OpenLearning Limited Overview
OpenLearning is a micro-cap Australian education-technology company that sells an AI-native learning management system (LMS) to universities, colleges, vocational providers, governments and corporates on a SaaS basis. Pricing is primarily per learner. The company has evolved from a social-learning and MOOC platform (2012–2019) through an online-programme-management phase (2020–2023). It is now a focused institutional LMS vendor attacking incumbent platforms (Canvas, Moodle, Blackboard) in price-sensitive Southeast Asian markets, above all Malaysia and the Philippines. Around the LMS it bundles four adjacent products:
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a course and student-recruitment marketplace (OpenLearning.com, The Uni Guide, PostGradAustralia);
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AI instructional-design tools (CourseMagic);
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a biomedical virtual-microscopy tool (BEST Network);
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work-readiness content (Employability Advantage).
Management frames this as "the AI-powered LMS for the entire student journey." Platform SaaS ARR was A$3.27 M at 30 June 2026. The business remains loss-making (H1 2026 EBITDA loss A$1.22 M), is majority-controlled (62.55%) by Education Centre of Australia, and targets cash-flow breakeven in 2027.
Company's own description (FY2025 Appendix 4E, paraphrased)
OpenLearning describes itself as an AI-powered LMS and lifelong-learning platform offered to education providers on a SaaS model. The platform lets institutions manage online, blended and on-campus learning end to end:
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course design and content authoring;
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delivery and assessment;
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student portfolios;
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programme management.
The company says it derives revenue primarily from five complementary products:
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OpenLearning LMS
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OpenLearning Marketplace
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BEST Network
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CourseMagic
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Employability Advantage
Its pricing model is primarily based on the number of learners at an institution, not the number of educators. Revenue therefore scales with institutional enrolment rather than staff numbers.
Management describes a "virtuous cycle" (the flywheel):
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Institutions build and deliver courses on the LMS.
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Courses are published to the marketplace portals, which attract learners.
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Learners accumulate verified skills portfolios.
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A planned Talent Search feature would let employers search and contact learners, creating a new revenue line and closing an education-to-employment loop.
The company cites more than 5 million learners who have passed through the platform, and 250+ active B2B customers in 19 countries at FY2025 year-end.
Independent characterisation
Economically, OpenLearning today is a sub-scale vertical SaaS business with ~A$3.3 M of ARR. Three features stand out.
First, revenue quality has improved materially. In FY2022, Platform SaaS fees were 52% of statutory revenue (A$1.644 M of A$3.167 M). The balance came from lumpy programme-delivery and learning-services income (the UNSW Transition Program Online and bespoke course design). By FY2025, SaaS fees were 83% of statutory revenue (A$2.651 M of A$3.182 M). Programme delivery was discontinued in February 2024 and learning services were wound down during FY2023.
Second, the go-to-market has pivoted from small-provider self-serve plans to large institutional LMS contracts in emerging Asia. Average ARR per B2B customer rose from A$8,347 (FY2023) to A$9,767 (FY2024) and A$12,369 (H1 2026). Customer numbers grew only modestly, from 228 to 263. New contracts are typically 3–5 years, usage-based, with a contracted minimum.
Third, the business depends structurally on one related party. Education Centre of Australia (ECA) is at once:
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controlling shareholder;
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former lender (A$3 M facility in 2023, extended in 2024, fully converted to equity by December 2025);
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customer (5-year SaaS agreement, July 2025);
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channel partner (OpenLearning Bharat in India);
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vendor of the Employability Advantage assets, sold for A$1.
Revenue model mix
| Revenue line (AUD Mn) | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Platform SaaS fees | 1.644 | 1.846 | 2.145 | 2.651 |
| Program delivery | 1.036 | 0.287 | 0 | 0 |
| Marketplace sales (net of revenue share) | 0.092 | 0.102 | 0.128 | 0.369 |
| Services sales | 0.396 | 0.059 | 0.011 | 0.163 |
| Statutory revenue | 3.167 | 2.294 | 2.284 | 3.182 |
| Revenue mix (% of statutory revenue) | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subscription (Platform SaaS) | 51.9 | 80.5 | 93.9 | 83.3 |
| Program delivery (service) | 32.7 | 12.5 | 0 | 0 |
| Marketplace (transactional, net) | 2.9 | 4.4 | 5.6 | 11.6 |
| Services (professional services) | 12.5 | 2.6 | 0.5 | 5.1 |
Sources: FY2023 Annual Financial Statements Note 3; FY2024 4E Note 2; FY2025 4E Note 2.
There is no product (perpetual licence) revenue and no hardware. Marketplace gross sales are much larger than net revenue because course fees are shared with providers: marketplace gross sales were A$1.652 M in FY2025 against A$0.369 M net. Group gross sales were A$4.465 M in FY2025, versus statutory revenue of A$3.182 M after A$1.283 M shared with course creators.
Value-chain position, customers and end-markets
Value-chain position. OpenLearning sits in the "teaching and learning" software layer of the institutional education stack. It sells to:
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higher-education institutions (universities, private colleges, polytechnics);
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vocational and registered training organisations;
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government education bodies;
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corporate and NGO training (e.g., Field Ready in Africa; enterprise entry via Elcom Technology in Australia).
Ecosystem integrations.
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It integrates with student-management systems, notably through a partnership with Meshed Group.
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It offers migration tools to pull courses out of Canvas and Moodle.
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CourseMagic works alongside third-party LMSs as a lead-generation wedge.
End-markets by geography (H1 2026 ARR). Australia, Malaysia and the Philippines together account for ~88.6% of ARR. 51.9% of ARR comes from customers outside Australia.
Australia: Higher education, VET and corporate, plus the marketplace and The Uni Guide.
