NHPC Ltd

NHPC is a regulated-return hydropower utility whose earnings are set by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission on a cost-plus basis, delivering a post-tax return on regulated equity in the 15.5%–16.5% band. That model makes NHPC less a commodity power producer than a rate-base compounder: value accrues not from tariffs or merchant prices but from converting capital work-in-progress into commissioned, tariff-approved regulated equity. For a decade that conversion stalled — revenue compounded at roughly 3% while CWIP ballooned past ₹50,000 crore. FY2026 marked the inflection. NHPC commissioned 1,850 MW in a single year, its highest ever, lifting consolidated capacity to 9,333 MW and regulated equity from ₹18,309 crore toward a projected ₹30,723 crore by end-FY2027. Against that, the July 2026 Teesta-VI tunnel disaster, which killed 25 workers, has re-priced the execution and social-licence risk embedded in Himalayan tunnelling — the very activity on which the next 8,014 MW of hydro construction depends.

NHPC Limited is the Government of India's flagship hydroelectric power generation company and, on a consolidated basis, the single largest owner of hydroelectric capacity in the country. It operates under the administrative control of the Ministry of Power, holds Navratna status (conferred August 2024, upgraded from Miniratna Category-I), and has been listed since September 2009.

Zeros denote "not disclosed in that source", not a value of zero. The S&P Global series implies a 9.29% (394-person) increase in FY2026, which is inconsistent with the ~4,597 figure attributed to March 2025. NHPC's own FY2026 investor presentation discloses profit per employee of ₹23 lakh in Q1 FY2027 which, applied to Q1 attributable PAT of ₹1,095.87 crore, implies roughly 4,760 employees on a consolidated basis. Treat the headcount as approximately 4,600–4,800 and not precisely reconcilable from public sources.

What the company does

NHPC plans, investigates, designs, constructs, owns and operates hydroelectric power stations, and sells the resulting bulk electricity to state distribution utilities under long-term power purchase agreements. It has extended that core into ground-mounted and floating solar, wind, pumped storage hydro, and — since 2022 — into the role of Renewable Energy Implementing Agency (REIA), acting as an intermediary procurer that tenders renewable capacity, signs PPAs with developers and back-to-back PSAs with buying utilities.

The company's own characterisation

NHPC describes itself in its filings as being "primarily engaged in the generation and sale of bulk power to various power utilities," with "other business activities including project management, construction contracts, consultancy assignment services and trading of power." Its stated vision is "to be a global leading organization for sustainable development of clean power through competent, responsible and innovative values." The company emphasises that it is "involved across the entire chain of hydro power project development — from concept to commissioning," a claim substantiated by in-house survey and investigation, design and engineering, contract management and O&M capabilities that few Indian developers retain internally.

Independent characterisation

The accurate way to model NHPC is as a regulated asset-base utility with a long construction lag and a sovereign counterparty structure, not as a renewable-energy growth company. Five features define the model:

Regulated cost-plus economics. Tariffs for NHPC's central-sector stations are determined by CERC under multi-year tariff regulations. The annual fixed charge (AFC) comprises return on equity, depreciation, interest on loan capital, interest on working capital, and O&M expenses. Return on equity is set at a normative post-tax rate (15.5%–16.5% depending on project category and commissioning timing) applied to regulated equity — the equity portion of approved capital cost, conventionally 30% of the capitalised project cost. Recovery of the AFC is contingent on achieving a Normative Annual Plant Availability Factor (NAPAF), typically around 80–86% depending on station.

Revenue is availability-driven, not volume-driven. Because the capacity charge dominates, NHPC's revenue is far more sensitive to plant availability than to hydrology. The FY2026 consolidated PAF of 74.75% (80% excluding the out-of-service Teesta-V) versus a normative 80% is therefore the single most important operating metric, more so than the 29,600 MU of generation.

Cost overruns are substantially pass-through. As management put it on the Q4 FY2026 call, cost escalation "beyond the control of the management" is allowed by CERC. This materially de-risks the reported P&L from construction inflation but does not de-risk the timing of returns, since no revenue accrues until commercial operation.

