Murray River Organics Group Limited Overview
Murray River Organics was, at its 2016 IPO, marketed as the world's largest vertically integrated organic dried vine fruit business, covering everything from farmland and harvest in the Sunraysia district of the Murray River through processing, packing and branded retail sale in Australia and export markets. It grew certified organic sultanas, raisins and currants on its own properties, processed them at certified facilities at Mourquong (NSW) and Dandenong (Victoria), and sold them in bulk, as ingredients, as private-label product and under its own brands, including Murray River Organics, Gobble, Premium Australian Clusters, Murray River Wholegoods and Pacific Organics. From 2018 successive management teams attempted to pivot away from weather-exposed farming toward higher-margin branded "better-for-you" grocery products. Repeated harvest shortfalls, impairments, governance conflict and four heavily dilutive capital raisings failed to establish profitability, and the group collapsed into administration in February 2022 and liquidation in 2023.
What the company did. At its peak the group was a producer, processor, manufacturer and marketer of organic and natural foods. Its upstream asset base comprised eleven properties and more than 9,000 acres across Sunraysia used for dried vine fruit, wine grapes, table grapes and citrus (Source: Strawman member summary of company disclosures, circa 2021). Midstream, it ran two certified organic processing facilities: Mourquong in NSW, where dried fruit was graded, dehydrated, processed, packaged and distributed for export and domestic customers, and Dandenong in Victoria, a processing centre with seven lines across a range of pack formats intended to support rapid product innovation (same source). Downstream, it sold into Australian supermarkets (Coles, Woolworths, IGA), health-food channels, wholesale/food-service and ingredients customers, and export markets including China.
Business model and revenue model. Revenue was overwhelmingly product sales; there was no material service, subscription or licensing revenue disclosed. Within product revenue the mix shifted over time across four channel types:
Value chain position. The original thesis was full vertical integration ("soil to supermarket shelf", as characterised by The Land in 2017). From 2020 the company deliberately disintegrated, selling farms and the Mourquong plant while seeking to retain offtake of dried vine fruit from the new farm owners (Source: Strawman summary of FY21 results).
Company's own description. The last available company self-description in public sources (via Canaccord Genuity's February 2020 transaction note) positioned MRG as Australia's largest vertically integrated producer of organic dried vine fruit and a manufacturer of certified organic and "better-for-you" foods sold domestically and internationally, with growth focused on branding and high-margin product development while shrinking farming exposure to its best-performing dried vine fruit farms.
Independent characterisation. In substance MRG was a sub-scale agribusiness carrying fixed farming and processing costs, financed by bank debt, whose earnings were hostage to single-season harvest outcomes in a climatically volatile region. The branded pivot required marketing and new-product investment that the balance sheet could not sustain, and the company's own CEO acknowledged at the January 2022 AGM that trading had been disappointing and sales targets optimistic (Source: ARR.news, April 2022). The business never demonstrated a profitable branded franchise before capital ran out.
End markets served. Australian grocery (organic and health-positioned dried fruit, snacks, breakfast cereal, cooking oils, pantry staples); Australian food manufacturing and food-service (ingredients); export dried fruit (China cited as the main export growth driver in 2019 — Source: Stockhead, Oct 2019); fresh table grapes and citrus; wine grapes.
Strategy
Stated strategy themes (latest available). The company's articulated strategy evolved in three phases:
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Vertical integration and scale (2016–2017). Own the full organic dried vine fruit chain from soil to shelf, expanding via acquisitions (FSI, AOH) and farmland (7,700+ acres, 2017).
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Three-year turnaround plan (2018–2020). Under Tripp: cost reset, restructuring of farming, building a branded portfolio, export growth. Management claimed a $10m EBITDA-before-SGARA turnaround in year one (FY19). The stated vision by 2020 was to become a leading integrated organic branded food business (AusFoodNews, Sept 2020).
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Asset-light branded food company (2021–2022). Under Akdogan: exit farming entirely, sell processing, retain offtake, and prioritise branded retail (fruit and nut snacks, cereals, cooking oils) ahead of wholesale and ingredients (just-food, Dec 2021).
