The GO2 People Limited Overview
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Legal name | The GO2 People Ltd (styled "The GO2 People Limited"; during 2023 "Administrators Appointed" and later "Subject to DOCA") |
| Entity profiled | The listed parent, ACN 616 199 896 / ABN 45 616 199 896 — now an unlisted public company (delisted shell) |
| Former names | None for the listed entity per Market Index; operating business originated in 2011 as "Go2 Recruitment" |
| Founding year | 2011 (operating business, as Go2 Recruitment); listed parent incorporated circa late 2016 |
| Incorporation jurisdiction | Australia (Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)) |
| Historical headquarters | 10 Belmont Avenue, Belmont WA 6104 (per 8 July 2019 shareholder letter); later Forrestfield, WA (per PitchBook) |
| Current address of record | Level 1, 109 Oxford Street, Suite 104, Bondi Junction NSW 2022 (per Morningstar profile, post-recapitalisation) |
| Exchange / ticker | Formerly Australian Securities Exchange, code GO2 (GO2.AX); delisted 28 April 2025 |
| Listing date | 31 October 2017 |
| Suspension date | 28 April 2023 (Listing Rule 17.2) |
| Delisting date | 28 April 2025 (Listing Rule 17.12) |
| ISIN | AU000000GO22 |
| CUSIP | Not applicable (Australian issuer; none publicly disclosed) |
| Fiscal year end | 30 June |
| Employees | Approx. 1,000 employees (including on-hired workers) transferred with the businesses to IntoWork in June 2023 (Blackwall Legal, 15 June 2023); residual shell has no disclosed employees beyond directors |
| Auditor | — |
| Market capitalisation (current) | Not applicable — delisted; no quoted price. Historical reference: c. $10.62m in early 2019 (117.96m shares) and c. $5m in September 2019 at 2.9 cents |
| Website (historical) | http://www.thego2people.com.au (operating business, now under IntoWork ownership) |
| Website (shell) | https://go2peopleltd.com (hosts the 2023 Notice of General Meeting for the DOCA entity) |
| Current directors (from Nov 2023) | Tomasz (Thomas) Murmylo (Executive Chairman & Company Secretary), Dorota Bondaruk (Director), Vasilios (Bill) Argyros (Non-Executive Director) |
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total workforce incl. on-hired workers (approx.) | — | — | 1,000 |
Owler lists approximately 35 corporate staff (pre-Skill Hire), which reflects internal staff rather than on-hired labour. The ~1,000 figure is from the June 2023 restructuring and includes on-hired workers.
The GO2 People was a Perth-based micro-cap that sought to build a vertically integrated blue-collar workforce platform combining labour hire, professional and executive recruitment, registered training, apprenticeship and traineeship employment, and — until FY2020 — modular and remote-area building services. Listed on the ASX in October 2017 after a $10 million IPO at 20 cents, it grew revenue to roughly $45–47 million on the back of mining and infrastructure labour hire, then retrenched after a failed 2019 acquisition, exited building in FY2020, and re-expanded through the 2021 acquisitions of Hunter Executive Search Consultants and Skill Hire Australia, lifting FY2022 revenue to about $73 million. Thin labour-hire margins, legacy Australian Taxation Office and superannuation liabilities, deferred acquisition consideration and a disputed customer debt overwhelmed the balance sheet, triggering voluntary administration in May 2023. The operating businesses now sit inside IntoWork Australia; the listed shell was delisted in April 2025.
Company's own description
In its latest financial reports (Appendix 4D for H1 FY2023 and the FY2023 Appendix 4E), the company described itself as operating in a single operating segment: the provision of labour hire, recruitment and training services in Australia. Earlier communications (FY2019 Appendix 4E, September 2019) described it as a leading provider of vertically integrated recruitment, training and building services to industry, with a client base of national and multinational blue-chip organisations across construction, resources and industrial sectors.
