Naspers Limited

Comparability warning. Naspers has restated prior years several times:

• discontinued operations (OLX Autos, Russia exits);

• the move from "trading profit" to aEBITDA/aEBIT;

• the 2025 share split.

The tables below show figures as reported in each year's announcement unless labelled restated or derived. The figures for FY22 and FY23 come from secondary summaries of the FY23 and FY24 announcements, rounded to US$100m where the source gives US$bn.

Table 6.1 — Income statement (US$ m)

Notes to Table 6.1: - FY22 and FY23 revenue are shown before the OLX Autos reclassification. The FY24 announcement implies FY23 restated revenue of about US$5.9bn (derived).

• FY26 "profit" is the company's "earnings from continuing operations" of US$11.6bn, down 6% year on year because of US$1.3bn lower gains on Tencent disposals.

• Core HE for FY25 and FY26 is on a total-operations basis. The continuing-operations figures are US$3,110m and US$3,563m.

Table 6.2 — Per-share data (US cents, split-adjusted)

Notes to Table 6.2: - FY22–FY24 per-share values are the published pre-split figures divided by 5 (derived). The published values were: EPS 4,218 and 2,078; HEPS 143 (FY23 restated) and 792; core HEPS 546 (FY23 restated) and 1,148.

• The dividend figure is the dividend paid by Naspers from the amount it receives from Prosus, according to the rights attached to Naspers shares.

Table 6.3 — Margins (company-reported or computed)

Notes on growth and gross profit:

• Revenue CAGR (FY22–FY26, as reported) is about 14.6% (derived). It mixes reporting bases and is heavily acquisition-driven.

• Organic growth (local currency ex-M&A) was reported as 20% in FY25 and 12% in FY26.

• Gross margin is therefore not reported here.

Table 6.4 — Balance sheet and liquidity (US$ bn unless stated)

Notes to Table 6.4: Table 6.5 — Cash flow and capital return (US$ m)

Notes on cash flow: - FY23 free cash flow is derived from the FY24 statement that it improved by US$836m to US$477m.

• The FY26 Naspers buyback covered 49.8 million shares and was funded by selling 52.6 million Prosus shares.

• From June 2022 to 31 March 2026, Naspers repurchased 323.4 million of its own shares for US$12.1bn. Prosus repurchased 939.9 million of its own shares for US$32.8bn in the same period.

• Management says the group as a whole has returned US$46bn through buybacks.

• Free cash flow is the company-defined measure: aEBITDA less non-cash items, share-based compensation, working capital, tax, capex, leases and investment income.

Table 6.6 — Ratios

Notes to Table 6.6: - Current ratio and net debt/aEBITDA are computed from the figures above.

• Free cash flow exceeds aEBITDA because the measure includes the Tencent dividend.

• ROE, ROA, ROIC, debt/equity, interest coverage, asset turnover and the cash conversion cycle cannot be computed reliably without full balance-sheet and income-statement lines. They are therefore not reported.

• Net debt/aEBITDA overstates leverage in economic terms because it excludes the Tencent stake. Prosus's Tencent holding alone is worth more than Prosus's entire market value.

Trend commentary.

1. Revenue. Revenue was flat to modest from FY22 to FY24, then accelerated. The FY24 dip reflects exits and reclassifications (OLX Autos, Russia). FY25 delivered 12% reported growth to US$7.2bn. FY26's 51% jump is mostly from acquisitions; underlying growth was 12%, slowing from 20% in FY25. The deceleration reflects:

   • iFood facing Keeta and 99Food in the second half of FY26;

   • a softer jobs market at OLX;

   • Media24's print decline.

2. Profitability. The defining inflection was the move from heavy e-commerce losses (FY23 trading loss of US$435m) to:

   • break-even in FY24 (+US$24m);

   • US$499m of group aEBITDA in FY25;

   • US$1,093m in FY26. All three regional ecosystems are now aEBITDA-positive. IFRS operating profit turned negative in FY26 (-US$217m) despite higher aEBIT. The gap reflects acquisition-related amortisation, business-combination costs and other non-operating items that the adjusted measures exclude. This divergence deserves scrutiny.

3. Earnings quality. Core HE (US$3.6bn) remains dominated by Tencent's equity-accounted contribution. The consolidated businesses' aEBIT was US$583m. The FY24 Daily Investor analysis showed that profit excluding Tencent income was negative.

4. Balance sheet. Central cash fell from US$17.4bn to US$9.5bn in FY26 because of:

   • the JET (€4.1bn) and La Centrale (€1.1bn) acquisitions;

   • Despegar;

   • continued buybacks. This moved the HoldCo to US$6.5bn of net debt. Liquidity was then strengthened in July 2026 with a US$1.65bn bond issue to pre-fund the 2027 maturities. Pending proceeds from the Delivery Hero stake (about €2.1bn at €41.50 for about 51.1 million shares; derived) will rebuild cash when Uber's offer closes, expected in the second half of 2027.

