Liberty Media Corp Overview
Positioning statement (150 words). Liberty Media Corporation is now a concentrated owner-operator of two of the world's three or four genuinely global, calendar-anchored motorsport franchises: the FIA Formula One World Championship and the FIM MotoGP World Championship. It does not own teams, employ drivers or riders, or build cars; it owns the commercial rights, and it monetises them through three contracted, largely prepaid revenue streams — race promotion fees, media rights and sponsorship — supplemented by hospitality, freight and licensing. The economic architecture is exceptionally durable: F1's commercial rights run to 2110 under the 100-Year Agreements; MotoGP's run to 2060 under the FIM Agreement. Team participation is locked to 2030 (F1's 2026 Concorde Agreement) and to 2031 (MotoGP's manufacturer and team agreements signed in 2026). The result is a high-margin, low-capital-intensity, inflation-escalating annuity with optionality on global fan growth — wrapped in a Malone-legacy control structure and a management culture built around opportunistic capital allocation.
2.1 The company's own description
The FY2025 Form 10-K opens Item 1 with the following characterisation: Liberty Media, through its subsidiaries, is primarily engaged in the motorsport and live entertainment industries with events held worldwide and operations primarily headquartered in the United Kingdom and Spain; its most significant subsidiaries are Delta Topco Limited (the parent company of Formula 1) and MotoGP Sports Entertainment Group, S.L. (formerly Dorna Sports, S.L.). The 2026 proxy statement adds that following the December 2025 Liberty Live split-off the company no longer has a tracking-stock structure.
2.2 Independent characterisation
Liberty Media is best understood not as a media company but as a sports commercial-rights annuity with two operating vehicles and a holding-company overlay.
What it actually sells. In both F1 and MotoGP the product sold is access — access for a city or circuit to stage a round of a world championship (race promotion), access for a broadcaster to distribute the live feed in a territory and language (media rights), and access for a brand to attach itself to the property (sponsorship). None of these are consumer transactions; all are business-to-business contracts, typically three to seven years for race promotion, three to five years for media rights, and one to five years for sponsorship, with payment in advance and contractual annual escalators tied to CPI or fixed percentages of up to 5% per year.
Revenue model mix (FY2025). For Formula 1: race promotion 26.7%, media rights 31.3%, sponsorship 21.7%, other (hospitality, freight, licensing, F2/F3, F1 Academy, Grand Prix Plaza) 20.3%. For MotoGP: media rights 41.2%, race promotion 33.7%, sponsorship 12.7%, other (WorldSBK, hospitality, licensing) 12.4%. There is effectively no "product" revenue in the manufacturing sense; the business is a licensing and services model with an embedded live-events operation.
Value-chain position. Liberty sits between the sanctioning bodies (FIA, FIM) that own and regulate the championships, and the demand side (promoters, broadcasters, sponsors, fans). It is the exclusive commercial intermediary. Critically, it is not a pass-through: under F1's Concorde Agreement a fixed percentage of Prize Fund Adjusted EBIT flows to the teams, meaning Liberty retains operating leverage on incremental revenue above that share. Team payments as a percentage of pre-team-payment Adjusted OIBDA fell from 66% (2022) to 62.6% (2023) to 61.5% (2024) to 59.7% (2025) — the single most important margin variable in the F1 P&L.
Customer types. Governments and quasi-governmental agencies (a substantial proportion of race promotion and some media contracts are directly or indirectly with, or guaranteed by, state bodies — a credit-risk disclosure in the 10-K); circuit owners and national automobile/motorcycle federations; global broadcasters and streaming platforms; global and regional brand sponsors; and, for hospitality and the self-promoted Las Vegas Grand Prix, individual consumers and corporates.
End-markets served. Global sports media rights; live sports events and premium hospitality; brand sponsorship and experiential marketing; sports licensing and merchandising; and — increasingly — destination entertainment (Grand Prix Plaza, Las Vegas) and premium travel experiences.
Structural distinguishing feature. Both businesses are seasonal and calendar-driven: revenue and cost are recognised proportionately to races held. This makes quarterly comparisons close to meaningless in isolation and is the direct cause of the optically alarming H1 2026 declines (see Sections 6 and 14). It also creates working-capital dynamics that are the inverse of a normal industrial: deferred revenue swelled from $263m at 31 December 2025 to $1,117m at 30 June 2026 as the season's prepayments landed.
Strategy
10.1 Stated corporate strategy — verbatim themes
The 2026 proxy statement sets out five "Defining Attributes" that function as Liberty's articulated operating philosophy:
- Forward-looking: invest in premium sports and live entertainment businesses with significant growth potential and provide strategic support to their management teams.
- Nimble: maintain a lean corporate structure enabling decisive action, creative transaction structuring and opportunistic capital deployment.
- Financially sophisticated: deep experience in complex transactions, capital markets execution and disciplined capital allocation across global operating platforms.
- Long-term focused: steward premium global franchises with a multi-year strategic lens, investing for sustained growth rather than reacting to short-term market volatility.
- Stockholder centric: think like owners, with leadership aligned through meaningful equity ownership and performance-based compensation.
Derek Chang's stated 2026 priorities (February 2026 results release): "sustaining F1's momentum, positioning MotoGP for future growth and remaining disciplined yet opportunistic with our capital to drive shareholder value." In August 2026 he added: "Disciplined capital allocation remains a core priority as we evaluate strategic investment opportunities to enhance long-term shareholder value."
10.2 Formula 1's operating strategy (as stated in the 10-K)
Maximise the value of commercial rights by (i) leveraging demand and competitive tension for event slots to protect the quality and value of every race slot; (ii) maximising media rights across markets including through collaboration with new distribution partners; (iii) growing sponsorship by optimising physical, virtual and experiential assets; (iv) evolving hospitality with best-in-class Paddock Club experiences plus new premium offerings; and (v) deepening fan engagement through licensing with globally beloved brands. Additionally: augment the fanbase and enhance access to monetisable fan data; improve on-track competition and enhance participating team value; and deliver Net Zero by 2030.
