NOVONIX Limited American Depository Shares

Important comparability note. FY2021 and FY2022 were June-year-end periods reported in A$. The 20-F presents audited calendar FY2023–FY2025 in USD. Calendar FY2021–FY2022 USD comparatives are not available, so those columns are left empty.

Income statement

Source notes:

• Net income FY2023–FY2025 is from the 20-F. There is a discrepancy for FY2025: the 20-F risk factors state net loss as $84.5M, while the 20-F Business Overview and AGM materials state an after-tax loss of $92.7M. The difference may reflect comprehensive-loss versus profit-or-loss presentation or the treatment of discontinued items. $92.7M is used here.

• Gross profit conflicts sharply across aggregators: +$3.1M (Weiss) versus −$24.4M (VCP Scanner, which likely includes plant overhead in cost of sales). It is left blank.

Margins (derived):

Revenue CAGR: not meaningful. Revenue is immaterial and declining; FY2025 was about −4% year on year. H1 2026 continuing revenue was down about 61% year on year after the BTS reclassification.

Balance sheet

Notes:

• FY2025 cash: the 20-F gives $79.9M as "cash, cash equivalents and short-term investments". The Q4 2025 quarterly report gave $81.3M, and aggregators show $84.1–84.2M (possibly including restricted cash).

• FY2023 cash of $78.7M is aggregator-derived (Kalkine).

• FY2024 net assets of $137.6M are derived from the H1 2025 statement that net assets rose $6.2M to $143.8M.

• Total liabilities: edgar.tools gives $121.3M; Digrin gives $125.7M.

Total debt: aggregators diverge ($42.2M per Digrin versus $61.0M per Kalkine at Dec 2025). Most Yorkville debentures were being converted to equity progressively, so the debenture balance outstanding is NPD.

Goodwill and intangibles: NPD. Any BTS-related goodwill would have left the group on the 2026 disposal.

Interim snapshot, 30 Jun 2026 (H1 2026 report): cash $59.5M; net assets $157.3M; total assets about $264.6–265.0M (aggregator); total liabilities about $112.0M (aggregator); capex commitments $15.7M; DOE grant remaining claimable $51.3M; net tangible assets per share $0.15.

Cash flow

Notes:

• Operating cash flow is from the 20-F. Aggregators show FY2025 at −$42.2M to −$43.7M.

• Capex is derived as free cash flow minus operating cash flow, using the aggregator (Kalkine) free cash flow series. It is indicative only.

• FY2025 financing reflects the Yorkville debentures (about $95M cash for $100M face value) and the Phillips 66 placement.

• H1 2026 free cash flow: about −$31.6M to −$32.2M (aggregator).

Ratios

Ratio notes:

• FY2025 debt to equity uses the $42.2M debt aggregator figure. Using $61.0M instead gives 0.38x.

• ROIC, interest coverage and net debt/EBITDA are not meaningful because EBIT and EBITDA are negative.

• Net cash: positive in FY2025, with roughly $80M cash against roughly $42–61M of debt.

• Current ratio: only slightly above 1.0x at FY2025, given net current assets of just $3.9M.

• Cash conversion cycle: not meaningful while the company is pre-revenue.

Commentary on trends, inflections and drivers

The financial profile is that of a capital-intensive project developer, not an operating business.

Losses have widened every year. Net loss went from $46.2M (FY2023) to $74.8M (FY2024) to $92.7M (FY2025). The drivers are Riverside staffing ahead of revenue, depreciation of installed furnaces and finance costs. The FY2025 jump also reflects non-cash items, including fair-value movements on convertible debentures and a disclosed loss on equity investment securities.

Operating cash burn is steadier than accounting losses. It sat at about $36–41M a year. Capex accelerated sharply in FY2025, to about $62M on aggregator data, as Panasonic-specification equipment was installed (complete October 2025).

The balance sheet is refinanced repeatedly with dilutive capital. Funding came from the A$44.4M placement at A$0.60 (Nov 2024), US$100M of Yorkville debentures convertible at a discount (2025), and the A$20.7M placement at A$0.16 (Jun 2026). Equity issuance prices fell by roughly 73% over 19 months.

H1 2026 marked an inflection toward capital conservation. Full Riverside capacity was deferred four years, to September 2031. The adjacent land purchase was shelved. BTS was divested to cut overhead. Cash fell from $79.9M to $59.5M in six months; management cited roughly four quarters of runway in the Q1 2026 report.

