Salesforce Inc

Employee trend

Source: Forms 10-K, Item 1 "Human Capital Management," FY2022–FY2026. FY2026 headcount of 83,334 is confirmed in the FY2026 Annual Report. Revenue per employee is a derived figure. FY2022 and FY2023 headcounts are as reported in the respective 10-Ks; FY2024 (72,682) and FY2025 (76,453) are directly verified from the FY2024 and FY2025 Forms 10-K.

Positioning statement (150 words)

Salesforce is the world's largest independent enterprise applications company and the long-standing leader in customer relationship management software, holding a 20.0% share of the global CRM market in calendar 2025 per IDC — more than Microsoft, Oracle, Adobe and SAP combined, and the thirteenth consecutive year at number one. The company sells a subscription-based, multi-tenant cloud platform spanning sales, service, marketing, commerce, integration, analytics and collaboration, and has since 2024 repositioned the entire portfolio around Agentforce, its autonomous AI agent layer, and Data 360, its data foundation. FY2026 revenue reached $41.5 billion with a non-GAAP operating margin of 34.1% and $14.4 billion of free cash flow. Salesforce is now simultaneously the principal incumbent beneficiary of enterprise agentic AI adoption and the software franchise most visibly discounted by investors on the thesis that AI erodes seat-based SaaS economics — a tension that defines the equity story.

2.1 What the company does

Salesforce provides cloud-based enterprise application software and platform services, sold predominantly by subscription. Its core proposition is a unified "system of record" for customer data, layered with workflow automation, analytics, integration middleware, collaboration tooling and, since FY2025, autonomous AI agents. Customers subscribe to functional offerings (Sales, Service, Marketing, Commerce, Platform, Integration, Analytics, Slack), industry-specific vertical packages, and consumption-based AI and data products.

2.2 The company's own characterisation

In the FY2025 Form 10-K, Salesforce describes itself as a global leader in CRM technology that connects companies with customers through data, artificial intelligence, CRM and trust, bringing humans together with AI agents on a single unified platform. The FY2026 positioning, articulated in the Q4 FY2026 release and the 2026 proxy statement, is materially more expansive: management now describes Salesforce as the operating system for the "Agentic Enterprise," integrating humans, agents, applications and data on one trusted platform. The proxy's opening letter frames the current period as the "Agentic Revolution" and asserts that the company has re-architected its entire platform to convert raw model intelligence into executed enterprise work.

2.3 Independent characterisation

Stripped of the marketing frame, Salesforce is three businesses stacked on one distribution engine:

1. A mature, high-share applications franchise. Sales and Service clouds together generated $18.8 billion of subscription revenue in FY2026, growing 7–8% in constant currency. This is a slow-growth, extremely high-retention annuity with dominant installed-base share among enterprises. It funds everything else.
2. A data and integration infrastructure business. MuleSoft, Tableau, Data 360 (formerly Data Cloud) and, since November 2025, Informatica. This is the fastest-growing part of the portfolio and the strategic bet: management's thesis is that agentic AI is bottlenecked on data quality, lineage and governance, and that owning that layer is defensible.
3. An emerging agentic AI business. Agentforce reached $800 million of ARR by 31 January 2026, up 169% year over year, with combined Agentforce and Data 360 ARR of $2.9 billion (including $1.1 billion of Informatica Cloud ARR). This is real but small — roughly 7% of total revenue on an ARR basis — and its growth must eventually offset decelerating core seat growth.

2.4 Revenue model

Revenue is overwhelmingly subscription. The mix is stable and highly recurring:

Source: Forms 10-K FY2022–FY2026, Consolidated Statements of Operations; Q4 FY2026 earnings release for FY2026 and FY2025.

Contract terms are typically 12 to 36 months, billed in advance, producing large unearned revenue and remaining performance obligation balances. Professional services are deliberately run near break-even or at a loss (FY2026 professional services revenue of $2,137 million against cost of $2,474 million — a gross loss of $337 million) and function as an adoption accelerant rather than a profit centre.

Increasingly, Agentforce and Data 360 are sold on consumption-based pricing rather than per-seat licensing. Management flags in the FY2025 risk factors that it has limited experience setting optimal prices for consumption contracts and that customer discretion over timing of consumption introduces revenue variability. This is the single most important structural change to the revenue model in a decade.