Two secondary revenue layers. (i) Incentives — secondary (surplus) energy sales, PAF-based incentives above normative levels, and deviation settlement charges. These totalled ₹913 crore in FY2026 (secondary energy ₹570 crore, PAF incentives ₹297 crore, deviation ₹46 crore) versus ₹865 crore in FY2025. (ii) Consultancy, contracts and project management — NHPC has historically executed consultancy for projects in Bhutan (Mangdechhu 720 MW, Kurichhu 60 MW, Tala 1,020 MW HRT repair) and Myanmar (Tamanthi 1,200 MW). These do not constitute a reportable segment.

Trading and intermediation. NHPC trades power and, as REIA, has awarded roughly 23 GW of renewable capacity to developers, of which approximately 13 GW is expected to reach PPA/PSA signature and roughly 7 GW had been signed as of May 2026. This is a fee/margin-light intermediation business, not balance-sheet capacity, and should not be conflated with owned generation.

Revenue model mix

There is no subscription or licensing revenue. Product-versus-service framing is not meaningful for this issuer; the appropriate axis is regulated versus non-regulated, and NHPC is overwhelmingly regulated.

Value chain position and customers

NHPC sits at the generation node of the electricity value chain, immediately upstream of inter-state transmission (Power Grid) and state distribution utilities. Customers are almost exclusively state-owned distribution companies and state power departments, allocated power by the Ministry of Power under the central-sector allocation framework. NHPC's largest exposures as at 30 June 2026 were Uttar Pradesh (₹740 crore receivable), Jammu & Kashmir (₹714 crore), Rajasthan (₹571 crore), Punjab (₹469 crore) and Haryana (₹320 crore).

Counterparty risk — historically the sector's central weakness — has been materially mitigated by the Electricity (Late Payment Surcharge and Related Matters) Rules and the tri-partite agreement mechanism. Debtor days have collapsed from 212 in FY2023 to 83 in FY2026, and dues outstanding beyond 45 days were only ₹262 crore at 30 June 2026 against total trade receivables of ₹4,354 crore.

End-markets

Bulk electricity supply to the Indian grid, with three demand drivers specific to NHPC: (i) India's non-fossil capacity target and the resulting requirement for despatchable clean power; (ii) grid-balancing demand created by the ~208 GW of private renewable capacity now on the system, which raises the option value of hydro and pumped storage; and (iii) strategic/geopolitical development of the Chenab, Teesta, Subansiri and Dibang basins, where hydro build carries policy weight beyond its economics.

Stated strategy

NHPC's published vision is "to be a global leading organization for sustainable development of clean power through competent, responsible and innovative values." The operative strategy, as expressed through capital allocation and management commentary rather than mission language, has four pillars.

Pillar one — convert the pipeline. NHPC's total identified portfolio is 48,620 MW against 9,333 MW operating. The strategic imperative is throughput: moving projects from survey and investigation (19,820 MW) through clearance (10,263 MW) to construction (9,204 MW) to commercial operation. Director (Projects) Sanjay Kumar Singh stated on the Q4 FY2026 call a target of bringing five hydro projects into the construction stage during FY2027 — Uri-I Stage-II and Dulhasti Stage-II already awarded, plus Etalin, Sawalkot and Kamala — plus one pumped storage project, Indira Sagar–Omkareshwar 640 MW.

Pillar two — pumped storage as the second act. NHPC has 15 PSP schemes totalling 17,930 MW at PFR or DPR stage across Maharashtra (7,500 MW), Andhra Pradesh (3,270 MW via the ANGEL JV with APGENCO), Odisha (2,820 MW), Chhattisgarh (1,800 MW), Rajasthan (1,000 MW), Gujarat (900 MW) and Madhya Pradesh (640 MW via NHDC). Management explicitly declined to guide on PSP tariffs or returns, saying "it is very early to say about realization" — a candid admission that the economics are unproven.

Pillar three — brownfield capacity augmentation. The Uri-I Stage-II (240 MW, ₹2,709 crore) and Dulhasti Stage-II (260 MW, ₹2,994 crore) approvals of February 2026 represent a new and structurally attractive strategy: adding units at existing sites with existing reservoirs, access roads, transmission and clearances. At roughly ₹11.3 crore and ₹11.5 crore per MW, these are the cheapest hydro MW in the portfolio and carry a fraction of the greenfield execution risk. This is the most sensible strategic move NHPC has made in years and it is under-discussed.