Initiatives in the final 24 months of operation (2020–2022):
Medium-term targets/guidance: The only explicit forward target in the record is the February 2020 expectation of positive cash flow in FY2021, which was not met. No guidance has been issued since 2021 and none will be.
ESG commitments: Former B Corp certification (ethical.org.au); organic certification under ACO. Neither was maintained.
Products & Services
Product-level pricing was not publicly disclosed for any line. Launch years are given where publicly reported.
5.1 Farming and commodity outputs
5.2 Wholesale and ingredients
The group described itself in 2019 as a producer of dried fruits, nuts, seeds and rice (Source: just-food, June 2019), supplying food manufacturers and the wholesale channel. Specific SKUs and customers are not publicly disclosed.
5.3 Branded retail
5.4 Services. None material disclosed. Processing capacity at Mourquong and Dandenong was used for own products; any toll-processing revenue is not publicly disclosed.
Product Portfolio
| Product | Description | Target customer | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
Organic sultanas | Certified organic dried vine fruit from own farms | Bulk, ingredients, retail | Core commodity |
Organic raisins (incl. Sun Muscat raisins) | Certified organic | Bulk, retail | Sun Muscat raisins later sold in branded pantry range |
Organic currants | Certified organic dried vine fruit | Bulk, retail | — |
Fresh table grapes | From Sunraysia properties | Fresh produce trade | Harvest of 3,105 t combined dried fruit and table grapes in 2018 |
Citrus | Conventional citrus at Nangiloc | Fresh trade | 113 ha (with wine grapes) sold to Costa in 2020 |
Wine grapes | Conventional plantings | Wineries | Partly sold to Costa in 2020 |
Organic hemp (licence) | Organic food-grade hemp licence for Nangiloc, granted June 2019 | — | No commercial output disclosed |
| Brand / line | Description | Channel | Launch / latest |
|---|---|---|---|
Murray River Organics (master brand) | Branded organic range launched in FY20 | Coles, Woolworths, IGA, health stores | FY2020 |
Murray River Organics muesli / breakfast cereals | Organic muesli range | Coles (entry announced June 2020), Woolworths | 2,020 |
Murray River Organics pantry staples | Ten products: Sultanas and Sun Muscat Raisins (from own farms), Almonds, Apricots, Chia Seeds, Psyllium Husks, Green Lentils, Pumpkin Kernels, Coconut Oil, Organic Avocado Oil, in 220–350g refillable canisters | Supermarkets | 2020 (Source: Food & Drink Business) |
Plant-based "mylk" chocolate | Organic plant-based chocolate range | Retail | 2,020 |
Gobble | Consumer snack brand | Retail | Pre-2019 (exact year n/d) |
Premium Australian Clusters | Fruit and nut snack clusters | Retail | — |
Murray River Wholegoods | Brand referenced in court filings | — | — |
Pacific Organics | Consumer brand | Retail | Referenced 2019 |
2021 new product wave | About 30 branded products launched in 2021, with results described as disappointing | Retail | 2021 (Source: Food & Drink Business, Feb 2022) |
Financial Narrative
The five fiscal years covered are FY2017–FY2021, the last five complete years with publicly reported results. FY2022 was never reported as a normal annual result.
6.1 Income statement (AUD M, as reported)
Sources and caveats:
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FY2017: revenue $48.5m statutory ($62.6m pro forma including acquisitions); EBITDA loss $0.6m statutory (positive $6.4m pro forma); net loss approx. $6m per just-food (Aug 2017). The Land reports the FY17 loss as $6.6m — discrepancy noted.
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FY2018: revenue $68.5m (up 41%). Net loss $58.1m per Stockhead's reading of the FY18 annual report; a later Stockhead article cites $59.6m — discrepancy noted. Full-year EBITDA n/d; H1 FY18 EBITDA was a loss of $16m.
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FY2019: revenue derived. Underlying EBITDA loss $3.6m per just-food (as the prior-year comparative in the FY20 result). Company guidance in June 2019 was an EBITDA-before-SGARA loss of $3.7–4.2m, so definitions differ slightly. Net loss approx. $12m per Stockhead.