10.3 MotoGP's operating strategy (as stated in the 10-K)
Grow MotoGP in markets where it is not traditionally present and expand cultural relevance through better storytelling; maximise commercial rights value by leveraging improved brand awareness across media rights, race slot competition and sponsorship; transform races through enhanced onsite fan experience, elevated production standards and stronger circuit collaboration; innovate to maintain competitive balance and safety; cultivate a sustainable athlete pipeline that diversifies riders beyond Spain and Italy; and enhance environmental and social impact.
10.4 Announced strategic initiatives, last 24 months
10.5 Sustainability and ESG commitments
Formula 1 targets Net Zero by 2030, defined as a minimum 50% absolute carbon emissions reduction versus a 2018 baseline before credible offsets. The F1 Engineering Scholarship Program has supported 50 students at UK and Italian universities since 2021, with discussions to extend beyond the 2028/29 academic year. F1 Academy, launched 2023, featured at seven events in 2025. MotoGP's Road to MotoGP programme provides development pathways for young riders.
10.6 Management's medium-term financial targets
Liberty Media does not issue formal revenue, earnings or Adjusted OIBDA guidance and has not published quantified medium-term financial targets. Management commentary is directional. The only quantified forward commitments are non-financial: F1's Net Zero by 2030 and its 50% absolute emissions reduction target. Investors should treat the absence of guidance as a structural feature of the Liberty model rather than an omission.
Products & Services
5.1 Formula 1 segment
FIA Formula One World Championship (the F1 Championship). The flagship property. An approximately nine-month, 22–24 event global series. In 2025, 24 events in 21 countries across Europe, Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and North and South America. Followed by hundreds of millions of television viewers in approximately 200 territories; the largest events host live audiences in excess of 450,000 across a race weekend. Total 2025 season attendance 6.75 million (up 4% YoY); cumulative TV viewership 1.6 billion; 115 million social media followers; YouTube highlights views up 21% YoY; global fanbase reported by F1 at over 826 million. Customers: promoters, broadcasters, sponsors. Pricing model: multi-year contracts with fixed or escalating fees.
Race promotion rights. Sold to circuit owners, automobile clubs, event organisers and governmental bodies. Initial terms typically three to seven years; renewals more variable. Escalators typically CPI-linked or fixed at up to 5% per annum. 2025–2026 renewals and additions include Las Vegas (10-year extension to 2037, announced Q2 2026), Barcelona-Catalunya (through 2032, on rotation with Belgium), Portugal (returning 2027–2028), Turkey (returning from 2027 under a new multi-year agreement), Madrid (from 2026 to at least 2035), Italy and Monaco (through 2031), China (through 2030), plus renewals with Mexico, Canada, Austria, Miami, Austin and Azerbaijan.
Media rights (television rights agreements). Over 50 broadcast agreements worldwide in 2025, including multi-territory contracts spanning free-to-air and pay platforms. Principal broadcasters: Apple TV (United States, exclusive, five years from 2026), Sky (UK, Germany, Italy), Canal+ (France), DAZN (Spain; d/b/a Fox Sports in Australia), beIN Sports (Asia, Middle East, North Africa), ESPN (Latin America and the Caribbean, extended through 2028), Viaplay (Nordics and Netherlands), SuperSport (Sub-Saharan Africa), Foxtel (Australia). Renewals in 2025–2026 also covered pan-Asia, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, New Zealand, Japan and India.
F1 TV / F1 TV Premium. Direct-to-consumer OTT product. In the United States from 2026 it is bundled into the Apple TV subscription ($12.99/month) rather than sold standalone; elsewhere it remains a standalone subscription. Subscription growth was cited as a driver of media rights revenue increases in both FY2024 and FY2025.
Sponsorship — Global Partners and Official Suppliers. Event-based trackside advertising, race title sponsorship, Global Partner status and Official Supplier status. Contracts typically three to five years with annual escalators. 2025–2026 additions and renewals include PepsiCo, Standard Chartered, PwC, Barilla, LEGO, Disney (licensing), Salesforce, Allwyn, Marsh (first Official Risk and Insurance Brokering Partner), FanDuel, Betway, Pirelli (extended through 2028), Flexjet (Official Private Aviation Supplier, from the 2026 British Grand Prix), Crypto.com (through 2030), MSC Cruises, Heineken and Aramco.
Formula 1 Paddock Club. The premium on-site hospitality programme, sold at most events; F1 holds Paddock Club rights at all but three events under Circuit Rights Agreements. Sold out for the remainder of the 2026 season as at the Q2 2026 earnings call, with new premium products being introduced at recurring events.
Formula 2 and Formula 3. Exclusive rights to promote and commercially exploit through 2041. Run principally as support races at F1 event weekends. Economics include periodic sale of new-generation cars and parts to teams at the start of each vehicle cycle (an F2 cycle boosted FY2024 other revenue; an F3 cycle boosted early FY2025 and created a negative comparison in H1 2026).
F1 Academy. All-female driver development series launched in 2023; featured as a support race at seven F1 events in 2025. Licensing tie-ins include a Hello Kitty x F1 Academy programme.
Freight, logistics and travel services. Provided to F1 teams and third parties for events outside Europe; a variable-margin service line whose revenue and cost both track event count and geography.
Television production and post-production. The international television feed is produced in-house, primarily out of the Media and Technology Centre at Biggin Hill, distributing to broadcasters across roughly 180–200 territories.
Brand licensing and consumer products. Agreements signed in 2025 with Disney, Pottery Barn Kids, Pottery Barn Teen and Hello Kitty (via F1 Academy). Licensing income was specifically identified as a growth driver of other F1 revenue in FY2025 and H1 2026.
Grand Prix Plaza, Las Vegas. Opened May 2025 on the Las Vegas Grand Prix paddock site. Generates rental income booked in Corporate and Other ($33m in FY2025; $12m in H1 2026) plus event and activation revenue booked in F1's other revenue. It is the company's only permanent consumer destination asset.
Las Vegas Grand Prix (self-promoted). The only F1 event promoted directly by F1, meaning F1 receives ticketing, sponsorship and hospitality revenue and bears circuit and paddock development and operating costs. The 2025 edition sold out with weekend attendance above 300,000 and generated 1.8 billion social impressions. Extended by ten years through 2037.
F1 The Movie. Apple Original Film released June 2025 in close collaboration with F1; grossed nearly $630m globally, becoming Apple's largest film to date and the highest-grossing sports film ever. It earned four Academy Award nominations and won Best Sound at the BAFTAs. Generated one-time revenue recognised in F1's FY2025 media rights line — and a corresponding negative comparison in Q2 2026.