Independent characterisation
At its peak (FY2022–H1 FY2023), GO2 was a sub-scale Australian staffing and workforce-development group with four revenue engines:
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Blue-collar labour hire (GO2 Recruitment): placing and mobilising workers onto construction, infrastructure, mining, energy, warehousing/logistics and waste-management sites, including remote fly-in/fly-out projects in Western Australia and Queensland. Revenue is time-and-materials: the client pays an hourly charge-out rate covering wages, on-costs (superannuation, payroll tax, workers' compensation) and a margin. Gross margins in this model were thin — 10–11% at group level in FY2019–FY2021.
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White-collar and executive search (Hunter Executive): permanent placement fees, contract placements and board/executive search for engineering, mining exploration, geosciences, environment and water, government and not-for-profit clients. Higher-margin, fee-based.
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Apprenticeship and traineeship employment / group training (Skill Hire): employing apprentices and trainees and hosting them out to businesses, generating "apprentice income", supported by government incentives.
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Training and workforce development (GO2 Skills & Training, Skill Hire RTO, NARA Training and Assessing): government-funded and fee-for-service training, pre-employment and "Job Ready" programs, including targeted support for disadvantaged job seekers.
A fifth engine, GO2 Building, delivered remote and regional building, civil and modular construction (including affordable housing for over-55s, aged care and retirement villages using a proprietary "rapid building method") until it was wound down in FY2020; GO2 Building Pty Ltd was later placed into members' voluntary liquidation.
Revenue model mix
| Revenue type (H1 FY2023, half-year to 31 Dec 2022) | AUD K | % of total | Model |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recruitment income (labour hire + permanent/executive placement) | 30,378 | 70.6 | Service, time-and-materials and placement fees |
| Apprentice income | 9,329 | 21.7 | Service (hosted apprentice/trainee employment, government incentives) |
| Job Ready income | 1,470 | 3.4 | Government-funded program revenue |
| Training income | 1,816 | 4.2 | Service (government-funded and fee-for-service training) |
| Other revenue | 28 | 0.1 | Other |
| Total | 43,021 | 100.0 | — |
Source: The GO2 People Ltd Appendix 4D, half-year ended 31 December 2022 (lodged 27 February 2023). All revenue was recognised over time. There was no product, subscription or licensing revenue.
Value chain position and customers
GO2 sat in the intermediary layer of the labour market: sourcing, screening, training, mobilising and employing workers on behalf of end-clients. It claimed a job-applicant database of roughly 175,000 candidates (Proactive Investors, 2019). Customer types included tier-one and tier-two construction and civil contractors, mining contractors (e.g., VCS Civil and Mining, which collapsed in February 2018), a major Queensland labour hire client retained on a four-year term in 2022, state and local governments (building contracts in 2018), and a large federal government department (Hunter Executive executive-search mandate, September 2022). Government workforce-development funding was a material counterparty for the Skill Hire business.
End-markets
| End-market | Size / growth | GO2 share / rank |
|---|---|---|
| Australian employment placement and recruitment services | — | Negligible share; not ranked among major players |
| Australian labour supply / labour hire | — | Negligible |
| Group training / apprenticeship services | — | Small regional player (WA/SA) |
| VET private RTO market | — | Small |
Mining and resources (WA, QLD); major infrastructure construction; electrical/energy; warehousing and logistics; waste management; commercial and residential building; government and not-for-profit (executive search); vocational education and training (VET).
Strategy
Historical strategic themes (paraphrased from company releases)
Vertical integration (2017–2019): combining recruitment, training and building into a one-stop workforce and project offering.
EBITDA over growth (April 2019): a deliberate move away from aggressive revenue growth toward positive EBITDA and cash flow, with a small cost-plus building team retained briefly.
Labour hire plus training (2019): the IPW deal was intended to make GO2 a national vertically integrated labour hire and training business, cross-selling training to its 175,000-candidate database.
Consolidation and bolt-on M&A (2020–2021): focus on core recruitment and training; earnings-accretive acquisitions of Hunter (white-collar) and Skill Hire (apprenticeships/training), described as transformational.
