjustment HK$(3.47)M.

• Total debt is not separately disclosed in retrieved data. Interest expense of about US$13–14K a year in FY2023–FY2024 (Barchart) implies negligible borrowing. Liabilities are mainly accruals, tax and lease liabilities.

• The "net cash" row conservatively deducts all liabilities from cash.

Subsequent event. The US$7.5M (about HK$58.4M) Class B placement on 29 April 2026 would lift pro-forma equity to roughly HK$150M before H1 FY2026 earnings.

Cash flow

Notes to 6.5

• FY2025 operating cash outflow of HK$178,028, capex history, and PIPE net proceeds of US$3,818,011 (about HK$29.73M) are from the FY2025 20-F.

• ESOP proceeds were a further US$787,500 gross.

• FY2024 IPO net proceeds are not separately retrieved. The increase in cash of about HK$38.2M is consistent with the IPO.

Ratios

Return and turnover ratios use average balances. Interest coverage is computed from aggregator operating income and interest expense. Net debt/EBITDA is not meaningful because the company holds net cash and EBITDA is negative.

Trend commentary

Revenue. INTJ has never broken out of a HK$14–23M revenue band. FY2021 was the peak (HK$22.5M), lifted by HK$10.9M of project work from the 2020–21 HK IPO boom. FY2022 fell 36% on COVID disruption. FY2023 recovered to HK$20.5M on a large retainer book. FY2024–FY2025 then slid as the retainer book shrank by about a third. H1 FY2026 revenue of HK$15.5M (+89%) is the strongest half on record and points to a full-year FY2026 above the FY2021 peak, provided the HK IPO pipeline holds. HKEX recorded 119 new listings in calendar 2025 versus 73 in 2024 (FY2025 20-F, citing HKEX statistics).

Profitability. Margins have compressed steadily: operating margin went from about 60% in FY2021 to 20% in FY2023 and -12% in FY2024. That was before the FY2025 SBC charge. The drivers are public-company costs after the IPO and higher staff costs (HK$1.5M in FY2023, HK$3.3–3.4M in FY2024–FY2025). G&A rose from HK$8.6M to HK$13.9M to HK$30.2M. Of the FY2025 increase, HK$18.7M is SBC from the equity incentive plan: 2.625M pre-split shares issued at US$0.30 versus a market price that was materially higher during the year. Professional fees eased to HK$3.33M from HK$3.79M. Other administrative expenses jumped to HK$2.10M from HK$0.29M. H1 FY2026's return to profit (HK$2.83M net) shows the cost base is coverable at HK$30M-plus annualised revenue, but at a gross margin of about 50%, not 70%-plus.

Balance sheet. The defining feature is excess liquidity relative to operations: HK$67.5M cash against HK$18.5M revenue. This is now augmented by the US$7.5M April 2026 placement. The most important red flag is the HK$21.26M (US$2.73M) amount due from related parties at FY2025 year-end, up HK$19.7M in one year and equal to 22% of total assets. Investors should read the related-party note in full. The balance coincided with a control change, a related-party acquisition (LQ Capital from the controlling shareholder) and a US$20M-labelled minority investment (Fine Glory) that does not appear among non-current assets (total HK$1.63M).

Cash generation. The operating business is roughly cash-neutral: FY2025 operating cash flow was -HK$0.18M despite the large accounting loss. Cash growth has come entirely from equity issuance: the IPO in FY2024, the PIPE and ESOP in FY2025, and the Class B placement in FY2026.

Guidance and consensus

• Management issues no guidance.

• There is no consensus.

• Run-rate inference: H1 FY2026 revenue of HK$15.5M and net income of HK$2.83M suggest FY2026 revenue could exceed HK$25M, the highest since listing, if H2 IPO activity holds. This is an observation, not a forecast. Historically the business has been lumpy.

Bull case

1. Cash-backed optionality. Cash of about US$8.7M at FY2025, plus US$7.5M raised in April 2026, against a market cap of about US$6.7M. If capital is deployed rationally (for example, LQ Capital lending at Hong Kong market rates) or returned, the discount could close.

2. Operating inflection. H1 FY2026 revenue rose 89% and returned to profit, driven by HK IPO activity. The HKEX pipeline strengthened from 73 new listings in 2024 to 119 in 2025.

3. Sponsor with resources. The XJ International / Hope Education / Tequ-linked group invested US$7.5M at US$12.50 per share, roughly 4x the current price. That signals intent to build the platform and could bring client flow from the controller's ecosystem.

Bear case

1. Minority holders are structurally subordinated. Combined controlling voting power is about 97%. A 500-vote Class C is authorised. The director-removal threshold has been cut, Nasdaq exemptions are invoked, and the board is 67% executive.

2. Questionable capital allocation and related-party flows. There is a HK$21.3M related-party receivable (22% of assets), a related-party purchase of LQ Capital, and a Fine Glory stake "valued at US$20M" that is invisible on the balance sheet. ESOP issuance at US$0.30 produced HK$18.7M of SBC.

3. Deteriorating core quality. Retainer revenue fell from 75% to 20% of the mix. Gross margin fell to about 50%. Revenue CAGR from FY2021 to FY2025 was -4.8%. Material weaknesses persist and the CFO seat has turned over repeatedly.

Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)

Concluding analyst verdict

Intelligent Group Limited is two companies under one ticker.

The first is a small, cyclical Hong Kong Financial PR boutique. It earns HK$18–23M a year in normal conditions and can be meaningfully profitable at IPO-cycle peaks, as in FY2021 and again in H1 FY2026. It is also structurally losing its recurring retainer base and its premium gross margins. On its own, that business might be worth a modest multiple of earnings that are normalised but unpredictable.

The second company, which now dominates the investment case, is a cash-rich listed vehicle under near-total control of a group linked to Mr. Huiwu Wang. That control was assembled between December 2025 and April 2026 through a shareholder-level control transfer, a Class B placement carrying 50 votes per share, and the authorisation of a 500-vote Class C. Since then, management and the board have been reconstituted with controller-linked executives. Nasdaq governance protections have been partly waived. Capital has gone into related-party and opaque transactions: LQ Capital from the controlling shareholder, a Fine Glory stake of uncertain size, and a HK$21.3M related-party receivable.

The market's verdict is clear. The shares have fallen about 96% from the split-adjusted IPO price and trade at roughly 0.35x book and below net cash. That discount is rational. Minority holders have neither the votes nor the governance safeguards to compel distribution or efficient deployment of the cash.

The constructive reading is that the controller's April 2026 entry at US$12.50 per share, several times the current price, aligns its economics with a platform build-out, and that the H1 FY2026 recovery shows the operating business can stand on its own.

Rating stance (qualitative): Speculative / governance-constrained. Only investors with high tolerance for controlled-company and related-party risk should consider exposure. Any position should be sized as an option on transparent capital deployment, which would need to be demonstrated in the FY2026 20-F.