THE CODI Co., Ltd. Overview
THE CODI is a Cheonan-based micro-cap equipment and components maker. It began as a Samsung-qualified supplier of semiconductor and flat-panel-display process tools: wafer cleaning, photoresist coating and developing, back-end bonding, and the hot-plate/cool-plate (HP/CP) glass-drying units it says it has supplied exclusively to Samsung Electronics since 2010. Since 2017 it has been reshaped repeatedly by changes of control. It pivoted into a "bio platform" (subsidiaries PharmaWorks and Cellforium). It absorbed a 1973-founded coil/transformer maker (Daeshin Electronics, merged July 2024), plus small insulation and electrical-equipment companies. It also consolidated real-estate development vehicles that now carry about KRW 39.5 bn of development land on its balance sheet. The core equipment business is sub-scale: consolidated revenue was KRW 25.3 bn in FY2025, with persistent operating losses since 2016. Leverage is high (liabilities about 5.7x equity at FY2025, about 14.8x at June 2026). A contested, repeatedly delayed change of control is tied to a proposed pivot into robotics and AI. The equity is best characterised as a governance-driven special situation rather than an equipment growth story.
Company's own description (from DART filings and IPO materials, paraphrased)
The company describes itself, in its filings and vendor-reproduced business summaries, as a manufacturer and seller of semiconductor equipment, LCD equipment and OLED equipment, established in July 1999. It names PharmaWorks and Cellforium as its principal subsidiaries and says most revenue comes from the semiconductor division. As a new business, it plans to build an "open-innovation bio platform." Under this platform it would continuously source drug-development pipelines in Korea and abroad and rapidly co-develop or license them out to global pharmaceutical companies (Alphasquare reproduction of the business summary; Simply Wall St). The registry-based business description (Saramin) lists:
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electronic components: high-frequency coils, transformers and SMD inductors;
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equipment for manufacturing semiconductors and flat-panel displays.
The KRX industry code is electronic coils, transformers and other electronic inductor manufacturing. The articles of incorporation list 85 business purposes, headed by "manufacture and sale of exposure equipment (노광기) for PCB, LCD and PDP" (TheVC).
At its December 2015 IPO, the company (then CEO Lee Woo-suk) described its core products as follows (Edaily IPO interview, Dec-2015):
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front-end semiconductor equipment for cleaning, photoresist coating and developing;
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back-end bonding (adhesion) equipment;
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FPD HP/CP equipment for drying glass.
It claimed the ability to support 7 of 20 semiconductor process steps once its etch, characterization-test and final-test tools under development were included. It also said it had secured capacity of about 1.5x its then-current revenue to serve Samsung's Pyeongtaek fab and Chinese panel makers (BOE, Tianma).
Independent characterisation
| Engine | What it does | Evidence of scale | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Semiconductor & display equipment | Wet/track-type equipment (cleaning, coat/develop), bonding equipment, HP/CP thermal units, exposure equipment | "Semiconductor [products]" = 40.09% of FY2025 revenue (≈KRW 10.1 bn); "Display [products]" = 0.09% | Legacy core; customer concentration on Samsung Electronics / Samsung Display (Aju News, Sep-2026) |
| Electronic components | High-frequency coils, transformers, SMD inductors (ex-Daeshin Electronics, now the Gumi branch; Tianjin subsidiary) | Included in "Other [products etc.]" = 59.83% of FY2025 revenue (≈KRW 15.1 bn, shared with other lines) | Low-margin commodity magnetics; accounts for the post-2024 revenue uplift |
| Bio / healthcare | PharmaWorks (100%) and Cellforium (70%). Therapeutic programs reportedly target Zika/MERS, glaucoma, non-alcoholic fatty liver disease, chronic kidney disease, and immunotherapy for cancer/inflammatory disease | No disclosed revenue; Simply Wall St business description | Option value only; bio plant and acquisitions delayed for lack of funding (IB Tomato, Apr-2026) |
| Real-estate development vehicles | Road One Real Estate Fund No.1 PEF (99.49%), Marine One Development (consolidated via CB holdings), E&K Consortium (99.96%), Kingdom Fore | KRW 39.5 bn of development land (용지) in inventory at FY2025 and June 2026 (Valueline) | The largest single asset class on the balance sheet; illiquid; linked by press reports to the former Sambu Construction chairman's family |
THE CODI today is a holding-style conglomerate of small, loss-making businesses wrapped around a legacy Samsung equipment supplier. Four economic engines can be identified:
Business model / revenue model. Revenue is almost entirely product sales (equipment and components). No subscription, licensing or recurring-service revenue is disclosed. Equipment revenue is project-based and recognised around customer acceptance (검수). Press coverage notes that revenue swings with customer capex timing and acceptance dates (JobPost, Oct-2026). Equipment is sold to semiconductor and display fabs. Components are sold to electronics/power-supply OEMs (customer names for components are not disclosed).
Value-chain position. THE CODI is a tier-2/tier-3 domestic tool supplier. It supplies peripheral process modules (thermal plates, wet-process and bonding stations) rather than critical lithography/etch/deposition tools. It is a price-taker to Samsung and relies on Samsung's line investment cycles (Pyeongtaek, Godeok, Onyang, Xi'an were cited at IPO).
End-markets. Memory and foundry semiconductor fabs; OLED/LCD display fabs; general electronics (coils/transformers); and prospectively biopharma and, if the pending control change completes, robotics/AI.
