Landrich Holding Limited Overview
Landrich Holding is a family-controlled Hong Kong civil engineering contractor with more than 31 years of operating history. It earns essentially all of its revenue from public-infrastructure-linked works in Hong Kong: roads and drainage, site formation and, to a lesser extent, building works. It acts as either main contractor or subcontractor, and in recent years much of its volume has come from subcontracting packages awarded by large tier-one contractors. That mix produces high revenue (HK$1.11 billion in FY2026) but very thin margins (4.9% gross, 1.1% net). The investment case rests on three features. First, the balance sheet holds net cash of about HK$274 million, larger than the company's entire market value. Second, the order book reached a record HK$3.33 billion across 28 projects at 31 March 2026, helped by Hong Kong's Northern Metropolis infrastructure pipeline. Third, profitability has been compressed for several years. Offsetting these are extreme customer concentration (71.4% of revenue from one client), no dividends since FY2021, and 75% insider control.
Company's own description (Annual Report FY2026)
The Annual Report describes the Company as an investment holding company. Through its subsidiaries, the Group mainly provides civil engineering works that fall into two broad categories: (i) roads and drainage works and (ii) site formation works. The Group also performs building works. It can take on civil engineering works as either a main contractor or a subcontractor, and it cites a track record of more than 31 years in the Hong Kong construction industry. For segment reporting, all revenue, results and assets come from one operating segment, the provision of construction engineering works services, and no geographical segment information is presented.
Independent characterisation
Landrich is best understood as a project-based, tender-driven, labour-intensive contracting business. Its economics follow from four structural features.
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Non-recurring revenue. Every contract is won through competitive tender or quotation. Revenue is recognised over time as work progresses, so the income statement follows the stage of completion of a portfolio of 27 to 31 live projects. The company's own risk disclosure names this non-recurring, tender-dependent nature as its first principal risk.
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Main contractor versus subcontractor mix drives margin. The FY2025 and FY2026 commentary links swings in gross margin directly to this mix. In FY2025, gross margin fell to 3.1% because extra direct staff costs were spent to accelerate certain subcontracting projects and because main-contracting jobs carried lower expected margins. In FY2026, margin recovered to 4.9% because the subcontracting projects in progress were priced at better margins.
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Cost structure dominated by labour and subcontracting. Staff costs of HK$246.8 million in FY2026 equalled about 22% of revenue (derived). Direct costs were 95.1% of revenue (derived from HK$1,054.3m ÷ HK$1,108.5m). Small changes in labour productivity or subcontractor pricing therefore swing profitability sharply.
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Customer base made up of tier-one contractors and government. The FY2023 chairman's statement says the Group's projects are mainly carried out in cooperation with leading construction contractors and Hong Kong government departments, and that progress payments are therefore considered stable and efficient. Concentration has risen steeply. The largest customer accounted for 71.4% of FY2026 revenue and the top five for 97.4%.
Revenue model mix
| Revenue type | Share | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| Product sales | 0% | — |
| Construction services (contract revenue) | ~100% | Revenue from construction contracts recognised over time |
| Subscription / licensing / recurring | 0% | — |
| Investment income (fair-value gains/losses) | Reported below gross profit in "other income, other gains and losses" | FY2026: fair-value loss of HK$8.8m on financial assets at FVTPL; FY2025: gain of HK$9.6m |
Value-chain position
Landrich sits in the execution layer of the Hong Kong public-works value chain:
Project owners / employers: HKSAR Government works departments (for example Civil Engineering and Development Department, Drainage Services Department, Highways Department), statutory bodies and private developers.
Main contractors: large local and mainland-backed contractors. Landrich itself acts as main contractor on smaller and mid-sized public works.
Subcontractors (Landrich's most common role recently): civil packages under tier-one main contracts.
Sub-subcontractors and suppliers: Landrich's five largest subcontractors accounted for 25.8% of direct costs in FY2026 and its five largest suppliers for 36.6%.
End-markets served
| End-market | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Public infrastructure: roads, drainage, river training | Core declared activity. Prospectus-era main-contract projects included Kwu Tung North, Tsui Ping River and Kwun Tong (AR FY2023 use-of-proceeds table) |
| Land development: site formation | Core declared activity; linked to New Development Areas and the Northern Metropolis |
| Building works | Secondary activity; no revenue split disclosed |
Strategy
Stated strategy (AR FY2026 Chairman's Statement and MD&A, paraphrased themes)
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Ride the policy-driven infrastructure cycle. Management identifies the Northern Metropolis and livelihood-related civil engineering projects as the core growth driver and intends to follow policy direction and target public works and infrastructure expansion.
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Prudent, risk-based tendering. Given intense competition and volatile material and labour costs, the Group will tender selectively rather than chase volume. This is an implicit admission of the FY2024 and FY2025 margin problems.
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Operational efficiency and cost control. Improve resource allocation, professional management systems and cost discipline.
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Two formal strategic bullets: continue to optimise the development strategy for the construction business, and actively take part in tendering to consolidate market position.