5.2 MotoGP segment
FIM Grand Prix World Championship (MotoGP Championship). Held every year since 1949; MotoGP has been the exclusive rights holder since 1991. Three classes — MotoGP, Moto2 and Moto3. In 2025, 22 events in 18 countries across Europe, Asia-Pacific, Australia, the Middle East and North and South America; approximately 200 territories reached; 2025 attendance over 3.66 million (up 21% YoY) with cumulative TV viewership up 9%. Eleven teams competed in 2025; engines supplied by Aprilia, Ducati, Honda, KTM and Yamaha.
MotoGP media rights. In 2025, 19 free-to-air agreements and 45 pay-television agreements. Key broadcasters: DAZN (Spain, extended 2026), Sky Italia (Italy, through 2027), Canal+ (France), TNT Sports (UK), SPOTV and Trans7 (Indonesia), Ziggo Sport (Netherlands), ServusTV (Austria, renewed through 2030), Sky DACH (Austria, Germany, Switzerland, extended 2026), Band (free-to-air partner for the Brazil Grand Prix), Fox Sports (Australia).
VideoPass. MotoGP's direct-to-consumer OTT subscription product; subscription growth was cited as a media rights revenue driver in FY2025.
MotoGP race promotion. Contracts typically five to ten years initially. 2025–2026 renewals and additions include a new Adelaide, Australia agreement for 2027–2032 (MotoGP's first modern-era city-centre Grand Prix), Thailand (through 2031), Malaysia (through 2031), Silverstone (through 2028), Japan, Catalonia, Valencia, France, Germany and San Marino, plus the relocation of the Argentine Grand Prix to Buenos Aires.
MotoGP sponsorship. Championship and event-level advertising, trackside, title sponsorship and digital inventory; contracts typically one to five years. Recent activity: Motul extended, Liqui Moly extended, Repsol signed for Moto2 and Moto3, Estrella Galicia 0,0 as title sponsor of the Brazil Grand Prix. CAA appointed as global sponsorship agency in 2026 to accelerate the commercial pipeline — a direct application of the Liberty playbook used at F1 after 2017.
FIM Superbike World Championship (WorldSBK). Production-based motorcycle racing championship; commercial rights held to 2036 per deal disclosure at acquisition.
FIM Women's Circuit Racing World Championship (WorldWCR) and junior championships, including the Road to MotoGP development programme.
MotoGP VIP Village and MotoGP Premier hospitality. From 2026, operated under a new multi-year exclusive partnership with Quint (now a Liberty Live Holdings subsidiary following the December 2025 split-off). Materially, MotoGP now recognises hospitality revenue and costs on a net basis, which reduces reported other revenue and cost without affecting margin dollars — a presentational change that explains part of the H1 2026 other-revenue decline.
MotoE. The electric support championship; contractual fees declined in FY2025 and a one-time termination penalty relating to MotoE cancellation was recorded in Q4 2025.
Season launch event. Second annual edition held in Kuala Lumpur in February 2026 with attendance doubling year-over-year — a direct import of F1's O2 launch-event format.
Financial Narrative
6.1 The only genuine five-year series: Formula 1 revenue
Zeros denote figures not verified against a primary source in this review, not nil values. FY2021 and FY2022 operating income are sourced from contemporaneous reporting of Liberty's Formula One Group disclosures; FY2023 segment-level operating income and Adjusted OIBDA were not verified, though consolidated Formula One Group figures of $297m and $686m respectively are verified.
Five-year revenue CAGR (FY2021–FY2025): 16.0%. Adjusted for the COVID-depressed 2021 base, the FY2022–FY2025 CAGR is 14.6% — a more defensible run-rate for the underlying franchise.
6.2 Consolidated income statement — continuing operations
FY2023 line detail on the current continuing-operations basis was not verified; only revenue, operating income and Adjusted OIBDA are verified for that year. FY2024 pre-tax income from continuing operations was reported as nil.
6.3 Margin profile
FY2024 effective tax rate is not meaningful given nil pre-tax income from continuing operations against a $44m tax charge.
6.4 Earnings per share and distributions
Liberty Media does not pay a dividend on its common stock and has no stated dividend policy. Exact basic and diluted EPS as presented in the FY2025 income statement, and the weighted-average share counts underlying them, were not verified in this review; the $2.22 figure is an analyst computation on 250.5m period-end shares and should not be used as a reported figure. FY2024 shares outstanding not verified on a comparable post-reclassification basis.
6.5 Balance sheet
6.6 Cash flow
6.7 Ratio analysis
Cash conversion cycle is not meaningful for this business model and is not disclosed. The company collects the substantial majority of race promotion, media rights and sponsorship fees in advance; deferred revenue of $1,117m at 30 June 2026 against trade receivables of $255m implies a structurally and substantially negative cash conversion cycle. ROIC computed as NOPAT (operating income taxed at the effective rate) divided by GAAP debt plus equity plus redeemable NCI less cash. FY2024 ROIC is not meaningful given the nil pre-tax result.
6.8 Commentary on trends, inflections and drivers
Revenue. The 22.7% consolidated growth in FY2025 is a composite of three unrelated forces: F1's genuine 13.5% organic expansion, MotoGP's half-year consolidation ($325m), and a one-time media rights benefit from F1 The Movie. F1's own growth was broad-based: sponsorship up roughly 10% on new partners, contractual uplifts and digital advertising; media rights up on contractual escalators, F1 TV subscription growth and the film; race promotion up on contractual escalators alone (race count was flat at 24). The most important observation is that F1 grew 13.5% with zero incremental races — this is a pricing and mix story, not a volume story, and that is the higher-quality version of growth.
The 2025 margin inflection. F1 operating margin expanded 190bps and Adjusted OIBDA margin 120bps despite a $50m Concorde incentive payment. The mechanism is the Concorde formula: as Adjusted OIBDA grows, the team payout percentage steps down. The move from 61.5% to 59.7% released roughly $44m of incremental margin at FY2025 revenue levels. This is a structural, contractual operating-leverage feature that persists under the 2026 Concorde Agreement, which retains a fixed-percentage-of-Prize-Fund-Adjusted-EBIT construct.
