Treasury Wine Estates Limited Overview
Treasury Wine Estates is the world's largest listed pure-play wine company and Australia's largest wine producer, built around Penfolds — arguably the most valuable wine brand in Asia and the number one wine brand in China by both online and offline share in F26. TWE is vertically integrated across viticulture, winemaking, packaging, brand marketing and distribution, sourcing from Australia, New Zealand, California, Bordeaux, Tuscany and Ningxia. Over the past six years it has repositioned from a volume-led portfolio to a luxury-led model, with luxury wine contributing 55% of F25 NSR and the large majority of EBITS. F26 exposed the fragility of that model: Chinese consumption shifts, US category softness, a Californian distributor collapse and A$1.31bn of post-tax material items produced the company's largest statutory loss since demerger. Under new CEO Sam Fischer, the "TWE Ascent" transformation is shrinking the portfolio from 76 brands to fewer than 30, resetting the US supply chain, and targeting A$100m of annual cost savings by F29.
Company's own description (2026 Annual Report)
The 2026 Operating and Financial Review describes TWE as a vertically integrated global wine business focused on grape growing and sourcing, wine production, and wine marketing, sales and distribution, with its brand portfolio sold in approximately 100 countries and concentrated in the luxury and premium price segments. TWE classifies its price segments by retail shelf price: Luxury (A$30+ per bottle), Premium (A$10–A$30) and Commercial (below A$10). The company frames itself as a global leader in wine with leading market positions across Asia, the United States and Australia.
Business model
TWE is a branded consumer-products company with an unusually capital-intensive, agricultural supply base. Its economic engine has four stages:
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Grape growing and sourcing. TWE owns or leases 6,464 hectares of vineyards in Australia and New Zealand, 2,700 hectares in California, 180 hectares in Bordeaux, 165 hectares in Tuscany and 51 hectares in Ningxia, China (2026 Annual Report). Owned vineyards supply flagship brands (Penfolds, DAOU, Frank Family Vineyards, Matua, Wynns, Pepperjack, Squealing Pig). Premium and commercial wines are preferentially sourced from grower contracts and the bulk wine market, giving TWE a "multi-regional sourcing model" that the company presents as its core supply-side advantage against vintage variability and climate risk.
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Winemaking and maturation. Luxury wines require multi-year barrel and bottle maturation, which explains the outsized inventory on the balance sheet (A$2,305.7m total inventory at 30 June 2026, of which A$1,772m is luxury at book value).
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Packaging and logistics. Packaging centres in the Barossa (being transformed into an integrated filling, gift-packaging and maturation facility for Penfolds and luxury brands) and in California.
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Brand building, sales and distribution. Route-to-market is tailored by region: a domestic China business model with authorised distributors; a three-tier US system (wholesalers such as Reyes Beverage Group and Breakthru Beverage Group, after the exit of Republic National Distributing Company from California); direct relationships with Australian supermarket majors and independent retail; and UK/EMEA grocery and on-premise channels. Direct-to-consumer (cellar doors at Magill, Napa and Paso Robles; e-commerce; wine clubs) is meaningful in the US luxury portfolio.
Revenue model mix
| Revenue type | Share of revenue | Commentary |
|---|---|---|
| Product sales (wine, B2B to distributors/retailers) | Vast majority (exact split n/d) | Shipments to customers drive NSR; depletions (customer sell-out) drive future shipments |
| Direct-to-consumer (cellar door, e-commerce, clubs, hospitality) | — | Concentrated in Treasury Americas luxury brands and Penfolds Magill Estate |
| Services / subscription / licensing | Immaterial (n/d) | Branded retail licensing exists for Penfolds (disclosed as an IP-protection risk area); no separate revenue disclosure |
| Bulk wine and other revenue | Small (n/d) | "Revenue from ordinary activities" (A$2,626.0m F26) exceeds NSR (A$2,561.0m), implying approx. A$65m of other revenue including bulk and sundry items |
Value-chain position and customer types
TWE sits across the full value chain from vineyard to shelf, but its customers are predominantly intermediaries: US wholesalers/distributors, Chinese authorised distributors and e-commerce platforms, Australian national retailers (Coles/Woolworths-owned liquor chains and independents), UK grocers, travel retail, and on-premise accounts. End consumers are reached indirectly, except via DTC channels.
End-markets served
| End-market | F26 NSR (AUD Mn, by sales region, derived from divisional disclosure) | Character |
|---|---|---|
| Americas | 976.8 | US luxury (DAOU, Frank Family, BV, Stags' Leap) and premium (19 Crimes, Matua); softest category conditions |
| Asia | 792.6 | Dominated by Penfolds in Mainland China and fast-growing Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore) |
| ANZ | 479.4 | Home market; Penfolds plus premium/commercial portfolio |
| EMEA | 312.2 | UK-centred; commercial and premium brands; UK duty changes weighing on volumes |
Independent characterisation
TWE is best understood as two businesses sharing a balance sheet. The first is Penfolds — a genuine luxury franchise with approximately 40% EBITS margins, pricing power in Asia, and Kantar-measured brand strength rising across six key markets. The second is a portfolio of US luxury, US premium and Australian/European commercial wines whose returns have structurally deteriorated in a declining global wine category. Management's own F26 numbers make this plain: Penfolds generated 72% of divisional EBITS from 39% of NSR. The strategic question for investors is whether TWE Ascent and the Americas strategic review can either fix or exit the second business quickly enough to let the first drive valuation — something three prior CEOs attempted with limited durable success.