Malaysia: Higher education; OpenLearning claims SaaS agreements with more than 40% of the country's major higher-education institutions.
Philippines: Higher education, with over 17 institutions signed by September 2026 and a reseller in CE-Logic (C&E Publishing).
Smaller or nascent markets: - Indonesia (Muhammadiyah university network);
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India (via ECA's OpenLearning Bharat, Gujarat University pilot, GJUST contract);
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Africa (Field Ready reseller);
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Brazil and Vietnam (resellers);
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UAE (first contracts in FY2025).
Strategy
Stated strategic themes (paraphrased from FY2025 4E, AGM presentation of 27 May 2026, and H1 2026 release)
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"The AI-powered LMS for the entire student journey." The positioning spans:
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student recruitment (The Uni Guide);
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learning (LMS, CourseMagic, BEST);
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employability and graduate outcomes (Employability Advantage, portfolios, planned Talent Search).
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Displace incumbent LMS providers. Canvas, Moodle and Blackboard are characterised as pre-AI, legacy-architecture platforms. OpenLearning competes on:
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an AI-native all-in-one subscription;
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lower total cost;
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OBE support;
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usage-based pricing;
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migration tools.
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Larger, multi-year institutional contracts. The company moved away from short courses, micro-credentials and small-provider plans. Results include rising ARR per customer and the phase-out of low-priced plans.
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Emerging-market focus via resellers. Partners include CE-Logic (Philippines), Field Ready (Africa) and resellers in Brazil, Vietnam and the UAE. Market entries in India and Indonesia are low-cost.
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Native AI embedded in the workflow, not a bolt-on layer. Internally, AI-assisted software development raised release velocity without adding headcount.
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Network-effect flywheel. Institutions feed learners; learners build portfolios; portfolios feed employers.
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Cost discipline and a path to cash-flow breakeven.
Strategic initiatives, last 24 months (Oct 2024 – Oct 2026)
| Initiative | Date | Description / status |
|---|---|---|
| Accounting and cost discipline | Jan 2024 onward | Further cost reductions; operating expenses down 31% in FY2024 |
| Meshed Group partnership | FY2024 | LMS–SMS integration; five higher-education customers signed via Meshed by Q1 FY2025 |
| CourseMagic.ai scale-up | Jun 2024 onward | 126 paying customers end-FY2024; 154 active B2C customers Q1 FY2025 |
| Employability Advantage acquisition and relaunch | Apr 2025; relaunched May 2026 | Work-readiness portal with AI résumé builder, AI skills assessment and job boards, integrated into LMS |
| Development cost expensing | 1 Jan 2025 | Policy change increases reported losses and improves earnings quality |
| Elcom Technology reseller | 2,025 | Australian enterprise market entry (3-year reseller deal) |
| CE Logic reseller (Philippines) | Jul 2025 SaaS; Oct 2025 reseller | First university via channel: PNU (May 2026); largest: HCDC (Jul 2026) |
| CE Nexus strategic investment | Nov 2025 | A$153k at A$0.043, aligning the reseller's parent as a shareholder |
| Field Ready reseller | Q4 FY2025 | US$240k over 3 years; Africa |
| Brazil, Vietnam, UAE | FY2025 | Resellers and first UAE SaaS contracts |
| Phase-out of low-priced plans | FY2025 | Some low-end churn accepted to focus resources on institutions |
| The Uni Guide global recruitment marketplace | May 2026 | 15 institutional partners and ~100 recruitment partners at launch; commission revenue from early 2027 |
| Agentic AI and outcome-based rubric generation | In development (H1 2026) | Product roadmap |
| Talent Search | Planned | Employer search of learner portfolios |
| Sales and marketing investment | H1 2026 | A$0.55 M cash spend; company states steps were taken in H1 2026 to reduce costs |
Sustainability / ESG commitments
None disclosed. The company states its operations are not regulated by any significant environmental regulations.
Medium-term targets and guidance
| Target | Statement | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Cash-flow breakeven | "Within 18 months" from October 2025; restated as "early 2027" (FY2025 4E) and "by 2027" (Q2 FY2026 4C summary) | ASX 8 Oct 2025; FY2025 4E; Q2 FY2026 |
| Commission revenue (The Uni Guide) | Expected from early 2027 | AGM presentation, 27 May 2026 |
| H2 2026 focus | Convert pipeline into larger multi-year contracts; maintain cost discipline | H1 2026 release |
No revenue, ARR or EBITDA numerical guidance has been issued.
Products & Services
Platform Subscription (SaaS) division
OpenLearning LMS (flagship)
Description: End-to-end, cloud-hosted, AI-powered LMS for creating, marketing, delivering and managing courses, micro-credentials and online degrees.
Key capabilities: - AI Course Builder (step-by-step wizard generating objectives, outcomes, structure, modules and content);
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AI Assistant (content generation in 14 types, learning-activity generation in 17 types, image generation);
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AI quiz and question-bank generation;
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AI rubric creation and AI outcome-based rubric generation (in development, H1 2026);
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file-based content generation;
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AI feedback and facilitation on assessments and discussions;
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outcomes-based education (OBE) assessment;
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integrated learner portfolios;
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interactive and social learning tools;
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course-migration tools from Canvas and Moodle;
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agentic-AI support (in development, H1 2026).
Target customers: Universities, colleges, polytechnics, VET providers, governments, corporates.
Version history: Platform live since 2012. Generative-AI features since 2023; AI Course Builder released December 2023.
Pricing: Primarily per learner (usage-based), with contracted annual minimums on multi-year institutional deals.
- Disclosed contract examples: CIT University A$340k over 5 years; Holy Cross of Davao College ~A$300k minimum over 4 years for at least 11,000 learners a year; National University (Philippines) US$400k over 5 years.
