St Peter Port Capital Limited Overview
St Peter Port Capital was a Guernsey-domiciled, AIM-quoted closed-ended investment company. It launched in April 2007 with £75 million of new equity to invest in growth companies shortly before an IPO or another liquidity event. Its model was to supply the bridging or working capital that would carry an investee to that event, often with warrants or equity participation attached. The strategy produced early realisations: £63.9 million had been realised by March 2014 at a 55% gain on cost. However, the post-2011 commodity downturn and the illiquidity of its later holdings stranded the residual portfolio. That portfolio was concentrated in frontier natural-resource projects (Brazilian potash, Caspian oil, Oregon nickel) plus two technology companies. NAV fell from 94.13p in March 2014 to 14.98p by September 2020. With no liquidity events in sight, the board auctioned the portfolio in 2021, sold it for £2.2 million, delisted and entered liquidation. The company is now best understood as a closed case study in pre-IPO fund risk.
The company's own description
In its FY2020 audited results (29 May 2020), the company described itself as a Guernsey-registered, closed-ended investment company admitted to AIM. Its investment strategy was primarily to invest in unquoted companies close to a liquidity event, with the funds often providing the working capital to make that event possible. The company named three types of event:
-
an IPO;
-
a trade sale; or
-
repayment of a bridging loan, typically with warrants or another form of participation, out of a later fund-raising by the investee at a higher price.
The investable universe was described as companies across a broad range of sectors and geographies expecting a liquidity event within months of investment.
The original 2007–2015 description, used in the Chairman Bob Morton era, was more concise. The company aimed to generate value by investing predominantly in growth companies shortly before an IPO or other exit event, which it called "pre-IPO companies" (FY2014 and FY2015 final results).
Business model and "revenue" model
SPPC had no trading revenue. Its income statement consisted of five lines:
-
net gains or losses on financial assets at fair value through profit or loss (realised and unrealised);
-
small amounts of interest income;
-
foreign-exchange gains or losses;
-
occasional "other income"; and
-
administrative expenses, including the management fee until 2019.
Under the IFRS 10 investment-entity amendments, the company did not consolidate its subsidiaries. These were St Peter Port Capital (RFN) Limited (Guernsey), which held an 80% stake in Red Flat Nickel Corp. (USA), and St Peter Port Capital Services Limited. All of them were carried at fair value.
The revenue-type mix requested by the template (product, service, subscription, licensing) does not apply. The company's "return engine" had three parts:
-
Capital gains on exit. Its mandate was to sell positions after the investee's IPO or trade sale.
-
Bridging-loan economics. It lent to investees and received warrants or equity. The Red Flat Nickel bridge loan, for example, converted into control in 2011 when the loan reached term.
-
Distribution policy. Each six-month period, subject to Guernsey solvency requirements, it paid out in cash 50% of the net gains from realisations (FY2014 and FY2018 Chairman's statements).
Value-chain position
SPPC sat at the late-stage private / pre-IPO bridge point of the capital-markets value chain. It provided capital after venture or development rounds and before a public listing.
The fund was sponsored and managed by St Peter Port Investment Management Limited (SPPIM). SPPIM was a joint venture between Shore Capital Limited, the Guernsey-headquartered investment group, and Broughton Investments Group Limited, in which investment adviser Tim Childs was interested (H1 FY2010 interim; H1 FY2014 interim). This structure linked the fund to Shore Capital's broking and corporate-finance deal flow.
Investor and end-market exposure
| Exposure | Share of portfolio book value |
|---|---|
| Mining (Brazil Potash, Red Flat Nickel) | 62.4% |
| Oil and gas (Buried Hill) | 30.4% |
| Technology (Stream TV/SeeCubic, iQur) | 5.6% |
| Agriculture/forestry (Agriculture Investment Group, Uruguay) | 1.6% |
The company's "customers" were its shareholders. Its end-markets were the sectors of its investees. By the final audited balance sheet (31 March 2020) the portfolio was concentrated as follows (book value):
Independent characterisation
SPPC is best described as a failed-liquidity, late-life pre-IPO fund. Its 2007 thesis was buying pre-IPO paper at a discount to imminent listing prices. That thesis depended on open IPO windows for frontier natural-resource issuers. Those windows effectively closed after the 2011–2015 commodity bear market.