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Operational playbook (unchanged since FY2023): monitor project progress and communicate with suppliers and subcontractors; keep close contact with customers and project-owner representatives; follow up tenders and quotations actively; and apply cost control measures.
Initiatives in the last 24 months (Oct 2024 to Oct 2026)
| Date | Initiative | Type | Detail / target | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | Leasehold land addition (HK$3.5m) | Asset base | Purpose not disclosed | Completed |
| FY2025 (agreement 3 May 2024) | One Midtown property purchase (HK$6.11m) | Cost programme | Rationale: secure premises, save rent, capture appreciation, limit rent increases | Completed |
| 24 Jun 2025 | Janis Tsui appointed to Nomination Committee | Governance | — | Completed |
| 14 Aug 2025 | Workforce Diversity Policy | ESG / HR | Non-discrimination, equal opportunity; no numeric targets | Adopted |
| 21 Nov 2025 | Investment Committee established | Treasury / capital allocation | Mandate covers listed securities and bonds, and virtual assets; may approve non-notifiable investments | Active |
| FY2026 | Record order-book build to HK$3,325.7m | Commercial | 28 projects | Achieved |
| 2,025 | CEO admitted as FICE; CEO Vice Chairman of HKCA Environmental Committee | Industry positioning | — | — |
Medium-term targets and guidance
None publicly disclosed. Landrich issues no numeric revenue, margin, order-intake or dividend guidance. The only forward statement is qualitative: with the projects on hand, management expects performance to remain steady in the coming years (AR FY2026 MD&A).
IPO business-plan delivery (prospectus vs. actual, AR FY2023)
| Use of proceeds | Planned (HKD Mn) | Used by 31 Mar 2023 (HKD Mn) | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Finance existing main-contractor projects (Kwu Tung North, Tsui Ping River, Kwun Tong) | 23.2 | 23.2 | Fully used |
| Acquire machinery and equipment | 17.9 | 17.9 | Fully used |
| Strengthen manpower | 11.4 | 11.4 | Fully used |
| Upgrade enterprise information system | 2.4 | 0.9 | HK$1.5m remaining; expected to be used by 31 Mar 2024 |
| BIM / innovation and productivity | 0.9 | 0.9 | Fully used |
| General working capital | 2.0 | 2.0 | Fully used |
| Total net proceeds | 57.8 | 56.3 | 97% used by FY2023 |
Products & Services
Landrich sells no products, owns no brands or platforms, and publishes no price lists. Its offering is a set of construction capabilities, each delivered under bespoke tendered contracts. The catalogue below is the most granular breakdown the disclosures allow.
Gaps. Contract-level revenue, the number of active main contracts versus subcontracts, the client roster and Works Bureau registration categories are not disclosed in the annual reports reviewed.
Product Portfolio
| Service line | Description and capabilities | Target customer | Delivery role | Pricing model | Named flagship work |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Roads works | Construction, widening and improvement of public roads; associated utilities and road furniture | HKSAR works departments; tier-one main contractors | Main contractor or subcontractor | Tendered lump-sum / remeasurement contracts (typical for HK public works; specific terms not disclosed) | Kwun Tong civil engineering project (prospectus-era main contract, AR FY2023) |
Drainage works | Stormwater drains, sewers, box culverts, river and nullah improvement | Drainage Services Department and other works departments; main contractors | Main or subcontractor | Tendered | Tsui Ping River project (prospectus-era main contract, AR FY2023) |
Site formation works | Earthworks, excavation, slope works, formation of development platforms | CEDD (New Development Areas), developers, main contractors | Main or subcontractor | Tendered | Kwu Tung North civil engineering project (prospectus-era main contract, AR FY2023); Kwu Tung North is a core Northern Metropolis New Development Area |
Building works | Ancillary building construction | — | — | Tendered | — |
Plant and equipment deployment | Owned fleet including truck-mounted concrete pumps, mobile cranes, excavators, crane lorries and a dumper bought with IPO proceeds | Internal use on projects | Enabler | — | Two excavators and a dumper bought FY2023 (AR FY2023) |
Digital construction capability | Building Information Modelling (BIM) adopted with IPO proceeds (HK$0.9m); cloud storage applied | Internal / client requirement on public works | Enabler | — | BIM adoption fully funded (AR FY2023) |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Financial Narrative
Income statement
Sources: ARs FY2022 to FY2026; FY2022 results announcement (PBT HK$48,606k, net HK$41,230k); TipRanks (FY2023 net HK$32,791k; FY2024 net HK$26,149k); Longbridge (FY2026 PBT HK$14.517m, EPS HK$0.79 cents). FY2023 to FY2025 PBT derived as net profit plus tax. EPS for FY2022 to FY2025 derived from net profit ÷ about 1.58 billion weighted shares (1.6 billion less trust-held award shares). Company-reported EPS for those years was not captured. Finance costs are implied by the gap between derived operating profit and PBT, roughly HK$0.4m to HK$1.7m a year.
