Prenetics Global Limited

Comparability warning: FY2021–FY2022 figures are as originally reported and dominated by COVID testing. FY2023 is "continuing operations" as reported in April 2024 (ACT plus CircleDNA). FY2024–FY2025 are continuing operations excluding ACT (IM8 plus CircleDNA plus Europa). These series describe three different businesses.

Income statement

Notes. FY2021/FY2022 gross profit is derived from reported gross margins of 38.5% and 47.7% (FY2022 release). FY2023 gross profit of $1.2M and FY2025 gross profit of $48.8M are 20-F restated / audited. FY2021 net loss comes from a market-data aggregator (S&P via VCP Scanner). FY2022 net loss of $190.5M and EPS of −$2.51 pre-split (−$37.65 on a post-1:15 basis, derived) come from Simply Wall St summarising the FY2022 results. FY2023–FY2025 net losses are from the FY2025 20-F risk factor disclosure. FY2022 adjusted profit attributable was $39.2M (non-IFRS); FY2023 adjusted net loss attributable was $(28.4)M (non-IFRS).

Margins (%)

All margins derived from the figures in 6.1. FY2023 gross margin uses the 20-F restated gross profit of $1.17M against FY2023 continuing revenue of $21.7M as originally reported, so the bases may differ.

Revenue CAGR: FY2021–FY2025 on the reported basis is −23.9% a year. That figure reflects the collapse of COVID testing and is not meaningful for today's business. FY2024–FY2025 continuing revenue grew 479.7%. Management's FY2026 guidance of $220–230M implies about 138–149% growth.

Operating expense structure

The 20-F reports goodwill impairment of $6.8M. The preliminary release reported $8.2M, related to Europa. S&M was 38.5% of FY2025 revenue, and management guided 45–50% for 2026. Q2 2026 acquisition marketing spend was $36.2M.

Balance sheet

Source: FY2025 results release, unaudited balance sheet at 31 Dec 2025 versus audited 31 Dec 2024. Net cash equals cash plus current FVTPL financial assets.

Subsequent liquidity. As of 15 Feb 2026, adjusted liquidity was $171.1M. That comprised cash of $99.3M, FVTPL assets of $29.3M, escrows of $7.3M and Bitcoin of $35.2M (FY2025 release). After the Bitcoin sale ($41.3M, Apr–May 2026) and H1 2026 operating burn, cash and current financial assets were $109.4M at 30 Jun 2026 (Q2 2026 call). The company has had no bank debt. Drawings under the General Catalyst CVF facility began in Q3 2026; their accounting presentation (debt versus revenue-share liability) is not yet disclosed.

Cash flow: notes and sources

Source: FY2025 results release, unaudited cash-flow statement. In 2026 management introduced "consolidated adjusted free cash flow," which includes General Catalyst financing. On that basis July 2026 was the first positive month, and Q3 2026 is expected to be the first positive quarter.

Ratios (derived)

ROIC, net debt/EBITDA and interest coverage are not meaningful because EBITDA is negative and there is no debt. Working-capital days are computed on FY2025 direct costs of $43.4M and revenue of $92.4M. FY2024 ratios other than the current ratio are not meaningful.

2026 year-to-date: notes and sources

Sources: Q1 and Q2 2026 releases and calls. Q1 adjusted EBITDA is derived from the H1 2026 total of $(24.6)M less Q2's $(19.0)M.

Commentary on trends, inflections and drivers

The five-year record has three distinct regimes.

FY2021–22: COVID testing. Revenue was about $276M in both years. Adjusted EBITDA was strongly positive ($34M, then $58M). IFRS net losses were nonetheless large ($174M and $190M) because of fair-value losses on preference-share liabilities ($60.1M in FY2022), SPAC-related listing costs and restructuring impairments. Underlying cash generation was real but non-recurring.

FY2023–24: oncology and genomics. Revenue fell to $16–22M. The company burned roughly $18–25M a year in adjusted EBITDA, carried goodwill from ACT and Europa, and booked investment fair-value losses ($8.9M in FY2024).

FY2025 onward: IM8. The inflection is visible in the quarterly data. IM8 revenue went from $5.7M (Q1 2025) to $45.0M (Q2 2026). IM8 gross margins held at about 60–65% while international mix rose. Adjusted EBITDA losses stayed roughly flat in absolute terms, at $13–25M a year, while revenue grew about 6x. That is the operating leverage management emphasises.

Three caveats temper that story:

Below-the-line volatility: IFRS results were distorted by the Bitcoin strategy (a $9.7M unrealised loss in FY2025, a further mark-to-market loss in Q1 2026, and a realised exit at $41.3M against roughly $54.4M of purchases). Warrant exchange accounting and goodwill impairments added further noise.