Strategy
Stated strategy (2026 Annual Report and Investor Day, 4 June 2026)
TWE Ascent is a multi-year transformation with four pillars:
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Focusing where we'll win — concentrating on three growth pillars: luxury red wine leadership in key markets; building a stronger position in luxury white wine; and a growing position in "modern refreshment" (lighter styles, moderation, new occasions, brand innovation). The portfolio will move from more than 70 brands (76 cited at Investor Day) to around 30, with ten receiving increased investment: three global Power Brands (Penfolds, DAOU, Matua) and seven Regional Heroes.
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Transforming how we operate — a regional operating model (Americas; ANZ & Europe; Greater China; Emerging Markets) effective 1 October 2026, designed to create clear accountability and faster decisions, embed a performance culture, accelerate adoption of technology, data and AI, and unlock A$100m per annum of cost reduction (A$40m in F27; full run-rate by F29).
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Shaping a future-fit supply chain — simplifying the Australian network (Barossa packaging transformation; vineyard disposals), right-sizing the US network, reducing excess supply from future US vintages (fallowing North Coast vineyards from 2026), and phasing out transition volumes.
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Delivering consistent, high-quality financial returns — depletions-led top-line growth (revenue growth expected from F28 once customer inventory is rebalanced), progressive EBITS margin expansion to a long-term target of 25%+, significantly improved ROCE, and leverage below 2.0x by end F28.
The earlier "Game Plan" framework (August 2025, under Tim Ford) articulated a vision of being the world's most desirable luxury wine company; Ascent supersedes it operationally while retaining the luxury-led thesis.
Initiatives announced in the last 24 months
| Date | Initiative | Detail / target |
|---|---|---|
| Aug 2025 | A$200m on-market buy-back | Paused Oct 2025; cancelled Dec 2025 after A$30.5m (15%) completed |
| Aug 2025 | Game Plan strategic framework | New purpose, vision and priority areas |
| FY25 | Ningxia Stone & Moon Winery (75%) | Local Chinese sourcing |
| Sep 2025 onward | California distribution transition | RNDC exit; BBG appointed in California; Reyes Beverage Group in ten states; residual RNDC exposure below 3% of Americas NSR |
| 17 Dec 2025 | TWE Ascent launched | A$100m p.a. cost target; customer inventory reduction in China (0.4m cases) and US (0.3m cases, A$125m NSR); parallel-import restriction |
| 16 Feb 2026 | Dividend suspension | Temporary, until leverage trends to target |
| Mar 2026 | Refinancing | A$300m of additional lender commitments |
| 22 Apr 2026 | Regional operating model | Effective 1 Oct 2026; leadership realigned |
| 4 Jun 2026 | Portfolio and supply plan; Americas strategic review | 76 to fewer than 30 brands; review of all options including potential sale of the Americas business (FNArena) |
| 2,026 | Penfolds x Troye Sivan creative partnership | Bin 389 2023 limited edition; launched Paris Fashion Week FW2026 |
| 2,026 | Grange 75th anniversary programme | "The Conversation" film; Kantar Digital Excellence accolade |
| 10 Aug 2026 | US supply-chain rebalancing | Reduce US vintage makes from 2026; A$558.4m post-tax charge |
| F26–F27 | Divestment programme | Rouge Homme, San Luis Obispo winery, Seppelt, Rosemount, Ingoldby, Secret Stone; three Australian vineyards listed |
| F26 | Barossa decarbonisation | 50% co-investment from ARENA to remove scope 1 emissions at the Barossa site |
Ascent one-off costs (company estimates)
| Item | Timing | Total P&L | Recognised F26 | Expected cash |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Programme implementation incl. operating model | F26–F30 | A$(85–100)m | A$(21.6)m | A$(85–100)m |
| Australian supply-chain transformation | F26–F27 | A$(35–40)m | A$(7.3)m | A$(30–35)m |
| US supply-chain transformation | F26–F31 | A$(100–120)m | — | A$(45–60)m |
| US strategic review; incremental supply-chain initiatives | F26 | A$(611.3)m | A$(611.3)m | — |
| Total (ex-divestments) | — | A$(830–870)m | A$(640.2)m | A$(160–195)m |
TWE states Ascent is expected to be cash positive after divestment proceeds.
Medium-term guidance and targets
| Target | Detail |
|---|---|
| F27 EBITS | At least equivalent to F26 (A$492.3m); approx. 55% second-half weighted |
| F27 regional EBITS | Greater China A$280–310m; Emerging Markets A$95–115m; Americas approx. A$50m; ANZ & Europe A$100–120m |
| F27 corporate costs | Expected to improve modestly versus A$70.2m |
| Cost savings | A$40m in F27; A$100m p.a. by F29 |
| Capex | Approx. A$75m in F27 |
| Leverage | 2.8x peak at F26; below 2.0x by end F28 |
| Revenue | Growth expected from F28 |
| EBITS margin | Long-term 25%+ |
| Portfolio | Power Brands + Regional Heroes from 68% to approx. 90% of NSR within five years |
| Dividend | Suspended; resumption considered as leverage trends to target |
Products & Services
TWE's Ascent strategy classifies the portfolio into Power Brands (Penfolds, DAOU, Matua), Regional Heroes (Frank Family Vineyards, Beaulieu Vineyard, Stags' Leap Winery, Wynns, Squealing Pig, Pepperjack, Coldstream Hills — per FNArena's Investor Day summary) and non-priority brands (managed for decline, divestment or exit). In F26, Power Brands delivered 27% of volume, 55% of NSR and 71% of gross profit; Regional Heroes 11% of volume, 14% of NSR and 9% of gross profit (F26 results presentation). The target is for these ten brands to reach approximately 90% of group NSR within five years, from 68% today. Pricing models are not disclosed beyond price-segment classification; indicative positioning below is based on TWE's luxury/premium/commercial bands.