Non-chartable items: EBITDA, depreciation and amortisation, and diluted EPS were not captured in the sources reviewed. Diluted EPS is very likely equal to basic, since no options are outstanding (AR FY2026).
Reference year FY2021: revenue HK$634.4m, gross profit HK$67.4m (10.6% margin), PBT HK$57.0m, net profit HK$47.9m (AR FY2021; FY2022 results announcement). A final dividend was declared for FY2021, the only cash dividend since listing. Per-share amount not captured.
Margin profile (%)
Revenue CAGR: FY2021 to FY2026 (five years) about 11.8% a year (derived: HK$634.4m to HK$1,108.5m). FY2022 to FY2026 (four years) about 2.8% a year (derived).
Commentary on the income statement.
Volume versus value: FY2022 to FY2024 was a volume boom. Revenue more than doubled from FY2021 to a peak of HK$1.37 billion in FY2024. Gross profit did not follow, and was roughly flat in absolute terms (HK$67m to HK$87m to HK$81m) while margins halved from 10.6% to 5.9%. Management repeatedly blamed rising construction costs and "increasing works from several projects, which are expected to have lower gross profit margins" (AR FY2023). The company took on large, competitively priced packages, mostly as subcontractor, to keep its workforce and plant busy.
FY2025 trough: Gross margin collapsed to 3.1%, the lowest in the Group's listed history. The company gave two causes: extra direct staff costs to speed up certain subcontracting projects, and lower-margin main contracts. Staff costs rose 13% to HK$242.3m while revenue fell 6.3%. That combination signals overtime or acceleration costs that were probably not fully recoverable from clients.
FY2026 partial recovery: Revenue fell 13.5% as several large subcontract packages neared completion, but gross profit rose 35.8% to HK$54.3m and margin to 4.9%. Net profit still fell, to HK$12.4m. The reason is a HK$21.3m swing in "other income, gains and losses", from a HK$15.3m gain to a HK$6.0m loss, driven by an HK$8.8m fair-value loss on financial assets at FVTPL (the unlisted fund held through joint operations) against a HK$9.6m gain the year before. Excluding fair-value movements, core pre-tax profit improved materially in FY2026. An approximate derived measure: FY2026 PBT HK$14.5m + FV loss HK$8.8m = HK$23.3m, versus FY2025 HK$18.7m − FV gain HK$9.6m = HK$9.1m.
Investment volatility as an earnings driver: Fair-value swings of HK$9m to HK$14m a year (FY2024 loss HK$14.1m; FY2025 gain HK$9.6m; FY2026 loss HK$8.8m) are now as large as the Group's entire net profit. Combined with the November 2025 creation of an Investment Committee whose remit includes virtual assets, this is a material change in earnings quality.
Balance sheet
Sources: ARs FY2023, FY2025, FY2026; FY2022 results announcement (FVTPL HK$232k at 31 Mar 2022). FY2023 fund fair value not captured; the FY2023 entry of 0 is a placeholder for "not captured", not a confirmed nil. Debt is entirely HK$-denominated. The split between bank overdrafts and term loans was not fully captured; FY2026 management attributes the increase in debt to higher overdrafts.
Not captured in sources reviewed: total assets, goodwill and intangibles, contract assets, trade receivables and the short/long-term debt split.
Commentary. The balance sheet is the strongest part of the Landrich story. Net cash has nearly tripled since FY2022 to HK$274.4m, equal to about 80% of shareholders' equity and more than the company's market value. Equity has compounded at about 7% a year (derived) because all profits have been retained since FY2022. Bank debt is minimal and mostly overdraft-based, which is normal for HK contractors managing progress-payment timing. One caution: distributable reserves at the holding-company level have stayed fixed at HK$74.0m since FY2023. Most retained earnings therefore sit in operating subsidiaries, so a large dividend would require upstreaming cash. That is feasible but not automatic.
Cash flow
Notes: FY2022 dividends paid refer to the FY2021 final dividend paid during FY2022. Amount not captured, so 0 is a placeholder for "not captured". FY2022 change in net cash not derivable without FY2021 balances. Trustee purchase of 24m shares for about HK$6.0m in FY2023 (AR FY2023).
Operating cash flow and free cash flow: not captured in sources reviewed (consolidated cash flow statement, pages 88 to 89 of AR FY2026). A proxy is the derived change in net cash. In FY2025 and FY2026, net cash rose by HK$93.5m and HK$69.1m against net profit of only HK$13.3m and HK$12.4m. This strongly suggests large working-capital releases (collection of contract assets and receivables, retention releases) as big projects completed. Stockopedia showed a trailing price-to-free-cash-flow of about 2.4x, which is consistent with exceptional recent cash generation. Unaudited aggregator data; treat with caution.
Ratios
FY2022 average-equity ROE is shown as 0 because FY2021 closing equity was not captured; read it as "not calculated".