From roughly 2014 the company was a run-off vehicle in all but name. It made minimal new investment (£1.3 million in FY2014, £218,000 in follow-ons in FY2015, about £1.0 million in FY2017 and nothing thereafter). It spent cash on fees while waiting for exits that did not come.
The cost of the listed wrapper eventually came to dominate the economics. The board said in the FY2019 results that there was a minimum cost below which an AIM-traded Guernsey company simply could not operate, and it estimated operating costs at about £26,000 per month if the company stayed listed (September 2021 circular).
Financial Narrative
Scope note. The five fiscal years with available data are FY2016–FY2020. FY2021 audited accounts were never published. FY2016 is available only as closing net assets and cash, carried as opening balances in the FY2017 accounts. Operating-company metrics such as revenue, gross profit, EBITDA, capex, goodwill, ROIC and the cash conversion cycle do not apply and are omitted or marked NA. Sources: FY2018 final results (FY2017–FY2018 figures), FY2020 final results (FY2019–FY2020 figures) and the H1 FY2021 interim (H1 figures).
Per-share data
FY2016 NAV per share is derived from £24,068k of opening net assets divided by 64,221,500 shares. The NAV changes for FY2017, FY2019 and FY2020 are derived. The FY2018 change (-30.1%) is reported. The FY2018 dividend per share is derived from £482k paid divided by 64.22m shares; the dividend rate itself was not stated in the reviewed extract.
Balance sheet
The FY2017 and FY2018 "portfolio investments" lines are rounded £m figures from the Chairman's statements. The balance of financial assets is the £1.0m ABN Amro floating-rate note. FY2016 net debt is shown on a cash-only basis, because FY2016 holdings of the floating-rate note are not disclosed.
The FY2018 statement of changes in equity mislabels the FY2016 closing balance as "1 April 2017". It is treated here as 1 April 2016 (£24,068k), since the FY2017 loss of £5,087k reconciles it to £18,981k.
Portfolio cost versus fair value
All fair-value assets were Level 3 (unobservable inputs).
Cash flow
FY2019 "sale of investments" (£1,096k) consists mostly of the floating-rate note redemption. True portfolio realisations were £96k (FY2019 Chairman's statement). In H1 FY2021, operating cash flow was -£182k and investment purchases (SeeCubic) were -£28k.
Ratios (derived from the tables above)
Ratios not meaningful for this entity include ROIC, net debt/EBITDA, interest coverage, asset turnover and cash conversion cycle. The company had no debt, no EBITDA, no revenue and no working-capital cycle. The FY2017 and FY2018 "portfolio fair value / NAV" ratios use only the rounded portfolio figures (£16.5m and £12.1m), excluding the floating-rate note.
NAV compound growth (derived)
Revenue CAGR is not applicable.
Commentary on trends, inflections and drivers
FY2017–FY2018: the write-down and FX phase. Losses on investments of £4.1m and £4.4m dominated these two years. They were driven by three factors:
-
Illiquidity discounts imposed by the board. In FY2018 Buried Hill was cut 20% below the company's own fair value, and Union Agriculture was carried at a 70% discount to its reported NAV.
-
Sterling strength against the US dollar. This alone cost 2.81p of NAV per share in FY2018, which was 31.6% of that year's NAV decline.
-
Commodity-linked marks across uranium, coal and iron-ore holdings.
Administrative expenses of over £1.0m in FY2017 amounted to nearly 5% of average NAV. That was an untenable drag for a vehicle making almost no realisations (£218k in FY2017, £17k in FY2018).