Penfolds division (Power Brand)
| Product / range | Description and positioning | Target customer | Notes / latest year |
|---|---|---|---|
| Penfolds Grange | Shiraz-dominant multi-regional South Australian blend; Australia's most famous wine; Icon tier | Collectors, ultra-high-net-worth consumers, gifting in Asia | 75th anniversary celebrated 2026; 2022 Grange is the 75th release in an unbroken line since 1951 (2026 Annual Report) |
| Bin 707 Cabernet Sauvignon | Icon-tier Cabernet | Collectors | Named in 2026 Annual Report as a brand icon |
| Bin 407 Cabernet Sauvignon | Luxury Bin-tier Cabernet; key China growth wine | Affluent consumers, China banquets/gifting | Depletions in strong growth globally (F26); F27 China EBITS phasing tied to Bin 407 shipments |
| Bin 389 Cabernet Shiraz ("Baby Grange") | Luxury Bin-tier blend | Affluent consumers; core China SKU | Limited-edition 2023 vintage designs with Troye Sivan / Tsu Lange Yor launched at Paris Fashion Week FW2026 |
| Other Bin range (Bin 28, Bin 128, Bin 150, Bin 8, Bin 2 etc.) | Entry-to-mid luxury varietal and regional wines | Luxury entry consumers | Specific F26 performance n/d |
| Penfolds luxury whites — Yattarna, Bin 311 Chardonnay, Bin 51 Riesling | "Luxury white" growth pillar under Ascent | Luxury consumers, on-premise | Depletions growth accelerated in F26, led by these three wines (F26 presentation) |
| RWT, St Henri, Magill Estate | Icon/ultra-luxury Shiraz expressions | Collectors | Part of annual Penfolds Collection release |
| Max's, Koonunga Hill, Rawson's Retreat | Entry-level Penfolds-branded tiers | Premium/luxury-entry consumers | Shipment of entry tiers into China post-tariff contributed to F24 Q4 margin dilution |
| One by Penfolds | Multi-country-of-origin range launched for China and Asia | Younger Asian consumers | Successful launch cited in F23 results |
| Penfolds California Collection | California-sourced luxury range (incl. Quantum Bin 98) launched 2019 | US and Asian collectors | Penfolds Americas NSR A$27.8m in F26 (–22.5%) |
| Penfolds French range (Bordeaux-sourced) | French-origin Penfolds wines | Asia, collectors | Sourced via TWE's 180 ha in Bordeaux |
| Penfolds China-origin wines (Ningxia, Shangri-La) | Chinese-sourced Penfolds wines | Mainland China | Supported by 75% stake in Ningxia Stone & Moon Winery (F25) |
| Services: Penfolds Re-Corking Clinics | After-sales authentication and re-corking service, running since 1991 | Collectors | 2025 clinics: approx. 1,000 guests, 5,500+ bottles presented; 200,000+ bottles assessed since inception |
| Publication: Rewards of Patience (9th edition) | Back-vintage reference guide compiled by Andrew Caillard MW | Collectors/trade | Released early 2026; 17 critics, 500+ wines |
Treasury Americas division
| Brand | Description | Ascent classification | F26 notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| DAOU Vineyards | Paso Robles luxury Cabernet brand (DAOU Mountain); flagship Soul of a Lion; range spans Discovery, Reserve, Patrimony tiers | Power Brand | Depletions +5.0% F26; category-weighted distribution +3.5ppts; 2023 Soul of a Lion released with "Soul of a City" US tour (Miami, Los Angeles, Spring 2026); partnerships with 2026 Nexo Dallas Open and 2025 Laver Cup; brand impaired in F26 |
| Frank Family Vineyards | Napa luxury brand (acquired 2021) | Regional Hero | Depletions +5.1%; "Frank for a Cause" partnership with 4ocean; brand impaired in F26 |
| Beaulieu Vineyard (BV) | Historic Rutherford, Napa; Georges de Latour Private Reserve Cabernet | Regional Hero | BV x Gibson guitar partnership; Napa tasting room grand re-opening July 2026 (growth capex); brand impaired in F26 |
| Stags' Leap Winery | Napa luxury | Regional Hero | Depletions +1.9%; production being moved within the rationalised California network |
| Beringer (incl. Private Reserve, Knights Valley tiers) | Iconic Napa brand | Non-priority (not on Power/Hero list) | Brand impaired in 1H26 (A$257.3m brand write-down "predominantly" Sterling and Beringer, per Just Drinks) |
| Sterling Vineyards | Napa | Non-priority | Impaired 1H26 |
| Other US luxury/premium labels (e.g., Etude, Chateau St Jean, Hewitt, Provenance — portfolio composition subject to change) | Various California brands | Non-priority (unconfirmed individually) | Candidates for divestment under Americas review (unconfirmed) |
Treasury Collective division
| Brand | Description | Ascent classification | F26 notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Matua | New Zealand Sauvignon Blanc pioneer (first NZ Sauvignon Blanc); formats include 1.5L "bagnum", Matua Lighter, Matua Coolers | Power Brand ("modern refreshment" pillar) | Global depletions +7%; US depletions +6.7%, Matua Lighter +17.4% (F26 presentation); Impact Blue Chip Brand award; official white wine of Palm Tree Music Festivals |
| Squealing Pig | Contemporary NZ/Australian rosé and Sauvignon brand; Squealini Spritz (new flavours Ripe Raspberry, Lush Lychee) | Regional Hero | Depletions growth in Australia; Pride partnerships (Sydney Mardi Gras, San Francisco Pride) |
| Pepperjack | Barossa Shiraz-led premium brand | Regional Hero | Depletions growth in Australia |
