Peter Warren Automotive Holdings Limited Overview
Peter Warren Automotive Holdings is one of Australia's largest listed multi-franchise automotive retailers and the second-largest listed pure-play dealer group behind Eagers Automotive. Built over almost seven decades from a single Warwick Farm site into an "auto mall" operator, it represents more than 30 OEM brands through over 80 franchise operations in New South Wales, south-east Queensland and Victoria, earning revenue from new and used vehicle sales, service, parts, and finance and insurance commissions. Its distinguishing assets are a A$243.7m owned property portfolio, a family-controlled register (Warren family ~40%) that aligns ownership with long-term value, and a conservatively geared balance sheet. Since 2024 it has been navigating a structural reset in Australian new-car retailing — margin compression, record brand proliferation and the rapid rise of Chinese manufacturers — by pivoting its brand portfolio toward Chinese and new-energy marques, expanding high-margin aftersales, and consolidating smaller dealer groups, most recently Wakeling Automotive.
What the company does
Peter Warren operates franchised motor-vehicle dealerships under agreements with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Each franchise typically sells new vehicles of one brand, while the group also retails used vehicles across brands, runs service workshops and parts departments, and arranges finance and insurance on behalf of third-party financiers and insurers for which it earns commission. The group also owns a portfolio of commercial dealership properties, reported as a separate segment.
The company's own description (consistent across FY23–FY26 announcements) characterises it as an automotive dealership group with a rich heritage operating in Australia since 1958, offering the complete range of integrated sales and support, including parts, service, finance and insurance, and aftermarket products, across volume, prestige and luxury segments on the eastern seaboard. Statutory segment reporting describes the Vehicle Retailing segment as offering new vehicles, used vehicles, vehicle maintenance and repair services, vehicle parts, extended service contracts, vehicle protection products and other aftermarket products; the Property segment holds commercial properties used mainly as dealership premises.
Business model and revenue mechanics
| Revenue stream | How money is made | Margin character | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| New vehicles (dealer model) | Buy from OEM (floorplan-funded), sell to retail/fleet customers; plus OEM volume bonuses and KPI incentives | Lowest gross margin %, most cyclical | Under pressure FY24–FY26 from oversupply, discounting and new entrants |
| New vehicles (agency model) | OEM owns stock and sets price; dealer earns a fixed commission per delivery | Lower revenue, commission-only | Mercedes-Benz moved to agency in 2022; reduced reported revenue by an estimated A$100m in FY22 |
| Used vehicles | Trade-ins and sourced stock, reconditioned and retailed | Moderate margin; requires "buying right" | Record 10,578 units in FY26 (+~10%) |
| Service | Labour on maintenance and repairs | High margin, recurring | Service retention up 8 percentage points (FY26) |
| Parts & accessories | Retail, workshop and wholesale parts | High margin, recurring | Service + parts revenue record A$442m in FY26 |
| Finance & insurance (F&I) | Commissions from arranging consumer finance and insurance products | Very high margin (commission revenue) | Driven by new and used unit volumes |
| Aftermarket / car care | Protection products, extended warranties | High margin | Part of "back-end" gross profit |
| Property | Owned premises used by dealerships | Rental/asset backing | Owned property A$243.7m at 30 June 2026; LTV 19.5% |
Product vs. service vs. subscription vs. licensing mix: Peter Warren is overwhelmingly a product-sale business by revenue (new and used vehicles), with a service/parts layer (A$442m, ~17.8% of FY26 revenue — derived) and commission income (F&I). It has no subscription or licensing revenue. By gross profit, however, the mix is far more balanced: the company's "mixed business ratio" — the share of gross profit from higher-margin used, parts, service, F&I and other back-end streams — rose to 60.4% in FY26.
Value chain position
Peter Warren sits at the downstream retail end of the automotive value chain: OEM (manufacturing) → national distributor/importer (often the OEM's Australian subsidiary) → franchised dealer (Peter Warren) → end customer. Its bargaining position is shaped by (a) OEM franchise agreements that govern territories, standards, stock allocation and margins, (b) floorplan financiers (often OEM captive finance companies) that fund inventory, and (c) end-customer demand and price competition among dealers.
Customer types and end-markets
Retail consumers: the core customer base across volume (e.g., Toyota, Kia, Mazda, MG), prestige (e.g., Volvo, Audi) and luxury (e.g., Mercedes-Benz) segments.
Fleet and business buyers: not separately quantified in disclosures.
Service customers: the "car park" of vehicles previously sold, plus conquest customers; the company describes its existing car park as a long-tail service opportunity.
Recreational vehicles: via Patriot Campers (Arundel, Gold Coast), acquired 2021.
Commercial vehicles: the 2021 Annual Report referenced Trucks within its segment coverage; detail not disclosed.
Independent characterisation
Peter Warren is best understood as a property-backed, family-controlled dealer consolidator whose economics are driven far more by gross profit per unit (GPU) on new cars and by aftersales absorption than by revenue. Revenue has been essentially flat at ~A$2.48bn for three years (FY24–FY26) while underlying PBT collapsed from A$88.2m (FY22) to A$14.5m (FY26) — an 84% decline — revealing high operating leverage to new-car margins. The investment case now rests on (1) whether the Chinese-brand portfolio pivot restores front-end profitability, (2) whether aftersales growth can continue to offset front-end pressure, (3) the integration of the ~A$500m-revenue Wakeling acquisition, and (4) the significant asset backing (NTA A$1.48 per share versus a share price near A$0.73).