FY2018: the reserve reorganisation and the last dividend. The £66.4m special reserve, which originated from the IPO share premium, was transferred to revenue reserves. A £482k dividend was paid in the same year. Given negligible realised gains in FY2018, it probably related to gains realised in an earlier period, although the reviewed extract does not state its basis. The payment reduced the cash buffer to £301k at year-end, giving only 0.38 years of cash runway, the low point of the series.
FY2019–FY2020: the cost-cutting inflection. Administrative expenses fell by 39% in FY2019 (£888k to £541k) and by a further 42% in FY2020 (to £316k). This followed fee renegotiations, director fee cuts, the change of auditor and, most importantly, the move to self-management in late 2019. The admin-to-NAV ratio fell to 2.98%.
Investment losses also slowed sharply, to £1.7m in FY2019 and £0.6m in FY2020, because the portfolio had shrunk to six largely static marks. The underlying problem was unchanged: there were zero realisations in FY2020. The cash buffer could only be replenished through the floating-rate note redemption (FY2019) or the AIG sale (H1 FY2021).
The terminal inflection, 2021. Book NAV of £9.6m (September 2020) was realised at £2.2m (August 2021). In practical terms, about 77% of reported NAV was illusory to a forced seller. That is the defining financial fact of the company's late history. Level 3 marks based on the last private fund-raising price, such as Brazil Potash at US$2.50 per share, did not survive contact with a time-limited auction.
7. SEGMENTAL AND GEOGRAPHIC MAPPING
Portfolio book value by region of principal activity: notes and sources
Source: FY2020 final results, region table (£m rounded to £0.1m).
Sector × geography (31 March 2020, as inferred from holding descriptions)
Residual values are derived from Note 3 sector totals less disclosed individual valuations and are indicative only.
Fastest-growing and declining regions
The question can only be framed as changes in book value. South America grew as a share of the portfolio because Brazil Potash's carrying value was stable in US dollar terms while other holdings were written down.
North America declined most. The Stream TV write-down from US$1.00 to US$0.25 and Red Flat Nickel's regulatory impasse reduced the region to about 4% of book value against a cost of £3.2m.
Asia (Caspian) was flat to modestly lower, reflecting FX and an unchanged US$1.60-per-share carrying value. All regions were exposed to sterling/US dollar translation, since most assets were denominated in US dollars.
Unlock Company Financials
Unlock this company profile to view its financial data.
View Subscription PlansFinancial Detail
Income Statement
| Metric (GBP K) | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Net gains/losses on financial assets at FVTPL | -4,076 | -4,357 | -1,682 | -587 |
Interest income | 4 | 7 | 1 | 3 |
Foreign exchange gain | 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
Other income | 1 | 7 | 7 | 0 |
Net investment loss | -4,065 | -4,343 | -1,674 | -583 |
Administrative expenses | -1,022 | -888 | -541 | -316 |
Net loss / pre-tax loss | -5,087 | -5,231 | -2,215 | -899 |
Net loss attributable to shareholders | -5,087 | -5,231 | -2,215 | -899 |
Margin Analysis (%) and Share Count (millions)
| Metric | FY2016 | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Basic and diluted EPS (pence) | — | -7.92 | -8.15 | -3.45 | -1.40 |
NAV per share (pence) | 37.48 | 29.56 | 20.66 | 17.21 | 15.81 |
NAV per share change (%) | — | -21.1 | -30.1 | -16.7 | -8.1 |
Dividend paid per share (pence, derived) | — | 0 | 0.75 | 0 | 0 |
Weighted average shares (millions) | — | 64.22 | 64.22 | 64.22 | 64.22 |
Valuation Snapshot
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
Net change in fair value | -£378k |
Administrative expenses | -£154k |
Net loss | -£532k |
EPS | -0.83p |
Net assets | £9,622k |