| Wynns Coonawarra Estate | Historic Coonawarra Cabernet producer | Regional Hero | Growth in Australia |
| Coldstream Hills | Yarra Valley Pinot Noir/Chardonnay | Regional Hero | — |
| 19 Crimes (incl. Cali by Snoop variants) | Augmented-reality-label premium brand; partnerships with NBCUniversal "Universal Monsters" and "Serve the Red" football campaign | Non-priority globally (managed by market) | US declines drove Collective weakness; outperforming category in UK/EMEA and Australia; Cali by Snoop innovations (Cali Sweet, Cali Chill in US; Cali Smooth in Australia); campaign won Mumbrella CommsCon 2026 award, 1.7bn+ impressions |
| Wolf Blass, Lindeman's, Yellowglen, Saltram, Blossom Hill, Annie's Lane and other commercial/premium labels | Australia/UK commercial and premium portfolio | Non-priority | Commercial depletions –20.2% globally, driven by UK |
| Sorbet; Convida | New refreshment-style brands launched F26 | Innovation | Targeted at younger, diverse consumers |
| No- and low-alcohol range | Produced at a purpose-built A$15m Barossa facility | Innovation | Specific brands n/d |
| Divested in 2026 | Rouge Homme (May 2026, to Redman Wines); Seppelt (Sept 2026); Rosemount, Ingoldby, Secret Stone (Oct 2026) | Exited | Programme proceeds approx. A$50m to date (AGM, 15 Oct 2026) |
Financial Narrative
Income statement summary
Margins
Revenue CAGR. NSR CAGR F23–F26 (three years, A$2,432m to A$2,561m) is approximately 1.7%; F23–F25 CAGR was approximately 9.9%, driven by the China re-opening and DAOU. Revenue-from-ordinary-activities CAGR F22–F26 is approximately 0.9% — effectively flat over four years. EBITS CAGR F22–F25 was 13.7% before the F26 collapse took the four-year CAGR to –1.5%.
Commentary. The five-year arc has three phases. F22–F23 was the China-tariff period: Penfolds redirected Australian wine to other Asian markets and built multi-country-of-origin ranges, lifting EBITS margin 2.9 points in F23 even as NSR declined. F24–F25 was the luxury acceleration: China tariffs removed in March 2024, DAOU consolidated from 2H24, and EBITS margin peaked at 26.2% in F25 — finally exceeding the long-held 25%+ target. F26 was the reversal: NSR –12.8%, gross margin –2.9 points (portfolio mix, US RNDC inventory repurchased at original value and resold at nil margin, Penfolds ultra-luxury mix), and EBITS margin –7.0 points as costs of doing business could not be cut at the pace of revenue. Management's narrative is that much of F26's decline was deliberate (destocking China and US customer inventory, restricting parallel-import shipments), and depletions data — Penfolds China +34.7%, Treasury Americas +4.2% — supports the claim that sell-out was healthier than sell-in. Half of the China depletion growth, however, came from diverting parallel-import volume into authorised channels rather than new demand.
Half-year split F26. 1H26: NSR A$1,297.7m (–16.0%), EBITS A$236.4m (–39.6%), margin 18.2%, statutory loss A$649.4m. 2H26 (derived): NSR approx. A$1,263m, EBITS approx. A$255.9m — the sequential improvement management guided to.
Material items (F26)
Source: F26 results presentation. Note that the 1H26 announcement described a A$987.6m pre-tax impairment including a A$257.3m brand write-down (predominantly Sterling and Beringer); the full-year brand write-down of A$390.3m includes 2H26 impairments of DAOU, Frank Family Vineyards and Beaulieu Vineyard.
Balance sheet
Source: F26 results presentation; Appendix 4E. Net debt F24 (opening F25) was A$1,712.5m. Short-term versus long-term debt split for F26 is n/d in sources reviewed (FNArena's aggregated F25 split was approx. A$140m short-term and A$2,059m long-term including leases). Working capital (receivables + current inventory – payables, derived): F25 A$915.4m; F26 A$836.5m. Goodwill in the Americas (A$687.4m at 30 June 2025) was fully written off in F26.
Cash flow
Source: F26 results presentation. F26 capex comprised A$70.7m maintenance/replacement and A$42.7m growth (including the BV Napa brand-home refurbishment); F27 capex guided at approximately A$75m. The F26 dividend paid (A$162.3m) was the F25 final dividend of 20cps; no F26 dividends were declared. Earlier-year cash flow detail is n/d in sources reviewed; FNArena data indicates net operating cash flow (statutory definition) of A$525.7m in F25.
Ratios
ROCE history (2026 Annual Report): F22 10.7%, F23 11.3%, F24 11.4%, F25 11.9%, F26 7.9%. The Chairman/CEO letter cites 8.2% (–3.7ppts) while the profit report and presentation cite 7.9% (–4.0ppts); this internal discrepancy within the annual report is noted.
Ratio commentary. TWE's capital intensity is structural: luxury wine inventory turns roughly once every 20 months, and US/Australian vineyard and winery assets sit on the balance sheet at scale. That is why ROCE has never exceeded 12% even at peak margins, and why management's Ascent targets focus as much on capital employed (fallowing vineyards, divesting wineries, reducing capex to A$75m, and "improving the level of capital invested in maturing luxury inventory") as on margin. Leverage at 2.8x is above the sub-2.0x target but well inside covenant headroom (company statement), with liquidity of A$1.3bn and A$300m of new lender commitments established in March 2026.