Deliberate burn increase in Q2 2026: The adjusted EBITDA loss widened to $19.0M as acquisition spend doubled to $36.2M. Management guides H2 2026 adjusted EBITDA losses of $8–12M and adjusted EBITDA profitability by Q4 2027.

Funding of growth: The General Catalyst CVF is expected to fund about 70% of acquisition marketing. This shifts cash burn from equity holders to a structured financing partner, at a cost that has not been disclosed.

Management guidance (as of 18 Aug 2026)

FY2026: total revenue $220–230M, of which IM8 $215–222M.

Q3 2026: $63–64M. Q4 2026: $75–84M.

Exit run-rate: about $300M.

FY2027: IM8 revenue of $400M or more.

Profitability: H2 2026 adjusted EBITDA loss of $8–12M; adjusted EBITDA profitability by Q4 2027.

Cash flow: positive consolidated adjusted FCF (including CVF funding) from Q3 2026.

Consensus growth expectations

The five covering analysts all rate the stock Buy, with targets of $35–40. That implies the Street broadly accepts the $220–230M (2026) and $400M+ (2027) trajectories.

Bull case

1. Validated hyper-growth. Six consecutive record quarters, July revenue at a $251M annualised run-rate and a guided $300M exit run-rate put FY2027's $400M+ within reach. At about 0.65x EV to FY2027 guided sales, the valuation sits far below DTC consumer comparables.

2. Economics funded by others. A 65% gross margin, a 3–4 month payback and the CVF facility funding about 70% of acquisition spend mean growth no longer depends on dilutive equity. Positive adjusted FCF from Q3 2026 removes the financing overhang.

3. Clean, focused asset. Every non-core asset has been sold for cash (ACT about $46M, Insighta $70M, Bitcoin $41.3M), there is no debt, and new optionality (new SKUs, 2027 clinical readouts, possible US redomicile) is not in guidance.

Bear case

1. Paid growth, not organic. The Q2 2026 adjusted EBITDA loss widened to $19.0M as marketing doubled. If cohort retention weakens or CAC rises from $239–301, the CVF facility amplifies losses.

2. Concentration and fragility. About 97% of revenue comes from one brand built on celebrity association, in a category with low formulation barriers and well-funded rivals such as AG1 and Huel. An ambassador controversy or a platform algorithm change could hit growth quickly.

3. Capital-allocation and governance record. Since 2020 the company has gone through COVID testing, oncology, multi-cancer detection, sports distribution and Bitcoin, with about $13M lost on the BTC round-trip and $37M of goodwill eliminated. Add a dual-class structure, controlled-company exemptions, Hong Kong domicile and repeated resale registrations, and a persistent discount is justified.

Key catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)

Analyst verdict

Prenetics is no longer the company its name, history or legacy screening codes suggest. It is effectively a two-year-old premium supplement brand in a Nasdaq wrapper, and the operating evidence for that brand is strong. IM8 went from launch to about a quarter-billion-dollar run-rate in 20 months. It held gross margins in the mid-60s, kept more than 60% of revenue outside the US, and converted almost all of its revenue to subscriptions. The 2025–26 restructuring was messy, but in hindsight it was value-preserving. The company sold ACT, Europa, Insighta and its Bitcoin for cash and ended with no debt and about $109M of liquidity before drawing on the $1B General Catalyst facility. At about $260M of enterprise value against $220–230M of 2026 revenue guidance and $400M+ of 2027 IM8 guidance, the market is still applying a heavy discount. That discount reflects governance, domicile and credibility, not the operating trajectory.

That discount is partly deserved. Management's capital-allocation record over 2020–2025 was erratic, and the Bitcoin episode is fresh. The governance structure (combined Chair/CEO, dual-class shares, controlled-company status) concentrates power. The most important numbers, retention, LTV and CAC payback, are company-defined and unaudited. The Q2 2026 widening of the adjusted EBITDA loss is a deliberate bet that cohort economics will hold at much larger scale and across new product categories. The CVF facility removes equity-financing risk but adds leverage to that bet.

Our synthesis is a constructive, high-volatility stance with execution-gated upside. The thesis would be confirmed by three things:

• Q3 2026 revenue at or above $63M with positive adjusted FCF;

• stable or falling CAC as acquisition spend scales;

• successful Q4 SKU launches.

The thesis would be broken by any of these:

• a guidance cut;

• a deterioration in retention disclosures;

• renewed non-core capital allocation;

• a reputational event involving a core ambassador.