Strategy
The company publishes no investor-day material, medium-term plan or financial targets. Stated strategic themes, paraphrased from filings and company statements:
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"Two businesses" strategy (2017–present). Keep the semiconductor equipment business while building a bio business through an open-innovation in-licensing/out-licensing platform (Newsis, Dec-2017; company summary).
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Normalisation via sale of control (Dec 2024–present). The company publicly committed to a sale of the largest shareholder's stake or a new-share sale to normalise management (Seoul Economic TV, Jul-2025). The deadline has been extended to 31 Dec 2026 (Green Economy).
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Robotics/AI pivot (Sep 2026–present). Linked to the proposed Pantos takeover. Elements: expand the articles to cover service/humanoid robots, drones, RaaS, AI SaaS, AI chips and data centers; use the KRW 30 bn CB (since withdrawn) to acquire securities of other companies (Dealsite, Oct-2026). Market commentators speculated about cooperation with LG-family companies, but no agreement has been disclosed (Aju News).
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Bio plant and acquisitions (2026). Funding from the spring-2026 placement/CB was earmarked for a bio-production facility and an acquisition. Both were delayed when payments slipped (IB Tomato, Apr-2026).
Initiatives in the last 24 months:
Cost programs, ESG commitments, guidance: none disclosed.
Products & Services
The company publishes no current product catalog with specifications or pricing. The list below is reconstructed from the IPO description (2015), the registry business description, the articles of incorporation and vendor summaries. Launch years, specifications and pricing are n/d unless stated.
Semiconductor equipment (≈40% of FY2025 revenue)
| Product | Description | Target customer | Notes / flagship status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wafer cleaning equipment | Front-end wet cleaning tools | Memory/foundry fabs (Samsung Electronics) | Core front-end line at IPO | Edaily (2015); Aju News (2026) |
| Photoresist coating & developing equipment | Front-end track-type process modules | Samsung Electronics | Core at IPO | Edaily (2015) |
| Bonding (adhesion) equipment | Back-end packaging/bonding process tool; first deliveries April 2015 to Samsung Onyang and Xi'an | Samsung back-end lines | Growth product at IPO | Edaily (2015) |
| Etch, characterization-test and final-test equipment | In development or planned at IPO (2015) | Fabs | Commercial status today n/d | Edaily (2015) |
Display equipment (0.09% of FY2025 revenue)
| Product | Description | Target customer | Notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HP/CP (hot plate / cool plate) | Thermal units for drying/baking display glass in LCD/OLED processes | Samsung Electronics/Samsung Display | Exclusive supplier since 2010 per IPO materials; now negligible revenue | Edaily (2015); Alphasquare |
| Exposure equipment (노광기) | Exposure tools for PCB, LCD and PDP manufacturing | Panel and PCB makers | Listed as the first business purpose in the articles; TheVC lists "display exposure equipment" as the main product | TheVC |
| OLED equipment | General OLED process equipment | Display makers | Description only | Company summary (Alphasquare) |
Electronic components (main constituent of "Other," ≈60% of FY2025 revenue)
| Product | Description | Target customer | Notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| High-frequency coils | Wound magnetic components for consumer/telecom electronics | Electronics OEMs | Heritage of Daeshin Electronics (founded 1973) | KIND; Saramin |
| Transformers | Power/signal transformers ("민생용 및 통신기용 각종 코일, 변성기") | Electronics OEMs | Produced at the Gumi branch and Tianjin subsidiary | KIND |
| SMD inductors | Surface-mount inductors | Electronics OEMs | — | Saramin |
Other businesses absorbed in 2025
| Business | Description | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Insulation materials (ex-Techron) | Insulation material manufacturing | KIND (merger note) |
| Electrical/vehicle-electronics equipment (ex-GET Plus) | Electrical equipment ("전장장비") manufacturing | KIND (merger note) |
Bio / healthcare pipeline (no revenue disclosed)
| Program area | Modality / status | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Zika / MERS antivirals | Development stage n/d | Simply Wall St |
| Glaucoma | Development stage n/d | Simply Wall St |
| Non-alcoholic fatty liver disease | Development stage n/d | Simply Wall St |
| Chronic kidney disease | Development stage n/d | Simply Wall St |
| Immunotherapy (cancer, inflammatory disease) | Development stage n/d | Simply Wall St |
| "Open-innovation bio platform" | In-license / co-develop / license-out model | Company summary (Alphasquare) |
Proposed new businesses (pending EGM approval, 27 Oct 2026)
The articles amendment would add the following business purposes (company stated reason: "business diversification"):
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service robots, humanoids/autonomous robots, drones/unmanned vehicles, robot components, robot control software and control platforms, robot-as-a-service (RaaS);
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AI SaaS/cloud, AI agents, AI semiconductors and data centers, AI training data, and AI-based medical/financial/education/manufacturing solutions;
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investment in, and acquisition of control over, AI and robotics companies.
Sources: Dealsite (Oct-2026); ChickStock DART summary (7 Oct 2026). TheVC also references AI ed-tech diversification. None of these generate revenue today.
Financial Narrative
Basis: K-IFRS consolidated. FY2021 data come only from Investing.com/S&P. FY2022–FY2025 come from DART-based disclosures (Edaily/Digital Today/Bizmetric) and Valueline/DataHero balance-sheet and P&L extracts. Where the as-originally-reported figure differs from the vendor/restated figure, the dossier uses the as-reported figure in the main table and shows the alternative below.
