Troy Resources Limited Overview
Troy Resources Limited was a Perth-headquartered, ASX-listed junior gold producer with a 39-year history. It built and operated small, short-life gold mines across Western Australia (Sandstone), Brazil (Sertão, Andorinhas), Argentina (Casposo) and finally Guyana (Karouni). Karouni began commercial production on 1 January 2016 and was Troy's sole producing asset from FY2017.
Karouni peaked at 70,207 ounces in FY2018. It was then undermined by grade reconciliation failures, pit-wall failures, two fatalities, COVID-19 logistics and chronic under-capitalisation. Production fell to 22,781 ounces in FY2021 at an AISC of US$2,290/oz, and the mine entered care and maintenance in August 2021.
A debt-for-equity recapitalisation in 2022 did not secure the roughly US$10m needed to develop the Smarts Underground reserve. The Guyanese subsidiary entered administration in June 2023, ASX removed the company in September 2023, and Guyana cancelled its licence in October 2023. Troy today is a dormant, unlisted shell with residual Brazilian iron-ore rights and contingent liabilities.
Company's own description (latest annual report)
The FY2021 Annual Report, Troy's last lodged annual report, describes the company as a gold producer and explorer with a history of developing and operating mines in Australia and South America. It records that Troy acquired the undeveloped Karouni Project in Guyana from Azimuth Resources in July 2013, developed it, produced first gold in November 2015, and had recently completed a Pre-feasibility Study on Smarts Underground.
The Directors' Report states that the Group's principal activity during FY2021 was gold production at Karouni, which commenced commercial production on 1 January 2016, together with exploration at Karouni.
Independent characterisation
Troy was a single-asset, mid-tier-aspiring but in practice marginal, open-pit gold miner. Its whole revenue base came from doré produced at one 1 Mtpa-class carbon-in-leach (CIL) mill at Karouni, in the Cuyuni-Mazaruni / Potaro-Siparuni regions of Guyana, about 180 km south-southwest of Georgetown.
The business model was a classic junior-miner cycle:
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acquire an undeveloped deposit, usually through a share-based takeover (Azimuth, 2013);
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fund construction with equity and project debt (Investec);
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mine short-life open pits (initially a 3-year mine life);
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try to extend mine life through brownfields discovery.
The model failed at the extension stage. Ore reserves were repeatedly depleted faster than they were replaced: 72,200 oz at 30 June 2020 and 89,400 oz at 31 July 2021, the latter consisting entirely of the undeveloped Smarts Underground. Repeated grade reconciliation shortfalls followed, including Hicks 4 Phase 3, which produced about 40% less gold than the grade control model predicted (FY2021 Chairman's Review).
Revenue model
| Revenue element | Share | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Product sales (gold doré) | ~99%+ | Gold sold to a single refiner (gold transported to a refinery in Canada, per FY2021 Annual Report). Priced in US$ at spot, with revenue recognised when an irrevocable instruction is given to the refiner. |
| By-product silver | <1% | Silver sales of A$210k in FY2019 and A$192k in FY2018 (FY2019 Annual Financial Report, Note 3) |
| Hedging gains/losses | Variable | Hedge net gain of A$1.48m in FY2019; loss of A$3.85m in FY2018. Hedging was required under the Investec facility and ended January 2019. |
| Services / subscription / licensing | 0% | Not applicable |
| Royalty income | Incidental | A royalty termination payment of A$250,000 was received from Middle Island Resources in July 2021 (FY2021 Annual Report, Subsequent Events) |
Value-chain position, customers and end-markets
Troy sat entirely in the upstream extraction and primary processing segment of the gold value chain: exploration, mining, crushing, gravity, CIL leaching, and doré pouring. It had one external customer, its refiner (FY2019 Annual Financial Report, Note 3, which states the Group "only has one external customer").
End-markets were the global gold market (investment, central bank, jewellery and industrial demand) through the refiner. Troy had no downstream exposure.
Strategy
Stated strategy (FY2021 Annual Report, "Future Developments")
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Pursue growth at Karouni through developing the Smarts Underground and exploration.
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Consider acquiring new projects or corporate merger activity where demonstrable value would be added for shareholders.
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Commitment to international best practice in health and safety, environmental stewardship and social responsibility (Corporate Profile).