Strategy
Stated corporate strategy (FY26 results presentation)
| Pillar | Objective (paraphrased) | Evidence of delivery |
|---|---|---|
| Acquisition | Opportunistic acquisitions and portfolio optimisation for scale and EPS-accretive growth | Wakeling (completed Oct 2026); Macarthur (2024); Toyota/VW (2023); Penfold (2021) |
| Customer | Customer-centric culture driving retention, service revenue and lifetime value | +7 pts OEM customer satisfaction index; +8 pts service retention; CX360 platform |
| Organic | Best-in-class performance: mix and margin resilience via used, service and parts | Record used units (10,578) and service & parts revenue (A$442m) in FY26 |
| Innovation | Productivity and efficiency via clean data, automation and AI | AI pilots at ~20 sites: 44% of online-lead appointments captured after hours; ~A$44m revenue from converted service opportunities (+56%); 2.9x improvement in service win-back conversion |
Vision: to be the most valued automotive group, exceeding the expectations of customers, employees, brand partners and investors.
Four pillars:
Underpinning values: growth, integrity, focus, teamwork.
Strategic initiatives (last 24 months)
| Initiative | Timing | Description | Targets / status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chinese-brand portfolio pivot | Since FY24, accelerating | Partnerships with Geely Holding, SAIC, Chery, GWM, GAC; one new Chinese-brand dealership added roughly every six weeks since Jan 2025 | 0 (Jun 2023) → 2 (FY24) → 9 (FY25) → 17 (Jun 2026); ~10 in pipeline; >30% of brand portfolio in FY27 |
| Geely partnership | FY25–FY26 | Peter Warren is Geely's largest Australian partner by sales and footprint | Geely EX5 launched; 8+ new Geely models expected within 12 months |
| ZEEKR partnership | FY26 | Premium Chinese EV brand; Gold Coast opening | 7GT, 8X, 9X models expected early 2027 |
| Inventory discipline | FY25–FY26 | Reducing aged stock and floorplan interest | Aged >120 days down to 26.1%; interest −10.8% in FY26 |
| Cost-out program | FY25 onward | ~A$5m savings in FY25; FY27 focus on neutralising A$6.4m inflation, rationalising support functions, supplier scale, lease optimisation, closing underperformers | Opex/revenue to fall from 12.4% back toward 11.7% progressively through FY27 |
| AI rollout | FY27 | Sales AI and service AI rolled out network-wide after vendor selection | Over a quarter of sites piloted (~20) |
| Capability investment | H1 FY26 | New CFO, COO, CTO | Completed |
| Property strategy | Ongoing | "Sweat" owned property; reduce leased exposure; add brands within existing sites | Nine dealerships added in FY26 with reduced leasehold footprint |
| Workforce/EV skills | Ongoing | 220+ apprentices; high-voltage technician training | Positioning for NEV servicing |
| Greenfield optionality | FY27+ | Open to greenfield sites, including outside current states, if business case supports | No specific commitments |
Management targets and guidance
| Item | Guidance / target |
|---|---|
| FY27 earnings | Management expects earnings to grow vs FY26 (confirmed by CEO on FY26 call); no numeric guidance |
| Opex ratio | Return from 12.4% of revenue toward 11.7% (progressively) |
| Gross margin | Stabilised; H2 FY26 at 16.5%; no explicit target |
| Chinese-brand mix | >30% of brand portfolio during FY27 |
| Dividend policy | 60–70% of underlying NPAT, fully franked |
| Wakeling | Immediately EPS accretive after funding costs; ~20% revenue uplift (pre-divestment) |
| Medium-term financial targets | None published |
Sustainability commitments
The company states it supports the transition to new-energy and lower-emission vehicles and is positioned to sell and service them. No quantified emissions targets were identified.
Products & Services
Peter Warren does not manufacture products; its "portfolio" is a portfolio of OEM franchises, retail banners and service offerings. Pricing is set by the market (or by OEMs under agency); no proprietary price lists are disclosed.