Flagship deployments named: - Australia: UNSW, Australian Catholic University, APIC.
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Malaysia: Sunway University, Universiti Poly-Tech Malaysia, University of Cyberjaya.
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Philippines: University of the Philippines Manila, National University, Philippine Normal University, Jose Rizal University.
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Indonesia: UMP.
CourseMagic (CourseMagic.ai)
Description: Suite of AI instructional-design tools for educators that works with any LMS, including Canvas, Blackboard and Moodle.
Role: Positioned as a lead-generation and land-and-expand tool into institutions on other platforms.
Launch: June 2024.
Traction: 126 paying customers at end-FY2024; 154 active B2C customers at end-Q1 FY2025.
Pricing: Subscription; price points not publicly disclosed.
BEST Network (Biomedical Education and Skills Training)
Description: Image-based teaching tool with virtual microscopy for biomedical education.
Customers: Medical schools.
Pricing: Included in Platform SaaS revenue (Q2 FY21 presentation); price points not disclosed.
Launch year: Not publicly disclosed.
OpenCreds (legacy framework)
Description: Cross-sector micro-credential framework for Australia and Malaysia, launched 2020.
Status: Related capitalised course-design costs were impaired in FY2023 (A$0.458 M impairment covering CS101, OpenCreds and TPO course design). Its current commercial status is not separately disclosed.
Marketplace division
OpenLearning Marketplace (OpenLearning.com)
Description: Global course-discovery and enrolment marketplace.
Revenue model: Revenue share on course enrolments, recognised net of amounts shared with course creators.
Quality control: Courses must pass OpenLearning quality guidelines.
The Uni Guide (TheUniGuide.com.au)
Acquisition: Acquired in 2024 as part of the Prosple/Anabranch marketplace deal.
2024 role: Higher-education marketplace with nearly 1 million annual visitors (FY2024 4E). The broader portal network is described as close to 1 million visitors per year (FY2025 4E).
May 2026 relaunch: Became a global international-student recruitment marketplace with 15 university and college partners and close to 100 recruitment partners at launch (ASX, 25 May 2026).
Monetisation: Listing fees historically. Commission revenue on recruited students is expected from early 2027 (AGM presentation, 27 May 2026).
PostGradAustralia.com.au and StudyNewZealand.nz
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Postgraduate and New Zealand study marketplaces acquired in 2024.
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Revenue from listing fees paid by institutions (ASX release, 2 January 2024).
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StudyNewZealand.nz is not named in the FY2025 product list; its current status is not disclosed.
Employability / Talent
Employability Advantage
Acquisition: Acquired from ECA in April 2025 for A$1.00. No customer contracts or liabilities transferred.
Original offering: Work-readiness suite of short courses, live bootcamps and workplace-simulation projects.
Integration: Integrated into the LMS in Q1 FY2026.
May 2026 relaunch: Became a branded employability portal with AI résumé building, AI skills assessment, career-planning tools and job boards.
Pricing: Not disclosed.
Talent Search (planned)
- Employer-facing search of learner portfolios. Announced as planned in FY2025 4E; launch date and pricing not disclosed.
Discontinued offerings (for completeness)
| Offering | Description | Status |
|---|---|---|
| UNSW Transition Program Online (TPO) | Direct-entry pathway programme delivered with UNSW College | Discontinued Feb 2024 |
| CS101 | Computer science programme | First cohort Oct 2021; course-design asset impaired FY2023 |
| Learning Services | Bespoke learning-design services | Discontinued FY2023 |
| Lower-priced self-serve provider plans | Small-provider subscription tiers | Phased out FY2025 (caused some low-end churn) |
Financial Narrative
Basis of figures.
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FY2022–FY2025 figures come from audited statements or Appendix 4E reports.
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FY2021 figures are limited. Revenue comes from the FY2022 Annual Report comparative. FY2021 loss and operating loss come from Stockopedia (secondary). FY2021 cash and equity come from the FY2023 AFS opening balances.
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EBITDA and EBIT are analyst-derived: loss before tax, adding back finance expense, removing finance income, and (for EBITDA) adding back depreciation and amortisation.
Margins (%)
Revenue CAGR.
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FY2021–FY2025 statutory revenue: –2.4% p.a.
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FY2022–FY2025 statutory revenue: +0.2% p.a.
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FY2022–FY2025 Platform SaaS fees: +17.3% p.a.
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FY2022–FY2025 SaaS ARR: +21.0% p.a.
Definition warning on gross margin. The "gross margin proxy" deducts only the line item "web-hosting and other direct costs." The company's own gross-margin metric (63.0% in H1 2026, 15.3% in H1 2023) uses a broader cost-of-sales definition. That definition includes marketplace cost of sales and other delivery costs, and the company has not fully reconciled it in the documents reviewed. The two series are not comparable. Investors should use the company's half-yearly series in 6.6 for trend analysis.
EPS integrity warning. Reported EPS does not reconcile cleanly with disclosed share counts:
FY2024: The FY2024 4E printed basic EPS as "(0.006)" cents, apparently a units error. The FY2025 4E restates the comparative as (0.80) cents. Using the 482.67 M shares stated as the weighted average gives ~(0.59) cents.
FY2025: The 4E reports (1.43) cents but states a weighted average of 782.0 M shares, which equals the year-end count. That would imply ~(0.52) cents. An approximate time-weighting of the Q4 2025 issues gives a weighted average of ~500 M shares and EPS of roughly (0.8) cents.
- The audited FY2025 Annual Report (31 March 2026) should be consulted for the definitive figure.
Balance sheet
Notes: - Goodwill is only A$0.0245 M. The intangibles balance is mostly capitalised platform development, learning-platform software, and domain names and trademarks.