Initiatives in the final active period (2021–2023)
| Initiative | Date | Detail | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Smarts Underground development | PFS mid-2021; reserve 26 Jul 2021 | First underground mine in Guyana; initial capex about A$10m; GGMC approval subject to phased plans | Never funded; site lost |
| Barrick earn-in | 1 Jul 2021 | Barrick could earn 51% by sole-funding work and a PFS, plus 19% more by funding to feasibility. Troy had the option to require Barrick to finance its share for a further 10%. Barrick to act as operator with a 5% management fee. | Terminated effective 25 Dec 2022 |
| Recapitalisation | 5 Jan 2022, updated 1 Feb 2022 | Retire about A$20.7m of net debt and raise A$7.2m cash at A$0.022 per share; 1-for-1 entitlement; RiverFort convertible note of up to A$5m (later A$2m drawdown) | Approved 25 Jul 2022. Entitlement raised only A$9.2m plus A$0.8m against a A$37.4m maximum. Reinstatement conditions not met. |
| Brazilian iron-ore monetisation | Apr–May 2022 | US$4m lease and assignment to PST | Contract "continues on foot" (June 2023); outcome not disclosed |
| Restart targeting Q4 2023 | Nov 2022 | Country manager Tegeler sought a US$10m capital investment; new operations manager Michael Rodrigues; plan to mine Smarts UG and Hicks | Abandoned; TRGI administration June 2023 |
Medium-term guidance
There is no current guidance. The last production guidance (21 September 2020) for FY2021 was 35,000–40,000 oz at an AISC of US$1,450–1,550/oz. It was missed by about 35–43% on volume and about 50% on cost.
ESG commitments
Troy's ESG commitments included a Visual Safety Leadership Program, a "Lessons To Be Learnt" programme introduced after the October 2019 fatality, voluntary disclosure on its tailings storage facility to the Church of England Pensions Board and Swedish Council on Ethics, and an alliance with the University of Guyana for reclamation planting, which was put on hold during COVID-19 (FY2021 AR).
Products & Services
Troy's "products" were refined-metal precursors (doré) from mining assets. The catalog below is organised by asset, the meaningful unit for a miner.
Gold Mining – Guyana (Karouni Gold Project)
| Asset / deposit | Description | Key specifications | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Karouni processing plant | Crushing, gravity concentration, CIL leaching | Roughly 1 Mtpa design. Plant commissioned in about 9 months. FY2021 throughput 797,904 t at 0.98 g/t and 90.4% recovery. | Seized by Government of Guyana (Oct 2023). Reported plans exist to move power plants to Onverwagt and sell the mill. | FY2021 AR; Stabroek News 2024 |
| Smarts open pits (Smarts 1–3) | Primary open-pit source from 2015 | Part of the original 3-year mine plan | Mined out or reclassified | FY2021 AR |
| Hicks open pits (Hicks 1–4) | Main FY2020–21 ore source | Hicks 4 Phase 3 reconciled about 40% below the grade control model | Exhausted by July 2021 | FY2021 AR |
| Spearpoint | Satellite open pit | Pit-wall failure prevented reaching the final design | Exhausted | FY2021 AR |
| Goldstar | Satellite open pit, trial mined in H2 FY2021 | Low-grade, high dilution; negligible reserve | Mining ceased | FY2021 AR |
| Ohio Creek | High-grade prospect about 10 km from the plant | Inferred resource above 133,000 oz at 30 June 2020; very high nugget effect | Tenure relinquished in FY2021 | FY2021 AR |
| Smarts Underground (flagship development) | Proposed first underground mine in Guyana | Probable Reserve of 1.082 Mt at 2.6 g/t for 89,400 oz. PEA for a 2.5-year life showed LOM revenue of US$137m and net cash flow of US$47m. Initial capex about A$10m (US$10m per Nov 2022 statement). | Never developed; rights lost Oct 2023 | FY2021 AR; Business News 2022; Stabroek News 2022 |
| Smarts Deeps / Hicks Deeps | Underground-amenable resources | Smarts Deeps: 1.06 Mt Indicated at 3.6 g/t (124,100 oz) plus 1.94 Mt Inferred at 2.6 g/t (163,500 oz) | Lost Oct 2023 | FY2021 AR |
| Gem Creek | Brownfields prospect | Consistent mineralisation over about 500 m of strike; 93 RC holes for 7,836 m | Lost Oct 2023 | FY2021 AR |
| Honey Camp West, Singh Link, Mirror, Kuribrong | Greenfields targets | Soil anomalies up to 875 ppb Au (Honey Camp West) | Lost Oct 2023 | FY2021 AR |
| Potaro target | About 25 km south of the mill, on the Makapa-Kuribrong Shear Zone | Lifted Troy's landholding to about 89,000 ha | Barrick earn-in terminated 25 Dec 2022; tenure lost | FY2021 AR; ASX Dec 2022 |
Karouni Mineral Resources and Ore Reserves (as of 31 July 2021, JORC 2012)
| Category | Tonnes | Grade (g/t) | Ounces |
|---|---|---|---|
| Probable Ore Reserve (Smarts Underground) | 1,082,000 | 2.6 | 89,400 |
| Indicated Resource (incl. reserves) | 5,415,000 | 2.1 | 357,500 |
| Inferred Resource | 7,716,000 | 2.0 | 485,300 |
| Total Mineral Resource | 13,131,000 | 2.0 | 842,800 |
| Metric | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|
| Total Ore Reserves (oz) | 72,200 | 89,400 |
| Total Mineral Resources (oz) | 1,007,300 | 842,800 |
Source: FY2021 Annual Report, Table 1. Competent Person: Richard Maddocks (FAusIMM, consultant).