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Income Statement and Per-Share Data
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue from ordinary activities (AUD Mn) | 2,531.8 | 2,488.3 | 2,808.3 | 2,990.1 | 2,626.0 |
Net sales revenue (AUD Mn) | — | 2,432 | 2,739.8 | 2,938.1 | 2,561.0 |
Gross profit (AUD Mn, F24 derived) | — | 1,074.6 | 1,241 | 1,429.0 | 1,170.3 |
EBITS (AUD Mn) | 523.7 | 583.5 | 658.1 | 770.3 | 492.3 |
EBITDAS (AUD Mn) | — | — | — | 936.8 | 657.5 |
NPAT pre-material items & SGARA (AUD Mn) | 322.6 | 376.1 | 407.5 | 470.6 | 275.3 |
Statutory NPAT attributable (AUD Mn) | 263.2 | 254.5 | 98.9 | 436.9 | -1,077.8 |
EPS pre-MI & SGARA (A$ cents) | 44.7 | 52.1 | 52.3 | 58.0 | 34.1 |
Statutory basic EPS (A$ cents) | — | 35.3 | — | 53.8 | -133.4 |
Dividends per share (A$ cents) | 32 | 35 | 36 | 40 | 0 |
Margin metric
| Margin metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Gross margin (% of NSR) | — | 44.2 | 45.3 | 48.6 | 45.7 |
EBITS margin (%) | 21.2 | 24.1 | 24.0 | 26.2 | 19.2 |
EBITDAS margin (%) | — | — | — | 31.9 | 25.7 |
Underlying net margin (NPAT pre-MI / NSR, %) | — | 15.5 | 14.9 | 16.0 | 10.7 |
Statutory net margin (% of revenue) | 10.4 | 10.2 | 3.5 | 14.6 | -41.0 |
Material Item Details
| Material item (AUD Mn) | Pre-tax | Post-tax | Cash |
|---|---|---|---|
Impairment of US-based assets — total | (1,120.6) | (866.3) | — |
of which goodwill | (676.1) | (532.4) | — |
of which brands | (390.3) | (293.0) | — |
of which inventory | (54.2) | (40.9) | — |
TWE Ascent costs — total | (640.2) | (478.9) | (7.1) |
of which US strategic review / US supply-chain rebalancing | (611.3) | (458.6) | — |
of which restructuring and redundancy | (21.6) | (15.2) | (7.1) |
of which Australian PP&E write-down | (7.3) | (5.1) | — |
RNDC settlement (net of costs) | 26.1 | 19.6 | (44.7) |
Other items (incl. supply asset sales, held-for-sale write-downs, DAOU earn-out) | 22.5 | 17.1 | 30.8 |
Total material items | (1,712.2) | (1,308.7) | (56.5) |
Balance Sheet and Per-Share Data
| Balance sheet item (AUD Mn) | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|
Cash and cash equivalents | 427.7 | 221.8 |
Receivables | 745.5 | 720.9 |
Current inventories | 985.4 | 803.3 |
Non-current inventories | 1,495.3 | 1,502.4 |
Property, plant and equipment | 1,868.0 | 1,427.0 |
Right-of-use assets | 383.1 | 223.4 |
Intangibles (goodwill and brands) | 2,231.1 | 1,036.4 |
Total assets | 8,310.9 | 6,298.1 |
Payables | 815.5 | 687.7 |
Interest-bearing debt | 1,682.8 | 1,531.1 |
Lease liabilities | 515.8 | 465.5 |
Total liabilities | 3,509.1 | 2,949.8 |
Net assets (equity) | 4,801.8 | 3,348.3 |
Net debt incl. leases | 1,778.9 | 1,782.4 |
Net tangible assets per share (AUD) | 3.17 | 2.86 |
Cash flow metric (AUD Mn)
| Cash flow metric (AUD Mn) | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|
EBITDAS | 936.8 | 657.5 |
Net operating cash flow before financing, tax and material items | 819.2 | 535.3 |
Cash conversion (%) | 87.4 | 81.4 |
Capital expenditure | 137.1 | 113.4 |
Proceeds from sale of assets | 1.4 | 15.0 |
Finance costs paid | 118.0 | 114.4 |
Tax paid | 146.6 | 128.0 |
Free cash flow before dividends and material items | 390.9 | 194.5 |
Dividends paid | 316.5 | 162.3 |
On-market share buy-back | 0 | 30.5 |
Material item cash flows | 14.5 | 56.5 |
Returns & Leverage Ratios (%) and Financial Ratios (x)
| Ratio | FY2025 | FY2026 | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
ROCE (%, company-defined, excl. US impairment) | 11.9 | 7.9 | 2026 Annual Report |
ROE underlying (%, NPAT pre-MI / avg or closing equity) | 9.8 | 6.8 | Derived (F25 on closing equity; F26 on average equity) |
ROE statutory (%) | 9.1 | -26.5 | Derived; Yahoo Finance shows –26.47% TTM |
ROA statutory (%) | 5.3 | -14.8 | Derived on average/closing assets; Yahoo Finance shows –8.38% on a different basis (discrepancy noted) |
Debt (incl. leases) / equity (%) | 45.8 | 59.6 | Derived; Yahoo Finance 59.63% |
Net debt / EBITDAS (x) | 1.9 | 2.8 | Company-reported; target below 2.0x by end F28 |
Interest coverage (EBITS / net finance costs, x) | 7.0 | 4.6 | Derived from net finance costs A$109.9m / A$107.4m |
Asset turnover (NSR / assets, x) | 0.35 | 0.35 | Derived (F26 on average assets) |
Inventory days (total inventory / COGS × 365) | 597 | 605 | Derived; reflects multi-year luxury maturation |