Not calculable from captured data: ROA, ROIC, current ratio, net debt/EBITDA, interest coverage on a reported basis, asset turnover and cash conversion cycle. These need total assets, current liabilities, D&A and receivable/payable days. Interest coverage is clearly very high, since finance costs are roughly HK$0.4m to HK$1.7m against operating profit of HK$15m to HK$50m (derived). The company is in a net-cash position, so leverage ratios are not meaningful.
Trend synthesis. ROE has fallen from about 16% to under 4% in four years. Two forces drive this: margin compression, and a growing cash pile that earns little. Cash and the investment fund make up most of equity, and cash returns are low. Even with the operating recovery in FY2026, the business earns well below its cost of equity. That is the core reason the shares trade at about 0.65x book.
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Revenue by Segment and Segment Margins & Growth (%)
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Construction engineering revenue (HKD Mn) | 994.2 | 956.5 | 1,366.9 | 1,281.1 | 1,108.5 |
Segment gross profit (HKD Mn) | 86.8 | 71.6 | 81.1 | 40.0 | 54.3 |
Segment gross margin (%) | 8.7 | 7.5 | 5.9 | 3.1 | 4.9 |
Revenue YoY growth (%) | 56.7 | -3.8 | 42.9 | -6.3 | -13.5 |
Contribution to group revenue (%) | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
Work Type Details
| Work type | Description | Revenue disclosed? |
|---|---|---|
Roads and drainage works | Road construction and improvement, drainage and sewerage pipelines, culverts, river training | Not publicly disclosed in the annual reports reviewed |
Site formation works | Excavation, earthworks, slope and ground preparation for development | — |
Building works | Ancillary building construction | — |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Group Entities
| Entity | Role | Director oversight |
|---|---|---|
Landrich Holding Limited (Cayman) | Listed investment holding company | Full Board |
Richwell Engineering Limited (HK) | Original 1993 operating company | KK Tsui |
Richwell Civil Engineering Limited (HK) | Civil engineering contracting | KK Tsui, Ian Tsui |
Time Concept Construction Limited (HK) | Construction contracting; property owner (One Midtown); defendant in Nam Kwong claim | KK Tsui, Janis Tsui |
Joint operations (unnamed) | Project joint operations; held an unlisted fund investment outside Hong Kong (fair value HK$14.0m at 31 Mar 2026) | — |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Operating Metrics (count) and Revenue by Segment
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Projects on hand at year end (count) | 30 | 31 | 27 | 27 | 28 |
Outstanding contract value at year end (HKD Mn) | 2,004.5 | 1,657.0 | 1,343.0 | 2,345.1 | 3,325.7 |
Order book ÷ that year's revenue (x, derived) | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 3.0 |
Income Statement and Per-Share Data
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (HKD Mn) | 994.2 | 956.5 | 1,366.9 | 1,281.1 | 1,108.5 |
Direct costs (HKD Mn) | 907.5 | 884.9 | 1,285.9 | 1,241.1 | 1,054.3 |
Gross profit (HKD Mn) | 86.8 | 71.6 | 81.1 | 40.0 | 54.3 |
Other income, gains and losses (HKD Mn) | 0.9 | 7.7 | -11.4 | 15.3 | -6.0 |
Administrative and other operating expenses (HKD Mn) | 38.2 | 39.2 | 34.7 | 35.9 | 33.4 |
Operating profit, derived = GP + other − admin (HKD Mn) | 49.5 | 40.1 | 35.0 | 19.4 | 14.9 |
Profit before tax (HKD Mn) | 48.6 | 38.4 | 33.7 | 18.7 | 14.5 |
Income tax (HKD Mn) | 7.4 | 5.6 | 7.6 | 5.4 | 2.1 |
Net profit (HKD Mn) | 41.2 | 32.8 | 26.1 | 13.3 | 12.4 |
Basic EPS (HK cents) | 2.6 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 0.79 |
Dividend per share declared for the year (HK cents) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Gross margin (%) | 8.7 | 7.5 | 5.9 | 3.1 | 4.9 |
Operating margin, derived (%) | 5.0 | 4.2 | 2.6 | 1.5 | 1.3 |
Pre-tax margin (%) | 4.9 | 4.0 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 1.3 |
Net margin (%) | 4.1 | 3.4 | 1.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Effective tax rate, derived (%) | 15.2 | 14.6 | 22.6 | 28.9 | 14.5 |
Staff costs as % of revenue, derived (%) | 18.8 | 18.9 | 15.7 | 18.9 | 22.3 |
Balance Sheet
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Bank balances and cash (HKD Mn) | 122.8 | 160.1 | 131.4 | 215.0 | 291.0 |
Pledged bank deposits (HKD Mn) | 21.4 | 3.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Total debt: bank loans and overdrafts (HKD Mn) | 27.9 | 28.0 | 19.6 | 9.7 | 16.6 |
Lease liabilities (HKD Mn) | 4.4 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 1.7 | 0.1 |
Net cash, derived = cash − bank debt (HKD Mn) | 94.9 | 132.1 | 111.8 | 205.3 | 274.4 |
Net current assets / working capital (HKD Mn) | 231.3 | 264.1 | 297.8 | 311.7 | 329.2 |