Margin repair (2022): renegotiated client terms, including a four-year renewal of the main Queensland labour hire client at improved margins; national expansion of Hunter on the back of a federal government mandate; December 2022 messaging about "pivoting towards the future".
Initiatives in the last 24 months (Oct 2024 – Oct 2026)
There have been no operating initiatives. The shell lodged a quarterly 4C in November 2024 and an announcement in January 2025, but no reinstatement transaction (backdoor listing or asset injection) was completed before ASX's two-year deadline, and the company was delisted on 28 April 2025. No subsequent strategy, guidance or relisting plan has been publicly disclosed.
Medium-term targets
Not applicable. Historical guidance — including the FY2019 statement of a strong FY2020 revenue and earnings outlook and the expectation of a first EBITDA-positive month in July 2019 — was not met at the full-year level, as FY2020 revenue fell 38%.
ESG/sustainability commitments
None publicly disclosed beyond social-inclusion features of Skill Hire's programs.
Products & Services
Note: All operating brands below were sold to IntoWork Australia in June 2023. Pricing was not publicly disclosed for any offering.
Recruitment
| Offering | Description | Target customer | Launch / vintage | Pricing model |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GO2 Recruitment — Labour Hire | Supply and mobilisation of blue-collar workers (trades, operators, labourers) to construction, infrastructure, mining, energy, logistics and waste sites, including remote FIFO mobilisation | Tier-1/2 contractors, miners, industrial operators in WA, QLD, NSW, VIC | 2,011 | Hourly charge-out rate (wages + on-costs + margin); not disclosed |
| GO2 Recruitment — Professional Recruitment | Permanent placement of professional and supervisory staff | Same client base | c. 2011–2017 | Placement fee; not disclosed |
| Hunter Executive — Executive Search & Board Appointments | Retained/contingent search for executives and board members | Government, NFP, engineering, mining, environment and water organisations | Founded 2013 by Ben Oakley and Gregor McNally; acquired 2021 | Fee-based; not disclosed |
| Hunter Executive — White-collar Contract & Permanent | Contract and permanent placements in engineering, geosciences, mining exploration, building services, manufacturing | Mining exploration companies, consultancies | 2013 / 2021 | Margin on contractors; placement fees |
Apprenticeships, traineeships and employment services
| Offering | Description | Target customer | Launch / vintage | Pricing model |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Skill Hire — Apprenticeships & Traineeships | Group-training model: employing apprentices/trainees and hosting them with businesses | Host employers in WA and SA; trades businesses | Skill Hire acquired June 2021 | Host charge rates plus government incentives |
| Skill Hire — Pre-employment & Job Ready programs | Government-funded pre-employment programs for job seekers, including disadvantaged and marginalised cohorts | State/federal government programs; job seekers | Pre-2021 | Government contract funding |
| Skill Hire — Labour Hire & Recruitment | Fee-for-service recruitment and labour hire in WA and SA | Industrial employers | Pre-2021 | Margin and fees |
Training (RTO)
| Offering | Description | Target customer | Launch / vintage | Pricing model |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GO2 Skills & Training | Nationally registered training organisation delivering industry-specific training for construction and resources | Workers, employers in construction and mining | Alliance Jul 2018; acquired Dec 2018 | Fee-for-service and government-funded |
| GO2 online training courses | First online course launched Q4 FY2020; further courses in development | Individual learners | FY2020–FY2021 | Per-course fee; not disclosed |
| Nara Training and Assessing | RTO providing training and assessment | Construction/industrial workers | Acquired with Skill Hire (2021) | — |
| Skill Hire RTO training | Government-funded and fee-for-service accredited training | Apprentices, trainees, job seekers | Pre-2021 | Government funding and fees |
Building (discontinued FY2020)
| Offering | Description | Target customer | Launch / vintage | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GO2 Building — Remote & regional construction | Multidisciplinary building, civil, construction and project management in remote/regional Australia | Mining companies (e.g., Altura Mining), state and local government | c. 2016–2017 | Ceased FY2020 |
| GO2 Building — Rapid Building Method housing | Proprietary rapid build method with smart technology for affordable over-55s independent living, aged care and retirement housing (e.g., Meadowbrooke Lifestyle Estate) | Developers, retirement operators | c. 2017 | Ceased FY2020; entity in MVL |
Abandoned offering
| Offering | Description | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Industry Pathways (IPW) online training | Gold Coast online trainer with 25 staff delivering ~80% of courses online; forecast FY2019 revenue $6m and EBITDA $2m | Acquisition terminated 6 Sep 2019 |
Financial Narrative
Data limitations
Balance sheet and cash flow data are largely unverifiable and are left blank. No dividends were declared in FY2023 per the Appendix 4E; no dividend was reported in any other period reviewed, and the company was loss-making throughout.