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FY2020: revenue $48.3m (Sunraysia Daily; just-food reports $48.4m). Net loss $39.1m (Business News Australia; Sunraysia Daily cites $39m). Underlying EBITDA loss $10.3m.
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FY2021: revenue $42.6m and underlying EBITDA-SL loss $11.7m per just-food.
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No dividends were paid in FY18 and FY19 per the FY19 Appendix 4E; no dividends were paid at any time per available records.
6.2 Margins
Margins are calculated from the figures in 6.1. EBITDA margins mix statutory (FY17) and underlying (FY19–FY21) definitions and are therefore indicative of direction rather than strictly comparable.
Revenue CAGR. FY2017–FY2021: approximately -3.2% per year on a statutory basis (48.5 to 42.6). From the FY2018 peak to FY2021, revenue contracted at about -14.6% per year (68.5 to 42.6). The FY18 jump reflected full-year contributions from the Food Source International and Australian Organic Holdings acquisitions rather than organic growth.
6.3 Balance sheet
Commentary: The only verified balance-sheet datapoint is cash of $3.8m at 30 June 2018 (Stockhead). A secondary report summarising the FY18 accounts described the company as having no cash and owing $3.8m, which conflicts with the "$3.8m left in the kitty" description in a later Stockhead article; the discrepancy is unresolved. Qualitatively, the balance sheet relied on a secured bank debt facility, which the February 2020 raise was explicitly used to restructure and resize (Canaccord Genuity), and asset sale proceeds in 2020–2021 were repeatedly directed to debt reduction. The appointment of receivers by a secured creditor in February 2022 confirms that secured debt remained outstanding and in default at collapse.
6.4 Cash flow and capital returns
Equity raised notes: FY2017 combines the December 2016 IPO (approx. $35m) and the August 2017 raising (approx. $12.1m: $5m placement plus $7.1m entitlement) — the August 2017 raise may have settled in early FY2018, so allocation by fiscal year is approximate. FY2019: $30m entitlement offer at 10c (Oct 2018). FY2020: $25m accelerated renounceable entitlement offer at 1.5c (Feb 2020). In aggregate, approximately $102m of equity was raised across four offerings in about three years, all of which was ultimately lost.
Asset sale proceeds (non-recurring cash inflows): Nangiloc parcel $4.5m (FY21 settlement), Merbein $4.3m (FY21), Gol Gol $5m (FY21), citrus farm approx. $4m (FY21; may overlap with Gol Gol), Mourquong plus Mildura farm $7.8m (FY22). Management cited about $22m of asset sales announced during FY21 (Strawman summary).
6.5 Ratios
All return metrics were negative in every year on a directional basis (losses in each year FY2017–FY2021), and net debt to EBITDA and interest coverage were not meaningful given negative EBITDA from FY2019 onward. Precise values cannot be computed without verified balance-sheet data.
6.6 Commentary on trends, inflections and drivers
FY2017 (IPO year): a broken prospectus: The company listed on a forecast of $15.9m adjusted EBITDA and delivered a statutory EBITDA loss. Management attributed the gap to a harvest delayed by a cool, wet spring and to slow accreditation and equipment installation at a new packing facility. The magnitude of the miss — revenue about $15m below target — triggered the governance crisis that followed.
FY2018: acquisition-inflated revenue, catastrophic loss: Revenue rose 41% because Food Source International and Australian Organic Holdings contributed for a full year, but the business recorded a loss of roughly $58–60m driven by a weak 2018 harvest (3,105 tonnes, below even 2017), weak sales, asset impairments and revaluations, and restructuring costs. H1 FY18 alone saw a $16m EBITDA loss, with management highlighting poor margins in commodity and bulk segments.
FY2019: the high-water mark of the turnaround: Under Valentina Tripp, the net loss narrowed about 80% to roughly $12m and management described a $10m EBITDA turnaround in year one of a three-year plan. But revenue fell about 12%, and late harvest timing pushed Q4 orders into FY2020, inflating costs per tonne.