2.5 Value chain position

Salesforce sits in the application and data layer above hyperscale infrastructure. It does not own material data-centre real estate; it delivers services through third-party cloud platform providers (principally AWS, with Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure and Alibaba Cloud) plus infrastructure it designs but hosts within third-party colocation facilities, unified under the Hyperforce architecture. It licenses frontier large language models from OpenAI, Anthropic and Google rather than training its own frontier models. Downstream, it depends on a large systems-integrator ecosystem (Accenture, Deloitte, IBM, Infosys, Cognizant, Capgemini) for implementation, and on AppExchange ISVs for functional extension.

This position is simultaneously capital-light — FY2026 capital expenditure was $594 million, or 1.4% of revenue — and structurally exposed: Salesforce captures application-layer economics but pays rent to infrastructure and model providers on both ends.

2.6 Customer types and end-markets

Salesforce sells to organisations of every size across essentially all industries. Per the FY2025 10-K, no single customer accounted for more than 10% of revenue in FY2023, FY2024 or FY2025 — an unusually low concentration risk for an enterprise software vendor of this scale. The FY2024 10-K used a stricter five-percent threshold, also unmet.

Vertical concentration is heaviest in financial services, healthcare and life sciences, manufacturing, automotive, communications, retail and consumer goods, professional services and public sector. The industry-specific businesses collectively closed FY2026 at $6.6 billion of ARR, up approximately 20% year over year. Public sector is a distinct and growing vector: the Missionforce National Security platform received IL5 authorisation in August 2026, enabling Agentforce 360 deployment across US Department of War unclassified missions.

Management disclosed in the 2026 proxy that over 70% of the Fortune 100 are customers of both Agentforce and Data 360, and that nearly 90% of the Forbes top-50 AI companies run on the platform.

10.1 Stated strategy

The FY2025 Form 10-K sets out five explicit growth priorities: expand relationships with existing customers through cross-sell and upsell; increase geographic reach; focus on industries and new products; leverage the partner ecosystem; and promote adoption while reducing attrition. It couples these with an explicit operating-expense reduction objective to improve operating margin.

The 2026 proxy statement escalates the framing substantially. The recurring themes, in management's own vocabulary:

• The Agentic Enterprise / Agentic Revolution. Salesforce as the operating system on which humans and agents work together; the platform as the mandatory "landing zone" for enterprise agents.
• Data as the precondition for AI. Benioff's formulation — get the data right to get the AI right; without clean, connected, trusted data there is intelligence only in the form of hallucination. This is the strategic justification for Informatica.
• Intelligence converted into work. The Agentic Work Unit metric operationalises the claim that Salesforce monetises outcomes, not tokens.
• Disciplined, profitable growth. The Lead Independent Director's letter emphasises a return-on-invested-capital framework underpinning M&A and responsible capital deployment.
• Values-led leadership. The 1-1-1 model, nearly $1 billion in community grants, over 10 million volunteer hours, over 64,000 nonprofits on free or discounted licences.

Notably, the Lead Independent Director's 2026 letter explicitly acknowledges "the current discounting of sector enterprise values due to uncertainty in financial markets around the evolution of AI" — an unusually direct board-level admission of the equity-market problem.

10.2 Strategic initiatives in the last 24 months

10.3 Sustainability and ESG commitments

Salesforce maintains net zero residual emissions across its full value chain, compensating ongoing and future residual Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions with purchased carbon credits, and procures renewable electricity or claims equivalent to 100% of global electricity consumption. It was an early SBTi adopter and exceeded its original 50% Scope 1 and market-based Scope 2 reduction goal (achieving 56.4% by FY2023). It subsequently adopted a more ambitious target: 50% reduction in absolute location-based emissions by 2030 and 90% by 2040 across Scopes 1, 2 and 3, without compensation mechanisms.

A material 2025 change: Salesforce shifted its 2030 climate framing toward emissions intensity rather than absolute reduction, characterised by the company as more actionable and pragmatic given that growth may outpace the global decarbonisation rate. This is a genuine weakening of the commitment relative to the roughly 80% of SBTi-approved companies that use absolute targets, and it was made in the same period as the AI compute build-out.

The company published its first standalone Trusted AI and Agents Impact Report in 2025 and implemented Responsible Agentic AI Principles in 2024, reinforced by an AI Acceptable Use Policy.

10.4 Medium-term financial targets

Implied arithmetic on the FY2030 target. From FY2026 revenue of $41.5 billion to $63 billion in FY2030 implies a 10.9% four-year CAGR. FY2027 guidance of 10–11% is consistent with that path but includes three points of inorganic contribution that will not repeat in FY2028. To hit $63 billion, Salesforce must therefore either (a) achieve genuine organic re-acceleration to roughly 11% from a current organic run-rate of 7–8%, or (b) continue acquiring. Management's framing points to (a); the balance sheet and the ROIC framework make (b) harder to justify. This is the central tension in the outlook.