Division Overview
| Division | ANZ | Asia | Americas | EMEA | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Penfolds | 166.1 | 747.0 | 27.8 | 57.4 | 998.3 |
Treasury Americas | 0 | 0 | 575.0 | 0 | 575.0 |
Treasury Collective | 313.3 | 45.6 | 374.0 | 254.8 | 987.7 |
Group | 479.4 | 792.6 | 976.8 | 312.2 | 2,561.0 |
Revenue by Region
| Region NSR (AUD Mn) | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|
ANZ NSR (AUD Mn) | 557.0 | 479.4 |
Asia NSR (AUD Mn) | 800.2 | 792.6 |
Americas NSR (AUD Mn) | 1,229.8 | 976.8 |
EMEA NSR (AUD Mn) | 351.1 | 312.2 |
Region | F26 YoY growth | F26 share of NSR |
ANZ | –13.9% | 18.7% |
Asia | –0.9% | 30.9% |
Americas | –20.6% | 38.1% |
EMEA | –11.1% | 12.2% |
Share price at 30 June (AUD)
| Share price at 30 June (AUD) | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
TWE share price at 30 June (AUD) | 11.35 | 11.23 | 12.44 | 7.81 | 4.76 |
Market capitalisation at 30 June (AUD Mn) | 8,193 | 8,106 | 10,094 | 6,340 | 3,910 |
Share Price & Returns
| Period | Performance | Basis |
|---|---|---|
Latest price | A$5.65 (14 Oct 2026) | Kalkine |
1-year (Oct 2025 – Oct 2026) | Approx. –0.5% | ADR TSRYY monthly price US$3.86 → US$3.84 (Digrin) |
3-year (Oct 2023 – Oct 2026) | Approx. –46% | ADR US$7.15 → US$3.84 |
5-year (Oct 2021 – Oct 2026) | Approx. –50% | ADR US$7.61 → US$3.84 |
FY26 (ASX) | –39.4% (A$7.85 → A$4.76); range A$3.34–A$8.205 | InvestSMART |
CY2025 (ASX) | –53.4% | InvestSMART |
Rally from March 2026 low | Approx. +67% from A$3.37 close (Motley Fool, Aug/Sep 2026) | — |
Valuation Multiples
| Multiple | TWE | Basis |
|---|---|---|
P/E (trailing, statutory) | Not meaningful (loss) | F26 statutory EPS –133.4c |
P/E (trailing, underlying) | Approx. 16.6x | F26 EPS pre-MI 34.1c |
P/E (forward, F27 consensus range) | Approx. 14x–18x | Broker F27 EPS 31.0c–39.7c (FNArena) |
EV/EBITDAS (trailing) | Approx. 9.6x | F26 EBITDAS A$657.5m |
EV/EBITS (trailing) | Approx. 12.9x | F26 EBITS A$492.3m |
EV/Sales | Approx. 2.5x | F26 NSR A$2,561.0m |
P/B | Approx. 1.4x | F26 net assets A$3,348.3m |
Analyst Ratings & Targets
| Broker | F27 EPS forecast (cents) | F27 DPS forecast (cents) |
|---|---|---|
Macquarie | 39.7 | 0 |
Morgans | 32.3 | 0 |
Jarden | 31.3 (another update shows 34.9) | 9 |
UBS | 31.0 | 0 |
Dividends per share (A$ cents)
| Dividends per share (A$ cents) | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total DPS (A$ cents) | 32 | 35 | 36 | 40 | 0 |
Capital Markets
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
Moody's / S&P / Fitch | Not publicly rated by these agencies (no rating disclosed); TWE states its metrics are consistent with an investment-grade credit profile |
Debt instruments | US Private Placement (USPP) notes; drawn and undrawn bilateral bank facilities; term loan |
Gross interest-bearing debt | A$1,531.1m (30 Jun 2026) plus leases A$465.5m |
Liquidity | A$1.3bn |
Weighted average debt duration | 3.2 years |
Maturity profile | Spread F27–F35 (chart in F26 presentation; tranche amounts n/d) |
Covenants | "Significant headroom" retained |
FX-adjusted debt | Net debt excludes fair-value hedge adjustments on USD borrowings (F26 A$(12.4)m) |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance (F27)
-
Group EBITS at least equivalent to F26 (≥A$492.3m), approximately 55% second-half weighted.
-
Regional EBITS: Greater China A$280–310m; Emerging Markets A$95–115m; Americas approx. A$50m; ANZ & Europe A$100–120m.
-
Includes approx. A$40m of Ascent savings; corporate costs to improve modestly; capex approx. A$75m.
-
China customer inventory rebalancing completed in F27; US rebalancing meaningfully progressed (completion by 1H28); remaining RNDC inventory sold through at nil margin in 1H27.
-
Revenue growth expected from F28; leverage below 2.0x by end F28.
-
1Q27 described at the AGM as positive, with Penfolds China depletions ahead of plan.
Consensus expectations
Broker F27 EPS forecasts span 31.0c–39.7c (versus 34.1c in F26), implying flat-to-modestly-higher earnings; most brokers forecast no F27 dividend (Jarden 9c the exception). Simply Wall St's aggregated narrative projects revenue of approx. A$3.3bn and earnings of approx. A$606m by 2028 — an ambitious recovery that would require both Penfolds growth and a fixed or exited Americas business.