The balance sheet inflection. Net debt moved from $361m to $4,045m in a single year. This is entirely the MotoGP acquisition: $3,267m of cash paid for acquisitions (net of cash acquired), funded by $1,748m of new borrowing and the drawdown of the $2.6bn cash balance. Goodwill rose $2,891m and amortisable intangibles rose $2,413m. Intangible-heavy assets now represent 73.9% of the balance sheet — appropriate for a rights business, but it means book equity carries limited information about downside protection.
The FX forward mechanics. FY2025 investing cash flow shows $3,700m received and $3,503m paid on foreign currency forward contracts — Liberty hedged close to the full euro-denominated MotoGP purchase price after the April 2024 signing, and the $288m of realised and unrealised gains on financial instruments in FY2025 is largely attributable to this hedging programme and the convertible notes' embedded derivative. This is a material, non-recurring contributor to the FY2025 net income figure and should be stripped out for run-rate purposes.
H1 2026 — read the calendar, not the headline. Consolidated revenue fell 8.0% to $1,645m and operating income fell 28.6% to $152m. Both are calendar artefacts. F1 recognised 8/22nds of season-based revenue in H1 2026 versus 11/24ths in H1 2025 — a 9.2 percentage-point swing in recognition. Adjusting mechanically, F1's underlying revenue is up, not down, and management pointed to contractual fee increases, new sponsors and higher hospitality revenue at recurring events. The MotoGP business grew 6% reported and 1% constant currency in H1 with Adjusted OIBDA up 10% reported and 5% constant currency. What is genuinely negative in H1 2026: SG&A rose 13% at F1 on personnel and IT; the F1 The Movie one-time revenue does not repeat; net leverage ticked up to 3.4x; and two Middle East races were lost to geopolitical disruption (one subsequently recovered by relocating Bahrain to Malaysia).
Cash generation quality. FY2025 operating cash flow of $908m against $577m of operating income and $119m of capex is a 1.57x conversion of operating income to OCF and an 89% conversion of Adjusted OIBDA to free cash flow before interest. H1 2026 OCF of $673m already exceeds 74% of the full prior-year figure, reflecting the seasonal prepayment cycle. Capital intensity is exceptionally low at 2.7% of revenue (FY2025) — the Grand Prix Plaza build is the only significant capital project of recent years.
What to watch in the numbers. Three items: (i) the FY2026 team payment ratio, which determines whether the Concorde operating leverage continues to compound; (ii) MotoGP's Adjusted OIBDA trajectory in constant currency, since roughly two-thirds of the acquisition thesis is commercial-uplift execution rather than the acquired run-rate; and (iii) the deferred revenue balance at each year-end, which is the cleanest forward indicator of contracted revenue.
Financial Detail
Segment Revenue
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
Formula 1 revenue (USD M) | 3222 | 3411 | 3873 |
MotoGP revenue (USD M) | 0 | 0 | 325 |
Corporate and other revenue (USD M) | 16 | 373 | 414 |
Eliminations (USD M) | -16 | -131 | -130 |
Consolidated revenue (USD M) | 3222 | 3653 | 4482 |
Segment Revenue
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
Formula 1 operating income (USD M) | 0 | 492 | 632 |
MotoGP operating income (USD M) | 0 | 0 | 38 |
Corporate and other operating income (USD M) | 0 | -205 | -93 |
Consolidated operating income (USD M) | 297 | 287 | 577 |
Segment Revenue
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
Formula 1 Adjusted OIBDA (USD M) | 0 | 791 | 946 |
MotoGP Adjusted OIBDA (USD M) | 0 | 0 | 117 |
Corporate and other Adjusted OIBDA (USD M) | 0 | -17 | 5 |
Consolidated Adjusted OIBDA (USD M) | 686 | 774 | 1068 |
Segment Revenue
| Metric | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|
Formula 1 revenue YoY growth (percent) | 5.9 | 13.5 |
Formula 1 operating margin (percent) | 14.4 | 16.3 |
Formula 1 Adjusted OIBDA margin (percent) | 23.2 | 24.4 |
Formula 1 share of consolidated revenue (percent) | 93.4 | 86.4 |
MotoGP share of consolidated revenue (percent) | 0.0 | 7.3 |
Corporate and other share of consolidated revenue (percent) | 10.2 | 9.2 |
Consolidated revenue YoY growth (percent) | 13.4 | 22.7 |
Consolidated operating margin (percent) | 7.9 | 12.9 |
Consolidated Adjusted OIBDA margin (percent) | 21.2 | 23.8 |
Segment Revenue
| Metric | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|
Primary MotoGP revenue (USD M) | 435 | 502 |
Other MotoGP revenue (USD M) | 68 | 71 |
Total MotoGP revenue (USD M) | 503 | 573 |
Cost of motorsport revenue (USD M) | -247 | -292 |
Selling, general and administrative (USD M) | -81 | -80 |
Adjusted OIBDA (USD M) | 175 | 201 |
Depreciation and amortisation (USD M) | -146 | -147 |
Operating income (USD M) | 29 | 54 |
Races held | 20 | 22 |
Segment Revenue
| Metric | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|
Primary Formula 1 revenue (USD M) | 2757 | 3086 |
Other Formula 1 revenue (USD M) | 654 | 787 |
Total motorsport revenue (USD M) | 3411 | 3873 |
Team payments excluding Concorde incentive (USD M) | -1266 | -1400 |
Other cost of motorsport revenue (USD M) | -1066 | -1181 |
Selling, general and administrative (USD M) | -288 | -346 |
Adjusted OIBDA (USD M) | 791 | 946 |
Concorde incentive payments (USD M) | 0 | -50 |
Stock-based compensation (USD M) | -3 | -1 |
Depreciation and amortisation (USD M) | -296 | -263 |
Operating income (USD M) | 492 | 632 |
Races held | 24 | 24 |