Income statement
Sources and notes:
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FY2021: revenue, gross profit, operating income and attributable net income from Investing.com/S&P. Consolidated net loss is derived: FY2022 disclosure stated net loss of KRW 8.73 bn was a 61.3% improvement, implying ≈KRW -22.6 bn in FY2021.
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FY2022: revenue KRW 20.11 bn, operating loss KRW 8.95 bn, net loss KRW 8.73 bn (Edaily, DART 30%-change disclosure, Feb-2023). Gross profit and attributable NI from Investing.com.
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FY2023: revenue, operating loss and net loss from Bizmetric (DART quarterly series); gross profit and attributable NI from Investing.com.
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FY2024: revenue KRW 33.52 bn and operating loss KRW 3.71 bn as originally reported (DART preliminary FY2025 disclosure comparatives); net loss KRW 7.82 bn. Gross profit is the restated figure (Investing.com).
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FY2025: audited figures — revenue KRW 25.27 bn, operating loss KRW 0.83 bn, net loss KRW 15.72 bn (Alphasquare; Daily Union). P&L lines from Valueline (annual figure = 2025/12 trailing column). EPS KRW 4,706 (Valueline).
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No dividends paid in any year (Stockopedia: the company does not pay a dividend).
Alternative/conflicting figures:
The FY2025 preliminary-to-audited swing is material. Operating loss widened from KRW 0.20 bn to KRW 0.83 bn, and net loss from KRW 9.93 bn to KRW 15.72 bn. This indicates sizeable year-end audit adjustments (Daily Union cites emphasis-of-matter and key audit matters).
Margins and growth
Notes: the FY2024 gross margin uses restated gross profit over restated revenue (5.31/27.13). FY2024 operating and net margins use as-reported revenue (33.52). Revenue CAGR FY2021–FY2025 = -13.6% p.a. (KRW 45.36 bn → KRW 25.27 bn).
EBITDA. Not reported by the company. Computed FY2025 EBITDA ≈ operating income (-0.83) + depreciation (0.98) + amortisation (0.18) ≈ KRW +0.33 bn (Valueline cash-flow add-backs). Valueline's own EBITDA field shows KRW -3.34 bn (definition unknown). EBITDA margin is ≈1% on the computed basis. Earlier years: n/d.
Recent quarterly trajectory
Sources: Google Finance (S&P-sourced). Bizmetric shows Q1 2026 net loss of KRW 4.0 bn on a consolidated basis. The Google Finance net line appears to be attributable to owners, and its Q4 2025 figure of KRW +27.1 bn reflects the parent/NCI allocation discussed below.
Trailing twelve months to June 2026 (Valueline): revenue KRW 22.72 bn; gross profit KRW 3.32 bn; SG&A KRW 9.39 bn; operating loss KRW 6.07 bn; consolidated net loss KRW 16.18 bn; attributable net income KRW +27.11 bn; NCI share KRW -43.30 bn; TTM attributable EPS KRW 5,255. SG&A jumped (TTM KRW 9.4 bn vs KRW 5.7 bn in FY2025), led by fees/commissions (KRW 2.5 bn) and salaries (KRW 3.9 bn). This coincides with the change-of-control and financing process.
The attributable-vs-consolidated anomaly (critical for valuation)
Since FY2024, THE CODI shows positive profit attributable to the parent but large negative profit attributable to non-controlling interests. In FY2025, consolidated net was KRW -15.7 bn, split into owners KRW +24.3 bn and NCI KRW -40.0 bn. NCI equity on the balance sheet has fallen to KRW -108 bn at FY2025 and KRW -113 bn at June 2026, while controlling-shareholder equity has risen to ≈KRW 118 bn.
Analyst interpretation (inference; not confirmed by company disclosure): losses are concentrated in consolidated SPVs where outside parties hold the economic residual. The real-estate fund/development vehicles and the CB-controlled Marine One are the likely candidates. Intra-group interest or valuation gains accrue to the parent. The consequence is that headline vendor metrics are economically misleading for the listed entity:
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attributable EPS of KRW 4,706–5,255;
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P/E of about 0.6–0.9x;
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PBR of about 0.15x on controlling BPS of KRW 22,834;
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"ROE" of 22–30%.
The consolidated group burns cash and its total equity is only KRW 4.7 bn.
Balance sheet
Sources: Valueline/DataHero consolidated balance sheet (FY2022–FY2025); Investing.com (FY2021 total assets and current liabilities). Share counts are split-adjusted (Valueline). Total debt = short-term borrowings + short-term bonds + current portion of long-term debt + long-term borrowings. It excludes lease/other financial liabilities of ≈KRW 2.3 bn at FY2025. Net debt = total debt – cash & equivalents.
Latest balance sheet (30 June 2026, KRW bn; Valueline). Total assets 74.43; cash 4.72; total liabilities 69.72; total equity 4.71; short-term borrowings 18.48; current portion of long-term debt 0.43; long-term borrowings 39.53. Total debt ≈ 58.44; net debt ≈ 53.72. Owners' equity 117.84; NCI -113.13. Development land 39.49. Controlling BPS KRW 22,834.
Key balance-sheet observations:
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Refinancing event in H1 2026. At FY2025, KRW 30.3 bn of long-term debt had moved into current liabilities. This drove the working-capital collapse to KRW 1.0 bn and a current ratio of about 1.0x. By June 2026 it had been refinanced into new long-term borrowings (cash-flow data show KRW 39.5 bn of new long-term borrowings in H1 2026 against KRW 29.9 bn repaid). Liquidity is extended, not resolved.