NAV per share | 14.98p (down 5.2% from March 2020, with FX contributing 0.6p) |
Cash | £215k |
Investments | £9,445k |
Balance Sheet
| Metric (GBP K) | FY2016 | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Financial assets at FVTPL | — | 17,482 | 13,126 | 10,382 | 9,795 |
of which portfolio investments | — | 16,500 | 12,100 | 10,382 | 9,795 |
Loans and other receivables | — | 111 | 45 | 11 | 20 |
Cash and cash equivalents | 3,215 | 1,488 | 301 | 756 | 425 |
Total assets | — | 19,081 | 13,472 | 11,149 | 10,240 |
Total liabilities (all current payables) | — | 100 | 204 | 96 | 86 |
Total debt (short-term) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Total debt (long-term) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Net debt (negative = net cash) | -3,215 | -1,488 | -301 | -756 | -425 |
Net assets / total equity | 24,068 | 18,981 | 13,268 | 11,053 | 10,154 |
Goodwill and intangibles | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Net current assets (all assets classified current) | — | 18,981 | 13,268 | 11,053 | 10,154 |
Instrument Class Details
| Instrument class | Historic cost | Fair value |
|---|---|---|
Listed equity | 3,169 | 0 |
Unlisted equity | 33,733 | 9,594 |
Unlisted debt | 2,931 | 201 |
Total | 39,833 | 9,795 (24.6% of cost) |
Cash Flow
| Metric (GBP K) | FY2016 | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Interest and investment income received | — | 6 | 7 | 1 | 3 |
Operating expenses paid | — | -1,047 | -795 | -676 | -335 |
Net operating cash flow | — | -1,041 | -788 | -675 | -332 |
Sale of investments | — | 218 | 17 | 1,096 | 0 |
Purchase of investments | — | -1,003 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Net subsidiary loan flows | — | 93 | 66 | 34 | 0 |
Net investing cash flow | — | -692 | 83 | 1,130 | 0 |
Dividends paid | — | 0 | -482 | 0 | 0 |
Share buybacks | — | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Capex | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Free cash flow (operating less net investment purchases, derived) | — | -2,044 | -788 | -675 | -332 |
Net change in cash | — | -1,733 | -1,187 | 455 | -332 |
Margin Analysis (%) and Financial Ratios (x)
| Ratio | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Return on average equity (%) | -23.6 | -32.4 | -18.2 | -8.5 |
Return on closing total assets (%) | -26.7 | -38.8 | -19.9 | -8.8 |
Admin expense / average NAV (%) | 4.75 | 5.51 | 4.45 | 2.98 |
Current ratio (x) | 190.8 | 66.0 | 116.1 | 119.1 |
Debt / equity (x) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Cash runway at year-end (years of operating outflow) | 1.43 | 0.38 | 1.12 | 1.28 |
Portfolio fair value / NAV (%) | 92.1 | 98.9 | 93.9 | 96.5 |
NAV per Share CAGR by Period
| Period | NAV per share CAGR |
|---|---|
FY2016 to FY2020 (37.48p to 15.81p) | -19.4% |
FY2014 to FY2020 (94.13p to 15.81p) | -25.7% |
Key Financials
| Region (GBP K) | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|---|
Europe | — | — | 300 |
North America | — | — | 400 |
Asia | — | — | 3,000 |
South America | — | — | 6,100 |
Total | 12,100 | 10,382 | 9,800 |
Region (%) Overview
| Region (%) | FY2020 |
|---|---|
Europe | 3.6 |
North America | 4.1 |
Asia | 30.4 |
South America | 61.9 |
Region Overview
| Region | Number | Cost (GBP Mn) | Book value (GBP Mn) | % of book value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Europe | 1 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 5.3 |
North America | 2 | 3.2 | 0.4 | 4.2 |
Asia | 1 | 1.8 | 2.9 | 30.5 |
South America | 2 | 3.4 | 5.7 | 60.0 |
Total | 6 | 9.1 | 9.5 | 100.0 |
Holding Details
| Holding | Sector | Region | Country of activity | Book value (GBP K) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Brazil Potash | Mining | South America | Brazil | 5,906 |
Agriculture Investment Group | Agriculture | South America | Uruguay | About 154 |
Buried Hill | Oil and Gas | Asia | Turkmenistan (Caspian) | 2,982 |