Retail banners (Vehicle Retailing segment)
| Banner | Location / region | Description | Target customer | Since |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peter Warren Automotive | Warwick Farm (Western Sydney) auto mall and other NSW sites | Flagship multi-franchise auto mall; group headquarters site | Mass-market and prestige retail | 1,958 |
| Frizelle Sunshine Automotive | Gold Coast / south-east Queensland | Multi-franchise group (Frizelle family heritage) | SEQ retail | Pre-IPO |
| Sydney North Shore Automotive | Northern Sydney | Multi-franchise dealerships | Affluent North Shore retail | Pre-IPO |
| Mercedes-Benz North Shore | Northern Sydney | Luxury franchise (agency model since 2022) | Luxury buyers | Pre-IPO |
| Macarthur Automotive | Campbelltown/Narellan/Smeaton Grange region, SW Sydney | Multi-franchise group; expanded by Mazda/MG/Nissan/LDV acquisition (Mar 2024) | Growth-corridor mass market | Pre-IPO; expanded 2024 |
| Penfold Motor Group | South and east Melbourne (Burwood, Malvern, Hawthorn, Frankston) | Acquired Dec 2021; brands include Audi, Mazda, Suzuki | Victorian retail | 2,021 |
| Bathurst Toyota and Volkswagen | Bathurst, regional NSW | Acquired July 2023 (related party) | Regional retail | 2,023 |
| Sydney South Automotive | Southern Sydney | Banner referenced in FY24 Annual Report | Southern Sydney retail | By FY24 |
| Euro Collision Centre | Sydney (location n/d) | Collision/smash repair | Insurance and retail repair customers | Pre-IPO |
| Patriot Campers | Arundel, Gold Coast | Off-road camper trailers | Recreational buyers | 2,021 |
| Peter Warren ZEEKR Gold Coast | Gold Coast | New premium Chinese EV franchise opened within existing footprint | Premium EV buyers | FY26 |
| Wakeling Automotive | Macarthur, Wollongong, Shellharbour, Moss Vale (NSW) | 30 dealerships, 16 brands; acquired 1 Oct 2026 (eight Macarthur sites to be divested) | SW Sydney and Illawarra retail | 2,026 |
OEM franchise portfolio (brands verified in public sources)
| Brand | Segment | Origin | Source of verification |
|---|---|---|---|
| Toyota | Volume | Japan | 2023 acquisition; trade press |
| Mazda | Volume | Japan | Penfold; Tweed Mazda; Macarthur |
| Honda | Volume (agency in Australia) | Japan | Collins Honda, Northern Rivers Honda; Wakeling |
| Nissan | Volume | Japan | Macarthur (2024); Wakeling |
| Suzuki | Volume | Japan | Penfold; trade press |
| Isuzu Ute | Volume/LCV | Japan | Trade press |
| Kia | Volume | Korea | Trade press; Wakeling |
| Hyundai | Volume | Korea | Wakeling brand list |
| Ford | Volume | USA | Trade press |
| Jeep, Chrysler, Dodge | Volume/SUV | USA (Stellantis) | Trade press |
| Peugeot | Volume | France (Stellantis) | Trade press |
| Volkswagen | Volume | Germany | Bathurst VW; Wakeling |
| Skoda | Volume | Czech (VW Group) | Trade press |
| Volvo | Prestige | Sweden (Geely-owned) | Trade press |
| Audi | Prestige | Germany | Penfold (Malvern, Burwood) |
| Mercedes-Benz | Luxury (agency) | Germany | Mercedes-Benz North Shore; Wakeling |
| MG | Volume | China (SAIC) | Macarthur (2024) |
| LDV | LCV/volume | China (SAIC) | Macarthur (2024) |
| GWM (Haval/Tank/Cannon) | Volume | China | FY24 Annual Report |
| Geely | Volume/NEV | China | FY26 results (PWR is Geely's largest Australian partner) |
| ZEEKR | Premium EV | China (Geely) | FY26 results (Gold Coast opening) |
| Chery Group brands | Volume | China | FY26 results (partner groups) |
| GAC Group brands | Volume/NEV | China | FY26 results (partner groups) |
The company states it partners with Geely Holding Group, SAIC Motor Group, Chery Group, GWM Group, GAC Group and "other partners"; individual Chery and GAC sub-brands represented were not itemised in sources reviewed. The full list of 30+ OEMs is not reproduced in any single public source reviewed.
Service and ancillary offerings
| Offering | Description | Target customer | Pricing model |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scheduled servicing and repairs | OEM-accredited workshops; high-voltage (EV) technician capability being built via apprentice program | Owners of new and used vehicles | Labour-hour and capped-price (OEM) servicing |
| Parts & accessories | OEM and aftermarket parts, retail and workshop | Service customers, trade | Retail pricing |
| Finance & insurance | Arranging car loans, leases, insurance, on behalf of third parties | New and used car buyers | Commission per contract |
| Extended service contracts / vehicle protection | Warranties, paint/fabric protection, other aftermarket | Vehicle buyers | Product sale / commission |
| Collision repair | Euro Collision Centre | Insurers and retail | Repair quotes |
| Car care | Detailing and related services (referenced in FY26 call) | Existing customers | Per service |
Digital and customer platforms (proprietary/in-house)
| Platform | Function | Status |
|---|---|---|
| CX360 | Internal customer review and feedback platform | In use (FY26) |
| AI sales and service agents | After-hours lead capture and appointment booking | Piloted at ~20 sites (over a quarter of sites); rollout across network during FY27 |
| D.R.I.V.E. framework | Staff training/customer service framework | In use (FY26) |
| Peter Warren Apprentice program | Technician pipeline (220+ apprentices) | In use |
| Staff Gift Garage | Staff recognition | In use |
Financial Narrative
Sources: FY22, FY23, FY24, FY25 results announcements and Appendix 4E reports; FY26 Appendix 4E and results call; FY22 investor presentation (FY21 comparatives). All A$ millions unless stated.
Income statement
Notes:
-
FY21 revenue (A$1,622m) and PBT (A$76m; A$75.7m derived from FY22 underlying PBT +16.5%) from FY22 investor presentation; FY21 NPAT derived from FY22 NPAT A$56.5m being "+50.5%" — FY21 included pre-IPO/IPO costs.
-
FY22 revenue growth reported as 5.6% by company (5.5% derived from rounded figures); FY22 revenue depressed by ~A$100m agency-model effect.
-
Gross profit FY23–FY25 derived as revenue × disclosed gross margin; FY26 A$406m as disclosed (+1.6%).