Income statement
Notes and sources:
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FY2019 revenue $46.621m per Appendix 4E FY2019 (2 Sep 2019); aggregators show $46.45m (IBISWorld, Stockopedia) — discrepancy likely reflects other income classification.
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FY2019 gross profit derived from the reported 11.3% gross margin (derived: 46.62 × 11.3%).
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FY2020 revenue $29.084m (IBISWorld).
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FY2021 revenue: IBISWorld $29.495m vs Stockopedia $29.68m — conflicting; IBISWorld figure shown.
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FY2022 revenue $73.412m (IBISWorld); consistent with FY2023 4E statement that revenue fell 71.6% to $20.879m.
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FY2022 net loss of -$5.46m is derived from the FY2023 Appendix 4E, which states the FY2023 loss of $13.441m was up 146.4%.
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EPS: the FY2023 Appendix 4E table is column-headed "2022 / 2021" but sits within the FY2023 report; it is presented here as FY2023 (-3.23c) and FY2022 (-1.37c). This labelling discrepancy in the source document is flagged.
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FY2023 revenue reflects trading only up to loss of control on 1 May 2023 (the businesses were then controlled by administrators and sold).
Margins (%)
FY2022 and FY2023 net margins derived. Group gross margin was reported at 10.87% for H1 FY2021 and 11.3% for the December 2020 quarter (SIA). Gross margin at H1 FY2022 was 30.9% and at H1 FY2023 15.1% (derived from Appendix 4D) — the structural uplift reflects Skill Hire's higher-margin apprenticeship and government program revenue.
Growth
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Revenue CAGR FY2019–FY2022: +16.3% (acquisition-driven).
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Revenue CAGR FY2019–FY2023: -18.2% (collapse into administration).
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FY2018 revenue was approximately $45m (+30% on FY2017; Proactive Investors), giving FY2019 growth of 4.4% (Appendix 4E FY2019).
Balance sheet
FY2023 4E states available cash was nil: all cash was taken under the control of the administrator on 1 May 2023 and all liabilities were under the administrator's control at 30 June 2023. At 31 December 2022 the group reported total available funding of $2.4m, which management estimated would cover 8.7 quarters of operating cash flow (Appendix 4D H1 FY2023) — an estimate overtaken within four months. Known liabilities at collapse included ATO liabilities exceeding $3m (Business News WA), the historical superannuation guarantee provision ($2.643m booked H1 FY2022), and the Skill Hire deferred consideration ($3.25m principal at 8% interest, later partly converted to equity in March 2023).
Cash flow
FY2020 and FY2021 operating cash flows per the FY2021 Q4 update (SIA). Quarterly customer receipts rose from $6.9m (Q3 FY2021) to $10.8m (Q4 FY2021) after Hunter and Skill Hire were added, and Q1 FY2023 delivered record cash receipts on an annualised run-rate above the $77.5m level of Q1 FY2022 (SIA).
Ratios
These ratios cannot be computed without verified balance sheet data. Qualitatively: EBITDA was negative in H1 FY2022 and H1 FY2023, so interest coverage and net debt/EBITDA were not meaningful; finance costs more than doubled from $341k to $779k between those half-years, signalling rising reliance on debt and tax/supplier funding.