Pillar four — asset-light renewables intermediation. The REIA and BESS intermediary roles put roughly 20 GW of tendered capacity through NHPC's books without balance-sheet exposure. Management conceded on the Q4 call that renewable tendering has slowed — "we have not done any tendering in last recent past" — and that of ~23 GW awarded, only ~7 GW has reached signed PSAs against ~13 GW hoped for. The intermediation model is bottlenecked by discom appetite, not by NHPC's capability.

Announced initiatives, last 24 months

Sustainability and ESG commitments

NHPC publishes a Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (BRSR) under the SEBI framework, first adopted for FY2022-23.

Management's medium-term financial targets

Management does not issue revenue or earnings guidance. It does provide physical and capital guidance, which is more useful:

Regulated equity is recognised in the financial year of full commissioning, with full-year PAT attributed to the following financial year — management describes this as a deliberately conservative convention. Zeros denote no guidance issued.

The headline is stark and rarely stated plainly: regulated equity is projected to rise 68% in a single year — from ₹18,309 crore to ₹30,723 crore — and then to grow by less than 5% in total over the following two years. FY2027 is not the start of a growth curve; it is a step function, after which growth resumes only from FY2030 as Ratle, Kwar, Teesta-VI and the Stage-II projects land. The expected additional PAT profile (₹2,110 crore in one year, then ₹118 crore, then ₹137 crore) makes the point unambiguously.

NHPC's "products" are power stations. The catalog below is complete for operating assets as disclosed in the FY 26-27 (June 2026) investor presentation.

Operating hydroelectric stations — NHPC standalone (7,251.20 MW)

Flagship commentary. Dulhasti was the highest-PBT station in Q1 FY2027 at ₹195 crore. Sewa-II recorded the highest PAF at 109.59% against a normative 86%. Uri-II delivered the best generation relative to design energy (47% of annual design energy in Q1 alone). Subansiri Lower was the highest-generating station in Q1 FY2027 at 1,316 MU. Chutak and Nimoo Bazgo carry extreme tariffs (₹9.91 and ₹10.61/kWh) reflecting tiny scale and Ladakh construction costs — these are strategic rather than commercial assets. Parbati-II is the cautionary tale: capitalised at ₹13,875 crore, it generated only 1,642 MU in FY2026 against 3,125 MU design energy following a cloudburst, and delivered a full-year loss of ₹150 crore despite a Q4 profit of ₹104 crore.

Operating renewable assets — NHPC standalone (400 MW)

Operating assets — subsidiaries (1,681.70 MW)

Consolidated operating portfolio: 31 stations, 9,332.90 MW, 31,155.65 MU design energy, ₹66,357.70 crore gross capital cost.

Services

REIA and BESS intermediation book (not owned capacity)

All figures consolidated, ₹ crore, unless stated. Sources: NHPC consolidated financial statements as reproduced by Screener.in from BSE filings; NHPC Investor Presentation FY 26-27; Q4 FY2026 earnings call.

Important reconciliation caveat. Screener's aggregation of "Other income" and "Expenses" does not match NHPC's own line-item classification, chiefly because NHPC reports Rate Regulated (Regulatory Deferral) Income separately below PBT. Screener's FY2026 "Other income" of ₹3,196 crore compares with the company's stated other income of approximately ₹1,071 crore. The lines that reconcile exactly across both presentations are Revenue from operations, Finance cost, Depreciation, PBT (after regulatory deferral) and PAT, and derived metrics in this dossier are built from those.

Income statement

Zeros denote line items not disclosed in the sources reviewed for that year. NHPC does not report a gross profit line; for a regulated hydro utility the nearest analogue is revenue less generation expenses, which was 92.3% of revenue in FY2025 and 92.9% in FY2026.

Revenue CAGR. FY2022–FY2026: 6.2%. FY2021–FY2026 (five years from ₹9,648 crore): 3.8%. Ten-year compounded sales growth is approximately 3%. Trailing-twelve-month revenue to 30 June 2026 is ₹12,210 crore, implying a 12% TTM growth rate — the inflection is real but only one year old.

Balance sheet

Goodwill. No material goodwill is separately disclosed. Intangibles are grouped with right-of-use assets at ₹4,514 crore (FY2026) and are immaterial relative to a ₹120,007 crore balance sheet.