Bull case
-
Penfolds is under-earning, not impaired. Penfolds depletions grew strongly in F26 (China +34.7%, Asia ex-China +18.1%, Australia +5.7%) while NSR fell 7.0% because of deliberate destocking. Once the remaining 0.2m cases of China inventory are cleared in F27, shipments should re-align with depletions, and Greater China is already guided to A$280–310m EBITS versus A$264.8m in F26.
-
Self-help is large relative to the earnings base. A$100m of Ascent savings equals approximately 20% of F26 EBITS; combined with nil-margin RNDC inventory rolling off and US destocking ending by 1H28, a return toward the 25% EBITS margin target is mathematically plausible on a smaller, more profitable portfolio.
-
Optionality in the Americas. With A$1.1bn of US impairments already booked and advisors appointed for "all available options," a sale or partial disposal at a value above written-down book could accelerate deleveraging and refocus TWE as a higher-multiple, Asia-centred luxury company.
Bear case
-
The China problem is structural. The October 2025 guidance withdrawal was caused by fewer banqueting occasions — a behavioural, not cyclical, change — and half of F26 China depletion growth came from recapturing parallel-import volume rather than new demand. Penfolds' NSR per case fell 4.5% in F26 on lower ultra-luxury mix.
-
The US is a recurring value trap. TWE has written down its US business repeatedly; F27 Americas EBITS guidance of approx. A$50m on a region that produced A$315m in F25 shows the scale of the reset, and Ascent's US supply-chain transformation runs to F31.
-
Balance-sheet constraints limit flexibility. Leverage of 2.8x, suspended dividends, capex cut to A$75m, a A$2.3bn inventory base turning roughly once every 20 months, and ROCE of 7.9% leave little room if vintages, tariffs or distributor disruptions surprise negatively; divestment proceeds to date (approx. A$50m) are modest.
Key catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
| Catalyst / monitorable | Expected timing |
|---|---|
| Outcome of Americas strategic review (sale, partial sale, JV or restructure) | F27 (timing not committed) |
| Additional brand/asset divestments signed | By end 1H27 (Dec 2026) |
| Sales of Markaranka, Schultz and Lights vineyards | F27 |
| 1H27 results (first reporting under regional structure) | Approx. February 2027 |
| China Lunar New Year 2027 depletions; Bin 407 shipment phasing | Jan–Mar 2027 |
| Completion of China customer inventory rebalancing | F27 |
| US inventory rebalancing progress and sell-through of RNDC stock | 1H27–1H28 |
| Ascent savings delivery (A$40m F27) | Through F27 |
| Leverage trajectory and any dividend resumption signal | F27 results, Aug 2027 |
| New board appointment with US/Europe industry experience | F27 |
| US tariff policy on Australian/NZ wine; UK duty settings | Ongoing |
| 2027 Australian and NZ vintage quality and cost | Mar–May 2027 |
Analyst verdict
Treasury Wine Estates enters F27 having completed the hardest part of a necessary but painful reset. F26 was a trough year by design and by misfortune in roughly equal measure: management deliberately destocked China and US customers and choked off parallel imports, while category weakness in both markets, RNDC's California exit and over-built US supply forced A$1.31bn of post-tax material items and the suspension of dividends. The operating core held up better than the statutory loss suggests. EBITS of A$492.3m beat revised guidance, Penfolds still earned a 40.5% margin, and Greater China grew revenue at a 46.8% margin through the destocking.
The investment case now rests on three questions. First, whether Penfolds' Chinese demand is resilient enough — after the banqueting shift — to resume shipment growth in F28 once inventory is rebalanced. The 1Q27 commentary is encouraging but brief. Second, whether Sam Fischer can deliver Ascent's A$100m of savings and portfolio contraction without damaging the ten focus brands, while a newly configured regional structure and a newly permanent CFO bed in. Third, and most importantly, whether the Americas strategic review produces a decisive outcome rather than another incremental fix; history argues for scepticism.