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Equity erosion. Total equity fell from KRW 38.0 bn (FY2022) to KRW 4.7 bn (June 2026), only ≈1.8x paid-in capital (KRW 2.58 bn). A further loss of a few billion won would push the consolidated group toward capital impairment.
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Asset quality. Development land (KRW 39.5 bn) is 53% of total assets. Its carrying value and realisability are the swing factor for solvency. Press reports say the land is tied to the former controlling family's real-estate projects, and that registered addresses of related vehicles could not be located (Seoul Economic TV, Jul-2025; Dealsite, Oct-2026).
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Accumulated deficit. Seoul Economic TV reported an accumulated deficit of KRW 49.2 bn and a liabilities-to-equity ratio of 285% at Q1 2025. The ratio was 572.5% at FY2025 (Alphasquare) and ≈1,480% at June 2026 (computed).
Cash flow
Sources: Daily Union (FY2024 and FY2025 OCF and investing CF, from DART); Valueline (FY2025 capex, financing CF). TTM to June 2026 (Valueline): OCF KRW -10.04 bn; capex KRW 1.22 bn; interest paid KRW 6.91 bn; financing CF KRW +6.38 bn. Valueline's "ending cash" field (KRW 23.6 bn at FY2025) is inconsistent with balance-sheet cash (KRW 6.17 bn) and has not been used.
Commentary. Operating cash flow has been negative in every period available. The FY2025 investing inflow came from liquidating short-term financial assets (KRW 11.3 bn of disposals; short-term financial assets fell from KRW 4.06 bn to KRW 0.68 bn), not from operations. Cash interest paid (KRW 3.7 bn in FY2025; KRW 6.9 bn TTM June 2026) exceeds gross profit. The company is structurally dependent on external financing (placements, CBs, re-sales of its own CBs) to service debt.
Ratios
Computation notes: averages use opening and closing balances. FY2024 asset turnover uses as-reported revenue. FY2025 interest expense is KRW 3.98 bn (Valueline). ROIC and the cash conversion cycle cannot be computed reliably because invested capital is distorted by development-land inventory and negative NCI. Net debt/EBITDA is not meaningful: on computed EBITDA of ≈KRW 0.33 bn it would be about 135x. Vendor-quoted ROE of 21.8–29.6% (Valueline, Alphasquare) corresponds to the owners' basis.
Trend synthesis. FY2021–FY2023 was a collapse: revenue fell 55%, gross margin turned negative, and operating losses reached about half of revenue. FY2024 marked an inflection in gross profit to ≈20% margin, attributable to consolidating the higher-volume components business (Daeshin Electronics) and cost cuts. FY2025 operating loss narrowed to near break-even (KRW -0.8 bn) on lower revenue. Below the operating line, however, interest (KRW 4.0 bn), impairments (KRW 3.5 bn), other non-operating losses and discontinued operations (KRW -8.0 bn) produced a doubling of the consolidated net loss. In H1 2026, operating performance deteriorated again (TTM operating loss KRW 6.1 bn) as SG&A rose with transaction costs.
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View Subscription PlansFinancial Detail
Product Category Details
| Product category (FY2025, % of consolidated revenue) | FY2025 |
|---|---|
Other products etc. (%) | 59.83 |
Semiconductor products (%) | 40.09 |
Display products (%) | 0.09 |
Product Category Details — Other products etc.
| Product category (KRW Bn) | FY2025 |
|---|---|
Other products etc. | 15.12 |
Semiconductor products | 10.13 |
Display products | 0.02 |
Revenue by Segment
| Metric (KRW Bn) | FY2024 as originally reported | FY2024 restated (in FY2025 report) |
|---|---|---|
Revenue | 33.52 | 27.13 |
Operating income | -3.71 | -3.52 (Investing.com/S&P) or +0.25 (Daily Union) |
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View Subscription PlansGroup Entities
| Entity | Stake | Activity (as far as disclosed) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
THE CODI Co., Ltd. (parent) | — | Semiconductor/display equipment; electronic components (Gumi branch, ex-Daeshin Electronics) | KIND |
PharmaWorks Co., Ltd. (㈜파마웍스) | 100.00% | Bio/drug development | WISEreport; KIND |
Cellforium Co., Ltd. (㈜셀포리움) | 70.00% | Bio (cell-based / therapeutics) | WISEreport; KIND |
CODI-M VINA Corporation (Vietnam) | 100.00% | Overseas subsidiary (function n/d) | WISEreport; KIND |
Daeshin Electronics Tianjin (대신전연천진전자유한공사, China) | 100.00% | Coils/transformers manufacturing (inferred from parent's former business) | WISEreport; KIND |
GE Tech (지이테크) | 100.00% | — | WISEreport; KIND |
E&K Consortium (이엔케이컨소시엄) | 99.96% | Investment vehicle | WISEreport; KIND |