Working capital (FY2026, from the Q1 FY2027 presentation's comparative column). Current assets — trade receivables ₹2,629 crore + cash and bank ₹3,651 crore + other current assets ₹8,386 crore = ₹14,666 crore. Current liabilities and provisions ₹14,106 crore. Net working capital: +₹560 crore, a current ratio of 1.04x. At 30 June 2026 the comparable figures were ₹15,136 crore and ₹14,433 crore, a current ratio of 1.05x.

The single most important balance-sheet event of FY2026 is the transfer of roughly ₹28,000 crore from CWIP to PPE — CWIP fell from ₹50,601 crore to ₹34,948 crore while net PPE rose from ₹22,168 crore to ₹50,290 crore. This is the accounting signature of Parbati-II, Subansiri Lower units 1–3 and Karnisar entering commercial operation, and it is the mechanical driver of the ₹783 crore step-up in depreciation and the ₹877 crore step-up in interest charged to P&L rather than capitalised.

Cash flow

NHPC has never conducted a share buyback. Capital returns are entirely via dividend.

Ratios

Inventory days and payable days are not meaningful and are not disclosed for a hydro generator; the cash conversion cycle therefore equals debtor days.

Commentary — trends, inflections and drivers

Revenue. The five-year picture is a company that went nowhere and then moved. FY2022 revenue of ₹9,144 crore was below FY2020's ₹10,008 crore. FY2023 recovered to ₹10,607 crore on strong hydrology (30,063 MU generated, the best year in the series). FY2024 fell back 9% to ₹9,631 crore on a weak monsoon and the first full-year effect of Teesta-V's outage. FY2025 recovered modestly. FY2026's 12% increase to ₹11,615 crore is the first growth driven by new assets rather than weather — attributable to Parbati-II's first full year, four Subansiri Lower units, and Karnisar Solar. Generation rose 16% to 29,600 MU (excluding infirm power).

Margins. The EBITDA margin peaked at 72.3% in FY2024 and has compressed to 62.8%. The FY2026 compression is almost entirely explained by a ₹1,938 crore increase in other expenses: general network access charges +₹822 crore (a direct consequence of new capacity being scheduled onto the grid), insurance expense +₹476 crore (post-Teesta-V, insurance for Himalayan assets has repriced sharply), losses out of insurance claims +₹225 crore, provisions +₹168 crore, and R&M +₹111 crore. Employee benefits fell ₹325 crore, from ₹1,823 crore to ₹1,498 crore, because FY2025 contained a ₹383 crore pay-anomaly charge that did not recur. The insurance line deserves particular attention: it is a structurally higher, permanently elevated cost of doing business in the Himalaya, not a one-off.

Interest and depreciation — the commissioning tax. Finance cost rose from ₹1,189 crore to ₹1,423 crore, a net figure that conceals a ₹877 crore increase in interest on bonds and term loans now expensed rather than capitalised (Parbati-II, Subansiri Lower, Karnisar), offset by a ₹677 crore decrease in interest on arbitration and court cases. Depreciation rose ₹783 crore for the same reason. Together these two lines absorbed ₹1,017 crore of incremental cost in FY2026. This is the mechanical cost of commissioning, and it arrives before the offsetting revenue does — because CERC tariff orders lag COD.

The tariff-lag problem, quantified. Management disclosed on the Q4 FY2026 call that it is booking revenue at a conservative 80% of the annual fixed charge filed with CERC for both Parbati-II and Subansiri Lower, pending final orders. Parbati-II booked ₹1,320 crore against a grossed-up ₹1,600 crore, an under-recovery of roughly ₹300 crore; Subansiri Lower booked ₹613 crore with an under-recovery of roughly ₹150 crore. Approximately ₹450 crore of FY2026 revenue was deliberately not recognised and will be booked, with interest from the date of COD, once final tariff orders are issued. Parbati-II's final hearing concluded in May 2026 with orders expected by mid-June 2026; Subansiri Lower's interim order was awaited with a final order anticipated within six months of it. This is a recognised, dated, quantified catch-up — arguably the most under-appreciated item in the FY2027 earnings bridge.