iQur | Technology | Europe | UK | 348 |
Red Flat Nickel | Mining | North America | USA (Oregon) | Nominal (residual of the Mining total) |
Stream TV | Technology | North America | USA (with R&D in the Netherlands and manufacturing in Asia) | About 203 (residual of Technology) |
Financial Ratios (x)
| Data point (pence) | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|
Share price, end of December within fiscal year | — | — | 2.01 |
Implied share price at start of calendar 2020 (derived from the reported 62% year-to-date fall) | — | — | 5.29 |
NAV per share at period reference date | 17.21 | 15.81 | 14.98 |
Price / NAV (x) | — | — | 0.13 |
Capital Markets
| Measure | Value |
|---|---|
Discount to NAV at 30 December 2020 | About 86.6% (2.01p against 14.98p) |
Estimated liquidation return against the end-2020 price | About 3.38p against 2.01p, implying about 68% upside for an end-2020 buyer, before final cost adjustments and time value |
Estimated liquidation return against the last NAV | About 3.38p against 14.98p (a 77% shortfall) |
Dividend History
| Fiscal year | Dividend paid |
|---|---|
FY2018 | £482k paid (about 0.75p per share, derived) |
FY2020 | Nil (no net realised gains) |
Capital Markets (2)
| Item | Relevance |
|---|---|
Liquidator final account and Guernsey Registry dissolution notice | Confirms closure and the final distribution per share |
Any unclaimed-distribution notices from the liquidator | Relevant to residual shareholders |
Brazil Potash (NYSE American: GRO) permitting, financing and share price | Benchmarks the value transferred to RAB Capital in the 2021 auction (subject to share-capital comparability checks) |
Buried Hill / Caspian (Dostluk/Serdar) development agreements | Same purpose |
SeeCubic commercialisation; iQur clinical progress | Same purpose |
Executive Leadership
Board of Directors
| Name | Role | Tenure (as evidenced) | Background / notes | Compensation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Lynn Bruce | Chairman; company contact director | Chairman by November 2017 at the latest, through liquidation in October 2021 | Signed all Chairman's statements FY2018–H1 FY2021; led the strategic review conclusion, cost-cutting, self-management and the auction/liquidation | Not publicly disclosed in reviewed extracts. Directors' fees were reduced (FY2020) |
Bob Morton | Chairman | At least FY2010 (H1 interim) to FY2015 | Chaired the company during the growth and early run-off phases. Prior career and education not detailed in reviewed sources | — |
Peter Griffin | Director / company contact (Guernsey) | At least 2009–2015 | Listed as company contact in 2009–2015 announcements | — |
Other directors | Non-executive directors | — | The September 2021 circular listed directors on page 4, but that list was not reproduced in the RNS extract | — |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Role | Period |
|---|---|---|
Tim Childs | Investment adviser to SPPIM; interested in Broughton Investments Group (JV partner) | At least 2009–2013 |
Graham Shore | Signed the Investment Manager's Report on behalf of SPPIM | FY2018 |
Jonathan Paisner | For LMN Capital Limited, adviser to SPPIM | FY2018 (LMN cited from H1 FY2018) |
Shore Capital Group employees | Staff used by St Peter Port Capital Services Limited | From late 2019 |
Board & Management Changes
| Date | Change | Context |
|---|---|---|
Between FY2015 and November 2017 (exact date not disclosed) | Chairman succession from Bob Morton to Lynn Bruce | Accompanied the shift from a pre-IPO growth mandate to realisation |
2017 (from H1 FY2018) | LMN Capital Limited appears as adviser to SPPIM | The Tim Childs / Broughton advisory role is no longer cited |
2 September 2019 – December 2019 | External manager SPPIM terminated; self-managed structure adopted | Cost reduction |
13 March 2019 | Change of auditor | Cost reduction |
5 January 2018 | Change of administrator / registered office | Not detailed |