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H1 2026 cash: A$0.87 M at 30 June 2026.
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FY2024 total liabilities are A$4.132 M in the FY2025 4E comparative; the FY2024 4E shows A$4.132 M (marginally different cents).
Cash flow
Company-defined net cash outflow (operating plus technology investment; FY2025 4E chart): A$6.24 M (2022), A$4.08 M (2023), A$2.87 M (2024), A$2.52 M (2025).
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A$(2.152) M in the FY2024 4E statement;
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A$(2.152) M in the FY2025 4E comparative (to the dollar: 2,151,842 vs 2,152,388);
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A$(2.198) M in the FY2024 4E commentary.
The statement figure is used above.
Ratios
Ratios not shown are not meaningful: ROE: for FY2023–FY2025: equity was negative or near zero.
ROIC, net debt/EBITDA, interest coverage: EBIT and EBITDA are negative.
Cash conversion cycle: no inventory; DSO is shown instead.
Debt/equity: for FY2023–FY2024: equity was negative.
The FY2025 DSO jump to 81 days coincides with a A$1.18 M rise in payables and a doubling of deferred revenue to A$1.742 M. This is consistent with multi-year institutional contracts invoiced annually in advance, concentrated in Q4. FY2025 impairment of trade receivables rose to A$0.134 M (FY2024: A$0.038 M), a credit-quality monitorable.
Half-year trend
Sources: H1 2024 Appendix 4D; H1 2026 Appendix 4D release: - H1 2025 EBITDA, net loss and ARR are analyst back-calculations from the stated H1 2026 growth rates: EBITDA improved 27.1%, loss narrowed 20.5%, ARR grew 23.4%.
- H1 2025 gross margin is derived from the stated +8.4 percentage-point expansion.
Commentary on trends, inflections and drivers
Revenue. The five-year statutory revenue line is flat to down (CAGR –2.4%). That headline masks a deliberate mix shift.
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FY2021–FY2022 revenue was inflated by programme delivery (the UNSW TPO, A$1.036 M in FY2022) and learning services (A$0.396 M). Both were low-margin and non-recurring.
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Their removal produced the FY2023 trough (–27.6%) and FY2024 stagnation (–0.4%).
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Throughout, Platform SaaS fees compounded at 12–24% a year.
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FY2025 marked the inflection: revenue +39.4% to A$3.182 M, driven by SaaS (+23.6%) and a near-trebling of net marketplace revenue to A$0.369 M as The Uni Guide was integrated.
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H1 2026 extended the trend at +42.8%.
Profitability. Losses fell from ~A$6.7 M (FY2021) to A$2.85 M (FY2024) through successive cost programmes in FY2023 and January 2024. Employee costs fell 55% from FY2022 to FY2024. The apparent FY2025 reversal (loss of A$4.10 M) is largely accounting:
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From 1 January 2025 the company stopped capitalising platform development.
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In FY2024 it had capitalised ~A$0.67 M of platform development (~A$0.95 M of total intangible purchases).
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On a like-for-like cash basis, company-defined outflows improved from ~A$2.87 M to A$2.52 M.
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Nevertheless, FY2025 also saw genuine opex growth: professional services +57% to A$1.04 M, contractors A$0.60 M, and G&A +33%. These costs supported the Philippine expansion.
H1 2026 is the cleanest evidence of operating leverage:
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EBITDA loss of A$1.22 M, the smallest in seven halves;
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core-business cash burn of only A$0.19 M after excluding sales and marketing (A$0.55 M), the new divisions (A$0.22 M) and listed-company costs (A$0.25 M).
Balance sheet and funding. OpenLearning has never been self-funding, and the balance sheet has been sustained by ECA:
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A$3 M loan in 2023, converted at A$0.020 in June 2024.
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A further A$2 M plus A$1 M of facility, drawn in 2024–2025, converted at ~A$0.0176 in December 2025.
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A$1.25 M of the October 2025 A$2.6 M placement.
Equity swung from –A$2.0 M (FY2023) to +A$1.07 M (FY2025) solely through these conversions and raises. Accumulated losses reached A$46.9 M against cumulative share capital of A$46.1 M.
Each set of accounts (FY2023, FY2024, FY2025) states that the 12-month cash-flow forecast indicates a risk the group may not meet all payment obligations. The directors nonetheless adopted the going-concern basis.
Cash fell to A$0.87 M at 30 June 2026, against a Q2 FY2026 net operating outflow of A$0.533 M. On simple arithmetic that implies under two quarters of runway at mid-2026, absent new funding or a step-up in collections. The Q3 FY2026 Appendix 4C (due by end-October 2026) is therefore the critical near-term disclosure.
Cash conversion. Customer receipts consistently exceed statutory revenue because receipts include gross marketplace collections before revenue sharing:
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A$4.89 M receipts vs A$3.18 M revenue in FY2025.
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Q2 FY2026 receipts of A$1.653 M were a company record, up 27% YoY.