FY2020: the pivot's cost: Revenue fell 20% to $48.3m and the loss expanded to about $39m, attributed to adverse weather (drought) and the cost of restructuring farming operations, including exiting the Colignan lease. Underlying EBITDA loss widened to $10.3m despite branded launches into Coles and Woolworths.
FY2021: shrinking into insolvency: Revenue fell a further 12% to $42.6m and underlying EBITDA-SL losses widened to $11.7m even after a 17% operating-cost reduction plan, around $22m of asset sales and about 30 new branded products. The branded strategy was not producing contribution fast enough to offset the loss of farming revenue and the overhead of the remaining structure.
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View Subscription PlansFinancial Detail
Business Lines
| Business line (as referenced by management) | Contents | Status at collapse |
|---|---|---|
Farming | Dried vine fruit, table grapes, citrus and wine grape properties in Sunraysia | Majority divested 2020–2021; full exit announced Dec 2021; residual seven properties marketed by receivers in 2022 |
Commodity / bulk | Bulk dried vine fruit sales | Margin-dilutive; de-emphasised |
Wholesale and ingredients | Dried fruit, nuts, seeds, rice to manufacturers and food-service | Deprioritised behind branded retail in FY22 (Source: just-food, Dec 2021) |
Branded retail | Murray River Organics, Gobble, Premium Australian Clusters, Murray River Wholegoods, Pacific Organics | Strategic focus from 2019; did not achieve scale |
Revenue by Segment
| Segment (AUD Mn) | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|
Total group revenue | 60.4 | 48.3 | 42.6 |
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View Subscription PlansIncome Statement and Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (AUD Mn, statutory) | 48.5 | 68.5 | 60.4 | 48.3 | 42.6 |
Revenue YoY growth (%) | — | 41.2 | -11.8 | -20.0 | -11.8 |
Reported or underlying EBITDA (AUD Mn) | -0.6 | — | -3.6 | -10.3 | -11.7 |
Net profit after tax (AUD Mn) | -6.0 | -58.1 | -12.0 | -39.1 | — |
Dividends per share (AUD) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
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View Subscription PlansMargin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
EBITDA margin (%) | -1.2 | — | -6.0 | -21.3 | -27.5 |
Net margin (%) | -12.4 | -84.8 | -19.9 | -81.0 | — |
Key Financials
| Metric | FY2018 |
|---|---|
Cash and equivalents (AUD Mn) | 3.8 |
Balance Sheet
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Dividends paid (AUD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Buybacks (AUD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Equity raised (AUD Mn, gross) | 47.1 | 0 | 30.0 | 25.0 | 0 |
Revenue by Region
| Region (AUD Mn) | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|
Total | 60.4 | 48.3 | 42.6 |
Share Price History
| Date | Price | Context | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Dec 2016 | 1.30 or 1.36 | IPO price — sources conflict | Stockhead (1.30); The Land (1.36) |
Post-IPO peak | 1.27 | Peak trading price | Business News Australia |
Aug 2017 | 0.30 | Capital raise price | The Land |
Late 2017 | 0.45 | Trading level | The Land |
Early 2018 | 0.38–0.40 | Trading level | Stockhead; Business News Australia |
May 2018 | 0.31 | Last trade before suspension | Stockhead |
Oct 2018 | 0.10 | $30m entitlement offer price | Stockhead |
Oct 2019 | 0.075 | After export update | Stockhead |
Nov 2019 | 0.05 | Last trade before suspension | Business News Australia |
Feb 2020 | 0.015 | $25m entitlement offer price | Business News Australia |
At delisting | 0.245 | Last price per InvestSMART | InvestSMART |
Balance Sheet and Per-Share Data
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Equity raised gross (AUD Mn) | 47.1 | 0 | 30.0 | 25.0 | 0 |
Issue price (AUD per share) | 1.30 | 0 | 0.10 | 0.015 | 0 |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance: None. The company has no management, only liquidators.
Consensus expectations: None; no broker coverage.