Total equity attributable to owners (HKD Mn) | 260.2 | 288.7 | 315.0 | 328.4 | 340.8 |
Unlisted investment fund at fair value (HKD Mn) | 0.2 | 0 | 13.7 | 23.1 | 14.0 |
Distributable reserves of the Company (HKD Mn) | 74.3 | 74.0 | 74.0 | 74.0 | 74.0 |
Cash Flow
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Capex: PP&E additions (HKD Mn) | 7.7 | 4.0 | 1.6 | 5.3 | 0.5 |
Right-of-use additions: motor vehicles (HKD Mn) | 6.9 | 3.0 | 5.2 | 1.2 | 0 |
Right-of-use additions: leasehold land (HKD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3.5 | 0 |
Dividends paid (HKD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Share buybacks via award-scheme trustee (HKD Mn) | 0 | 6.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Change in net cash, derived (HKD Mn) | 0 | 37.2 | -20.3 | 93.5 | 69.1 |
Margin Analysis (%) and Financial Ratios (x)
| Ratio | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ROE on closing equity, derived (%) | 15.8 | 11.4 | 8.3 | 4.0 | 3.6 |
ROE on average equity, derived (%) | 0 | 11.9 | 8.6 | 4.1 | 3.7 |
Gearing: bank debt ÷ equity, company-reported (%) | 10.7 | 9.7 | 6.2 | 2.9 | 4.9 |
Net cash ÷ equity, derived (%) | 36.5 | 45.8 | 35.5 | 62.5 | 80.5 |
Revenue ÷ closing equity, derived (x) | 3.8 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 3.9 | 3.3 |
Revenue per employee, derived (HKD Mn) | 2.76 | 2.69 | 3.32 | 3.52 | 3.23 |
Net profit per employee, derived (HKD K) | 114 | 92 | 63 | 37 | 36 |
Revenue by Region and Revenue by Region (%)
| Region | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Hong Kong revenue (HKD Mn) | 994.2 | 956.5 | 1,366.9 | 1,281.1 | 1,108.5 |
Hong Kong share of revenue (%) | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
Hong Kong revenue growth (%) | 56.7 | -3.8 | 42.9 | -6.3 | -13.5 |
Segment / Geography Details
| Segment / Geography | Hong Kong | Mainland China | Rest of world |
|---|---|---|---|
Construction engineering works | 100% of revenue | 0% | 0% |
Revenue by Region (%) and Revenue by Region
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Largest customer share of revenue (%) | 26.5 | 35.9 | 39.0 | 52.3 | 71.4 |
Top 5 customers share of revenue (%) | 88.0 | 78.4 | 88.2 | 93.0 | 97.4 |
Largest customer revenue, derived (HKD Mn) | 263.5 | 343.4 | 533.1 | 670.0 | 791.5 |
Largest supplier share of direct costs (%) | 8.5 | 2.1 | 7.0 | 9.7 | 9.8 |
Top 5 suppliers share of direct costs (%) | 16.4 | 9.2 | 18.1 | 17.6 | 36.6 |
Largest subcontractor share of direct costs (%) | 5.2 | 6.8 | 5.1 | 4.2 | 10.6 |
Top 5 subcontractors share of direct costs (%) | 20.8 | 18.9 | 18.6 | 15.9 | 25.8 |
Valuation Snapshot
| Metric | Value | Source / date |
|---|---|---|
Shares outstanding | 1,600,000,000 | AR FY2026 |
Latest captured share price | About HK$0.13 to HK$0.14 | Stockopedia (HK$0.14); Google Finance (HK$0.14, 5 Jun, year inferred as 2026) |
Market capitalisation | About HK$214m to HK$227m | Google Finance / Stockopedia |
52-week range (aggregators) | HK$0.08 to HK$0.28 | TipRanks |
Average daily volume | About 166,000 shares | Google Finance |
12-month price change | About −19% | Stockopedia |
Analyst coverage | 0 analysts | Simply Wall St |
Share Price
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Closing price at award grant / weighted vesting price (HKD) | 0.242 | 0.420 | 0.186 | 0.091 |
Valuation Multiples
| Multiple | Landrich | Basis |
|---|---|---|
Market cap | HK$224m | 1.6bn × HK$0.14 |
Enterprise value | About −HK$50m (negative) | Market cap − net cash HK$274.4m |
P/E (FY2026) | About 18.1x | HK$224m ÷ HK$12.4m |
P/E ex-FV loss (FY2026, approximate) | About 11x | Adds back the HK$8.8m FV loss, tax-unadjusted |
P/B | About 0.66x | ÷ equity HK$340.8m (Stockopedia: 0.69x) |
P/S | About 0.20x | ÷ revenue HK$1,108.5m (Stockopedia: 0.21x) |
EV/EBITDA, EV/Sales | Not meaningful (negative EV) | — |
Dividend yield | 0% | No dividend |
Dividend History
| Fiscal year | Dividend |
|---|---|
FY2021 | Final cash dividend declared, the first since listing (per-share amount not captured) |
Capital Markets
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
Buyback authorisation | The only on-market purchase was 24m shares by the award trustee in FY2023 (about HK$6.0m) |
Credit ratings (Moody's / S&P / Fitch) | Not rated |
Debt maturity profile | Bank debt HK$16.6m (mainly overdrafts, repayable on demand or short term); lease liabilities HK$0.1m; no bonds |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance
The only guidance is qualitative: with its projects on hand, the Group expects performance to remain steady in coming years. It will pursue Northern Metropolis and livelihood-related public works while tendering prudently and controlling costs (AR FY2026). No numeric targets are given.