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View Subscription PlansFinancial Detail
Group Entities
| Entity | Country | Ownership | Activity |
|---|---|---|---|
OpenLearning Limited | Australia | Parent (ASX-listed) | Holding company |
OpenLearning Global Pte Ltd | Singapore | 100% | Investment holding; online education platform and services |
Open Learning Global Pty Ltd | Australia | 100% (via OpenLearning Global Pte Ltd) | Online programme management; platform and services |
OpenLearning Global (M) Sdn Bhd | Malaysia | 100% (via OpenLearning Global Pte Ltd) | Online education platform and services |
OLG Australia Investors Pte Ltd | Singapore | Struck off 3 Oct 2022 | Former investment holding |
Segment external revenue (AUD Mn)
| Segment external revenue (AUD Mn) | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|
Australia | 2.407 | 1.542 |
South East Asia | 0.612 | 0.631 |
Global Platform | 0.148 | 0.121 |
Global Services | 0 | 0 |
Corporate Overheads | 0 | 0 |
Total | 3.167 | 2.294 |
Segment profit / (loss) (AUD Mn)
| Segment profit / (loss) (AUD Mn) | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|
Australia | -1.268 | -0.671 |
South East Asia | -0.255 | -0.043 |
Global Platform | 0.148 | 0.121 |
Global Services | -2.565 | -2.429 |
Corporate Overheads | -1.708 | -1.400 |
Group loss | -5.648 | -4.422 |
Revenue by Segment (%) and Segment Margins & Growth (%)
| Segment metrics (%) | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|
Australia share of revenue | 76.0 | 67.2 |
South East Asia share of revenue | 19.3 | 27.5 |
Global Platform share of revenue | 4.7 | 5.3 |
Australia segment margin | -52.7 | -43.5 |
South East Asia segment margin | -41.6 | -6.8 |
Australia revenue growth YoY | — | -35.9 |
South East Asia revenue growth YoY | — | 3.1 |
Revenue by Segment and Segment Margins & Growth (%)
| Division KPI | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Platform SaaS fees (AUD Mn) | 1.644 | 1.846 | 2.145 | 2.651 |
Platform SaaS fees YoY growth (%) | — | 12.3 | 16.2 | 23.6 |
Marketplace gross sales (AUD Mn) | — | 0.793 | 1.549 | 1.652 |
Marketplace net revenue (AUD Mn) | 0.092 | 0.102 | 0.128 | 0.369 |
Platform SaaS ARR at year end (AUD Mn) | 1.715 | 1.903 | 2.335 | 3.035 |
Active B2B SaaS customers (number) | 245 | 228 | 236 | 252 |
Income Statement and Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Gross sales (AUD Mn) | — | 3.628 | 2.985 | 3.705 | 4.465 |
Revenue (AUD Mn) | 3.508 | 3.167 | 2.294 | 2.284 | 3.182 |
Revenue growth YoY (%) | 85.6 | -9.7 | -27.6 | -0.4 | 39.4 |
Web-hosting and other direct costs (AUD Mn) | — | 1.105 | 0.664 | 0.711 | 0.819 |
Gross profit proxy (AUD Mn) | — | 2.062 | 1.630 | 1.572 | 2.363 |
Employee benefits expense (AUD Mn) | — | 5.137 | 3.349 | 2.294 | 3.618 |
Professional services (AUD Mn) | — | 1.248 | 0.910 | 0.662 | 1.040 |
Depreciation and amortisation (AUD Mn) | — | 0.367 | 0.393 | 0.454 | 0.561 |
Impairment loss (AUD Mn) | — | 0 | 0.458 | 0 | 0 |
EBITDA analyst-derived (AUD Mn) | — | -5.277 | -3.971 | -2.279 | -3.439 |
Operating income EBIT (AUD Mn) | -6.75 | -5.644 | -4.364 | -2.733 | -3.999 |
Pre-tax income (AUD Mn) | -6.73 | -5.648 | -4.422 | -2.852 | -4.097 |
Net income (AUD Mn) | -6.73 | -5.648 | -4.422 | -2.852 | -4.097 |
EPS basic as reported (A cents) | — | -2.55 | -1.65 | -0.80 | -1.43 |
EPS diluted as reported (A cents) | — | -2.55 | -1.65 | -0.80 | -1.43 |
Dividends per share (A cents) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
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View Subscription PlansMargin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Gross margin proxy (%) | — | 65.1 | 71.1 | 68.8 | 74.3 |
EBITDA margin (%) | — | -166.6 | -173.1 | -99.8 | -108.1 |
Operating margin (%) | -192.4 | -178.2 | -190.3 | -119.7 | -125.7 |
Net margin (%) | -191.8 | -178.3 | -192.8 | -124.9 | -128.7 |
Balance Sheet
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total assets (AUD Mn) | — | 4.581 | 3.336 | 3.290 | 4.530 |
Cash and equivalents (AUD Mn) | 4.589 | 2.205 | 1.103 | 0.953 | 2.095 |
Trade and other receivables (AUD Mn) | — | 0.534 | 0.478 | 0.157 | 0.708 |
Goodwill and intangibles (AUD Mn) | — | 1.637 | 1.558 | 2.097 | 1.556 |
Short-term debt (AUD Mn) | — | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Long-term debt (AUD Mn) | — | 0 | 3.051 | 2.059 | 0 |
Total debt (AUD Mn) | — | 0 | 3.051 | 2.059 | 0 |
Net debt (AUD Mn) | — | -2.205 | 1.947 | 1.106 | -2.095 |
Deferred revenue (AUD Mn) | — | 1.109 | 1.093 | 0.896 | 1.742 |
Total liabilities (AUD Mn) | — | 2.164 | 5.347 | 4.132 | 3.456 |
Total equity (AUD Mn) | 4.126 | 2.417 | -2.011 | -0.741 | 1.075 |
Working capital (AUD Mn) | — | 0.745 | -0.550 | -0.812 | -0.436 |
Accumulated losses (AUD Mn) | -30.444 | -35.572 | -39.994 | -42.796 | -46.892 |
Cash Flow