At approximately 16.6x trailing underlying earnings and 9.6x EV/EBITDAS, the shares price in a stabilisation but not a full margin recovery. The risk-reward is balanced to modestly positive for investors with an 18–24 month horizon who believe in Penfolds' Asian franchise, but the stock remains a high-execution-risk turnaround: leverage of 2.8x, structurally declining commercial wine, US tariff exposure and climate-driven vintage volatility provide little margin for error. We would view a credible Americas transaction and evidence of China shipments re-aligning with depletions in 1H27 as the triggers for a sustained re-rating; failure on either would likely keep TWE trading as a value trap.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Title | Tenure in role | Prior roles / background | Education |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Sam Fischer | Managing Director & CEO | Since 27 Oct 2025 | CEO, Lion (Kirin Group) for three years; 15 years at Diageo including President Asia Pacific & Global Travel and Diageo Executive Committee member, seven years leading Greater China/APAC; 15 years at Colgate-Palmolive; former NED of Burberry Group (2019–2025) | BBA |
Justin Pipito | Group Chief Financial Officer | Interim from 1 Jun 2026; permanent from 1 Oct 2026 | Joined TWE late 2016 as CFO ANZ operations; five years in Asia (including Penfolds/Asia finance); Deputy CFO from Oct 2023 | — |
Tom King | Group marketing strategy, global brand strategy and innovation (previously MD, Penfolds) | New accountabilities from Oct 2026 regional model | Led Penfolds through China re-opening | — |
Ben Dollard | Leader, Americas region (previously President, Treasury Americas) | Long-serving | Led US luxury pivot and DAOU integration | — |
Kerrin Petty | Chief Supply & Sustainability Officer | — | Leads supply-chain transformation | — |
Kirsten Dale | Interim Chief People Officer | From 1 Apr 2026 | Global Director Strategic Talent & Employee Experience | — |
Alexandra Lorenzi | Group Company Secretary | — | — | — |
Board of Directors
| Director | Role | Appointed | Independence | Committees | Background |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
John Mullen | Non-executive Chairman | Board May 2023; Chair Oct 2023 | Independent | Chair, Nominations | Former CEO Asciano (2011–17), global CEO DHL Express (2005–09), CEO TNT Express Worldwide; Chair of Qantas and Brambles; director of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners (retiring Dec 2026) |
Sam Fischer | MD & CEO | Oct 2025 | Executive | — | As above |
Leslie Frank | Non-executive Director | Jul 2024 | Non-independent (grape supply agreements and consultancy with TWE) | — | Co-founder/former owner of Frank Family Vineyards; Emmy-winning journalist; retiring at conclusion of 2026 AGM |
Nigel Garrard | Non-executive Director | May 2025 | Independent | Chair, Human Resources; Nominations; Wine Operations & Sustainability | Former MD & CEO Orora; Chair of ALS and Ansell |
Garry Hounsell | Non-executive Director | Sep 2012 | Independent | Chair, Wine Operations & Sustainability; Audit & Risk; HR; Nominations | Chair of Helloworld Travel and Electro Optic Systems; former EY/Arthur Andersen partner; longest-serving director (14 years) |
Colleen Jay | Non-executive Director | Apr 2018 | Independent | HR; Wine Operations & Sustainability | Former President Global Beauty Specialty at Procter & Gamble; Chair of The Cooper Companies; director of Beyond Meat |
Antonia Korsanos | Non-executive Director | Apr 2020 | Independent | Chair, Audit & Risk; Nominations | Former CFO Aristocrat Leisure; Vice Chair of Light & Wonder |
Judy Liu | Non-executive Director | Jan 2025 | Independent | Audit & Risk | Former President Farfetch Asia Pacific; co-founder CuriosityChina |
Mark Weldon | Non-executive Director | Oct 2025 | Independent | — | Background n/d in sources reviewed |
Competitive Landscape
Competitors by Segment
| Segment | Competitor | Ownership | Relative positioning vs TWE |
|---|---|---|---|
Global luxury / icon wine | Moët Hennessy Estates & Wines (LVMH) | Listed (LVMH) | Broader luxury group; champagne-led; competes for Asian luxury gifting |
Global luxury / icon wine | Bordeaux first growths and négociants (e.g., Domaines Barons de Rothschild – Lafite) | Private | Benchmark for Penfolds icon pricing in China |
Global premium wine & spirits | Pernod Ricard (wine brands largely divested into Vinarchy, 2025) | Listed | Spirits-led; competes for distributor attention and on-premise |
US wine (all segments) | E. & J. Gallo Winery | Private | Largest US wine company; scale leader in premium and commercial; n/d financials |
US luxury wine | Constellation Brands (retained fine wine portfolio after selling mainstream wine brands) | Listed | Competes in Napa luxury (e.g., Robert Mondavi, To Kalon) |
US luxury wine | Jackson Family Wines | Private | Strong luxury and premium California portfolio |
US luxury wine | The Duckhorn Portfolio | Private (taken private 2024) | Direct competitor in US$20+ Napa/Sonoma luxury |
US premium/commercial | The Wine Group | Private | Commercial-tier scale competitor |
Australian wine | Vinarchy (formerly Accolade Wines, merged with Pernod Ricard wine brands) | Private | Hardys and others; competes in Australian/UK commercial and premium |
Australian wine | Casella Family Brands | Private | Yellow Tail; commercial export leader |
Australian wine | Australian Vintage Ltd | Listed (ASX: AVG) | McGuigan; smaller listed peer |
Chinese domestic wine | Changyu Pioneer Wine | Listed (Shenzhen) | Largest Chinese producer; competes with Penfolds China-origin |
NZ Sauvignon Blanc | Pernod/Vinarchy (Brancott), Constellation (Kim Crawford, if retained), Delegat | Mixed | Competes with Matua |
Market Share by Competitor
| Company | Latest revenue | Basis | Wine share / rank |
|---|---|---|---|
Treasury Wine Estates | A$2,561m NSR | F26, June YE | 2.7% of total US wine by value, ranked 7th among US marketers; #1 in US$20+ in Circana channels with 11% share (Shanken News Daily, Jun 2026); #1 wine brand in China (Penfolds: 15.7% online, 8.1% offline share, F26) |
Pernod Ricard | Approx. €11.0bn group net sales | — | Wine now minor after Vinarchy transaction |
LVMH Wines & Spirits | Approx. €5.9bn | — | Champagne and luxury still wine |
E. & J. Gallo | — | Private | Largest US wine company by volume (widely reported) |
Constellation Brands (wine) | n/d (segment reshaped by divestitures) | Feb YE | — |
Changyu | — | Dec YE | Chinese domestic leader |
Peer Comparison FY2025
| Metric | TWE (F26) | Pernod Ricard (FY25) | LVMH W&S (CY24) |
|---|---|---|---|
Revenue | A$2,561m | Approx. €11.0bn | Approx. €5.9bn |
Revenue growth | –12.8% reported | Approx. –3% organic | Negative |
Operating margin | 19.2% EBITS | — | — |
R&D intensity | n/d (not disclosed) | — | — |