Going-concern uncertainty is now a recurring audit theme. It was flagged in the FY2025 20-F risk factors and in PwC's H1 2026 review.

Management guidance (operational only)

• Industrial-grade synthetic graphite mass production in 2026.

• Panasonic battery-grade mass production in H2 2027, subject to Panasonic and its customers completing qualification.

• PowerCo supply from 2027.

• Riverside full 20,000 tpa capacity by Sep 2031.

• Continued phased capex. Additional funding is required beyond existing cash and expected customer receipts (H1 2026 report).

Consensus

Consensus revenue and EPS expectations are NPD; coverage is minimal. The financial trajectory implies continued losses through at least 2027.

Bull case

1. Qualification converts to revenue. The Panasonic C-sample succeeds, mass production starts in H2 2027, and PowerCo volumes (minimum 32,000 t over 5 years) layer on from 2027. That would turn an asset base valued at about 0.4x book into a revenue-generating plant.

2. Policy cash crystallises. Placing equipment in service unlocks up to $103M of 48C credits, $51.3M of remaining DOE grant, and 45X credits. This is non-dilutive capital comparable to the current market cap.

3. Trade protection returns. Renewed action against Chinese or transshipped AAM (the 20-F flags Indonesia and Morocco routing) restores pricing power for the few domestic producers.

Bear case

1. Funding gap. Cash of $59.5M at Jun 2026 and a ~$30–40M half-year burn leave about 4 quarters of runway. Equity issue prices fell from A$0.60 to A$0.16 in 19 months, and the June 2026 SPP raised only 32% of target.

2. Execution credibility. Stellantis walked away over specifications, Panasonic slipped to H2 2027, and full capacity slipped four years to 2031. Each slip extends the period of cash burn.

3. Economics without tariffs. The ITC ruling exposes NOVONIX to Chinese pricing that the company itself warns may sit below US production costs (20-F). This could undermine offtake margins and the bankability of the DOE loan.

Key catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)

• Nasdaq bid-price compliance outcome, or a delisting/transfer decision, after the 1:40 ADS ratio change.

• Appointment of a permanent CFO; the interim term was 3–6 months from Jul 2026.

• Panasonic qualification progress after the C-sample, and any further timeline change.

• First industrial-grade commercial shipments and revenue in 2026.

• DOE ATVM loan financial close, or its withdrawal.

• Equipment placed in service, which triggers 48C claims and DOE grant drawdowns.

• New offtake signings from the 13 sampling prospects.

• Next capital raise: size, price, structure (equity versus convertible) and strategic-investor participation.

• US trade policy on graphite, including any new petitions or transshipment actions.

• Quarterly cash reports (Q3 2026 due late October 2026).

Analyst verdict

NOVONIX is a strategically relevant but financially fragile company. Few Western firms hold a credible path to domestic synthetic graphite at scale. NOVONIX has installed Panasonic-specification equipment, holds binding offtakes with two tier-1 counterparties, and enjoys unusually deep US government backing: a $100M grant, a certified $103M 48C allocation, and a conditional $754.8M DOE loan. Those assets explain why the company keeps finding capital.

The past 18 months, however, show a pattern investors cannot ignore:

• The largest offtake was lost (Stellantis).

• The lead customer's start date slipped (Panasonic, to H2 2027).

• The expected 160%+ tariff umbrella failed at the ITC.

• The only revenue-generating business was sold for US$1.

• The CFO left.

• Full nameplate capacity was pushed back four years, to 2031.

Each development was individually explainable. Collectively, they have pushed the stock to roughly A$0.10, a market value near A$99M and about 0.4x reported net assets. The auditor has flagged a material going-concern uncertainty.

The equity is now a binary, option-like instrument on Panasonic qualification and funding. If qualification succeeds on schedule and the company can bridge to H2 2027 without crippling dilution, the gap between market value and book value, plus unclaimed government credits, offers substantial upside. If qualification slips again, or financing arrives only on punitive terms, existing holders face further heavy dilution or worse.

On balance, the risk-reward suits only speculative, policy-thematic capital with high tolerance for dilution. Institutional investors should wait for three confirmations before underwriting the story: a permanent CFO, a fully funded plan through first battery-grade revenue, and documented progress in Panasonic qualification. Until then, the most important number to watch is not tonnage but quarters of cash runway.

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It is not investment advice. Figures marked as aggregator-derived or NPD should be verified against the company's audited filings before use.