The FY2026 tax anomaly. The reported effective tax rate of -8% is not an operating result. NHPC elected the concessional 25% regime under Section 115BAA because MAT credit is discontinued from FY2027. Deferred tax liabilities previously created at higher rates had to be restated to 25%, producing a ₹1,156 crore DTL reversal disclosed in Note 8 to the FY2026 results. A corresponding reversal was booked in the rate-regulated asset. The net one-off benefit to PAT was approximately ₹900 crore. Adjusted FY2026 consolidated PAT is therefore approximately ₹3,320 crore, not ₹4,220 crore — meaning underlying earnings fell year on year rather than rising 24%. Any valuation built on the reported ₹3.75 EPS is overstating the run-rate by roughly ₹0.90.

Cash flow deterioration. Operating cash flow fell from ₹7,252 crore (FY2024) to ₹3,294 crore (FY2026) while capex rose from ₹8,652 crore to ₹13,689 crore. Free cash flow was negative ₹8,274 crore in FY2026 after negative ₹3,823 crore in FY2025. The gap was bridged by ₹8,928 crore of financing inflow, with borrowings rising ₹12,770 crore to ₹52,327 crore. NHPC is in the deepest cash-burn phase of its history, funding a ₹15,000 crore FY2027 capex target from a shrinking operating cash base. The dividend cut — from ₹1.91 to ₹1.61 per share, payout from 64% to 43% — is the visible consequence and should be read as a deliberate, rational reallocation, not distress.

Leverage. Net debt to EBITDA of 6.7x is high in absolute terms but not unusual for a regulated utility mid-build, and interest coverage of 3.7x remains adequate. The credit agencies have not blinked: ICRA reaffirmed [ICRA]AAA (Stable) on 1 July 2026. The relevant risk is not solvency but the duration of the negative-FCF window, which on management's own guidance extends through at least FY2029 given Dibang's February 2032 completion date.

Management guidance

NHPC does not guide on revenue or earnings. Its guidance is physical and capital:

• FY2027 consolidated capex target: ₹15,000 crore (against ₹13,689 crore actual in FY2026).
• FY2027 hydro commissioning: 2,744 MW — Subansiri Lower balance 1,000 MW, Pakal Dul 1,000 MW, Kiru 624 MW, Rangit-IV 120 MW — taking cumulative hydro to 11,515 MW.
• FY2027 solar commissioning: 1,190 MW.
• FY2027 consolidated regulated equity: ₹30,723 crore (management also cited ₹30,627 crore on the call), from ₹18,309 crore.
• Expected additional PAT of ₹2,110 crore attributed to FY2028 on the conservative convention that a project's full-year PAT is recognised in the year following full commissioning.
• Five hydro projects plus one PSP into construction during FY2027: Uri-I Stage-II and Dulhasti Stage-II (already awarded), Etalin, Sawalkot, Kamala, and Indira Sagar–Omkareshwar PSP 640 MW. Subansiri Upper is explicitly deferred to FY2028.
• Normative PAF: 80% (consolidated NAPAF 82%). Q1 FY2027 actual was 80.79%.
• Average annual capex guidance beyond FY2027 was indicated in the range referenced at the 9M FY2026 call but was not restated precisely; treat as approximately ₹15,000 crore annually.

Consensus expectations

Consensus targets span ₹72 to ₹117 with a mean around ₹82–93 depending on source, against ₹76.4. Sell-side revenue growth expectations are aggressive — AlphaSpread's aggregated projections imply a three-year revenue CAGR of 39% and a three-year operating income CAGR of 72%, reflecting full-year contributions from Subansiri Lower, Parbati-II, Pakal Dul, Kiru and Teesta-V plus the tariff catch-up. These growth rates are arithmetically plausible from a low base but require essentially flawless execution and timely CERC orders.

Bull case

One — the tariff catch-up is dated, quantified and near-certain. Approximately ₹450 crore of FY2026 revenue was deliberately unbooked (₹300 crore Parbati-II, ₹150 crore Subansiri Lower), recoverable with interest from COD. Parbati-II's final hearing concluded in May 2026 with the order expected by mid-June 2026. Once received, the differential plus interest is recognised in the quarter it arrives. Subansiri Lower follows within roughly six months of its interim order. This is a mechanical, regulator-backed earnings release with a known floor.

Two — regulated equity rises 68% in one year and the market is not paying for it. From ₹18,309 crore to ₹30,723 crore by end-FY2027, with ₹2,110 crore of expected additional PAT. Against a current attributable PAT base of ₹3,766 crore reported (or ~₹2,870 crore adjusted), a ₹2,110 crore uplift is transformational. The stock fell 9% over the year in which this became visible.