-
FY23 opex 12.2% and FY24 11.5% as disclosed; FY25 11.7% and FY26 12.4% as disclosed on FY26 call.
-
FY25 statutory PBT derived (A$22.3m underlying less A$3.0m one-offs).
-
FY26 EPS derived: A$6.348m ÷ ~172.26m shares; diluted EPS not disclosed in sources reviewed.
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FY26 underlying EBITDA not disclosed in sources reviewed; company disclosed net debt/EBITDA of 0.83x on a pre-AASB 16 basis (different definition).
-
FY26 net interest cost on stock (floorplan) A$43.8m vs A$49.1m FY25 (derived from −A$5.3m).
Margin analysis
All margins derived from disclosed figures.
Revenue CAGR (derived): FY21–FY26: 8.9% per annum; FY22–FY26: 9.8% per annum; FY24–FY26: 0.3% per annum. Growth has been entirely acquisition-led since FY23; like-for-like revenue was negative in H1 FY25 (−4.3%).
Half-yearly progression (key inflection data)
H2 figures derived as full year less H1. H1 FY22 statutory PBT A$34.1m vs underlying A$36.3m.
Balance sheet
Notes and gaps:
-
H1 FY26 net debt peaked at A$61.5m; H1 FY25 net debt/property ratio 37% on property of A$225m (definition appears to differ from the FY26 LTV of 19.5% — likely gross vs net basis; not reconciled in sources).
-
Total assets, cash, short/long-term debt split, floorplan liabilities, lease liabilities, equity, goodwill & intangibles and working capital were not available in the primary documents retrieved. An aggregator reports book value per share of ~A$3.01, implying equity of ~A$518m; combined with NTA of A$1.48/share (A$255m), this implies goodwill and intangibles (largely franchise rights and goodwill) of roughly A$263m. These are derived approximations and should be verified against the FY26 balance sheet.
-
Wakeling (completed 1 Oct 2026) adds ~A$28m consideration (A$21.7m goodwill plus net assets at completion), funded from existing debt facilities — will lift net debt and goodwill in H1 FY27.
Cash flow
Capex, dividends paid in dollars and buybacks were not quantified in sources reviewed. No share buybacks have been announced since IPO (none identified). Dividend reinvestment plan existed (Paul Warren DRP participation in Aug 2023).
Ratios
ROE FY25 from aggregator (2.36% TTM to Dec 2025); FY26 derived (A$6.3m ÷ ~A$518m approx. equity). ROA, ROIC, current ratio, debt/equity, interest coverage, asset turnover and cash conversion cycle cannot be computed reliably without the full FY26 balance sheet and are marked not publicly disclosed in sources reviewed.
Commentary on trends, inflections and drivers
FY21–FY22: supply-constrained super-cycle. COVID-era vehicle shortages pushed new-car GPUs to historic highs. Peter Warren listed into this environment and delivered underlying PBT of A$88.2m in FY22 (5.2% margin) despite flood costs and the Mercedes-Benz agency revenue loss. The Penfold acquisition (Dec 2021) added scale in Victoria. Free cash flow of A$76.6m supported a 22c dividend at a 67% payout.
FY23: revenue up, profit rolling over. Revenue jumped 21% to A$2,073m on Penfold's full-year contribution and supply normalisation, but underlying PBT slipped 7% to A$81.9m as interest costs on rising floorplan inventory stepped up. Gross margin of 18.9% was the last "elevated" year.
FY24: the margin reset begins. Revenue grew 19% to A$2,475m (Toyota/VW Bathurst and Warwick Farm, Macarthur acquisitions), but gross margin collapsed 2.0 points to 16.9% as manufacturers flooded the market with stock, intensifying inter-dealer discounting. Underlying PBT fell 31% to A$56.8m, with acquisition-related interest (+A$5.9m) and higher inventory levels (+A$4.5m interest) adding pressure. The May 2024 downgrade and CEO departure mark the inflection.
FY25: trough. H1 FY25 underlying PBT was just A$7.1m, with like-for-like revenue down 4.3% and the company citing ~A$30m of PBT impact from new-car oversupply. Management responded with inventory reduction (new-vehicle stock down >8%), ~A$5m cost-out and growth in service (+10.2% LFL in H1) and used cars (+7.5% LFL in H1). H2 recovered to A$15.2m, for a full-year A$22.3m.
FY26: false dawn, then a second leg down. H1 FY26 PBT rose 76% to A$12.5m, and management guided to growth. But H2 FY26 collapsed to ~A$2.0m as fuel-price spikes linked to Middle East conflict, three RBA rate increases, a consumer shift to smaller, fuel-efficient cars, and Chinese-brand share gains (22.5% of the market in FY26; ~30% in the three months to July 2026) crushed legacy-brand GPUs. Opex rose 6.5% (A$12.3m deliberate investment in new brands and capability; A$6.4m inflation). Positives: record used units, record service and parts revenue, gross margin up 0.2 points to 16.3%, interest costs down 10.8%, order bank up 29.8%.
Key structural observation: The business has roughly A$300m+ of largely fixed operating costs against ~A$400m gross profit. Each 0.1 point of gross margin on A$2.5bn revenue equals ~A$2.5m of PBT — roughly one-sixth of FY26 underlying PBT. This extreme operating leverage explains both the depth of the decline and the potential magnitude of any recovery.