Consensus
No analyst coverage, so no consensus exists.
Bull case
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Backlog conversion. A record HK$3.33bn order book (about 3.0x FY2026 revenue) points to revenue rebounding toward or above the FY2024 peak of HK$1.37bn over FY2027 and FY2028. With gross margins already back to 4.9% and admin costs flat at about HK$33m to HK$36m, operating leverage could lift core pre-tax profit sharply.
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Cash is worth more than the company. Net cash of HK$274.4m against a market cap of about HK$224m means the market values the operating business below zero. Any capital return, even partial (holding-company distributable reserves are HK$74m), or a privatisation by the 75% holder would crystallise value.
-
Margin trough is behind it. FY2025 (3.1% GP margin) looks like the low point caused by acceleration costs. FY2026's +35.8% gross-profit growth on 13.5% lower revenue shows pricing discipline is returning.
Bear case
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Concentration risk. 71.4% of revenue from one undisclosed customer leaves Landrich exposed to that party's procurement decisions, payment terms and project phasing. The larger order book may deepen this dependence rather than diversify it.
-
Value trap governance. Five years without a dividend while cash has more than doubled, a related-party property purchase, no internal audit function, and an Investment Committee empowered to buy virtual assets all suggest surplus cash may be deployed speculatively rather than returned. The 0.66x P/B reflects this.
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Structural margin squeeze and litigation. Rising HK labour costs, competitive tendering, and a HK$24.7m claim (about 2x annual profit, unprovided) could keep net margins near 1%, where ROE stays well below the cost of equity.
Key catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
| Timing | Catalyst / monitorable | What to watch |
|---|---|---|
| Late Nov 2026 | Interim results H1 FY2027 (six months to 30 Sep 2026) | Revenue run-rate against backlog; GP margin holding at or above 4.9%; FV movements |
| Ongoing | Nam Kwong litigation | Judgment, settlement or provision |
| Ongoing | Investment Committee activity | Any listed-securities or virtual-asset investment announcement |
| Ongoing | Customer concentration | Whether the top-customer share falls below 71.4% |
| Ongoing | Northern Metropolis tender awards | New contract wins (Landrich rarely announces individual awards) |
| Jun 2027 | FY2027 final results | Dividend resumption; order-book replenishment |
| Ongoing | Controlling shareholder actions | Any privatisation or general offer given the discount to cash |
Analyst verdict
Landrich Holding is a textbook Hong Kong small-cap contractor. The operating business is competent but low-return. The balance sheet is far stronger than the share price implies. Governance is the swing factor between those two.
On operations, the past four years have been difficult. Revenue grew strongly to FY2024 on large, thinly priced subcontract packages, and margins were sacrificed. The FY2025 gross margin of 3.1% marked the trough. FY2026 shows the start of repair: gross profit rose by more than a third on lower revenue, and the order book roughly doubled from its FY2024 low to a record HK$3.33 billion. If management carries out this backlog at FY2026-type margins, core earnings should rise over FY2027 and FY2028, helped by Northern Metropolis demand that looks structurally durable.
On the balance sheet, net cash of about HK$274 million exceeds the market capitalisation, so the shares trade at negative enterprise value and about two-thirds of book value. In most markets that combination attracts activists. Here it cannot, because the founder owns 75% and the float is held at the legal minimum.
Governance is therefore what decides the investment case. The controlling family has not paid a dividend for five years. It bought a property from the Chairman's own company, has not built an internal audit function, and in November 2025 created an Investment Committee whose remit explicitly includes virtual assets. Investment fair-value swings already rival total profit. Customer concentration of 71.4% adds a further single-point-of-failure risk that the market is right to discount.
Verdict: Landrich is statistically cheap but carries real governance and concentration risk, so it fits as a special-situation holding rather than a quality compounder. Its re-rating depends on three things: visible capital returns, provisioning clarity on the Nam Kwong claim, and evidence that the record backlog converts at margins of 5% or better. Until at least one occurs, the deep discount to net cash is likely to persist. Investors should size positions for illiquidity and treat a privatisation offer as an upside option, not a base case.