Road One Real Estate Fund No.1 PEF (formerly Calvidon Real Estate Development Fund No.1) | 99.49% | Real-estate development | WISEreport; KIND |
Marine One Development (마린원개발㈜) | Controlled via potential voting rights on CBs held | Real-estate development | KIND; Seoul Economic TV |
Kingdom Fore (㈜킹덤포레) | Subsidiary (stake n/d) | — | KIND |
Associates: The First GM No.40, Song Kong Trading (쏭콩무역), Renaissance Avenue | Associates | — | KIND |
Income Statement and Per-Share Data
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (KRW Bn, as reported) | 45.36 | 20.11 | 20.21 | 33.52 | 25.27 |
Gross profit (KRW Bn) | -0.03 | -0.30 | -1.78 | 5.31 | 4.83 |
Operating income (KRW Bn, as reported) | -6.78 | -8.95 | -10.40 | -3.71 | -0.83 |
Pre-tax income from continuing ops (KRW Bn) | — | — | — | — | -7.52 |
Loss from discontinued operations (KRW Bn) | — | — | — | — | -8.00 |
Net income, consolidated (KRW Bn) | -22.57 | -8.73 | -13.70 | -7.82 | -15.72 |
Net income attributable to owners of parent (KRW Bn) | -27.11 | -14.10 | -7.98 | 15.46 | 24.28 |
Net income attributable to non-controlling interests (KRW Bn) | — | — | — | — | -40.01 |
EPS basic, attributable (KRW) | — | — | — | — | 4,706 |
Dividends per share (KRW) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Income Statement
| Metric (KRW Bn) | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Operating income per Investing.com/S&P | -11.17 | -9.96 | -3.52 | -0.31 |
Operating income per DART preliminary (Feb-2026) | — | — | -3.71 | -0.20 |
Net income per DART preliminary (Feb-2026) | — | — | -7.82 | -9.93 |
Net income per Investing.com (appears to be attributable) | -14.10 | -7.98 | 15.46 | 24.29 |
Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue growth YoY (%) | — | -55.7 | 0.5 | 65.8 | -24.6 |
Gross margin (%) | -0.1 | -1.5 | -8.8 | 19.6 | 19.1 |
Operating margin (%) | -14.9 | -44.5 | -51.5 | -11.1 | -3.3 |
Net margin, consolidated (%) | -49.8 | -43.4 | -67.8 | -23.3 | -62.2 |
Income Statement (Quarterly)
| Metric | Q3 2025 | Q4 2025 | Q1 2026 | Q2 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (KRW Bn) | 6.40 | 5.12 | 5.21 | 5.99 |
Cost of goods sold (KRW Bn) | 5.06 | 4.47 | 4.87 | 4.95 |
Operating income (KRW Bn) | 0.24 | -0.58 | -3.92 | -0.91 |
Net income per Google Finance (KRW Bn) | 0.57 | 27.08 | -0.19 | -0.34 |
Balance Sheet and Share Count (M)
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total assets (KRW Bn) | 122.49 | 93.63 | 99.39 | 94.05 | 72.31 |
Current assets (KRW Bn) | — | 83.82 | 76.91 | 74.72 | 59.77 |
Cash & equivalents (KRW Bn) | — | 14.44 | 11.53 | 8.10 | 6.17 |
Short-term financial assets (KRW Bn) | — | 13.93 | 5.17 | 4.06 | 0.68 |
Trade receivables (KRW Bn) | — | 3.80 | 9.57 | 10.51 | 5.30 |
Inventories, total (KRW Bn) | — | 49.28 | 47.28 | 47.81 | 44.69 |
of which development land (KRW Bn) | — | 41.67 | 39.63 | 39.63 | 39.49 |
Property, plant & equipment (KRW Bn) | — | 3.82 | 14.80 | 14.65 | 10.83 |
Goodwill (KRW Bn) | — | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Other intangibles (KRW Bn) | — | 0.30 | 0.99 | 0.87 | 0.30 |
Current liabilities (KRW Bn) | 64.39 | 23.79 | 32.78 | 34.65 | 58.78 |
Total liabilities (KRW Bn) | — | 55.67 | 67.22 | 67.99 | 61.55 |
Short-term borrowings (KRW Bn) | — | 12.08 | 16.65 | 20.33 | 20.43 |
Short-term bonds (KRW Bn) | — | 1.80 | 3.85 | 0 | 0 |
Current portion of long-term debt (KRW Bn) | — | 0 | 0.24 | 2.61 | 30.33 |
Long-term borrowings (KRW Bn) | — | 29.90 | 30.87 | 30.41 | 0.08 |
Total debt (KRW Bn) | — | 43.78 | 51.61 | 53.35 | 50.84 |
Net debt (KRW Bn) | — | 29.34 | 40.08 | 45.25 | 44.67 |
Total equity (KRW Bn) | — | 37.96 | 32.17 | 26.06 | 10.75 |
Equity attributable to owners (KRW Bn) | — | 46.97 | 46.93 | 93.92 | 118.69 |
Non-controlling interests (KRW Bn) | — | -9.00 | -14.76 | -67.86 | -107.94 |
Working capital (KRW Bn) | — | 60.04 | 44.13 | 40.08 | 0.99 |
Shares outstanding (M) | 2.74 | 3.22 | 4.75 | 5.16 | 5.16 |
Cash Flow
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Operating cash flow (KRW Bn) | — | — | — | -5.32 | -3.67 |
Investing cash flow (KRW Bn) | — | — | — | -2.86 | 3.48 |
Capex, PP&E (KRW Bn) | — | — | — | — | 1.47 |
Free cash flow, OCF minus PP&E capex (KRW Bn) | — | — | — | — | -5.14 |
Financing cash flow (KRW Bn) | — | — | — | — | -1.75 |
Dividends paid (KRW Bn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Share buybacks (KRW Bn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Returns & Leverage Ratios (%) and Financial Ratios (x)
| Ratio | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ROE, consolidated, on average equity (%) | — | -39.1 | -26.9 | -85.4 |