5. Cash. FY26 was a record year for free cash flow (US$1.5bn). The non-Tencent component turned positive at US$253m. FY27 investment in iFood and JET will test whether this holds.

Sources: Naspers FY26 short-form results and supplementary presentation; Naspers FY24 SENS results (24 June 2024) and trading statement (11 June 2024); Daily Investor (FY23, FY24 analyses); Aperture (Old Mutual) FY24 and FY26 notes; Alliance News (August 2026).

Management guidance for FY27 (Prosus-level; it drives Naspers):

• Framed as a "year of execution" and an investment year.

• Revenue is expected to grow.

• Group aEBITDA is expected to be broadly flat.

• iFood investment reduces aEBITDA by US$100–150m.

• JET targets: more than US$3.6bn revenue, more than US$100m aEBITDA, and a return to order growth by the end of the year.

• Buybacks of about US$5bn.

• Tencent to be held for the foreseeable future.

Aggregator price targets imply substantial upside from current levels, but those targets were mostly set before the August–October 2026 de-rating.

Bull case:

1. Tencent optionality at a discount. Prosus trades below the value of its Tencent stake alone (about 17% discount), so the ecosystem portfolio, which management values at about US$100bn excluding Tencent per Aperture's summary, is effectively free.

2. Proven profit engine with a self-funding path. Ecosystem aEBITDA tripled in two years. Free cash flow excluding the Tencent dividend turned positive (US$253m). If iFood regains share as it did in prior price wars and JET hits its targets, FY28 profit could re-accelerate sharply.

3. Capital returns and capital release. The about US$5bn buyback, about €2.1bn of Delivery Hero proceeds, and possible IPOs (PayU, Indian holdings) support NAV-per-share accretion. Buybacks have already added 16 percentage points of NAV accretion.

Bear case:

1. Brazil's moat is under attack. Chinese entrants (Keeta, 99Food) are well funded. iFood's planned spend of about US$4.7bn and lower FY27 margins could become a structural reset rather than a temporary one.

2. JET is a consolidator's underdog. The Uber–Delivery Hero combination (US$236bn of pro-forma gross bookings) and DoorDash–Deliveroo create stronger rivals. JET earned just US$8m of aEBIT on US$1.9bn of revenue over six months.

3. Structural discount and governance. The A-share control structure, repeated pay dissent, IFRS operating losses and Tencent/China risk may keep the discount wide, so buybacks deliver less than promised. Management itself admitted the discount has not narrowed as hoped.

Key catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months):

• Interim results H1 FY27 (expected late November 2026): iFood margins and market share; JET order growth.

• Close of Uber's Delivery Hero offer (acceptance window ends 5 November 2026; completion expected H2 2027).

• Tencent results and policy on AI capex; pace of Prosus's Tencent sell-downs.

• Evidence of NAV-discount narrowing after the FY27 board-priority statement.

• Credit losses in iFood Pago's consumer-credit expansion.

• Any PayU IPO or India portfolio monetisation.

• The 2027 AGM remuneration vote and any structural governance change.

• Takealot's competitive position against Amazon and Temu; the pace of Media24's digital transition.

Analyst verdict.

Naspers enters late 2026 in a paradox. Operationally, FY26 was the best year in its modern history:

• consolidated revenue of US$10.8bn;

• group aEBITDA of US$1.1bn, more than double FY25;

• record free cash flow of US$1.5bn;

• profitability in every regional ecosystem and in Takealot.

The Bloisi-era thesis, which turned a passive Tencent holding company into an AI-led operator with integrated regional ecosystems, has moved from slideware to the P&L. The cross-selling evidence from iFood, Despegar and iFood Pago is real.

Yet the share price sits near its 52-week low, about 44% below its high. There are three reasons:

Tencent sentiment: Naspers remains, in effect, a leveraged Tencent proxy.

An investment year: Management has chosen to forgo FY27 profit growth to defend iFood against heavily funded Chinese entrants and to rebuild JET.

A stubborn governance and structure discount: It persists despite US$46bn of group buybacks.

Our assessment is that the balance of evidence favours an improving but not yet de-risked story.

In the company's favour: - iFood has historically won price wars from a position of scale.

• OLX is a high-quality compounder.

• The balance sheet is investment-grade and is being replenished by Delivery Hero proceeds.

Against it: - The two largest uses of new capital are both in hyper-competitive delivery markets that are consolidating around larger players.

• IFRS operating results remain negative.

• N shareholders have no effective voice.

The equity is likely to re-rate only if three things happen together:

1. iFood shows share stabilisation with recovering margins in H2 FY27.

2. JET delivers its first sustained order growth.

3. The NAV discount narrows, ideally through a structural step rather than buybacks alone.

Until those signals appear, Naspers offers deep-value Tencent exposure with genuine operating upside. Investors should expect high volatility around Tencent and Brazil newsflow.