Bull-case arguments (historical, as they were made)
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Scarce asset base: certified organic land takes years to convert, giving MRG a supply moat in organic dried vine fruit (claimed world's largest integrated operator at IPO).
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Branded upside: national ranging in Coles and Woolworths and a $1 billion cereal category offered a path to higher margins than bulk.
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Asset-light optionality: after about $22m of FY21 asset sales and the Mourquong exit, an offtake model could have removed weather risk and fixed costs.
Bear-case arguments (which prevailed)
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Earnings never existed: losses every year from FY2017 to FY2021, with underlying EBITDA losses widening from $3.6m (FY19) to $11.7m (FY21) even after cost cuts.
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Shrinking top line: revenue fell from $68.5m to $42.6m between FY2018 and FY2021, so the pivot was cannibalising rather than replacing revenue.
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Capital exhaustion: four raises totalling about $102m and an issue price falling to 1.5c left no further equity tolerance; the secured lender enforced in February 2022.
Key catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
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Completion of the liquidation by Grant Thornton and any final report to creditors (via the Grant Thornton creditor portal and ASIC notices).
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Any liquidator investigations or recovery actions (none publicly disclosed to date).
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Deregistration of the four group companies with ASIC.
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Use of the former brands (Gobble, Premium Australian Clusters, Murray River Organics) by any acquirer — buyer identities not publicly disclosed.
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None of these is likely to produce value for former shareholders.
Concluding analyst verdict.
Murray River Organics is a case study in how an attractive category narrative — organic, Australian-grown, vertically integrated — cannot substitute for a business model that earns its cost of capital. The company came to market in December 2016 promising $15.9m of adjusted EBITDA and delivered a statutory EBITDA loss in its first year, citing weather and commissioning delays that should have been foreseeable risks for a single-region horticultural business. From there, every subsequent strategic phase was financed by fresh equity at progressively lower prices: about $47m in 2016–2017, $30m at 10c in 2018 and $25m at 1.5c in 2020. Across FY2017 to FY2021 the company did not report a single profitable year, and its revenue peaked in FY2018 only because of acquisitions.
The 2018–2021 turnaround under Valentina Tripp and then Birol Akdogan was directionally sensible — exit weather-exposed farming, sell surplus processing in a region with acknowledged overcapacity, and pursue higher-margin branded retail — but it was executed from a position of chronic illiquidity and against supermarket private labels with structural cost and shelf advantages. The branded portfolio grew in SKU count (about 30 launches in 2021) without generating the contribution needed to absorb overhead, and underlying EBITDA losses widened to $11.7m in FY21 even as revenue fell to $42.6m. Governance turbulence, including a board spill, an ASIC disclosure penalty and five CEO-level transitions in roughly five years, further eroded investor confidence and execution continuity.
The investment conclusion is unambiguous: there is no investable security. MRG was delisted in April 2023 and is in creditors' voluntary liquidation; equity holders should expect no recovery. The enduring lessons for analysts covering small-cap agrifood are to discount prospectus forecasts that depend on single-season harvests, to treat repeated deep-discount raises as a solvency signal rather than a reset, and to test whether a branded pivot can self-fund before the legacy asset base is sold.
Principal sources: ASX announcement lists (via InvestSMART and MarketScreener); MRG FY2019 Appendix 4E (ASX, 30 Aug 2019); Federal Court of Australia, [2022] FCA 232; Grant Thornton creditor information page; ASIC Published Notices (3 Jul 2023); just-food (2017–2022); Stockhead (2018–2019); Business News Australia (2018, 2020); The Land (2017); Sunraysia Daily (2020); Food & Drink Business (2020, 2022); AusFoodNews (Sept 2020); ARR.news (Apr 2022); Farm Online (2022); Canaccord Genuity transaction note (Feb 2020); Strawman member reports; Good On You / ethical.org.au (updated Mar 2025).