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Receipts from customers (AUD Mn) | — | 3.840 | 3.161 | 3.908 | 4.893 |
Operating cash flow (AUD Mn) | — | -5.409 | -3.317 | -2.152 | -2.520 |
Capex PP&E (AUD Mn) | — | -0.012 | -0.011 | -0.010 | -0.003 |
Capitalised development and intangibles (AUD Mn) | — | -0.727 | -0.768 | -0.946 | 0.000 |
Free cash flow (AUD Mn) | — | -6.148 | -4.096 | -3.108 | -2.523 |
Equity issued for cash (AUD Mn) | — | 3.883 | 0 | 0.951 | 2.662 |
Borrowings drawn (AUD Mn) | — | 0 | 3.000 | 2.000 | 1.000 |
Dividends paid (AUD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Share buybacks (AUD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Returns & Leverage Ratios (%) and Financial Ratios (x)
| Ratio | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ROA on average assets (%) | — | -111.7 | -86.1 | -104.8 |
ROE on average equity (%) | -172.6 | — | — | — |
Current ratio (x) | 1.34 | 0.76 | 0.61 | 0.87 |
Debt to equity (x) | 0 | — | — | 0 |
Asset turnover (x) | — | 0.58 | 0.69 | 0.81 |
Receivable days DSO (days) | 62 | 76 | 25 | 81 |
Income Statement and Margin Analysis (%) (Half-Yearly)
| Metric | H1 2023 | H1 2024 | H1 2025 | H1 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (AUD Mn) | 1.053 | 1.070 | 1.394 | 1.990 |
Gross margin company definition (%) | 15.3 | — | 54.6 | 63.0 |
SaaS gross margin company definition (%) | — | — | 54.4 | 65.6 |
EBITDA (AUD Mn) | — | — | -1.674 | -1.220 |
Net loss (AUD Mn) | -2.230 | -1.663 | -2.050 | -1.630 |
Platform SaaS ARR at period end (AUD Mn) | — | — | 2.650 | 3.270 |
Revenue by country (AUD Mn)
| Revenue by country (AUD Mn) | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Australia | 2.582 | 1.728 | — | — |
Malaysia | 0.582 | 0.521 | — | — |
Singapore | 0.004 | 0.045 | — | — |
Total | 3.167 | 2.294 | 2.284 | 3.182 |
Revenue growth by country (%)
| Revenue growth by country (%) | FY2023 |
|---|---|
Australia | -33.1 |
Malaysia | -10.5 |
Product Line by Geography FY2023 Details
| Product line by geography FY2023 (AUD Mn) | Australia | Malaysia | Singapore | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Platform SaaS | 1.327 | 0.519 | 0 | 1.846 |
Program delivery | 0.287 | 0 | 0 | 0.287 |
Services | 0.053 | 0.006 | 0 | 0.059 |
Marketplace (net) | 0.061 | -0.004 | 0.045 | 0.102 |
Total | 1.728 | 0.521 | 0.045 | 2.294 |
Product line by geography FY2022 (AUD Mn) | Australia | Malaysia | Singapore | Total |
Platform SaaS | 1.154 | 0.489 | 0.002 | 1.644 |
Program delivery | 1.036 | 0 | 0 | 1.036 |
Services | 0.305 | 0.091 | 0 | 0.396 |
Marketplace (net) | 0.087 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.092 |
Total | 2.582 | 0.582 | 0.004 | 3.167 |
Arr Mix At 30 June 2026 Details
| ARR mix at 30 June 2026 | Share of ARR (%) | Implied ARR (AUD Mn) |
|---|---|---|
Australia | 48.1 | 1.573 |
Outside Australia | 51.9 | 1.697 |
Australia + Malaysia + Philippines combined | 88.6 | 2.897 |
All other countries | 11.4 | 0.373 |
Share Price and Share Count (M)
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Share price at 30 June (AUD) | 0.185 | 0.115 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.015 | 0.012 |
Shares on issue at 31 December (M) | — | 197.358 | 267.869 | 267.869 | 482.675 | 782.006 |
Performance Details
| Performance (approximate, to ~A$0.016 in Oct 2026) | Return (%) |
|---|---|
1-year (from ~A$0.025, Oct 2025) | -36 |
3-year (from A$0.027, 30 Jun 2023 proxy) | -41 |
5-year (from A$0.115, 30 Jun 2021 proxy) | -86 |
Since IPO (A$0.20) | -92 |
Valuation Multiples
| Multiple | OpenLearning | Basis |
|---|---|---|
Market capitalisation (AUD Mn) | ~12.5 | 782.1 M × A$0.016 |
Enterprise value (AUD Mn) | ~11.6 | Market cap less A$0.87 M cash (30 Jun 2026); no debt |
EV / Sales TTM (x) | ~3.1 | TTM revenue A$3.78 M (H2 2025 A$1.79 M + H1 2026 A$1.99 M) |
EV / ARR (x) | ~3.5 | ARR A$3.27 M |
P/E | n/m | Loss-making |
EV / EBITDA | n/m | Negative EBITDA |
P/B | n/m | Market Index shows book value per share –A$0.001, implying negative equity after the H1 2026 loss |
Share Price & Returns
| Date | Raise | Price (AUD) |
|---|---|---|
Dec 2019 | IPO | 0.20 |
Dec 2021 / Jan 2022 | ATL placement and rights issue, up to A$5.96 M | 0.093 |
Nov 2022 | Rights issue | 0.043 |
Jun 2024 | ECA debt conversion, A$3.1 M | 0.020 |
Dec 2024 | Placement, A$1.0 M | 0.017 |
Oct 2025 | Placement, A$2.6 M | 0.022 |
Nov 2025 | CE Nexus placement, A$0.153 M | 0.043 |
Dec 2025 | ECA debt conversion, A$3.13 M | ~0.0176 |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance
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Cash-flow breakeven targeted in 2027 ("early 2027" per the FY2025 4E).
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Commission revenue from The Uni Guide expected from early 2027.
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H2 2026 priorities: convert the pipeline into larger multi-year contracts and maintain cost discipline.