Commentary on trends, inflections and drivers
FY2018–FY2019 — growth without profit. Post-IPO, GO2 grew revenue about 30% to $45m in FY2018 and a further 4% to $46.6m in FY2019, but this came from low-margin labour hire (93.5% of FY2019 revenue). Gross margin compressed to 11.3% in FY2019 as building revenue shrank. Management explicitly shifted in April 2019 away from aggressive revenue growth toward positive EBITDA.
FY2020 — retrenchment. Revenue fell 37.6% to $29.1m as the building division was closed and COVID-19 cut May–June labour hire volumes. Operating cash outflow was about $3m. Government stimulus cushioned the June quarter, which delivered positive EBITDA.
FY2021 — stabilisation and M&A. Revenue held at about $29.5m, the company delivered four consecutive positive EBITDA quarters (to December 2020) and generated slightly positive operating cash flow ($188k). Hunter (March 2021) and Skill Hire (June 2021) were bolted on.
FY2022 — scale via acquisition, losses widen. Revenue jumped 149% to $73.4m on full-year Skill Hire and Hunter contributions, and gross margin structurally improved, but the business swung to a derived loss of about $5.5m, burdened by a $2.6m historical superannuation provision, acquisition amortisation and integration costs.
FY2023 — collapse. H1 FY2023 revenue rose 19.7% to $43.0m, but gross profit fell 41% as Job Ready and training contracts were lost and mix shifted to labour hire. Finance costs doubled. A disputed material customer debt, legacy ATO liabilities above $3m and a client legal dispute triggered suspension (28 April 2023) and administration (1 May 2023). The FY2023 accounts show revenue of $20.9m (to loss of control) and a loss of $13.4m, inflated by deconsolidation and write-offs.
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View Subscription PlansFinancial Detail
Division Overview
| Division | FY2019 revenue (AUD Mn) | % of total |
|---|---|---|
Labour services (Recruitment Division) | 43.6 | 93.5 |
Building services | 2.3 | 4.9 |
Training services (GO2 Skills & Training, from Dec 2018) | 0.6 | 1.3 |
Total | 46.6 | 100 |
Revenue by Segment
| Division (AUD Mn) | H1 FY2018 | H1 FY2019 |
|---|---|---|
Labour hire services revenue | 16.40 | 24.59 |
Building services revenue | 2.59 | 1.75 |
Total revenue | — | 26.34 |
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View Subscription PlansRevenue stream (AUD K)
| Revenue stream (AUD K) | H1 FY2022 | H1 FY2023 |
|---|---|---|
Recruitment income | 21,521 | 30,378 |
Apprentice income | 7,423 | 9,329 |
Job Ready income | 4,517 | 1,470 |
Training income | 2,434 | 1,816 |
Other revenue | 42 | 28 |
Total revenue | 35,937 | 43,021 |
Revenue stream (%)
| Revenue stream (%) | YoY growth H1 FY2023 (%) | % of H1 FY2023 total |
|---|---|---|
Recruitment income | 41.2 | 70.6 |
Apprentice income | 25.7 | 21.7 |
Job Ready income | -67.5 | 3.4 |
Training income | -25.4 | 4.2 |
Total | 19.7 | 100 |
Revenue by Segment and Segment Assets & Liabilities
| Metric (AUD K) | H1 FY2022 | H1 FY2023 |
|---|---|---|
Revenue | 35,937 | 43,021 |
Cost of sales | 24,850 | 36,508 |
Gross profit | 11,087 | 6,513 |
EBITDA (as reported) | -1,399 | -545 |
Depreciation & amortisation | 1,004 | 903 |
Finance costs | 341 | 779 |
Loss after tax | -2,744 | -2,227 |
Margin (%)
| Margin (%) | H1 FY2022 | H1 FY2023 |
|---|---|---|
Gross margin | 30.9 | 15.1 |
EBITDA margin | -3.9 | -1.3 |
Net margin | -7.6 | -5.2 |
Group Entities
| Entity | Role | Post-2023 outcome |
|---|---|---|
The GO2 People Ltd (ACN 616 199 896) | Listed parent | DOCA with Alt Finance; recapitalised shell; delisted 28 Apr 2025 |
The GO2 People Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 616 564 115) | Operating subsidiary | DOCA; control passed to IntoWork 15 Jun 2023 |
GO2 Recruitment Pty Ltd (ACN 152 130 473), as trustee for the GO2 Recruitment Trust | Labour hire trading entity | Receivers and managers appointed to the trust; DOCA completion pending court orders as at 15 Jun 2023 |
GO2 Skills & Training Pty Ltd | RTO | DOCA; to IntoWork |
Hunter Executive Search Consultants Pty Ltd | Executive search | DOCA; to IntoWork |