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Role | Tenure | Prior roles / notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Erling Sorensen | Co-founder, Managing Director | Pre-IPO to 2017 | Co-founder; exited after the 2017 downgrade | just-food; Stockhead |
Jamie Nemtsas | Co-founder | Pre-IPO to 2017 | Nemtsas family founded the business in 1970 | Stockhead; ethical.org.au |
George Haggar | CEO | Late 2017 to early 2018 | Eight years as COO of Costa Group | The Land; Business News Australia |
Valentina Tripp | CEO and MD | ~April 2018 to January 2021 (almost three years) | Described as a turnaround specialist | Stockhead; just-food |
Birol Akdogan | CFO, then interim CEO (from 15 Jan 2021), then CEO and MD (from March 2021) | Joined Sept 2020 until administration | Global VP at Ansell (2008–2020); previously CFO at CPI Group | just-food |
Executive Leadership Team — Albert Zago
| Name | Tenure | Notes |
|---|---|---|
Albert Zago | To March 2020 | Departed for an undisclosed reason (just-food) |
Birol Akdogan | Sept 2020 – March 2021 | Promoted to CEO |
Successor CFO | Appointed March 2021 | Name n/d (MarketScreener headline only) |
Board of Directors
| Name | Role | Tenure | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
Andrew Monk | Chairman | January 2018 EGM onward | Appointed when the founder-aligned bloc rolled the board |
Steven Si | Non-executive director | From January 2018 | Associated with founders per Stockhead |
Keith Mentiplay | Non-executive director | From January 2018 | Associated with founders per Stockhead |
Farrow, Hennessy, Carr | Former directors | Removed January 2018 EGM | First names n/d in sources reviewed |
December 2021 changes | — | Board changes announced 22 Dec 2021 | Details n/d |
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Stake | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Jamel Family Trust (Melanie Nemtsas) | Reduced from 8.29% to 5.74% | Early 2018 | Stockhead |
Sorensen Family Trust (Kim Sorensen) | Reduced from 7.83% to 6.27% | Early 2018 | Stockhead |
Thorney Investment Group | Major shareholder; took full entitlement of the 2018 raise | Oct 2018 | Stockhead |
BLBD Pty and Meredith nominees | Together more than 5% | 2017 | The Land |
Late-stage substantial holder changes | Notices filed 29 Nov 2022, 24 Mar 2023 and 30 Mar 2023 | 2022–2023 | InvestSMART (holders n/d) |
Competitive Landscape
Key Competitors
| Competitor | Segment overlap | Positioning relative to MRG |
|---|---|---|
Sunbeam Foods (Australia) | Dried vine fruit, dried fruit snacks | Long-established Australian dried fruit processor; strong supermarket presence |
Costa Group (now private after 2024 take-private) | Fresh produce; bought MRG's Nangiloc citrus/wine parcel | Scale horticulture operator; 1H CY2020 revenue $612.4m (Food & Drink Business, 2020) — roughly 25x MRG's annual revenue |
Angas Park (Australia) | Dried fruit snacks | Established dried fruit brand |
Macro (Woolworths private label organic) | Organic pantry and snacks | Retailer-owned organic range competing directly on shelf |
Coles Organic (private label) | Organic pantry | Retailer-owned, price-advantaged |
Carman's | Muesli, bars, clusters | Leading Australian branded muesli; direct competitor to MRG cereals and clusters |
Freedom Foods / Noumi | Better-for-you cereals and snacks | Listed peer; also suffered financial distress |
Forage / The Healthy Snack Co. (various) | Fruit and nut snacks | Branded snack competitors |
Lotus / Pure Harvest / Absolute Organic | Organic pantry staples | Health channel competitors |
Turkish and US (California) dried vine fruit exporters | Bulk and export dried vine fruit | Lower-cost global supply; price setters in commodity markets |
Competitor Detail
| Metric | MRG (FY2021) |
|---|---|
Revenue (AUD Mn) | 42.6 |
Revenue growth (%) | -11.8 |
EBITDA margin (%) | -27.5 |
Recent Developments
Important: * There has been no operating newsflow for the past 18 months (April 2025 – October 2026). The company ceased operations in 2022 and was in liquidation from mid-2023.