ROE, owners, on average owners' equity (%) | — | -17.0 | 21.9 | 22.9 |
ROA, on average assets (%) | — | -14.2 | -8.1 | -18.9 |
Current ratio (x) | 3.52 | 2.35 | 2.16 | 1.02 |
Total debt / equity (x) | 1.15 | 1.60 | 2.05 | 4.73 |
Total liabilities / equity (%) | 146.6 | 209.0 | 260.9 | 572.5 |
Interest coverage, EBIT / interest expense (x) | — | — | — | -0.21 |
Asset turnover (x) | — | 0.20 | 0.35 | 0.30 |
Geographic Revenue
| Indicator | Observation | Source |
|---|---|---|
Customer base | Principal equipment customers are Samsung Electronics and Samsung Display (Korea; Samsung lines in China were cited at IPO, e.g., Xi'an) | Aju News (Sep-2026); Edaily (2015) |
Overseas operations | Manufacturing/sales subsidiaries in Tianjin (China) and Vietnam (CODI-M VINA) | WISEreport; KIND |
FX exposure | FY2025 foreign-exchange gains of KRW 0.88 bn and losses of KRW 1.19 bn, indicating meaningful foreign-currency revenue and/or costs | Valueline |
China expansion | At IPO the company targeted BOE and Tianma; no subsequent disclosure of material China panel-maker revenue | Edaily (2015) |
Share Price and Market Valuation
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Year-end share price (KRW) | 9,470 | 6,250 | 4,000 | 2,550 |
Year-end market cap (KRW Bn) | 28.74 | 29.67 | 20.64 | 13.16 |
Year-end shares outstanding (M) | 3.22 | 4.75 | 5.16 | 5.16 |
Share Price & Returns
| Period | Return | Basis |
|---|---|---|
Year-to-date 2026 | ≈+31% | KRW 2,550 (31 Dec 2025) → KRW 3,350 (19 Oct 2026) |
≈3 years | ≈-46% | KRW 6,250 (end-2023) → KRW 3,350 (approximate horizon) |
5 years | Not meaningful (capital reduction, serial issuance) | — |
52-week range | KRW 2,400 – 12,750 | Hankyung |
Drawdown from 52-week high | ≈-74% | Judal (16 Oct 2026) |
Valuation Snapshot
| Multiple | Value | Basis / caveat | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
P/E (attributable TTM EPS KRW 5,255) | 0.65x | Driven by negative-NCI allocation; consolidated group is loss-making | Valueline |
P/E (consolidated) | Not meaningful (loss) | — | Computed |
P/B (owners' BPS KRW 22,834) | 0.15x | Owners' equity inflated relative to total equity | Valueline |
P/B (total equity KRW 4.71 bn) | ≈3.7x | Consolidated basis | Computed |
EV/Sales | ≈3.1x | EV ≈ market cap 17.5 + net debt 53.7 = KRW 71.2 bn; TTM sales KRW 22.7 bn; excludes NCI | Computed |
Peer comparison | Sector median PBR 3.46x; median PER 21.6x (Korean semi equipment) | Alphasquare | — |
Capital Markets
| Item | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|
Sell-side coverage / consensus | None. Only automated AI "research" sites (e.g., Judal) publish recommendations, which carry no institutional weight | Judal; Simply Wall St (no forecasts) |
Dividend history / policy | No dividends paid; none expected | Stockopedia |
Buyback authorisations | None disclosed; treasury stock ≈0.5% | iTooza |
Moody's / S&P / Fitch ratings | Not rated | — |
Bucket Details
| Bucket | Amount (KRW Bn) |
|---|---|
Short-term borrowings (<1 yr) | 18.48 |
Current portion of long-term borrowings (<1 yr) | 0.43 |
Long-term borrowings (>1 yr) | 39.53 |
Lease and other financial liabilities | ≈2.3 |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance and consensus
Guidance: none issued.
Consensus: none exists.
The only forward markers are the EGM (27 Oct 2026; a separate EGM is also convened for 29 Oct 2026), the 9th-CB resale settlement (29 Oct 2026), the still-pending KRW 7 bn Pantos placement, and the public-sale deadline (31 Dec 2026).
Bull case
-
Credible control change. If Pantos pays the KRW 7 bn and takes ≈30% plus board control, the company gains a better-connected sponsor. The shares tripled in three sessions on this prospect alone (KRW 4,510 → 9,890, 7–10 Sep 2026).
-
Operating leverage on a repaired gross margin. Gross margin is now ≈19% versus negative in FY2021–FY2023. An AI/HBM-driven Samsung capex upturn could lift equipment revenue back toward FY2021 levels (KRW 45 bn). At FY2025 SG&A (KRW 5.7 bn), that could restore operating profit.
-
Asset monetisation. A sale of KRW 39.5 bn of development land at book value would roughly cover net debt (KRW 53.7 bn) together with other assets, transforming solvency against a KRW 17.5 bn market cap.
Bear case
-
Financing failure. Since March 2026, every change-of-control financing has been amended, delayed, re-allotted or withdrawn: GNT Pharma, then the Keyence/SOD Lab vehicles, then K-New Growth Equity, then Pantos. The KRW 33 bn CB package was withdrawn in October. With cash of KRW 4.7 bn and OCF of KRW -10 bn TTM, the company cannot fund itself.
