Jinhui Shipping and Transportation Limited

Basis: IFRS. FY2021–FY2024 are audited. FY2025 figures are from the preliminary release (27 Feb 2026) and the standardised StockAnalysis / Fiscal.ai feed. Company-reported figures take precedence where they conflict.

Income statement

Notes:

• Use the derived row for those years.

• The derived EBITDA for FY2021–FY2023 embeds impairment charges and reversals, so it is not comparable with the company's operating profit before depreciation and amortisation.

• FY2024 and FY2025 EBITDA are company-reported (operating profit before D&A).

• EPS for FY2021–FY2023 is from vendor data. FY2024 and FY2025 are company-reported.

Dividends per share, by fiscal year declared (Oslo Børs dividend calendar)

Mapping of payments to fiscal years:

FY2021: interim NOK 0.26461 (Aug 2021) + final NOK 0.62863 (May 2022).

FY2022: interim NOK 0.291 (Aug 2022) + final NOK 0.413272 (May 2023).

FY2023: nil.

FY2024: final NOK 0.34 (May 2025).

FY2025: final NOK 0.17 (May 2026), equivalent to USD 0.018 per the FY2025 release.

Treat the mapping of interim and final payments to fiscal years as indicative.

Margins and growth

Revenue CAGR FY2021–FY2025: (157.49 / 131.07)^(1/4) − 1 ≈ 4.7% per year. The figure is heavily distorted by the 2023 trough and the 2024 rebound.

Commentary. Revenue is driven by fleet days multiplied by TCE.

FY2023: Revenue halved as the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) fell, and impairments produced a USD 55M loss.

FY2024: Revenue nearly doubled, reflecting fleet expansion (Capesize entry plus charter-ins) and firmer rates.

FY2025: Revenue was flat at USD 157.5M despite a 3.8% lower TCE. Net profit halved to USD 12.5M because of a USD 9.2M non-recurring loss on eight Supramax disposals and higher D&A (USD 57.6M), which included capitalised drydocking and right-of-use depreciation. A one-off charterparty settlement of ≈USD 20.2M partly offset these.

H1 2026: Revenue fell 13% to USD 69.3M on a smaller fleet (21 vs 32 vessels), but TCE rose ≈30% to USD 17,150. Daily opex fell to USD 5,509 and D&A dropped to USD 20.4M. Underlying profitability therefore improved, with net profit of USD 9.6M versus USD 15.1M in H1 2025, which had included the settlement.

Table 6.2a — Half-year comparison, USD M (H1 2026 report)

Balance sheet

Notes:

Net debt: The vendor figure equals total debt including leases minus cash and short-term investments. The company's own gearing metric (net interest-bearing debt / equity) was 1% at FY2025.

Lease liabilities: The FY2021 lease figure is shown as 0 because none was reported in that year.

Interim balance sheet points, 30 Jun 2026 (H1 2026 report):

• Cash and cash equivalents fell to USD 13.8M from USD 53.5M, after newbuilding instalments and debt repayment.

• Cash plus securities totalled USD 70.6M, down from USD 110.9M.

• Secured borrowings fell to USD 98.3M from USD 114.9M.

• Gearing rose to 7% (1% at FY2025).

• The financial assets at fair value through profit or loss (FVTPL) portfolio was USD 44.1M: equities and funds of USD 30.6M plus FCNs and derivatives of USD 13.5M.

Cash flow

H1 2026 cash flow (company):

• Operating cash flow: USD 6.4M, versus USD 44.2M in H1 2025, weighed down by working capital.

• Investing outflow: USD 13.5M, including USD 19.3M of newbuilding instalments.

• Financing outflow: USD 32.6M, comprising USD 18.5M of loan repayments and USD 9.6M of lease repayments.

Commentary. Jinhui generates solid gross operating cash flow (USD 76–92M in normal years). Free cash flow is lumpy because of fleet renewal capex. The company effectively recycles capital by selling old Supramaxes (USD 74.6M of proceeds in FY2025) to fund newbuild instalments. With ≈USD 400M of newbuild contracts, FCF is likely to stay negative through 2028, with the gap funded by:

• ≈55–70% bank financing,

• sale-and-leasebacks,

• the securities portfolio.

Ratios

Notes:

ROIC: Only the TTM figure to Sep 2026 is available (3.33%, S&P via StockAnalysis). Earlier years are shown as 0 and are not computed.

Net debt / EBITDA: FY2023 is negative because derived EBITDA was negative. FY2021–FY2023 use derived EBITDA.