Skill Hire WA Pty Ltd | Apprenticeship/training | DOCA; to IntoWork |
Nara Training and Assessing Pty Ltd | RTO | DOCA; to IntoWork |
Skill Hire Australia Pty Ltd | Holding company for Skill Hire | Creditors resolved to wind up (6 Jun 2023) |
GO2 Building Pty Ltd | Building division | Members' voluntary liquidation (H1 FY2023) |
Terra Firma Constructions Pty Ltd | Building-related subsidiary (listed in FY2019 disclosures) | — |
Income Statement and Per-Share Data
| Metric | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (AUD Mn) | 46.62 | 29.08 | 29.50 | 73.41 | 20.88 |
Gross profit (AUD Mn) | 5.27 | — | — | — | — |
Net income attributable (AUD Mn) | — | — | — | -5.46 | -13.44 |
EPS basic (AUD cents) | — | — | — | -1.37 | -3.23 |
EPS diluted (AUD cents) | — | — | — | -1.37 | -3.23 |
Dividends per share (AUD cents) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2019 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
Gross margin (%) | 11.3 | — | — |
Net margin (%) | — | -7.4 | -64.4 |
Margin Analysis (%) — Revenue growth YoY
| Metric | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue growth YoY (%) | 4.4 | -37.6 | 1.4 | 148.9 | -71.6 |
Financial Analysis
| Metric (AUD Mn) | FY2023 |
|---|---|
Cash & equivalents | 0 |
Cash Flow
| Metric (AUD Mn) | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Operating cash flow | — | -3.0 | 0.188 | — | — |
Dividends paid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Buybacks | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Revenue by Region
| Region (AUD Mn) | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Australia | 46.62 | 29.08 | 29.50 | 73.41 | 20.88 |
Rest of world | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
State Details
| State | Exposure | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
Western Australia | Core: head office, labour hire, Hunter (Perth), Skill Hire WA, building contracts | Company HQ Belmont/Forrestfield; Hunter is Perth-based; Skill Hire WA Pty Ltd |
Queensland | Major labour hire client (retained on four-year term in 2022); marquee mining placements in FY2019 | SIA Q1 FY2023; Appendix 4E FY2019 |
New South Wales | Labour hire footprint expansion in H1 FY2019 | FY2019 chairman's letter |
South Australia | Skill Hire training and labour hire client base | Company description (Pearler/Morningstar) |
Victoria | Labour Hire licence granted 2021 | SIA Q3 FY2021 |
Share Price History
| Date | Price | Context | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Oct 2017 | 0.200 | IPO price | Stockhead |
Feb 2018 | 0.140 | After VCS administration (-18% on day) | Stockhead |
Early 2019 | 0.090 | Implied by $10.62m market cap / 117.96m shares (derived) | Kalkine |
Sep 2019 | 0.029 | Market cap ~$5m | Proactive Investors |
3 Apr 2020 | 0.008 | 52-week low (COVID) | SIA |
Jan 2021 | 0.038 | Close after Q2 FY2021 update | SIA |
28 Apr 2023 | — | Suspended | ASX |
Valuation Multiples
| Multiple | GO2 |
|---|---|
P/E | Not meaningful (loss-making; delisted) |
EV/EBITDA | Not meaningful (negative EBITDA) |
Capital Markets
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
Analyst coverage / consensus | None — Market Index notes GO2 was not covered by a major broker |
Dividend history | None declared in any period reviewed |
Credit ratings (Moody's/S&P/Fitch) | Not rated |
Debt maturity profile | Not publicly disclosed; historical debt included the Skill Hire deferred consideration ($3.25m at 8%, originally due within 24 months of June 2021 completion) |
Capital actions | 2017 IPO (>$10m at 20c); 2021 issue of 194.4m consideration shares to Skill Hire vendors; Nov 2023 1-for-48 consolidation and proposed securities issue |
Options | Listed option series expiring 29 January 2021 (code GO2AI, deferred) |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance and consensus
There is no management guidance and no analyst consensus. The entity is an unlisted shell with no disclosed operating business. Any future value depends on an undisclosed transaction by the controlling recapitalisation group.