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Segment Overview
| Segment | Contents | Products/services | Disclosure note |
|---|---|---|---|
Vehicle Retailing | All franchised and used-vehicle dealerships, service and parts operations, F&I | New vehicles, used vehicles, maintenance/repair, parts, extended service contracts, vehicle protection, aftermarket products, F&I commissions | Generates the overwhelming majority of revenue |
Property | Owned commercial properties used primarily as dealership premises | Property holding (internal rental to Vehicle Retailing) | Revenue largely eliminated on consolidation |
Revenue by Segment and Segment Margins & Growth (%)
| Metric | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|
Group revenue (AUD Mn) | 2,475.1 | 2,482.6 | 2,489.0 |
Revenue growth YoY (%) | 19.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
Underlying PBT (AUD Mn) | 56.8 | 22.3 | 14.5 |
Underlying PBT margin (%) | 2.29 | 0.90 | 0.58 |
Gross margin (%) | 16.9 | 16.1 | 16.3 |
Service and parts revenue (AUD Mn) | — | 422.1 | 442.0 |
Service and parts share of revenue (%) | — | 17.0 | 17.8 |
Revenue by Segment (%)
| Metric | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|
New vehicle units | 31,161 | 31,309 |
Used vehicle units | 9,702 | 10,578 |
Order bank (units, at 30 June) | 2,030 | 3,349 |
Mixed business ratio (% of GP from back-end) | — | 60.4 |
Inventory aged >120 days (%) | 29.5 | 26.1 |
Chinese-brand dealerships (count, at 30 June) | 9 | 17 |
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View Subscription PlansIncome Statement and Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (AUD Mn) | 1,622 | 1,711.3 | 2,073.1 | 2,475.1 | 2,482.6 | 2,489.0 |
Revenue growth (%) | — | 5.5 | 21.1 | 19.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
Gross profit (AUD Mn, derived) | — | — | 391.8 | 418.3 | 399.7 | 406.0 |
Gross margin (%) | — | — | 18.9 | 16.9 | 16.1 | 16.3 |
Underlying operating expenses (AUD Mn) | — | — | — | — | 289.7 | 308.4 |
Opex as % of revenue | — | — | 12.2 | 11.5 | 11.7 | 12.4 |
Underlying EBITDA (AUD Mn) | — | — | 140.5 | 135.0 | 110.1 | — |
Statutory EBITDA (AUD Mn) | — | 122.7 | 139.7 | — | — | — |
Underlying PBT (AUD Mn) | 75.7 | 88.2 | 81.9 | 56.8 | 22.3 | 14.5 |
Statutory PBT (AUD Mn) | — | 80.8 | 81.1 | 53.4 | 19.3 | 11.5 |
Statutory NPAT attributable (AUD Mn) | 37.5 | 56.5 | 56.4 | 36.1 | 12.1 | 6.3 |
Basic EPS (cents) | — | 33.37 | 32.78 | 20.99 | 7.03 | 3.69 |
Dividends per share (cents) | — | 22.0 | 22.0 | 14.5 | 5.6 | 3.6 |
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View Subscription PlansMargin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY21 | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Gross margin (%) | — | — | 18.9 | 16.9 | 16.1 | 16.3 |
Underlying EBITDA margin (%) | — | — | 6.78 | 5.45 | 4.43 | — |
Underlying PBT margin (%) | 4.67 | 5.15 | 3.95 | 2.29 | 0.90 | 0.58 |
Net margin (%) | 2.31 | 3.30 | 2.72 | 1.46 | 0.49 | 0.26 |
Income Statement and Margin Analysis (%) (H1FY22–H1FY26)
| Metric | H1FY22 | H1FY23 | H1FY24 | H1FY25 | H1FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (AUD Mn) | 777.9 | 999.0 | — | 1,229.4 | 1,268.5 |
Underlying PBT (AUD Mn) | 36.3 | 43.2 | 34.4 | 7.1 | 12.5 |
Underlying EBITDA (AUD Mn) | 54.0 | 70.6 | — | 51.1 | — |
Gross margin (%) | — | — | — | 16.1 | 16.2 |
Interim DPS (cents) | 9.0 | 11.0 | 8.5 | 1.6 | 3.0 |
Key Financials and Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | H2FY24 | H2FY25 | H2FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|
Underlying PBT (AUD Mn, derived) | 22.4 | 15.2 | 2.0 |
Gross margin (%) | — | 16.1 | 16.5 |
Income Statement and Margin Analysis (%) (FY24–FY26)
| Metric | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|
Net debt excl. floorplan and leases (AUD Mn) | — | 46.7 | 47.4 |
Owned property value (AUD Mn) | — | 229.0 | 243.7 |
Net debt / property (LTV, %) | — | 20.4 | 19.5 |
Net debt / EBITDA (x, pre-AASB 16) | — | — | 0.83 |
Average stock level funded (AUD Mn) | — | — | 371 |
NTA per share (AUD) | — | — | 1.48 |
Inventory, new vehicles (AUD Mn, excl. acquisitions) | 363.9 | — | — |
Cash Flow and Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY22 | FY23 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|
Operating cash flow after floorplan interest (AUD Mn) | — | — | 67.3 |
Cash conversion (%) | — | — | 71.1 |
Net cash generated after leases, loan interest and tax (AUD Mn) | — | — | 17.7 |