Source register
| Source | Use |
|---|---|
| Landrich Annual Report FY2026 (HKEXnews, 29 Jul 2026) | Primary: FY2026 financials, governance, strategy, litigation, ownership |
| Landrich Annual Report FY2025 (HKEXnews, 30 Jul 2025) | FY2024/FY2025 financials, connected transaction, customers |
| Landrich Annual Report FY2023 (HKEXnews, 28 Jul 2023) | FY2022/FY2023 financials, use of proceeds, senior management |
| Landrich Annual Reports FY2021 and FY2022 (HKEXnews) | FY2020 to FY2022 history |
| FY2022 final results announcement (HKEXnews, 24 Jun 2022) | FY2021/FY2022 income statement |
| Interim results H1 FY2023 (28 Nov 2022) and Interim Report H1 FY2024 (21 Dec 2023) | Interim figures |
| TipRanks; Simply Wall St; Stockopedia; Google Finance; Longbridge; Moomoo | Market data, aggregator news, peer list (unaudited) |
The analyst is not a licensed financial adviser.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Board of Directors
| Name | Role | Age (FY2026 AR) | Director since | Tenure (yrs, per AR) | Background and education | Committees |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Tsui Kai Kwong (徐繼光) | Chairman, Executive Director | 66 | 31 Jul 2018 (Chairman from 26 Oct 2018) | 7.7 | Founder (1993); over 40 years in civil engineering; Higher Certificate in Civil Engineering, Hong Kong Polytechnic (1987); Council Member, Hong Kong Construction Association | Remuneration (member), Nomination (member) |
Tsui Tsz Yeung Ian (徐子揚) | Chief Executive Officer, Executive Director | 43 | 31 Jul 2018 (CEO from 26 Oct 2018) | 7.7 | Joined Oct 2007; over 19 years in civil engineering; studied MSc Civil Engineering to penultimate year at Imperial College London (2002 to 2006); FICE (2025); Vice Chairman, HKCA Environmental Committee; son of the Chairman | Investment Committee (Chairman) |
Tsui Wai Yeung Janis (徐慧揚) | Executive Director | 46 | 31 Jul 2018 | 7.7 | Joined May 2013; over 12 years in construction administration and finance; BA Accounting & Finance and Economics, and PG Diploma Management Science, University of Kent; daughter of the Chairman | Nomination (from 24 Jun 2025) |
Lee Yan Kit (李殷傑) | INED | 55 | 21 Sep 2020 | 5.5 | Over 20 years in banking (BOCHK predecessor, Wing Hang, DBS, Standard Chartered, Dah Sing); independent director of Lixiang Education (NASDAQ: LXEH); former INED of C-Link Squared (1463); BA University of Manitoba; MSc Financial Management, University of London | Remuneration (Chair), Audit, Nomination |
Lee Kin Kee "Kevin" (李建基) | INED | 62 | 21 Sep 2020 | 5.5 | 38 years in finance; Price Waterhouse alumnus; financial controller roles in manufacturing; FCPA (HKICPA), FCCA; MBA University of Canberra | Audit (Chair), Remuneration, Nomination, Investment |
Kwong Ping Man (鄺炳文) | INED | 61 | 21 Sep 2020 | 5.5 | Over 29 years in accounting and corporate secretarial work; MD of O'Park Corporate Services; INED of Tang Palace (China) (1181); formerly INED of Royal Deluxe (3789, to Jan 2026), Rare Earth Magnesium (601, to Jun 2024) and others; FCPA, CPA (Aust.) | Nomination (Chair), Audit, Remuneration, Investment |
Board of Directors — Law Kwong Shun
| Name | Title | Age | Joined | Background |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Law Kwong Shun (羅廣信) | Commercial Director | 61 | Jun 2006 | Over 30 years in tendering and commercial management; BSc Construction Management (Wolverhampton); MCIOB |
Wong Kin Biu (黃健標) | Operation Director | 57 | Jun 2006 | Over 30 years supervising major civil engineering sites |
Tsui Ying Yin (徐英賢) | Financial Director (listed in AR FY2023) | 38 (FY2023) | May 2008 | Chairman's nephew; BA Accounting & Finance (Lancaster); BSc Surveying (PolyU). No longer listed in AR FY2025/FY2026; departure date and reason not disclosed in the reports reviewed |
Ng Hoi Ying (吳愷盈) | Company Secretary (outsourced) | 39 | Oct 2018 | HKICPA; ex-Deloitte |
Directors' Remuneration
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
Individual director emoluments | In Note 10 of each annual report; not captured in sources reviewed |
Senior management bands FY2026 | 1 person in HK$1.5m to HK$2.0m; 1 person in HK$2.0m to HK$2.5m |
Senior management bands FY2025 | 2 people in HK$1.5m to HK$2.0m; 1 person in HK$2.5m to HK$3.0m |
Senior management bands FY2023 | 1 each in HK$1.0m to HK$1.5m, HK$1.5m to HK$2.0m and HK$2.0m to HK$2.5m |
Share options | Scheme adopted 21 Sep 2020; 160,000,000 options available (10% of issued shares); none ever granted; about three years of scheme life remaining |
Share awards | Scheme adopted 22 Nov 2021; 8.56m shares granted 24 Jun 2022 to 72 grantees at nil cost with no performance targets; fully vested or lapsed by 31 Jul 2025; no unvested awards remaining at 31 Mar 2026 |