Team payments as percent of pre-team-payment Adjusted OIBDA | 61.5 | 59.7 |
Financial Analysis
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Formula 1 revenue (USD M) | 2136 | 2573 | 3222 | 3411 | 3873 |
Formula 1 revenue YoY growth (percent) | 86.6 | 20.5 | 25.2 | 5.9 | 13.5 |
Formula 1 operating income (USD M) | 40 | 173 | 0 | 492 | 632 |
Formula 1 Adjusted OIBDA (USD M) | 0 | 551 | 0 | 791 | 946 |
Races held | 22 | 22 | 22 | 24 | 24 |
Financial Analysis
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
Total revenue (USD M) | 3222 | 3653 | 4482 |
Motorsport revenue (USD M) | 0 | 3318 | 4105 |
Other revenue (USD M) | 0 | 335 | 377 |
Cost of motorsport revenue (USD M) | 0 | 2294 | 2758 |
Other cost of sales (USD M) | 0 | 194 | 213 |
Gross profit (USD M) | 0 | 1165 | 1511 |
Selling, general and administrative (USD M) | 0 | 421 | 514 |
Impairment and acquisition costs (USD M) | 0 | 105 | 27 |
Depreciation and amortisation (USD M) | 0 | 352 | 393 |
Operating income (USD M) | 297 | 287 | 577 |
EBITDA, operating income plus D and A (USD M) | 0 | 639 | 970 |
Adjusted OIBDA (USD M) | 686 | 774 | 1068 |
Interest expense (USD M) | 0 | 208 | 249 |
Realised and unrealised gains on financial instruments (USD M) | 0 | -139 | 288 |
Other net (USD M) | 0 | 60 | 117 |
Pre-tax income from continuing operations (USD M) | 0 | 0 | 733 |
Income tax expense (USD M) | 0 | 44 | 137 |
Net income from continuing operations (USD M) | 0 | -44 | 596 |
Net income from discontinued operations (USD M) | 0 | -2431 | -41 |
Net income attributable to stockholders (USD M) | 0 | -2063 | 555 |
Stock-based compensation in SG and A (USD M) | 0 | 30 | 21 |
Financial Analysis
| Metric | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|
Gross margin (percent) | 31.9 | 33.7 |
Operating margin (percent) | 7.9 | 12.9 |
EBITDA margin (percent) | 17.5 | 21.6 |
Adjusted OIBDA margin (percent) | 21.2 | 23.8 |
Net margin on continuing operations (percent) | -1.2 | 13.3 |
Effective tax rate on continuing operations (percent) | 0 | 18.7 |
Financial Analysis
| Metric | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|
Net income attributable to stockholders (USD M) | -2063 | 555 |
Shares outstanding at period end, millions | 0 | 250.5 |
Approximate EPS on period-end shares (USD) | 0 | 2.22 |
Dividends per share (USD) | 0 | 0 |
Financial Analysis
| Metric | FY2024 | FY2025 | H1 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
Cash and cash equivalents (USD M) | 2631 | 1055 | 1465 |
Trade and other receivables net (USD M) | 114 | 115 | 255 |
Contract assets (USD M) | 114 | 114 | 87 |
Total current assets (USD M) | 3348 | 1373 | 2109 |
Property and equipment net (USD M) | 810 | 868 | 882 |
Goodwill (USD M) | 4134 | 7025 | 6877 |
Intangible assets subject to amortisation net (USD M) | 2689 | 5102 | 4843 |
Deferred income tax assets (USD M) | 577 | 539 | 528 |
Total assets (USD M) | 13001 | 15398 | 15879 |
Accounts payable and accrued liabilities (USD M) | 649 | 575 | 417 |
Deferred revenue (USD M) | 267 | 263 | 1117 |
Current portion of debt (USD M) | 26 | 52 | 72 |
Total current liabilities (USD M) | 1134 | 939 | 1665 |
Long-term debt (USD M) | 2966 | 5048 | 4852 |
Total debt GAAP (USD M) | 2992 | 5100 | 4924 |
Net debt GAAP basis (USD M) | 361 | 4045 | 3459 |
Deferred income tax liabilities (USD M) | 52 | 656 | 589 |
Total liabilities (USD M) | 5950 | 6948 | 7501 |
Redeemable noncontrolling interests (USD M) | 0 | 693 | 759 |
Total equity (USD M) | 7029 | 7757 | 7619 |
Working capital (USD M) | 2214 | 434 | 444 |
Goodwill and intangibles as percent of total assets | 52.5 | 78.8 | 73.9 |
Financial Analysis
| Metric | FY2024 | FY2025 | H1 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
Net cash provided by operating activities (USD M) | 567 | 908 | 673 |
Capital expenditure (USD M) | 75 | 119 | 65 |
Free cash flow (USD M) | 492 | 789 | 608 |
Cash paid for acquisitions net of cash acquired (USD M) | 205 | 3267 | 0 |
Cash proceeds from foreign currency forward contracts (USD M) | 0 | 3700 | 0 |
Cash paid for foreign currency forward contracts (USD M) | 0 | 3503 | 0 |
Borrowings of debt (USD M) | 645 | 1748 | 116 |
Repayments of debt (USD M) | 677 | 781 | 257 |
Equity issuance proceeds (USD M) | 939 | 0 | 0 |
Dividends paid (USD M) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Share buybacks (USD M) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Financial Analysis
| Metric | FY2024 | FY2025 | H1 2026 annualised or period |
|---|---|---|---|
Return on equity on attributable net income (percent) | -29.4 | 7.2 | 0 |
Return on assets on attributable net income (percent) | -15.9 | 3.6 | 0 |
Return on invested capital, analyst computed (percent) | 0 | 3.8 | 0 |
Current ratio | 2.95 | 1.46 | 1.27 |
Debt to equity GAAP debt (times) | 0.43 | 0.66 | 0.65 |
Net debt to Adjusted OIBDA, analyst computed (times) | 0.5 | 3.8 | 0 |
Net leverage as reported by company (times) | 0 | 3.6 | 3.4 |
Interest coverage, Adjusted OIBDA over interest (times) | 3.7 | 4.3 | 2.8 |
Interest coverage, EBIT over interest (times) | 1.4 | 2.3 | 1.1 |
Asset turnover (times) | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0 |
Cash conversion cycle (days) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Geographic Revenue
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026E |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Formula 1 events held | 22 | 24 | 24 | 23 |
Formula 1 countries hosting events | 0 | 0 | 21 | 0 |
MotoGP events held | 0 | 20 | 22 | 22 |
MotoGP countries hosting events | 0 | 0 | 18 | 0 |