11 October 2021 | Directors' powers cease; liquidator Jeff Vincent assumes control | Members' voluntary liquidation |
Governance Detail
| Phase | Period | Stated strategy |
|---|---|---|
Launch / growth | 2007–c.2013 | Invest predominantly in growth companies shortly before an IPO or other exit event. Provide working capital or bridge loans to make the liquidity event possible |
Realisation drift | c.2013–2016 | "Major liquidity events becoming closer" (FY2014). Write-downs as commodity markets hit multi-year lows (FY2015). Minimal new investment |
Strategic review | October 2016 – November 2017 | Explore sale of the company, individual holdings or sector-related packages. No viable offers. Revert to orderly realisation |
Rolling-mandate hold | 2017–2020 | Hold the portfolio rather than sell at distressed prices. One-year rolling continuation mandates. Aggressive cost reduction. Self-management |
Terminal realisation | December 2020 – October 2021 | Auction all holdings to the highest cash bidders, return the net cash and liquidate |
Targets & Commitments
| Initiative | Date | Target / outcome |
|---|---|---|
Self-management (IMA termination) | Proposed 2 September 2019; effective by 12 December 2019 | Remove the external management fee. Monitoring by in-house subsidiary |
Continuation votes | January 2020 EGM; 29 October 2020 AGM | Both passed (one-year extensions) |
Cost reduction programme | FY2018–FY2020 | About £200k per year (FY2018) and a further £340k per year (FY2019). Admin expenses down from £1,022k (FY2017) to £316k (FY2020) |
Defensive SeeCubic litigation funding | July 2020 | US$35k to secure SeeCubic shares and warrants |
Secondary-market sales | FY2021 | One sale (AIG, US$176k) at close to book value |
Asset auction | Proposed 30 December 2020; formalised 15 February 2021; agent appointed June 2021 | Two-stage process (expression of interest, then offers after NDA). The board expected 6–8 weeks; it actually took about 6 months |
Portfolio disposal | 6 August 2021 | £2.2m from RAB Capital Holdings |
Liquidation and delisting | 11–12 October 2021 | Solvent members' voluntary liquidation. Target return about £2.17m (about 3.38p per share) |
Competitive Landscape
Key Competitors
| Peer | Domicile / listing | Strategy overlap | Relative positioning versus SPPC |
|---|---|---|---|
Baker Steel Resources Trust | Guernsey; LSE | Predominantly unlisted natural-resource investments | Larger, sustained vehicle in the same asset class. Comparative figures not compiled |
Origo Partners | Isle of Man; AIM | Pre-IPO / private natural resources (China / Mongolia focus) | Similar late-life wind-down trajectory |
Chrysalis Investments | Guernsey; LSE | Pre-IPO / late-stage growth equity (technology) | Same pre-IPO thesis, applied to technology; much larger |
The Schiehallion Fund | Guernsey; LSE | Late-stage private growth companies | Same "pre-IPO" positioning; institutional sponsor (Baillie Gifford) |
Molten Ventures (formerly Draper Esprit) | UK; LSE | Venture and growth equity | Broader VC model |
Augmentum Fintech | UK; LSE | Private fintech growth | Sector-specialist version of growth investing |
Seraphim Space Investment Trust | UK; LSE | Private space-technology growth | Sector specialist |
Oakley Capital Investments | Bermuda; LSE | Private equity (fund of own funds) | Diversified PE with strong realisation record |
Crystal Amber Fund | Guernsey; AIM | Activist small-cap; entered managed wind-down | Comparable wind-down governance pathway |
Shore Capital Group (sponsor) | Guernsey; formerly AIM | Principal finance and asset management | Sponsor rather than competitor; delisted in 2019 |
Competitor Detail
| Metric | SPPC FY2020 |
|---|---|
Net assets (GBP Mn) | 10.2 |
NAV per share total return (FY) | -8.1% (NAV only; no dividend) |
Admin expense / average NAV | 2.98% |
Realisations in year (GBP Mn) | 0.0 |