Presented by service-offering grouping, consistent with Salesforce's revenue disaggregation.

5.1 Agentforce Sales

5.2 Agentforce Service

5.3 Agentforce 360 Platform, Slack and Other

5.4 Agentforce Marketing and Agentforce Commerce

Analytical note: this is the portfolio's problem child. Constant-currency revenue declined 1% in Q4 FY2026. Marketing and commerce technology faces the most direct disruption from AI-native competitors (Klaviyo, Braze, and increasingly agent-first shopping surfaces), and Adobe grew CRM-adjacent revenue faster than any top-five vendor in 2025 per IDC-derived analysis.

5.5 Agentforce Integration and Agentforce Analytics

5.6 Industry clouds

Salesforce fields distinct vertical packages including Financial Services Cloud, Health Cloud, Life Sciences Cloud, Manufacturing Cloud, Automotive Cloud, Consumer Goods Cloud, Communications Cloud, Media Cloud, Energy and Utilities Cloud, Nonprofit Cloud, Education Cloud, Public Sector Solutions and Professional Services Cloud, plus Industries AI — a library of more than 100 industry-specific AI capabilities. Collectively the industries businesses ended FY2026 at $6.6 billion of ARR, up nearly 20% year over year — materially faster than the corporate average and the most credible organic growth vector outside Data 360.

5.7 Pricing

Salesforce publishes list pricing per user per month by edition (Essentials/Starter through Unlimited/Einstein 1), with enterprise pricing negotiated and heavily discounted at scale. Agentforce and Data 360 are priced on consumption — Agentforce originally at a per-conversation rate, subsequently supplemented by Flex Credits and, from the Summer '26 release, simplified Agentforce Self-Service pricing. Specific current list prices and enterprise discount curves are not reliably disclosed in filings and are not reproduced here.

The introduction of Agentic Work Units in Q4 FY2026 — 2.4 billion delivered cumulatively across Agentforce and Slack, growing 57% quarter over quarter — signals the direction of travel: from seats, to conversations, to units of completed work. Nearly 20 trillion tokens processed to date (up fivefold year over year) is the input-side counterpart.

6.1 Income statement

Sources: Form 10-K FY2022 (FY2022), Form 10-K FY2023 (FY2023), Form 10-K FY2024 and FY2025 MD&A (FY2024), Q4 FY2026 earnings release (FY2025, FY2026). FY2022 revenue, gross profit, R&D, sales and marketing, G&A, total operating expenses, income from operations and net income are directly verified. FY2023 same. FY2024 revenue, gross profit, income from operations ($5.0 billion per FY2025 10-K MD&A), net income and EPS are verified; the FY2024 split of operating expenses between R&D, sales and marketing, G&A and restructuring is not independently verified in this compilation and is presented as a reconciled derivation from verified totals — treat those four FY2024 line items as indicative only. FY2022 D&A of $3,342 million (used in the EBITDA derivation) is not verified; FY2023–FY2026 D&A are verified from the cash flow statements. Note that Salesforce renamed the "Marketing and sales" caption to "Sales and marketing" from FY2025.

6.2 Per-share data

Sources: Forms 10-K FY2022–FY2024; Q4 FY2026 earnings release for FY2025 and FY2026. FY2022 non-GAAP diluted EPS of $4.78 and FY2023 of $5.24 are not independently verified in this compilation. FY2024 non-GAAP diluted EPS of $8.22 is verified from the Q4 FY2024 press release. FY2022 basic share count of 955 million and FY2023 of 985 million: the FY2022 figure is verified; the FY2023 figure is not. Dividends: the first quarterly dividend of $0.40 was declared in February 2024 and paid within FY2025; the FY2026 declared total reflects four quarters at $0.416.

6.3 Margins

Non-GAAP operating margins: FY2024 (30.5%), FY2025 (33.0%) and FY2026 (34.1%) are verified from press releases. FY2022 (18.7%) and FY2023 (22.5%) are not independently verified. Gross margins and net margins are derived from the verified income statement.

6.4 Revenue growth and CAGR

Four-year revenue CAGR FY2022 to FY2026: 11.9%. Two-year CAGR FY2024 to FY2026: 9.2%.