Formula 1 attendance, millions | 0 | 6.49 | 6.75 | 0 |
MotoGP attendance, millions | 0 | 3.02 | 3.66 | 0 |
Geographic Revenue
| Region | Events | Notable venues |
|---|---|---|
Europe | 10 | Monaco, Barcelona, Austria, Britain, Belgium, Hungary, Netherlands, Italy (Monza), Madrid, Azerbaijan |
Americas | 6 | Miami, Canada (Montreal), United States (Austin), Las Vegas, Mexico, Brazil |
Middle East | 4 | Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi |
Asia-Pacific | 4 | Australia (Melbourne), China (Shanghai), Japan (Suzuka), Singapore |
Capital Markets
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
FWONK last verified close | 102.73 on 10 August 2026 |
FWONK 52-week range | 80.15 to 109.36 |
FWONA close, reference | 83.03 on 12 May 2026 |
FWONK close, reference | 91.83 on 14 May 2026; 96.05 on 5 August 2026 |
Beta | 0.73 |
Short interest | 6.61 million shares, approximately 2.64% of shares outstanding |
Capital Markets
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|
FWONA cumulative TSR index | 138.19 | 200.30 |
FWONK cumulative TSR index | 142.12 | 208.60 |
Peer group TSR index | 97.61 | 90.83 |
Capital Markets
| Metric | Liberty Media | TKO Group |
|---|---|---|
Market capitalisation (USD BN) | 25.7 | 15.0 |
Enterprise value (USD BN) | 29.9 | 20.0 |
EV to revenue on trailing revenue (times) | 6.7 | 3.8 |
EV to EBITDA (times) | 18.0 | 10.4 |
Price to earnings trailing (times) | 104.5 | 45.9 |
Price to earnings forward (times) | 44.4 | 0 |
EV to free cash flow (times) | 37.3 | 0 |
Price to book, analyst computed (times) | 3.3 | 0 |
Debt to equity (times) | 0.60 | 0 |
Return on equity (percent) | 2.73 | 0 |
Return on invested capital (percent) | 2.59 | 0 |
Capital Markets
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
Number of analysts covering | 14 to 18 depending on source |
Consensus rating | Buy to Strong Buy; buy percentage consensus 86 |
Average 12-month price target (range across providers) | 110.88 to 124.46 |
High estimate | 135.00 |
Low estimate | 97.00 |
Implied upside from approximately 98 to 100 | 12 to 26 percent |
Capital Markets
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
Total remaining repurchase authorisation as at 1 August 2026 (USD BN) | 1.1 |
Repurchases 1 November 2025 to 31 January 2026 (USD M) | 0 |
Repurchases 1 February to 30 April 2026 (USD M) | 0 |
Repurchases 1 May to 31 July 2026 (USD M) | 0 |
Capital Markets
| Entity | Agency | Rating | Outlook | Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Delta Topco Limited (Formula 1 parent) | Fitch | BB Long-Term Issuer Default Rating | Positive (revised from Stable) | August 2026 |
Delta Topco Limited | Moody's | Not verified | Not verified | — |
Delta Topco Limited | S&P | Not verified | Not verified | — |
MotoGP Sports Entertainment Group | All agencies | Not verified | Not verified | — |
Liberty Media Corporation (parent) | All agencies | Not rated / not verified | — | — |
Capital Markets
| Instrument | Principal at 30 Jun 2026 (USD M) | Rate | Maturity | Recourse |
|---|---|---|---|---|
2.25% convertible senior notes | 475 | 2.25 percent | 2027 | Liberty Media parent |
2.375% convertible senior notes | 600 | 2.375 percent | 2032 | Liberty Media parent (issued 13 Aug 2026, post-period) |
Formula 1 first lien Term Loan B | 1700 | Term SOFR plus 1.75 to 2.00 percent | 30 Sep 2031 | Non-recourse to Liberty Media |
Formula 1 first lien Term Loan A | approximately 689 | Term SOFR plus 1.50 to 2.25 percent | 30 Sep 2029 | Non-recourse to Liberty Media |
Formula 1 revolving credit facility | 500 undrawn capacity | Term SOFR plus 1.50 to 2.25 percent | 30 Sep 2029 | Non-recourse to Liberty Media |
Formula 1 senior loan facilities, total drawn | 3330 | — | — | Non-recourse |
MotoGP Term Loan B | approximately 840 euro equivalent (EUR 720m) | Repriced June 2026 | Not verified | Non-recourse to Liberty Media |
MotoGP Term Loan A | 209 | Repriced June 2026 | Not verified | Non-recourse to Liberty Media |
MotoGP multicurrency revolving credit facility | EUR 100m capacity | New June 2026 | Not verified | Non-recourse |
MotoGP credit facilities, total drawn | 1028 | — | — | Non-recourse |
Other corporate level debt | 22 | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Liberty Media parent |
Total debt (principal) | 4855 | — | — | — |
Capital Markets
| Metric | Q3 2025 | Q4 2025 | Q1 2026 | Q2 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Formula 1 net leverage (times) | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.7 |
MotoGP net leverage (times) | 5.6 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.5 |
Consolidated net leverage (times) | 3.8 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 3.4 |
Total cash and cash equivalents (USD M) | 1291 | 1055 | 1332 | 1465 |
Total debt principal (USD M) | 5056 | 5022 | 4989 | 4855 |
Analyst Conclusions
22.1 Management guidance
Liberty Media issues no quantitative financial guidance. Management's qualitative framing for 2026 comprises three elements: sustaining F1's momentum; positioning MotoGP for future growth; and remaining "disciplined yet opportunistic" with capital. Operationally disclosed forward facts are: an assumed 23-race F1 calendar for 2026 (one fewer than 2025, following the loss of Saudi Arabia and the relocation of Bahrain to Malaysia), with management warning that "additional calendar changes may be necessary"; a 22-race MotoGP calendar with a different order and mix affecting season-based recognition; and $1,117m of deferred revenue at 30 June 2026 expected to be recognised largely across H2 2026.