Free cash flow (AUD Mn, company definition) | 76.6 | — | — |
Dividend payout ratio (% NPAT) | 67 | 67 | — |
Margin Analysis (%) and Financial Ratios (x)
| Ratio | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ROE (%, approx.) | — | — | 2.4 | 1.2 |
Net debt / EBITDA (x) | — | — | — | 0.83 |
Opex / revenue (%) | 12.2 | 11.5 | 11.7 | 12.4 |
Revenue per employee (AUD Mn) | — | — | — | 1.1 |
Revenue by Region
| Region (as reported) | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|
Australia revenue (AUD Mn) | 2,475.1 | 2,482.6 | 2,489.0 |
International revenue (AUD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Share Price & Returns
| Reference point | Price (AUD) | Source / note |
|---|---|---|
IPO offer (Apr 2021) | 2.90 | Prospectus |
First-day trade (27 Apr 2021) | ~3.50 | Motley Fool |
28 Jun 2024 | 1.69 | Market Index history |
~Oct 2025 (pre-AGM) | ~1.80–2.00 | InvestSMART / Regal trades at ~A$2.00 |
52-week high (to Oct 2026) | 2.05 | SmallCaps / Investing.com |
4 Mar 2026 | 0.97 | PitchBook |
20–21 Aug 2026 (post-results) | 0.90 | Investing.com |
52-week low | 0.715 | SmallCaps |
4 Sep 2026 (ACCC approval) | ~0.84 | Business News Australia |
Early Oct 2026 (Wakeling completion) | ~0.725 | Grafa |
Period | Approx. total share-price return (%) | — |
1-year (Oct 2025 → Oct 2026) | about −60 (from ~A$1.80–2.00 to ~A$0.73; derived) | — |
Since IPO (Apr 2021, ~5.5 years) | about −75 (A$2.90 → ~A$0.73; derived, excluding dividends) | — |
5-year | not applicable as a clean period (listed Apr 2021); since-IPO used instead | — |
Calendar YTD 2026 | about −47 to −49 (SmallCaps data, mid-2026) | — |
Valuation Multiples
| Multiple | PWR | Basis |
|---|---|---|
Market capitalisation (AUD Mn) | ~125 | 172.26m shares × A$0.725 |
P/E (FY26 basic EPS 3.69c) | ~19.7x | Trough earnings — misleading |
P/E on aggregator TTM basis | 10.3–13.9x | SmallCaps (at A$0.87–0.95, pre-FY26 result) |
P/B | ~0.24x | Book value per share ~A$3.01 (aggregator) |
P/NTA | ~0.49x | NTA A$1.48 (company, FY26) |
EV/Sales (corporate net debt only) | ~0.07x | (A$125m + A$47.4m) ÷ A$2,489m |
EV/EBITDA | n/c | FY26 underlying EBITDA not disclosed |
Trailing dividend yield | ~4.9% | 3.6c ÷ A$0.73 (fully franked; grossed-up ~7.0%) |
Per-Share Data and Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Interim DPS (cents) | 9.0 | 11.0 | 8.5 | 1.6 | 3.0 |
Final DPS (cents) | 13.0 | 11.0 | 6.0 | 4.0 | 0.6 |
Total DPS (cents) | 22.0 | 22.0 | 14.5 | 5.6 | 3.6 |
Franking (%) | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
Payout ratio (% NPAT) | 67 | 67 | — | — | — |
Capital Markets
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
Moody's / S&P / Fitch ratings | Not rated (no public credit rating) |
Corporate debt | Master debt facility with existing lenders (amount and maturity not disclosed in sources reviewed) |
Floorplan facilities | Inventory finance funding average stock of ~A$371m in FY26; interest A$43.8m |
Lease liabilities | AASB 16 leases (amount n/d); leasehold footprint reduced in FY26 |
Wakeling funding | ~A$28m drawn from existing facilities (Oct 2026) |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance (FY27)
-
Earnings expected to grow in FY27 vs FY26 (no numeric range).
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Drivers cited: order bank +29.8% (3,349 units), continued growth in service, parts and used cars, broader Chinese-brand mix (>30% of portfolio), full-year contribution from new dealerships, roll-off of transition costs, and neutralisation of inflationary costs; opex/revenue to trend back from 12.4% toward 11.7%.
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AI sales and service tools to be rolled out network-wide.
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Wakeling now completed (not included in FY26; contributes from 1 Oct 2026, less eight divested sites).
Consensus growth expectations
Pre-Wakeling consensus (Aug 2025) implied ~2.7% p.a. revenue growth. Given Wakeling (up to ~20% revenue uplift pre-divestment, ~9 months of FY27 contribution), reported FY27 revenue could rise materially, but profit consensus is not verifiable.
Bull case (3 arguments)
-
Operating leverage works in reverse. FY26 underlying PBT of A$14.5m sits on ~A$406m of gross profit. Restoring opex to 11.7% of revenue (~A$17m), a modest GPU recovery as legacy-brand overstock clears in H2 FY27, plus Wakeling accretion could plausibly multiply PBT off a low base; H1 FY26 alone delivered A$12.5m.