-
Equity wipe-out risk. Total equity of KRW 4.7 bn covers only months of current losses (TTM net loss KRW 16.2 bn). Any write-down of the development land would eliminate it. Rescue capital, if it arrives, is priced at deep discounts (e.g., KRW 3,154 versus a pre-surge price of KRW 3,470).
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Governance and listing risk. The company has two prior unfaithful-disclosure designations (2020, 2023), a pending 2026 notice, related-party CB dealings under FSS review, a former-CEO misconduct allegation, and a largest shareholder whose capital is fully impaired. Accumulated penalties or financial thresholds could trigger KRX listing-eligibility review.
Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
| Catalyst / monitorable | Timing | What to watch |
|---|---|---|
| EGM(s) | 27 Oct and 29 Oct 2026 | Approval of Koo Bon-ho et al. as directors; robotics/AI articles; quorum |
| Pantos KRW 7 bn placement payment | Post-EGM (TBD) | Actual cash receipt; change-of-control disclosure |
| 9th-CB resale settlement | 29 Oct 2026 | KRW 3.15 bn balance received or further delay |
| KRX disclosure-penalty decisions | Q4 2026 | Penalty points; any listing-eligibility review |
| Q3 2026 quarterly report | Mid-Nov 2026 | Equity level, operating loss, going-concern language |
| Public-sale deadline | 31 Dec 2026 | Completion or abandonment of the sale process |
| FY2026 audit | Mar 2027 | Audit opinion; land valuation; capital-impairment status |
| Samsung memory/HBM capex | 2026–2027 | Any disclosed equipment orders (single-sales-contract disclosures) |
| FSS review of related-party CB sale | Open | Sanctions or referrals |
Analyst verdict
THE CODI should not be analysed as a semiconductor-equipment company that happens to be cheap. It is a heavily indebted, governance-impaired holding vehicle whose only genuine operating asset is a sub-scale, Samsung-dependent tool and components business. That business generated KRW 25.3 bn of revenue in FY2025, down 44% from FY2021, and roughly break-even operating results before interest. Everything below the operating line is what matters, and all of it is negative:
-
interest costs consume more than gross profit;
-
operating cash flow has been negative throughout the observable period;
-
consolidated equity has fallen to KRW 4.7 bn against KRW 69.7 bn of liabilities.
The apparently compelling valuation (0.65x P/E, 0.15x P/B) is an artefact of loss allocation to non-controlling interests in consolidated real-estate and investment vehicles. It should be disregarded. On a consolidated basis, the equity is priced at about 3.7x book with negative earnings, and enterprise value is ≈3x trailing sales of a shrinking business.
The investment debate therefore reduces to a binary governance event. Will a well-funded sponsor actually inject capital, take control and either (a) monetise the land and recapitalise the group or (b) reverse-merge a real operating business into the listing? The record of the past seven months is unambiguous. Four successive control-change financings, including the high-profile Pantos/Koo Bon-ho deal, have been amended, delayed or withdrawn. Every rescue structure has relied on deeply discounted shares or convertible paper that would multiply the share count.
Until cash is verifiably received, the risk/reward is asymmetric to the downside: dilution, disclosure sanctions, possible listing-eligibility review, and land-value write-downs. Verdict: Avoid / speculative only. The stock is suitable at most for event-driven traders sized for total loss. Re-assess only after (1) settlement of the Pantos placement, (2) a FY2026 audit without going-concern qualification, and (3) independent evidence on the carrying value of the KRW 39.5 bn development-land inventory.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Role | Tenure / dates | Background / notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Choi Hyun-joon (최현준) | CEO, inside director | CEO since Mar 2025; re-elected 31 Mar 2026 | Bought 4,500 shares on-market shortly before the Sep-2026 control-change disclosures | WISEreport; JobPost |
Jin Jong-pil (진종필) | Vice President | — | Bought 6,010 shares on-market (Sep-2026) | JobPost |
Jeon Kyung-woo (전경우) | Director | Re-elected Mar 2026 | — | WISEreport |
Choi Cheong-kyun (최청균) | Outside director (audit committee per TheVC listing) | Appointed Oct 2023; re-elected Mar 2026 | — | WISEreport |
Joo Hae-jung (주해중) | Inside director | Appointed Oct 2023 | — | WISEreport |
Former: Hwang Jung-hoon (황정훈) | CEO | Jun 2020 – Mar 2025 | Subject of a KRW 360 M embezzlement/breach-of-trust allegation disclosed April 2025 | Saramin; WISEreport |
Former: Sujit Thomas Varghese (TJ Varghese) | Director | Feb 2024 – Mar 2025 | — | WISEreport |
Former: Moon Yong-bae (문용배) | CEO | to Jun 2020 | — | Saramin |
Former: Lee Woo-suk (이우석) | CEO at IPO | c. 2015 | Led 2015 IPO | Edaily (2015) |
Former: Kim Sun-tae (김선태) | Vice President (bio) | c. 2017–2018 | Former co-CEO of Kangstem Biotech | BioSpectator |
Board of Directors
| Name | Proposed role | Notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Oh Il-sung (오일성) | Inside director | — | ChickStock (DART); Dealsite |