22.2 Consensus growth expectations
Sell-side consensus for the quarter following Q2 2026 was $682.9m of revenue and an EPS of −$0.09 — a loss, reflecting the H2 calendar shape. Trailing-twelve-month revenue was approximately $4.03bn to $4.04bn as at mid-2026. Analyst price targets cluster between $110.88 and $124.46 with a high of $135 and a low of $97, and 86% of covering analysts rate the stock a buy. No consensus multi-year revenue or EBITDA growth series was verified in this review.
22.3 Bull case
1. The MotoGP uplift is quantifiable and has barely started. MotoGP's sponsorship revenue is 12.7% of its total versus F1's 21.7% — the entire gap represents the category Liberty specialises in fixing, and the CAA appointment in 2026 is the same move that preceded F1's sponsorship acceleration. MotoGP already generates a 35.1% pro-forma Adjusted OIBDA margin against F1's 24.4%, because it carries no Concorde-equivalent variable prize fund. Every incremental dollar of MotoGP revenue is therefore worth roughly 1.4x an incremental F1 dollar at the OIBDA line. Manufacturer and team agreements to 2031, promoter renewals in Thailand, Malaysia and Silverstone, the Adelaide city-centre race from 2027, and the Quint hospitality partnership constitute a complete, executed foundation — with monetisation still ahead.
2. Contractual compounding requires no execution risk. F1 grew revenue 13.5% in FY2025 on a flat 24-race calendar. The Concorde payout ratio has fallen from 66% to 59.7% in three years, mechanically releasing margin as profitability rises. Race promotion, media rights and sponsorship contracts carry CPI or fixed escalators of up to 5% annually and are paid in advance. Rights are secured to 2110 and 2060; team participation to 2030 and 2031. This is an inflation-linked annuity with a contractual margin-expansion feature and a 60-year minimum runway.
3. The US media rights repricing sets a global benchmark. The Apple deal moved US rights from roughly $85–90m to roughly $140–160m per year — a 60–75% uplift secured while general entertainment content values were flat. Early evidence is encouraging: US viewership up year-over-year, total hours watched up 13%, and a demonstrably younger and more female audience. If that repricing pattern repeats across the European, Asian and Latin American renewal cycle over the next five years, the media rights line — 31.3% of F1 revenue — has substantial embedded upside not reflected in any published guidance.
22.4 Bear case
1. The valuation embeds a very large scarcity premium. At roughly 18x EV/EBITDA and 6.7x EV/revenue, Liberty trades at more than 70% above TKO Group's 10.4x EV/EBITDA and 3.8x EV/revenue — despite TKO growing revenue 22% and EBITDA 44% in its last fiscal year. Trailing P/E of 104.5x and forward P/E of 44.4x leave essentially no margin for disappointment. Return on equity of 2.73% and ROIC of 2.59% mean the multiple is entirely a function of expected future cash flows on an asset base that is 74% goodwill and intangibles.
2. The balance sheet and the cash-access structure are less comfortable than headline figures suggest. Net leverage rose to 3.4x at mid-2026. The $1,465m of consolidated cash is largely trapped: $1,024m sits at F1 and $142m at MotoGP, and the 10-K states plainly that the parent "generally do[es] not receive cash... from any of our subsidiaries," with subsidiary debt agreements restricting distributions. On top of this sits a $759m accreting redeemable NCI representing staged put rights held by the MotoGP sellers — a future cash obligation that is not in the net debt figure and that will require funding from a parent that has limited access to subsidiary cash. The August 2026 convertible raise, taken alongside the complete non-execution of a $1.1bn buyback authorisation at prices well below analyst targets, is consistent with a parent managing genuine liquidity constraints, not simply pre-positioning for opportunism.
3. Volume growth is contractually capped and the calendar has proven fragile. The 2026 Concorde Agreement requires 70% team consent to exceed 24 events. Growth must therefore come from price and mix, which is finite. Meanwhile, 2026 demonstrated that even the "price" leg is exposed: two Middle East events were lost to geopolitical tensions at an estimated ~$70m cost, and a MotoGP round was postponed. The IRTA agreement underpinning MotoGP team participation expired at the end of 2026, and while manufacturer and team agreements to 2031 have been signed, the 10-K had warned that renewal "could result in less favorable terms." Add the US paywall transition — F1 behind a $12.99/month subscription for the first time, against an ESPN benchmark of roughly 1.3 million viewers per race — and there is a plausible scenario in which reach contracts even as revenue per viewer rises.
22.5 Key catalysts and monitorables, next twelve months
22.6 Analyst verdict (300 words)
Liberty Media in August 2026 is the cleanest expression of a thesis that took nine years and three split-offs to isolate: that global, wholly ownable, calendar-anchored sports IP is among the scarcest and most durable cash-flow assets available in public markets. The evidence supports the thesis. Formula 1 grew revenue 13.5% in FY2025 on a flat race calendar, expanded margin through a contractual payout mechanism that improves as profitability rises, and repriced its US media rights by 60–75% in a market where content values were otherwise deflating. MotoGP arrives with a higher margin structure, a demonstrably under-monetised sponsorship line, and the same management team and playbook that delivered F1's transformation.
The concerns are real but mostly second-order. Reported H1 2026 weakness is a recognition artefact, and the sell-side is correctly looking through it. The genuine issues are the balance sheet and the price. Net leverage of 3.4x, cash largely trapped at subsidiaries the parent cannot freely tap, a $759m accreting minority put obligation absent from headline net debt, a $1.1bn buyback authorisation left entirely unexecuted for at least nine months, and an $600m convertible raise at a moment of no announced acquisition — these facts fit together into a picture of a parent with less financial freedom than the consolidated numbers suggest. And at roughly 18x EV/EBITDA against a comparable at 10.4x, investors are paying a substantial premium for scarcity.
The honest conclusion is that the asset quality is close to unimpeachable and the price already reflects it. This is a compounder whose contractual mechanics do much of the work without management intervention, held at a valuation that requires the MotoGP uplift to be delivered largely as advertised. The next twelve months — the first full Apple season, the first CAA-led MotoGP sponsorship cycle, and the disposition of roughly $2bn of parent-level flexibility — will determine whether the premium was foresight or enthusiasm.
APPENDIX: DATA VERIFICATION NOTES
The following items are recorded as not publicly disclosed or not verified and were not estimated:
- FY2025 Summary Compensation Table totals for named executive officers.
- Top ten institutional holders and their stake percentages.