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Deep asset backing. At ~A$0.73, the stock trades at ~0.5x NTA (A$1.48) and ~0.24x book, with owned property of A$243.7m exceeding market capitalisation (~A$125m) by nearly 2x and LTV under 20%. The controlling family is buying, limiting downside and raising the possibility of a take-private.
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Right side of the structural shift. With Chinese brands at ~30% of recent monthly sales and PWR as Geely's largest Australian partner (17 Chinese dealerships, ~10 more coming), plus record aftersales and a 60.4% mixed business ratio, PWR may emerge from the reset with a more resilient earnings base and a consolidation platform.
Bear case (3 arguments)
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Structural, not cyclical, margin decline. Gross margin fell from 18.9% (FY23) to ~16% and has not recovered; 67+ brands and aggressive Chinese pricing may permanently lower GPU. H2 FY26 PBT of ~A$2m on ~A$1.2bn revenue shows how little buffer remains.
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Execution and credibility risk. Three downgrades in roughly two years, a February 2026 growth outlook reversed within months, a largely new executive team, and the simultaneous integration of Wakeling and divestment of eight sites leave limited room for error.
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Governance and liquidity discount. A 40% family holder with an Executive Chair, a four-person board, a thin free float and falling dividends may keep the stock at a structural discount to NTA; creeping family acquisition could eventually lead to a low-premium take-private for minorities.
Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
| Timing | Catalyst / monitorable |
|---|---|
| Late Oct–Nov 2026 | 2026 AGM — any trading update on H1 FY27 GPU, order bank conversion and Wakeling |
| Q4 CY2026 | Execution and proceeds of the eight-site ACCC divestment |
| Ongoing | Monthly VFACTS data: Chinese-brand share, PWR brand mix, legacy discounting intensity |
| Ongoing | RBA rate decisions and fuel prices |
| Ongoing | Further Warren family substantial-holder notices (creep toward control) |
| Feb 2027 | H1 FY27 result: first Wakeling contribution; opex ratio progress vs 11.7% target; interim dividend |
| H1 CY2027 | Geely model launches (8+), ZEEKR 7GT/8X/9X arrivals; opening of ~10 pipeline Chinese dealerships |
| FY27 | AI rollout outcomes; any impairment testing outcomes given market cap far below book |
| Aug 2027 | FY27 result vs management's "earnings growth" commitment |
Concluding analyst verdict
Peter Warren Automotive Holdings is a sound, conservatively financed business trapped in a hostile phase of its industry's cycle and in the middle of a structural reset of Australian car retailing. The numbers are stark: revenue has held at roughly A$2.5bn for three years while underlying pre-tax profit has fallen from A$88m to A$14.5m, and the second half of FY26 barely broke even. The cause is not mismanagement of the controllable lines — used cars, service and parts all hit records, inventory ageing improved and interest costs fell — but the collapse of new-car gross profit as brand proliferation and Chinese price competition erode legacy franchise economics, compounded by cost inflation and an investment-heavy year.
The company's response is coherent: pivot the brand portfolio toward Chinese and new-energy marques within its owned property footprint, grow the recurring back end, use AI to lift productivity, and consolidate distressed competitors from a position of balance-sheet strength. The Wakeling deal, acquired for a modest ~A$28m against ~A$500m of turnover, is a classic counter-cyclical consolidation move, although ACCC divestments dilute its value and confirm that local dominance in Macarthur has reached its regulatory limit.
The equity is priced for continued disappointment: at about half of NTA and below the value of owned property alone, the market is effectively assigning little or negative value to the operating business. That creates asymmetric upside if margins merely stabilise and costs normalise, but management credibility has been dented by repeated downgrades, and the governance structure — a 40% family holder now chairing the board while buying stock — raises the probability that minority shareholders capture less of any recovery than the asset backing suggests.
Verdict: Deep-value, high-uncertainty recovery situation. Evidence of sustained H1 FY27 earnings growth and successful Wakeling integration is required before the discount to NTA can be expected to narrow.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Board of Directors
| Name | Role | Appointed | Background | Education | Independence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Paul Warren | Executive Chair (from 1 Jul 2026); previously Executive Director; Interim CEO Jul–Sep 2024 | Director since Nov 2016 | Eldest son of founder; joined 1975; executive head since 1982; board member, Australian Automotive Dealer Association; 50+ years in industry | Bachelor of Business, UTS | Not independent (executive; major shareholder) |
Niran Peiris | Deputy Chair and Lead Independent Director; Chair, Audit and Risk Committee | Apr 2021 | Former member of Board of Management of Allianz SE and CEO of Allianz Australia; former CFO Allianz Australia; tax roles at accounting firms; NED Nick Scali Ltd | BEc, LLB, University of Sydney | Independent |