Koo Bon-ho (구본호) | Inside director | Third-generation member of the extended LG family; chairman of Pantos Holdings; 100% owner of Pantos Corporation | Dealsite; Global Economic |
Kim Sung-il (김성일) | Inside director | Co-principal of Pantos Corporation per Seoul Economic Daily | Seoul Economic Daily |
Ahn Soo-kyung (안수경) | Independent director | — | ChickStock (DART) |
Kim Jong-hyun (김종현) | Independent director | — | ChickStock (DART) |
Governance Overview
| Feature | Status |
|---|---|
Independent / outside directors | At least one outside director (Choi Cheong-kyun); audit committee members listed in the registry (TheVC) |
Committees | Audit committee (per registry entries for 감사위원); others n/d |
Board size change | The EGM articles amendment changes the number of directors (details n/d) |
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Stake | Notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Iseok Industrial Development (이석산업개발) | ≈12% (press, Sep-2026); ≈1.09 M shares ≈21% including related parties (Seoul Economic TV, Jul-2025) | Largest shareholder since May 2022. 50% owned by Park Ran-hee, spouse of Cho Sung-ok (former Sambu Construction chairman). Capital fully impaired: equity KRW -6.89 bn at end-2025 (Lead Economy) | Global Economic; Dealsite; Lead Economy |
Minority (retail) shareholders | 78.83% held by 17,084 holders (30 Jun 2026) | Implies largest shareholder plus related parties ≈21% | Lead Economy |
Foreign ownership | 0.00% | Foreign exhaustion rate 0% during Sep-2026 trading | JoongAng Economy News |
Treasury shares | ≈0.5% | — | iTooza |
Institutional holders (top 10) | Not publicly disclosed; no meaningful institutional ownership evident | — | — |
Share-Based Incentives
| Instrument | Counterparty | Size | Terms | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Third-party placement | Pantos Corporation | KRW 7.0 bn; 2,219,403 shares | KRW 3,154/share; ≈43% of existing shares; ≈30.1% post-deal | Payment delayed repeatedly (22 Sep → 7 Oct → further delay) | Dealsite; Seoul Economic TV |
10th-series CB | Pantos Corporation | KRW 3.0 bn | — | Not paid; withdrawn | Dealsite (Oct-2026) |
11th-series private CB | Investment unions (some linked by press to former Cornerstone Networks chairman Cho Yun-hyung) | KRW 30.0 bn | Conversion KRW 3,550; ≈8.45 M shares | Not paid; withdrawn | Dealsite; JobPost |
Small public offering (third-party) | Power M Entertainment (replacing Greylock Investment Union) | KRW 1.5 bn; 317,863 shares | Price cut from KRW 8,772 to KRW 4,719 | Payment set for 12 Oct; postponed per Dealsite | Dealsite |
Resale of own 9th-series CB | Pacific Wave Union | KRW 3.5 bn face | 887,198 shares on conversion; KRW 0.35 bn deposit + KRW 3.15 bn balance | Balance now due 29 Oct 2026 | ChickStock (DART) |
Competitive Landscape
Competitors by Segment
| Business | Competitor | Country | Positioning vs. THE CODI |
|---|---|---|---|
Wafer cleaning / coat-develop (track) | SEMES (Samsung Electronics subsidiary) | Korea | Captive in-house Samsung supplier of cleaning/track tools; structurally advantaged at THE CODI's main customer |
Wafer cleaning / coat-develop (track) | Tokyo Electron | Japan | Global leader in coater/developer and cleaning |
Wafer cleaning | SCREEN Holdings | Japan | Global leader in single-wafer/batch cleaning |
Wafer cleaning / wet process | Zeus Co., Ltd. | Korea | KOSDAQ-listed wet-process/cleaning tool maker with materially larger scale |
Wet process / CMP-cleaning | KC Tech | Korea | Larger domestic peer in wet/CMP equipment |
Display thermal / heat-treatment (HP/CP) | Viatron Technologies | Korea | Heat-treatment equipment for display |
Display exposure | Mycronic | Sweden | Named by TheVC as a peer in display exposure (mask writers) |
Display laser/processing | Aton ENG; Osung Advanced Materials | Korea | Named by TheVC as comparable small display-equipment companies |
Coils / transformers / inductors | Samwha Electronics; Chinese and Taiwanese magnetics makers | Korea / Asia | Commodity, price-driven market; THE CODI is a niche player |
Back-end bonding | Hanwha Semitech; Hanmi Semiconductor | Korea | Large-scale back-end equipment suppliers (HBM-related TC bonders) |
Peer Comparison FY2025
| Metric | THE CODI (FY2025) | Tokyo Electron (FY3/2025) | SCREEN Holdings (FY3/2025) |
|---|---|---|---|
Revenue | KRW 25.3 bn | ≈JPY 2.43 tn | ≈JPY 625 bn |
Revenue growth | -24.6% | strong double-digit growth (n/v) | double-digit growth (n/v) |
Operating margin | -3.3% | ≈28% (n/v) | ≈20%+ (n/v) |
R&D intensity | — | ≈10% (n/v) | — |
Competitive Advantages & Vulnerabilities
| Advantages (evidence) | Vulnerabilities (evidence) |
|---|---|
Long qualification history at Samsung: HP/CP supply since 2010, bonding tools since 2015 (Edaily) | Scale: KRW 25 bn revenue; peers are 10–1,000x larger (Alphasquare ranking) |
Diversified revenue via components (≈60% of FY2025 revenue) reduces dependence on fab capex | Display line has collapsed to 0.09% of revenue (Alphasquare) |
Owns land and buildings (KRW 6.9 bn land in PP&E; Valueline) | No disclosed R&D spend; no disclosed product roadmap |
| — | Balance-sheet fragility limits customers' willingness to award large tool orders |
| — | Management bandwidth absorbed by financing and control transactions |