Constant-currency figures for FY2022 and FY2023 are not independently verified; FY2024–FY2026 are from the respective Q4 press releases.

6.5 Balance sheet

Source: Q4 FY2026 earnings release, Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets.

FY2023 and FY2024 total assets are verified from the FY2024 Form 10-K. FY2022 total assets of $95,209 million is not independently verified. Balance sheet detail for FY2022–FY2024 (cash, goodwill, debt, equity) is available in the respective Forms 10-K but is not reproduced here as it could not be verified in this compilation.

6.6 Derived balance-sheet measures

Commentary. Two things happened to the balance sheet in FY2026 and both matter.

First, Salesforce moved from a $5.6 billion net cash position to $4.9 billion of net debt — a $10.5 billion swing driven by $6.0 billion of new borrowing under the 364-day and three-year credit agreements to fund Informatica, $12.6 billion of buybacks, and a $2.9 billion drawdown of marketable securities. Gross leverage remains modest (net debt to EBITDA of 0.41x) but the direction is unambiguous and the $4.0 billion 364-day facility sits in current liabilities, driving the current ratio to 0.76 and working capital to negative $8.9 billion.

Second — and this is the more important observation — tangible book value went negative. Goodwill and intangibles of $64.8 billion now exceed total stockholders' equity of $59.1 billion. Salesforce carries $57.9 billion of goodwill against a market capitalisation of roughly $162 billion. Any sustained impairment of the Slack ($27.7 billion), Tableau ($15.7 billion) or MuleSoft ($6.5 billion) cash-generating units would be a headline event. There is no indication in the FY2026 filings of an impairment trigger, but the cushion is thinner than at any prior point.

The negative working capital position is largely benign in a subscription business — $24.3 billion of unearned revenue is a customer-funded float, not a claim on cash — but it does mean the $4.0 billion current maturity must be refinanced or repaid from operating cash flow within FY2027.

6.7 Cash flow

Sources: Q4 FY2026 earnings release (FY2025, FY2026); Form 10-K FY2025 cash flow statement (FY2024, FY2023 D&A, SBC and net income); Q4 FY2024 press release (FY2024 OCF of $10.23 billion and FCF of $9.50 billion). Not verified in this compilation: FY2022 operating cash flow, capex, D&A and SBC; FY2023 capex and buybacks; FY2024 buybacks. FY2022 business combinations exclude the Slack acquisition, which closed in FY2022 and involved substantial cash and stock consideration — the FY2022 investing line is not verified and the zero shown should not be relied upon.

6.8 Free cash flow conversion and shareholder returns

Commentary. Free cash flow conversion is exceptional and is the single strongest element of the fundamental case. FY2026 free cash flow of $14.4 billion on $41.5 billion of revenue is a 34.7% margin, up from 27.3% two years earlier, driven by margin expansion, negative-working-capital dynamics from upfront billing, and capital intensity that has fallen even as the AI product set scaled. Guidance for FY2027 capex of approximately 1.5% of revenue is a striking contrast to hyperscaler capital cycles — Salesforce is monetising the AI build-out without funding it.

The offsetting observation: stock-based compensation of $3.5 billion (8.5% of revenue) is rising in both absolute and relative terms, and FY2026 shareholder returns of $14.3 billion consumed 99% of free cash flow. With the new $50 billion authorisation and a $25 billion accelerated repurchase commenced in March 2026, FY2027 returns will exceed free cash flow and be partly debt-funded. That is a deliberate signal of management confidence — and, less charitably, a defence of a share price that has halved.

6.9 Key ratios

ROE, ROA and ROIC use average balances. FY2024 equity and total assets used in the averages rely on the FY2024 Form 10-K; the FY2024 equity figure is not independently verified and the FY2024 ratios should be treated as approximate. Interest coverage cannot be calculated: Salesforce does not disclose interest expense as a separate line item in the condensed consolidated statements of operations, reporting it within "Other income (expense)," which was a net positive $172 million in FY2026. Interest expense detail is disclosed in the debt footnote of the Form 10-K but is not reproduced here as it could not be verified. Cash conversion cycle is not meaningfully calculable for a software business with no inventory; DSO is presented instead.

Commentary on returns. ROIC of roughly 9% against a plausible weighted average cost of capital of 8–10% means Salesforce is, on a whole-company basis, approximately covering its cost of capital and no more. This is the arithmetic legacy of $50 billion-plus of acquisitions at premium multiples: the operating business generates outstanding returns on incremental capital, but the $57.9 billion goodwill balance in the denominator drags the aggregate to mediocrity. The trend is right — ROIC has risen from roughly 5.7% to 9.1% in two years — and the Board's newly disclosed return-on-invested-capital framework for M&A, referenced in the Lead Independent Director's 2026 proxy letter, is a direct acknowledgement of this history.