Remuneration structure | Fixed base salary plus discretionary bonus; Remuneration Committee sets executive packages (CG Code E.1.2(c)(ii) model) |
Directors' Remuneration by Dimension
| Dimension | Status |
|---|---|
Board size | 6 (3 executive, 3 INED) |
Independence | 50% independent, above the one-third Listing Rules minimum |
Chair / CEO separation | Formally separate (father as Chairman, son as CEO), but both are from the controlling family |
Gender diversity | 1 of 6 directors female (17%); senior management 100% male; workforce male-to-female ratio about 4.2:1 excluding senior management |
Age profile | Under 51: 33%; 51 to 60: 17%; 61 to 70: 50% |
Committees | Audit (all INED), Remuneration (INED chair), Nomination (INED chair), Investment (established 21 Nov 2025, executive chair) |
CG Code compliance | Full compliance claimed for FY2026, but no internal audit function has been set up (code provision D.2.5); an external consultant performs internal control reviews instead |
FY2026 meeting attendance | 5/5 Board meetings for all directors |
Auditor fees FY2026 | HK$750k audit plus HK$30k tax = HK$780k (FY2025: HK$863k) |
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Shares | % | Nature |
|---|---|---|---|
New Brilliance Enterprises Limited (100% owned by Tsui Kai Kwong) | 1,200,000,000 | 75.0 | Beneficial owner |
Tsui Kai Kwong | 1,200,000,000 (deemed) | 75.0 | Interest of controlled corporation |
Wong Cheuk Mui (Chairman's spouse) | 1,200,000,000 (deemed) | 75.0 | Interest of spouse |
Public float | 400,000,000 | 25.0 | At the Listing Rules minimum |
Institutional holders (top 10) | Not publicly disclosed; no other holder at or above 5% reported. TipRanks reports no hedge-fund holders | — | — |
Treasury shares | None at 31 Mar 2026 | — | — |
Competitive Landscape
Key Competitors
| # | Competitor | Ticker | Segment overlap | Relative positioning vs. Landrich |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Build King Holdings | 240.HK | Civil engineering main contracts (roads, drainage, site formation, marine) | Much larger tier-one main contractor; potential customer as well as competitor |
| 2 | Asia Allied Infrastructure (Chun Wo) | 711.HK | Civil engineering, roads, drainage, site formation | Much larger; tier-one |
| 3 | China State Construction International | 3311.HK | All public works | Dominant HK contractor; likely source of subcontract work for the sector |
| 4 | Kwan On Holdings | 1559.HK | Roads, drainage, waterworks | Direct tier-two peer |
| 5 | Chuan Holdings | 1420.HK | Site formation, excavation and lateral support | Direct peer; TipRanks shows market cap about HK$224m and P/E about 3.2x (aggregator, undated) |
| 6 | Geotech Holdings | 1707.HK | Slope works, site formation, geotechnical | Direct peer; TipRanks market cap about HK$92m |
| 7 | Affluent Foundation Holdings | 1757.HK | Foundation works | Adjacent (foundations); TipRanks market cap about HK$510m |
| 8 | Jujiang Construction Group (H) | 1459.HK | General construction | Different end-market (mainland-linked); listed as a "similar stock" by TipRanks |
| 9 | Chi Ho Development | 8423.HK | Civil and building works | Small-cap peer |
| 10 | WMCH Global Investment | 8208.HK | Civil engineering consultancy and works | Small-cap peer |
Peer Comparison FY2026
| Metric | Landrich (FY2026) | Peer 2: Chuan Holdings |
|---|---|---|
Revenue | HK$1,108.5m | — |
Revenue growth | −13.5% | — |
Gross margin | 4.9% | — |
Net margin | 1.1% | — |
R&D intensity | 0% reported | — |
Net cash / (debt) | +HK$274.4m | — |
P/E (aggregator) | ~18x (derived at HK$0.14) | ~3.2x (TipRanks) |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Competitive Advantages & Vulnerabilities
| Advantages | Evidence |
|---|---|
Over 31 years of track record and established tier-one relationships | Founded 1993; top-5 customers 97.4% of revenue |
Strong net cash for bonding and tender capacity | HK$274.4m net cash; gearing 4.9% |
Experienced, stable operating management | Commercial and Operation Directors have served since 2006 |
Record order book providing visibility | HK$3.33bn, about 3.0x revenue |
Vulnerabilities | Evidence |
Pricing power is minimal; margins are thin and volatile | GP margin swung from 8.7% to 3.1% to 4.9% |
Dependence on one customer | 71.4% of revenue |
No differentiation in technology or IP | No R&D or patents |
Labour-cost exposure in a tight HK labour market | Staff costs 22.3% of revenue; FY2025 acceleration-cost overrun |
Recent Developments
Landrich is a low-disclosure micro-cap.
Headcount fell from 364 to 343 during FY2026 (−5.8%). Results for the six months to 30 Sep 2026 are due around late November 2026.*