- ISIN and CUSIP identifiers following the May 2026 Nevada conversion.
- Country-level or segment-by-geography revenue splits.
- Research and development expenditure (not separately reported).
- Basic and diluted EPS as presented in the FY2025 consolidated statement of operations, and the weighted-average share counts.
- FY2023 segment-level operating income and Adjusted OIBDA for Formula 1 and Corporate and Other.
- FY2021 Formula 1 Adjusted OIBDA and FY2023 Formula 1 segment operating income.
- Moody's and S&P credit ratings for Delta Topco Limited and MotoGP.
- MSCI, Sustainalytics and CDP ESG ratings for Liberty Media.
- MotoGP quantified emissions baseline and targets.
- Live Nation and TKO Group full financial detail beyond the figures cited.
- Consolidated Liberty Media revenue for FY2021 and FY2022 on any basis comparable to the current continuing-operations presentation.
Source conflicts noted: (i) reported value of the Apple US media rights deal ranges from approximately $140m to $160m per year across ESPN, CNBC, Motorsport.com, Variety and Sportcal — the company has not disclosed terms; (ii) the MotoGP acquisition was announced in April 2024 as approximately 86% for a €4.2bn enterprise value and €3.5bn equity value, but closed in July 2025 at 84% with a €4.3bn enterprise value and €3.7bn equity value; (iii) at least one secondary source conflated the "Formula One Group" tracking-stock aggregate with the Formula 1 operating segment for FY2023 and FY2024, and this dossier uses the company's own FY2025 press release segment table as the controlling source; (iv) ISIN identifiers vary across data providers.
Executive Leadership
| Name | Title | Since | Age | Prior roles | Education |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Derek Chang | President & Chief Executive Officer | February 2025 (director since March 2021) | 58 | CEO of NBA China (2018–2020); CEO of Friend MTS (2021); Head of International Lifestyle Channels and MD Asia-Pacific at Scripps (2013–2018); EVP Content Strategy and Development, DIRECTV (2006–2013); EVP Finance and Strategy and interim Co-CFO, Charter (2003–2005); EVP Development, YES Network (2001–2003); TCI Communications. Co-founder and director of EverPass Media | MBA, Stanford University; BA, Yale University |
Brian J. Wendling | Chief Accounting Officer & Principal Financial Officer | Various positions since 1999 | Not disclosed | Assurance practice, KPMG; also CAO/PFO of Liberty Broadband. Board member of Comscore | BS Accounting, Indiana University |
Renee L. Wilm | Chief Legal Officer & Chief Administrative Officer (transitioning to Senior Advisor, announced 5 March 2026) | 2021 | Not disclosed | Senior Partner, Baker Botts L.L.P.; East Coast Corporate Department Chair; Partner-in-Charge, New York office; also CLO/CAO of Liberty Broadband | BBA Finance (High Honors), Hofstra University; JD summa cum laude, St. John's University School of Law |
Ben Oren | Executive Vice President & Treasurer | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Managing Director, Credit Suisse (Americas Head of Liability Management); Executive Director, UBS Securities; also EVP/Treasurer of Liberty Broadband | BS Economics, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania |
Michael E. Hurelbrink | Assistant Vice President and Secretary | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed |
| Name | Role | Director since | Age | Class / term expiry | Committees | Independent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Robert R. Bennett | Chairman of the Board (from 1 Jan 2026; Vice Chairman Jan–Dec 2025) | 2011 (Old Liberty board from 1994) | 67 | Class III / 2028 | Executive | No |
John C. Malone | Chairman Emeritus (stepped down from the board effective 1 Jan 2026) | Long-standing | Born 1941 | Not applicable | Formerly Executive | No |
Derek Chang | President & CEO, Director | 2021 | 58 | Class I / 2029 | Executive | No |
Chase Carey | Director | January 2025 | 72 | Class II / 2027 | Executive | Yes |
Brian M. Deevy | Director | June 2015 | 70 | Class II / 2027 | Audit (Chair) | Yes |
M. Ian G. Gilchrist | Director | 2011 (July 2009 per company site) | 76 | Class III / 2028 | Compensation (Chair); Audit; Nominating & Governance | Yes |
Evan D. Malone | Director | 2011 (August 2008 per company site) | 55 | Class I / 2029 | None | No |
Larry E. Romrell | Director | 2011 (Old Liberty from 1999) | 86 | Class I / 2029 | Audit; Compensation | Yes |
Andrea L. Wong | Director | September 2011 | 59 | Class II / 2027 | Nominating & Governance (Chair); Compensation | Yes |
| Name | Fees earned or paid in cash (USD) | Stock awards (USD) | Option awards (USD) | Deferred comp earnings (USD) | All other comp (USD) | Total (USD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Robert R. Bennett | 161746 | 0 | 13695173 | 79516 | 25891 | 13962326 |
Chase Carey | 138350 | 284412 | 0 | 0 | 94065 | 516827 |
Brian M. Deevy | 168350 | 66541 | 66207 | 0 | 24691 | 325789 |
M. Ian G. Gilchrist | 185738 | 0 | 132442 | 0 | 24691 | 342871 |
Evan D. Malone | 128350 | 0 | 132442 | 0 | 0 | 260792 |
Larry E. Romrell | 168350 | 0 | 132442 | 0 | 24691 | 325483 |
Andrea L. Wong | 148350 | 132990 | 0 | 79360 | 33836 | 394536 |
Competitive Landscape
| Metric | Liberty Media FY2025 | TKO Group latest | Live Nation FY2025 | MSG Entertainment FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (USD M) | 4482 | 5000 | 25000 | 943 |
Revenue growth (percent) | 22.7 | 22 | 0 | -2 |
Operating income (USD M) | 577 | 0 | 0 | 122 |
Adjusted OIBDA or adjusted operating income (USD M) | 1068 | 0 | 0 | 223 |
Adjusted margin (percent) | 23.8 | 0 | 0 | 23.6 |
Market capitalisation (USD BN) | 25.7 | 15 | 0 | 0 |
Enterprise value (USD BN) | 29.9 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
EV to revenue (times) | 6.7 | 3.8 | 0 | 0 |
EV to EBITDA (times) | 18.0 | 10.4 | 0 | 0 |
Research and development intensity (percent of revenue) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Recent Developments
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