Three — Teesta-V's return plus PAF normalisation is a clean, immediate ₹400–500 crore. Teesta-V contributed zero revenue in both FY2025 and FY2026 while carrying full costs, with an AFC of approximately ₹500 crore (₹400 crore excluding tax). It returned to full commercial operation on 16 July 2026. Excluding Teesta-V, group PAF was already 80%; with it restored, headline PAF should converge on normative, releasing availability incentives on top of the AFC. Q1 FY2027's 80.79% PAF already shows this working.

Bear case

One — reported FY2026 earnings are overstated by roughly 24% and the market may not have adjusted. The ₹1,156 crore Section 115BAA deferred-tax reversal nets to approximately ₹900 crore of PAT. Adjusted attributable PAT of roughly ₹2,870 crore against ₹3,007 crore in FY2025 means underlying earnings fell in the record commissioning year. On adjusted EPS of ~₹2.86, the stock trades at ~26.7x, not 20.2x. The one-off does not repeat, and MAT credit is gone from FY2027.

Two — the growth cliff after FY2027 is in management's own numbers. Regulated equity: ₹30,723 crore (FY2027) → ₹31,415 crore (FY2028) → ₹32,223 crore (FY2029). Expected additional PAT: ₹2,110 crore → ₹118 crore → ₹137 crore. FY2027 is a step function, not a growth curve. Meanwhile free cash flow stays deeply negative — ₹15,000 crore of annual capex against ₹3,294 crore of FY2026 operating cash flow — funding Dibang (₹31,876 crore, completing February 2032), Etalin (₹30,037 crore), Kamala (₹26,070 crore) and Sawalkot (₹26,374 crore). Investors fund a decade of construction to reach a plateau in FY2029.

Three — Teesta-VI has permanently re-priced execution risk, and the consequences are unquantified. Twenty-five deaths in a 72%-complete project with ₹5,453.78 crore already spent. The S&P Global ESG downgrade from 61 to 57 is only the first measurable consequence. The DG Mines-Safety investigation has not reported. Public allegations about safety officer deployment and gas monitoring are unanswered. This matters far beyond Teesta-VI: the entire 8,014 MW hydro construction programme is tunnelling-intensive Himalayan work. Expect slower construction, mandated safety spending, higher insurance (already up ₹476 crore in FY2026 with no coverage remaining on Teesta-V), harder clearances and stiffer local opposition. NHPC's whole thesis rests on execution throughput; a mass-fatality event is the most direct possible attack on it.

Catalysts and monitorables — next twelve months

Analyst verdict

NHPC in September 2026 is a company whose thesis and whose principal risk have both crystallised within eight weeks of each other. On 16 July, Teesta-V returned after three years, restoring roughly ₹500 crore of annual fixed charge. On 20 July, twenty-five workers died in the Teesta-VI head race tunnel. Both facts are true, and the market is right to be split three-three between buy and sell.

The bull case is arithmetic and near-term: regulated equity rising 68% to ₹30,723 crore, roughly ₹450 crore of deliberately unbooked revenue awaiting CERC orders, and Teesta-V's AFC returning. That combination should produce a substantial FY2027 and FY2028 earnings step-up with unusually high visibility, because it is regulatory rather than commercial.

The bear case is arithmetic too, and it is longer-dated. Strip the ₹900 crore net deferred-tax one-off and FY2026 adjusted earnings declined in the best commissioning year in NHPC's history — the stock is on roughly 26.7x adjusted, not 20.2x. Free cash flow was negative ₹8,274 crore. Management's own regulated-equity schedule shows growth of 2.3% and 2.6% in the two years after FY2027. Investors are being asked to fund Dibang to 2032 for a plateau in 2029.

Teesta-VI is what breaks the tie. NHPC's entire competitive advantage is the ability to execute Himalayan tunnelling that nobody else will attempt. A twenty-five-fatality event, followed by an unanswered investigation, unanswered allegations about safety-officer deployment, an ESG downgrade and a ₹476 crore insurance cost increase, attacks precisely that advantage.

The honest position: FY2027 earnings will be strong and largely pre-ordained; the multiple on those earnings should compress, not expand, because the terminal execution assumption has weakened. Own it for the tariff catch-up. Do not own it for the pipeline until the Teesta-VI investigation reports.

APPENDIX — DATA QUALITY REGISTER

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