Catherine West | Non-Executive Director; Chair, People and Remuneration Committee | Apr 2021 | 25+ years legal, business affairs and strategy in media, entertainment, telecoms, medical (Australia, UK, Europe); NED Monash IVF Group; former Independent Chair, Nine Entertainment; Chair NIDA; Chair Wenona School Board of Governors | — | Independent |
John Eastham | Non-Executive Director | May 2024 | 30+ years in dealerships; co-owner of Autopact from 2005, CEO to 2019, director/shareholder until change of ownership Nov 2023; former partner Horwath (now Deloitte) | BEc, Macquarie University | — |
John Ingram | Non-Executive Chair (retired 30 Jun 2026) | 2021 | Chaired through IPO and acquisition phase | — | Former independent chair |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Title | Tenure | Prior roles | Education |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Andrew Doyle | Chief Executive Officer | Since 1 Oct 2024 | MD Audi UK (2017–2024, ~7 years; member of VW Group UK Board of Management); MD Audi Ireland (3 years); MD Audi Australia (~4 years); early career BMW Australia and BMW Canada; 30+ years in automotive | Bachelor of Social Science & Economics (Melbourne University); postgraduate Marketing (Monash); Global Leadership (Harvard Business School) |
Anna Bail | Chief Financial Officer | Appointed during H1 FY26 (exact date n/d) | ~10 years at Inchcape Plc Australia; CFO & MD, KTM Australia and New Zealand; started at PwC | BBus (Accounting) and BIntStudies, UTS; Chartered Accountant; GAICD |
Victor Cuthell | Company Secretary (part-time from mid-2026) | Co Sec since Dec 2022; formerly CFO (retired as CFO) | 20 years as CFO in automotive/retail, incl. 6 years as Australian CFO of Inchcape Plc; former CFO of Craveable Brands (Oporto, Red Rooster, Chicken Treat) | BA (Hons) Accountancy & Finance; Chartered Accountant; GAICD |
Chief Operating Officer | COO | Appointed H1 FY26 | Name not disclosed in sources reviewed | — |
Chief Technology Officer | CTO | Appointed H1 FY26 | Name not disclosed in sources reviewed | — |
Directors' Remuneration
| Attribute | Status (post 1 Jul 2026) |
|---|---|
Board size | 4 directors |
Chair/CEO separation | Yes — CEO (Doyle) separate; however Chair is now Executive (Paul Warren), with a Lead Independent Director (Peiris) as counterweight |
Audit and Risk Committee | Chair: Niran Peiris |
People and Remuneration Committee | Chair: Catherine West |
Female representation on board | 1 of 4 (25%) |
Board & Management Changes
| Date | Change | Context |
|---|---|---|
21 Mar 2024 | Mark Weaver announces departure as CEO at end of FY24 after seven years | Followed an organisational structure review |
May 2024 | John Eastham joins board | Operator expertise |
Jun 2024 | Andrew Doyle appointed CEO (start no later than Nov 2024); Paul Warren interim CEO | External OEM-background hire |
1 Oct 2024 | Doyle commences | New four-pillar strategy |
H1 FY26 | New CFO (Anna Bail), COO and CTO appointed | Capability build for growth and technology |
8 May 2026 (announced) / 30 Jun 2026 (effective) | Chair John Ingram retires; Paul Warren becomes Executive Chair; CFO Victor Cuthell retires and stays as part-time Company Secretary | Paul Warren to focus on strategy; CEO on daily operations |
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Shares | % | Date / source |
|---|---|---|---|
Warren family (aggregate substantial holding) | 69,284,167 | 40.22 | Substantial holder notice, 15 Jun 2026 |
— of which The Warren Family Pty Ltd | 31,139,583 | 18.08 | Top-holder data (Morningstar via Market Index/Motley Fool) |
Frizelle Family Company Pty Ltd | 6,215,007 | 3.61 | Same source |
Competitive Landscape
Key Competitors
| Competitor | Ownership | Segment focus | Geography | Revenue | Relative positioning vs PWR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Eagers Automotive (ASX: APE) | Listed | Multi-franchise, all segments; large BYD distribution/retail exposure; used-car (easyauto123) | National + NZ | Approx. | Market leader with ~4–5x PWR scale; earlier and larger Chinese-brand (BYD) exposure |
Autosports Group (ASX: ASG) | — | Prestige/luxury (BMW, Audi, Mercedes, etc.) | Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane | — | Overlaps PWR's prestige portfolio |
Wakeling Automotive | Private (acquired by PWR Oct 2026) | Multi-franchise | Macarthur/Illawarra | ~A$500m | Now part of PWR |
Autopact | Private (ownership changed Nov 2023) | Multi-franchise | NSW/ACT | — | Large private peer; PWR director John Eastham formerly co-owner |
Phil Gilbert Motor Group | Private | Multi-franchise (Toyota etc.) | Sydney | — | Direct Sydney competitor (cited by CB Insights) |
Suttons Motor Group | Private | Multi-franchise | Sydney | — | Direct Sydney competitor |
Inchcape (Australia) | Listed (LSE parent) | Distribution plus retail | National | Not disclosed (AU) | OEM-distributor/retail hybrid |
Motorama | Private | Multi-franchise | Brisbane/SEQ | — | Competes with Frizelle Sunshine |
Other Macarthur dealers (e.g., independent single-brand dealers) | Private | Local franchises | SW Sydney | — | ACCC counted 34 new-car dealerships in Macarthur |
Online/direct models (OEM direct sales, agency models, online used-car retailers) | Various | Disintermediation | National | — | Structural threat to dealer margins |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Peer Comparison FY2026
| Metric | Peter Warren (FY26) | Eagers Automotive | Autosports Group | Large private groups |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (AUD Bn) | 2.49 | ~11 (CY24) | n/v | — |
Revenue growth (%) | 0.3 | n/v | n/v | — |
Gross margin (%) | 16.3 | n/v | n/v | — |
Underlying PBT margin (%) | 0.58 | n/v | n/v | — |
R&D intensity (%) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |