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No numerical revenue or ARR guidance.
Consensus
No sell-side consensus exists. Implied momentum: ARR growth of 23–35% YoY across the last four quarters, and revenue growth of 39–43% in FY2025 and H1 2026.
Bull case
-
Operating leverage is real and visible.
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Gross margin went from 15% to 63% in three years.
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SaaS gross margin is 65.6%.
-
Core-business cash burn was only A$0.19 M in H1 2026.
-
Another ~A$1 M of ARR at current margins could plausibly close most of the gap to breakeven, given that sales and marketing, new divisions and listed costs (A$1.02 M in H1 2026) are partly discretionary.
-
-
The Philippine channel can compound.
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More than 17 institutions signed against ~1,977 HEIs.
-
CE-Logic has 1,000+ relationships and has already delivered a A$300k contract.
-
Incumbent turmoil (Blackboard's Chapter 11) and OBE mandates support continued wins.
-
-
ECA control provides a funding backstop and a strategic exit path.
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ECA has funded every shortfall since 2023, converting debt at or below market.
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Its creeping ownership (62.55%) means a minority buy-out at a premium is a credible tail outcome.
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Bear case
-
Liquidity is the binding constraint.
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Cash of A$0.87 M at 30 June 2026 against quarterly operating outflows of ~A$0.5–0.7 M.
-
Further raises at depressed prices (~A$0.015) would add heavy dilution.
-
Shares on issue have already quadrupled since 2022.
-
-
Contract values are small and slow to convert.
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The September 2026 Philippine deals average ~A$43k a year combined; PNU is ≈A$30k in year one.
-
FY2025's "A$3.6 M new contract value" is multi-year total contract value, translating into only ~A$0.7 M of incremental ARR (A$2.335 M to A$3.035 M).
-
Statutory revenue is still below FY2021 levels.
-
-
Governance and minority-holder risk.
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A 62.55% controlling holder that is also customer, vendor, channel and ex-lender.
-
Thin, all-male board; inconsistent financial reporting (EPS errors, conflicting loss figures).
-
Negligible institutional ownership and a free float of under 40%.
-
These features cap any re-rating and leave minorities exposed to related-party terms.
-
Key catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
| Timing | Catalyst / monitorable |
|---|---|
| By 31 Oct 2026 | Q3 FY2026 Appendix 4C: cash balance, operating outflow, any funding announcement (placement, ECA facility, or strategic transaction) |
| Q4 2026 | Further Philippine contracts via CE-Logic; Malaysian campus-wide conversions; renewal of the PNU one-year term (due ~mid-2027) |
| Late Jan 2027 | Q4 FY2026 4C: whether ARR passes ~A$3.5 M and quarterly outflow trends toward zero |
| 26 Feb 2027 (forecast) | FY2026 Appendix 4E: full-year revenue (run-rate implies ~A$4 M+), EBITDA trajectory |
| Early 2027 | First The Uni Guide commission revenue; Talent Search launch timing |
| 2,027 | Delivery against the cash-flow breakeven target |
| Ongoing | ECA shareholding changes (takeover-threshold creep), board composition and independence, receivables quality (DSO, impairments) |
Analyst verdict
OpenLearning has executed a credible, if overdue, pivot. It began as a cash-burning MOOC and online-programme-management business with lumpy services revenue. It is now a focused AI-native LMS vendor with:
-
18 straight quarters of SaaS growth;
-
ARR of A$3.27 M;
-
a record 63% gross margin;
-
an EBITDA loss that has narrowed to A$1.22 M a half.
The product thesis is coherent. OpenLearning offers an all-in-one, per-learner-priced, OBE-aligned platform with embedded generative AI. Its target customers are price-sensitive Southeast Asian universities, where incumbents are expensive, legacy or distracted, and Blackboard has only just emerged from bankruptcy. The Philippine reseller channel is now producing repeatable wins. Malaysia offers a visible land-and-expand path.
The investment case, however, turns on solvency and governance rather than product.
-
Cash of A$0.87 M at mid-2026 leaves little margin for error.
-
Every set of accounts since FY2023 carries a going-concern risk statement.
-
History suggests the gap will again be bridged by ECA, which already owns 62.55% and has converted debt at 1.8–2.0 cents.
That backstop reduces insolvency risk but transfers value from minorities to the controller. It also leaves the register illiquid and institutionally orphaned. Inconsistencies in reported EPS and loss figures further weaken confidence in disclosure quality.
At ~A$12 M market capitalisation, or ~3.5x EV/ARR, the market is pricing meaningful probability of further dilution, not the operating-leverage story. That is a rational discount.
Analyst stance: a high-risk, speculative special situation. We would treat OLL as "Speculative / Monitor" rather than a fundamental buy.
Upgrade triggers:
-
a funding solution that does not materially dilute minorities;
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quarterly operating cash outflow sustainably below A$0.25 M;
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ARR above A$4 M with stable or rising ARR per customer;
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strengthened board independence.
Without these, the base case is incremental operational progress accompanied by continued ECA-led recapitalisation. In the tail, an ECA-led take-private at a modest premium is plausible but unannounced.