6.10 Inflection points

• FY2023 was the trough. Net income of $208 million on $31.4 billion of revenue, a 0.7% net margin, a 75.8% effective tax rate distorted by valuation allowance and discrete items, and a 3.3% GAAP operating margin. This is what triggered the activist campaign.
• FY2024 was the pivot. GAAP operating margin more than quadrupled to 14.4%; operating cash flow rose 44%. The restructuring worked, and it worked fast.
• FY2025–FY2026 is the plateau. Non-GAAP operating margin has advanced 110 basis points per year, to 34.1%. The FY2027 guide of 34.3% implies just 20 basis points of further expansion. The margin lever is largely exhausted.
• FY2026 is the leverage inflection. From net cash to net debt, from organic-only to $9.3 billion of acquisition spend, from $7.8 billion to $12.6 billion of buybacks.
• The unresolved question is FY2027. Revenue growth guidance of 10–11% includes approximately three points from Informatica. Organic growth is therefore guided to roughly 7–8% — slower than FY2026 organic. Management's promise of second-half re-acceleration is the whole thesis.

22.1 Management guidance

Beyond FY2027, management targets $63 billion of FY2030 revenue including Informatica, raised from the prior target on 25 February 2026, implying a 10.9% CAGR from FY2026.

22.2 Consensus expectations

Fifty-two covering analysts carry an average rating of Buy with a twelve-month target of $242.29, roughly 26% above the mid-August 2026 price. Q1 FY2027 non-GAAP EPS of $3.88 exceeded the $3.13 estimate by 24%. Consensus for Q2 FY2027, reporting 26 August 2026, sits near $3.28 per share.

22.3 Bull case

1. The valuation already discounts the terminal-decline scenario. At approximately 15 times forward non-GAAP earnings with an 8.9% free cash flow yield, the market is pricing Salesforce as a business whose revenue growth is about to stall permanently. Against that, FY2026 delivered 10% revenue growth, 110 basis points of margin expansion, 16% free cash flow growth and 23% non-GAAP EPS growth. If growth merely persists at high single digits and margins hold, the multiple has substantial room to re-rate. Q1 FY2027's 24% EPS beat and 52% GAAP EPS growth suggest the operating business is performing better than the multiple implies.

2. The Informatica thesis is proving out faster than promised. Accretion to non-GAAP operating margin and EPS is targeted within twelve months of close — a full year ahead of the deal-announcement commitment. Informatica contributed $1.1 billion of Cloud ARR and approximately $2.2 billion of RPO immediately, and Europe's constant-currency growth doubled from 7% to 13% in the quarter of consolidation. Enterprise agentic AI is bottlenecked on data governance, and Salesforce now owns the leading independent stack for it.

3. Consumption pricing structurally decouples revenue from headcount. The bear case rests on agents destroying seats. Salesforce's answer is Agentic Work Units — 2.4 billion delivered, growing 57% quarter over quarter — and 19 trillion tokens processed, up fivefold. If Salesforce successfully migrates the revenue base from seats to units of executed work, agent proliferation becomes the growth driver rather than the threat. Agentforce ARR of $800 million growing 169% and 29,000 deals closed with over 60% of Q4 bookings from existing-customer expansion suggest the land-and-expand motion is functioning.

22.4 Bear case

1. Organic growth is decelerating and the re-acceleration promise is unevidenced. Strip the approximately three points of Informatica contribution from FY2027 guidance and organic growth is 7–8%. Three of five service-offering buckets decelerated in Q4 FY2026, and Marketing and Commerce actively contracted 1% in constant currency. Sales and Service — nearly half of subscription revenue — sit at 7–8%. Management's forecast of second-half FY2027 organic re-acceleration is an assertion with no supporting disclosure in the FY2026 pack.

2. Salesforce has demonstrated the seat-destruction thesis on its own P&L. Support headcount fell from approximately 9,000 to approximately 5,000 during 2025, with AI resolving 50% of interactions and support costs down 17%. Every customer CFO can run that arithmetic on their own Salesforce contract. Curative's cancellation of an approximately $600,000 annual contract after building a replacement in two months, and the reported USDA move toward C3 AI, are the first visible instances. Salesforce's own FY2025 risk factors concede that new AI offerings may disrupt workforce needs and negatively impact demand for its offerings.