Bull-case arguments (for the residual shell)
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Clean corporate vehicle: the DOCA process extinguished pre-administration creditor claims against the parent, leaving a debt-free company that could theoretically host a new business.
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Existing shareholder base: a large register of legacy holders could support a future unlisted capital raise or compliance listing on an alternative exchange.
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Tax attributes: historical losses (e.g., $13.4m in FY2023) could have value if continuity-of-ownership or similar-business tests can be satisfied — highly uncertain after the change of control.
Bear-case arguments
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Delisted with no market: ASX removal on 28 April 2025 eliminated the principal value of a recapitalised shell — its listing.
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No operating assets: all trading businesses, licences, brands and staff passed to IntoWork in June 2023.
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Track record of value destruction: from a 20-cent IPO in 2017 through a sub-1-cent low in 2020 to administration in 2023 and a 1-for-48 consolidation, legacy shareholders have suffered near-total loss; deListed Australia recommends considering crystallising a capital loss.
Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
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Any ASIC filings indicating deregistration, winding up or a change of name/business of ACN 616 199 896.
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Any announcement of a reverse takeover, relisting application (ASX, NSX or other) or asset injection by the current board.
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Shareholder communications regarding capital structure post-consolidation.
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For the former operating businesses: IntoWork's performance with the GO2, Hunter and Skill Hire brands (outside the listed entity's economic interest).
Analyst verdict
The GO2 People is best understood as a case study in why sub-scale labour hire businesses struggle to survive as listed companies. Its core economics — gross margins of roughly 10–11% on blue-collar labour hire — left almost no buffer for overheads, customer bad debts, or the compliance costs of employing large numbers of on-hire workers. The company recognised this early: in April 2019 it publicly abandoned growth-for-growth's-sake in favour of EBITDA, and its attempted acquisition of a high-margin online trainer was an explicit bid to change its margin structure. When that deal collapsed in September 2019, it exited building, rode out COVID-19 on government stimulus, and achieved a brief run of positive EBITDA quarters.
The 2021 Skill Hire transaction delivered scale and a structurally higher gross margin, but it also handed half the company to the vendors, added a $3.25m interest-bearing deferred payment, and imported exposure to government workforce-development contracts. When those contracts were partly lost in FY2023 and the revenue mix swung back toward labour hire, gross profit fell 41% on higher revenue. Legacy ATO debts above $3m, a superannuation guarantee shortfall, doubling finance costs and a disputed customer receivable then overwhelmed a balance sheet that management had, only weeks earlier, described as funded for more than eight quarters.
The administration itself was executed efficiently — the businesses and about 1,000 jobs were preserved under IntoWork within six weeks — but this was a creditor and employee outcome, not a shareholder one. The parent survived only as a recapitalised shell, failed to reinstate within ASX's two-year limit, and was delisted in April 2025. For investors, the equity should be treated as having negligible recoverable value; for industry observers, the key lesson is that compliance liabilities and working-capital intensity, not demand, are what break small staffing groups.