Company gearing: The company reported 1% at FY2025, 2% at Q3 2025, 16% (net) at Q1 2025, 5% at Q1 2026 and 7% at H1 2026.

Cash conversion cycle: Not meaningful for a shipowner and not publicly disclosed.

TTM vendor metrics (Sep 2026): ROE 1.82%, ROA 1.63%, current ratio 3.56, debt/equity 0.33, interest coverage 1.76x.

Debt maturity profile

Secured borrowings were USD 98.3M at 30 Jun 2026 (H1 2026 report).

All borrowings are floating-rate and denominated in Hong Kong dollars and offshore renminbi (CNH). The 68% concentration in year 2 is a refinancing monitorable for 2027.

Management guidance

There is no quantified guidance. Management's qualitative stance (H1 2026 report) has four elements:

1. Freight markets are structurally supported by geopolitical inefficiencies (Hormuz).

2. The company remains committed to fleet renewal and to "well-priced, capital efficient" expansion.

3. It will keep pursuing cost reduction.

4. It has sufficient liquidity and credit facilities to meet its commitments.

Consensus

Not available.

Bull case

1. Earnings inflection is under way. Q2 2026 net profit of USD 5.3M came with TCE up 30% and opex down 20%. Annualised, the H1 2026 run-rate of ≈USD 19M of net profit implies a P/E near 4x on the current market cap of ≈USD 70M, if rates hold.

2. Asset backing. Book value per share is USD 3.48, roughly 5x the share price. Even a steep haircut to vessel values leaves material NAV upside.

3. The renewal programme transforms the fleet. Twelve eco-Ultramaxes against 18 owned vessels will roughly halve fleet age by 2030. Funding is largely pre-arranged through 55–70% bank debt and sale-and-leasebacks, and starts from near-zero gearing.

Bear case

1. Rates may mean-revert. "Back to Suez" and Hormuz normalisation risk could erase the 2026 TCE gains just as the fleet is at its smallest.

2. Capex commitments are heavy. With ≈USD 400M of newbuilds against USD 13.8M of cash (H1 2026), gearing will rise sharply by 2028. Any downturn in 2028–2030 would coincide with peak deliveries and the large 2027 refinancing wall.

3. Governance caps the multiple. Family control (≈56%), rising insider concentration, high CEO pay relative to the company's size, non-core investments (Shanghai property, FCNs) and discretionary dividends make a P/B re-rating structurally unlikely.

Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)

Analyst verdict

Jinhui Shipping and Transportation is a textbook deep-value, governance-discounted cyclical. The fundamentals are better than the valuation implies.

The FY2025 headline was dull: USD 12.5M of net profit was flattered by a USD 20.2M settlement and dragged down by USD 9.2M of disposal losses. Underneath, the business improved in 2026:

• H1 TCE rose about 30% to USD 17,150.

• Daily running costs fell to around USD 5,500.

• Depreciation dropped as expensive charter-ins rolled off.

• Q2 2026 net profit of USD 5.3M marked a clear turn from the prior-year loss.

The balance sheet entered the renewal cycle almost debt-free, at 1% gearing at FY2025. Yet the shares trade at about 0.19x book and under 2x EV/EBITDA.

The discount is not irrational. Capital allocation sits with a founding family that has run the business since 1987. That family has chosen to spend roughly USD 400M on Ultramax newbuilds delivering into a 2028–2030 window, when industry-wide Ultramax supply will also be rising. It has not prioritised buybacks or a fixed payout. Cash has fallen to USD 13.8M, with most liquidity held in marketable securities and FCNs, and floating-rate debt faces a concentrated 2027 maturity. Non-core write-downs, such as the Shanghai property stake marked to nil, reinforce investor scepticism about capital discipline.

On balance, Jinhui offers asymmetric upside for patient investors who believe in a firm dry bulk market through 2027. The newbuilds, financed largely with debt at currently low leverage, will lift both earnings power and fleet quality. The re-rating trigger, however, is more likely to come from capital-return policy than from freight rates. That trigger could be a higher payout, buybacks, or the family's continued accumulation culminating in a take-private.

Key monitorables are:

• the sustainability of TCE above about USD 15,000/day;

• the terms of the 2027 refinancing;

• the shape of net gearing as newbuild instalments accelerate.

Overall stance (analyst opinion, not investment advice): Value-positive, governance-constrained. Fundamentals are improving, and the discount is likely to persist without a change in capital-return policy.