3. The financial structure is being levered to defend a falling share price at exactly the moment execution risk is highest. Within twelve months Salesforce moved from $5.6 billion net cash to $4.9 billion net debt, spent $9.3 billion on acquisitions, returned 99% of free cash flow, launched a $25 billion accelerated repurchase, drew S&P's negative outlook, and reorganised its entire senior leadership after four executive departures. Tangible book value is negative, with $57.9 billion of goodwill against $59.1 billion of equity. Q1 FY2027 operating cash flow grew 3% against revenue growth of 13% — the first quarter in three years where cash conversion visibly lagged. There is no balance sheet slack left if the re-acceleration does not arrive.

22.5 Catalysts and monitorables — next twelve months

22.6 Analyst verdict

Salesforce is the clearest available expression of the central unresolved question in enterprise software: does agentic AI expand the application layer or hollow it out? The company's fundamentals are, by any conventional measure, excellent. FY2026 delivered $41.5 billion of revenue, a 34.1% non-GAAP operating margin, $14.4 billion of free cash flow at a 34.7% margin, $72.4 billion of contracted backlog and 20.0% global CRM share — more than the next four vendors combined, for the thirteenth consecutive year. It has completed a genuine margin transformation, lifting GAAP operating margin from 3.3% to 20.1% in three years. It generates cash at a rate that funds a $50 billion buyback authorisation, a growing dividend and $9 billion of M&A simultaneously. At approximately 15 times forward non-GAAP earnings and an 8.9% free cash flow yield, none of that is in the price.

What is in the price is the risk that the revenue base itself is impaired. The evidence for that concern is not speculative — it is in Salesforce's own disclosures. Sales and Service, nearly half of subscription revenue, grow 7–8%. Marketing and Commerce is shrinking. Three of five product buckets decelerated in Q4 FY2026. Strip Informatica and FY2027 organic growth is 7–8%, below FY2026. Salesforce itself cut roughly 4,000 support roles because its own AI made them unnecessary, and its risk factors concede that AI may reduce demand for its offerings. Q1 FY2027 operating cash flow grew 3% against 13% revenue growth. Management's answer — the FY2030 $63 billion target, the promise of second-half organic re-acceleration, the pivot to Agentic Work Units — is coherent, well-argued and, as at August 2026, entirely unproven.

The balance sheet has been mobilised in service of that answer. Net cash became net debt, tangible book value went negative, $25 billion is being spent buying back stock, S&P moved to negative outlook, and the leadership team that will execute the plan was reconstituted in August 2026 after four senior departures. Each decision is individually defensible. Collectively they mean there is no margin for error.

The honest position is that this is a genuinely two-sided situation where the valuation compensates for the risk but does not eliminate it. The asymmetry is favourable — a business generating a 9% free cash flow yield with 20% share of a growing market does not need much good news to re-rate — but the thesis is falsifiable on a specific, near-term, disclosed metric. Watch NNAOV and organic ex-Informatica growth at the 26 August 2026 print. Those two numbers, not revenue, will settle the argument.

END OF DOSSIER

Verification summary. Directly verified from primary sources: FY2025 and FY2026 income statement, balance sheet and cash flow; FY2022 and FY2023 income statements; FY2024 revenue, gross profit, income from operations, net income and EPS; FY2024–FY2026 service-offering and geographic revenue; FY2027 guidance; board composition, committees and director compensation; the Tallapragada transition terms; Informatica deal terms and financing; IDC market share; employee counts. Flagged as unverified in this compilation: FY2024 operating expense line-item split; FY2022–FY2024 balance sheet detail other than total assets; FY2022 cash flow and D&A; non-GAAP margins and EPS for FY2022–FY2023; peer company financials; current credit rating levels; current ESG ratings; institutional ownership percentages; patent portfolio size; three- and five-year share price returns; country-level revenue; current diversity metrics. Flagged as not publicly disclosed: segment-level profitability (single-segment reporter), country revenue, patent counts, separate interest expense in the earnings release, and the number of countries of operation.

A datapoint that belongs in this register precisely because it is uncomfortable:* the CEO of Curative publicly stated that his company cancelled an approximately $600,000 annual Salesforce contract, having replaced the CRM with an internally built tool developed with AI assistance in roughly two months. One anecdote is not a trend. But it is the clearest articulated form of the bear thesis, from a customer, on the record.