Sources referenced throughout: The GO2 People Ltd ASX announcements (Appendix 4E FY2019, 2 Sep 2019; IPW termination, 6 Sep 2019; Shareholder letter, 8 Jul 2019; Half Year Financial Report H1 FY2018, 28 Feb 2018; Appendix 4D H1 FY2023, 27 Feb 2023; Administrator updates 13 and 15 Jun 2023; Appendix 4E FY2023, 9 May 2024); ASX Settlement Notice 0394.23.05 (2 May 2023); ASIC Published Notices (29 May 2023); Blackwall Legal (15 Jun 2023); Staffing Industry Analysts daily news (2020–2024); Business News WA; Stockhead; Proactive Investors; Kalkine Media; MarketScreener; Crunchbase; IBISWorld; Stockopedia; Morningstar; Market Index; Investing.com; deListed Australia (accessed Oct 2026); go2peopleltd.com.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Board of Directors
| Name | Title | Appointed |
|---|---|---|
Tomasz (Thomas) Murmylo | Executive Chairman & Company Secretary | 9 Nov 2023 |
Dorota Bondaruk | Executive Director | 9 Nov 2023 |
Vasilios (Bill) Argyros | Non-Executive Director | 9 Nov 2023 |
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Role | Tenure | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
Billy Ferreira | Founder & Managing Director | 2011 – c. 2022 | Founded Go2 Recruitment; led IPO, IPW bid and Hunter acquisition |
Darren Cooper | Chair | c. 2017 – 2023 | Chaired through FY2019 restructure and Q1 FY2023 |
Douglas (Doug) Grewar | Director | IPO – Feb 2018 | Resigned owing to conflict as director of VCS Holdings |
Robert Stockdale | Director | From 2021 | Skill Hire co-founder; joined board on acquisition |
Tony Fitzpatrick | Director | From 2021 | Skill Hire co-founder; joined board on acquisition |
Shawn Murphy | CEO Skill Hire (from Aug 2020); Managing Director of GO2 (appointed 28 Jul 2022, per Appendix 4D) | 2020 – 2023 | Led group into administration |
Danny Warren | CFO (post-Skill Hire) | 2021 – c. 2022 | Former Skill Hire CFO |
Steven Richards | CFO | – 26 May 2023 | Resigned during administration |
John Fitzgerald | CFO | From May 2023 | Appointed as replacement |
Suzie Foreman | Company Secretary | H1 FY2023 | Per Appendix 4D |
Peter Torre | Joint Company Secretary | c. 2021 | Retained post-Skill Hire |
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Stake |
|---|---|
Former Skill Hire vendors (Shoreside Holdings, BC Fund II, Asstock and others) | c. 50% of issued capital post-June 2021 (194.4m consideration shares) |
Competitive Landscape
Competitors by Segment
| Business line | Competitors | Positioning vs GO2 |
|---|---|---|
Blue-collar labour hire (mining, construction, infrastructure) | WorkPac (private), Programmed/Skilled Group (Persol Holdings), Chandler Macleod (Recruit Holdings), PeopleIn Ltd (ASX: PPE), Ignite Ltd (ASX: IGN), Hays (LSE: HAS), Randstad, Adecco | All substantially larger with national branch networks, stronger balance sheets and procurement-panel scale; GO2 competed on WA/QLD remote-mobilisation niche |
Executive search / white-collar | Hays, Hudson, Korn Ferry, Davidson, Hamilton James & Bruce, Six Degrees Executive | Hunter was a boutique Perth player with mining/geosciences specialisation |
Apprenticeships & group training | MEGT, Apprenticeship Support Australia, other Group Training Organisations | Skill Hire was a mid-sized WA/SA provider |
Employment services / workforce programs | APM, MAX Solutions, IntoWork Australia (eventual acquirer), Asuria | Skill Hire competed for government Job Ready and pre-employment contracts — and lost some in FY2023 |
VET / RTO training | TAFE WA, Industry Pathways, numerous private RTOs | Small scope; online push from FY2020 |
Competitor Detail
| Metric | GO2 People (FY2022) |
|---|---|
Revenue (AUD Mn) | 73.41 |
Revenue growth (%) | 148.9 |
Net margin (%) | -7.4 |
R&D intensity (%) | 0 |
Recent Developments
The 18-month window (April 2025 – October 2026) contains very few events because the company has been a suspended, then delisted, shell.