End of dossier. All figures are in A$ unless stated otherwise. Fiscal years end 31 December. Figures marked "analyst-derived" are calculations from disclosed data. Items marked not publicly disclosed, or left blank in chartable tables, were not available in the filings and sources reviewed as at 12 October 2026.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Board of Directors
| Name | Role | Appointed | Background | Education | Independence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Spiro Pappas | Non-Executive Chairman | Director from 30 Aug 2019 (Morningstar lists chair from Jun 2020) | 30+ years in financial services. At NAB: Executive GM Global Institutional Banking, CEO Asia, Executive GM International & Innovation. Earlier at Deutsche Bank and 11 years with ABN AMRO/RBS in London. Chairman of Atlas Iron, Cognian Technologies, Go Zero Group; former Chair of OpenInvest; former NED of DataMesh Group and Splitit Payments (resigned Feb 2021) | B.Comm (Merit), AICD | Independent (company classification) |
Adam Brimo | Group CEO & Managing Director (Executive Director) | 30 Aug 2019 | Co-founder (2012). Previously software engineer at Macquarie Bank (FICC) and senior software engineer at Westpac Institutional Bank. Forbes 30 Under 30 Asia (2017); Pearcey NSW Hall of Fame (2018); Choice Consumer Activist of the Year (2011) | B.Eng (Software), B.Arts (Politics), UNSW; honours thesis with NICTA | Executive |
Rupesh Singh | Non-Executive Director | Oct 2022 | Founder and CEO of Education Centre of Australia (ECA): multi-sector education group with university partnerships (Victoria University, Swinburne, University of Canberra, Charles Sturt, London Met), vocational and postgraduate institutes, and a 40+ country recruitment network | GradDip (IT) | Non-independent (ECA nominee; controlling shareholder) |
Matthew Reede | Non-Executive Director | 21 Feb 2024 | Managing partner of Dominion Partners (founded 2021), which has provided investor-relations services to OLL since April 2023. Director of Caledonia Capital, Euphrates Capital and Colville Capital (UK). Co-founded Performance Education Group (2005; exited to EDU Holdings 2018). Founded BioScore (2018) and Habitat Travel (2013). Early career at KPMG and Macquarie | M.Com (Marketing & Communications), B.Econ (Accounting), Adv. Dip. Financial Services & IR | Website labels him independent. Analyst view: independence is questionable given his firm's paid IR mandate |
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Title | Notes |
|---|---|---|
Adam Brimo | Group CEO & MD | See above |
David Collien | Co-founder; Chief Technology Officer (KMP in FY2023) | Base salary A$189k + up to A$40k incentive (FY2023). Holds 3.56 M shares (FY2023). Current role not re-confirmed for 2026 |
Christina He | Strategy Director (KMP in FY2023) | Base salary A$185k + up to A$25k incentive (FY2023). Current role not re-confirmed for 2026 |
Loren D'Souza | Head of Operations, Employability Advantage | Joined OLL as a condition of the April 2025 acquisition |
Justyn Stedwell | Company Secretary | From Feb 2026. Predecessors: Sally Greenwood / Maria Clemente (2025); Robyn Slaughter (2023–24); Nova Taylor (resigned Oct 2023) |
Directors' Remuneration
| KMP remuneration (AUD) | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|
Adam Brimo total | 327,666 | 294,172 |
Adam Brimo salary and fees | 250,000 | 250,000 |
Spiro Pappas total | 49,265 | 49,000 |
David Collien total | 202,239 | 218,626 |
Christina He total | 124,939 | 204,887 |
Total KMP compensation | 1,333,713 | 802,337 |
Board & Management Changes
| Date | Change |
|---|---|
Oct 2022 | Rupesh Singh appointed NED |
| 2022 | Departures of NEDs Kevin Barry, David Buckingham, Prof. Beverley Oliver and Maya Hari; KMP departures of Cherie Diaz, Sarveen Kandiah and Huat Koh (FY2023 Remuneration Report) |
27 Jan 2023 | Benjamin Shields (Alchemy Tribridge) resigns |
11 Oct 2023 | Company Secretary Nova Taylor resigns |
5 Dec 2023 | John Merakovsky resigns |
21 Feb 2024 | Matthew Reede appointed |
| 2025 | Company secretarial function moves to Sally Greenwood / Maria Clemente |
9 Feb 2026 | Change of company secretary to Justyn Stedwell |
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Shares | % of capital |
|---|---|---|
ECA Investments Group Pty Ltd (ECA Investments Group A/C) | 442,781,489 | 56.62 |
ECA Investments Group Pty Ltd | 36,379,929 | 4.65 |
Future Now Ventures Pty Ltd | 26,069,518 | 3.33 |
HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited | 18,221,770 | 2.33 |
Magna Intelligent Sdn Bhd | 12,295,058 | 1.57 |
MCD Project Services Pty Ltd | 8,559,053 | 1.09 |
ECA Investments Group Pty Ltd (The ECA Investment Group A/C) | 7,390,940 | 0.95 |
Adam Maurice Brimo | 6,764,451 | 0.87 |
DMX Capital Partners Limited | 6,409,090 | 0.82 |
Salmon Capital Holdings Pte Ltd | 5,882,353 | 0.75 |
Bayesian Holdings Pty Ltd | 5,681,817 | 0.73 |
Richard Buckland (co-founder) | 5,094,288 | 0.65 |
Australian Catholic University Limited | 5,000,000 | 0.64 |
CE Nexus Pte Ltd (C&E Publishing) | 3,559,000 | 0.46 |
Competitive Landscape
Peer Comparison FY2025
| Metric | OpenLearning (FY2025) | D2L (FY ended Jan-2025) | Docebo (FY2024) | Instructure (FY2023, last public year) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (USD Mn) | ~2.1 (A$3.18 M at ~0.66) | ~205 | ~217 | ~530 |
Revenue growth YoY (%) | 39.4 | ~12 | ~20 | ~12 |
EBITDA margin (%) | -108 (analyst-derived) | — | — | — |
R&D intensity (% of revenue) | Not disclosed (expensed from FY2025); 41% capitalised in FY2024 | — | — | — |
Listing | ASX micro-cap | TSX | TSX / Nasdaq | Private (KKR) since 2024 |
Recent Developments
The ASX requested and granted the LR 10.1 waiver in April 2025.