Brazil
| Asset | Description | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Andorinhas gold mine (Pará) | Former producing gold mine | Ceased May 2016. Rehabilitation monitoring awaits final sign-off from DNPM / ANM (FY2021 AR). |
| Iron-ore mining rights 802.913/1978 and 810.354/1976 | Held by Reinarda Mineração | Subject to a definitive lease and assignment agreement with PST Empreendimentos e Participações for US$4m. Net proceeds are uncertain because of likely Brazilian tax liabilities (ASX, 15 Jun 2023). Status after June 2023 is not publicly disclosed. |
Historic (divested / closed) assets
| Asset | Country | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Sandstone (Bulchina, Lord Nelson, Lord Henry) | Australia (WA) | Developed under Nilsson. A royalty linked to Middle Island Resources was terminated for A$250,000 in July 2021. |
| Sertão | Brazil (Goiás) | Plant later relocated to Andorinhas |
| Casposo (gold-silver) | Argentina (San Juan) | 70% sold to Austral Gold in 2016 and 30% in November 2019 for US$0.2m. Silver production was 1.67 Moz in FY2016 and 3.11 Moz in FY2015. |
Pricing model: spot gold, US$-denominated, single refiner. Hedging was compulsory under the Investec facility through January 2019 and unhedged afterwards (FY2019 AFR Note 15).
Financial Narrative
All figures are A$ unless noted. Sources: FY2021 Annual Report (FY2021, FY2020) and FY2019 Annual Financial Report (FY2019, FY2018, plus FY2017 summary data from the five-year tables in both reports). Blank cells mean not publicly disclosed in the sources reviewed. FY2022 onwards is not publicly disclosed because no audited accounts were lodged.
Income statement
Operating income: Troy did not report an "operating income" sub-total. Pre-tax loss excluding finance costs serves as the proxy. In A$M this was -5.4 in FY2018, -41.0 in FY2019, -42.1 in FY2020 and -30.9 in FY2021, derived from the reported line items.
Margins and growth
Revenue CAGR FY2017–FY2021: about -10.3% per year (A$91.8m to A$59.5m). FY2016 revenue was A$145.4m and FY2015 revenue was A$180.8m, so the decade-long contraction was steeper still.
Balance sheet (30 June)
Notes:
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FY2021 non-current financial liabilities of A$11.8m represent the AIMS gold loan, then extended to 16 June 2023. After Troy missed the 1 October 2021 interest payment, this became payable on demand (FY2021 AR, balance sheet footnote).
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FY2018 debt was the Investec syndicated facility (US$11.19m outstanding). By 30 June 2019 this had fallen to US$1.79m and was repaid by 30 September 2019.
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FY2017 total debt is not separately disclosed in the sources reviewed. Investec balances imply roughly US$27m at 30 June 2017 (US$11.19m at June 2018 plus US$16m repaid in FY2018). This is a derived figure, not a reported one.
Cash flow
Notes:
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FY2020 debt repaid combines A$3.01m of borrowings and A$1.53m of short-term loan funding.
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FY2021 debt repaid combines A$1.60m of borrowings and A$2.06m of short-term loan funding.
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The capital expenditure figures in the five-year summary are 3 (FY2018), 16 (FY2019), 15 (FY2020) and 4 (FY2021). These are consistent with the cash-flow-derived values above. FY2021 capex excludes capitalised exploration of A$0.3m.
Ratios
Notes:
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FY2021 ROE and debt/equity are not meaningful because equity was negative (-A$17.1m).
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ROIC is not meaningful: NOPAT was negative in every year and invested capital was eroding.
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Net debt/EBITDA is not meaningful in FY2020–FY2021 because EBITDA was negative.
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The cash conversion cycle is not publicly disclosed. Receivables were minimal (gold settled within 7 days), and payables were very extended (A$25–28m against roughly A$60–100m of annual costs).
Commentary on trends, inflections and drivers
FY2017 – the crisis year. Karouni was in its first full year as Troy's sole producer after the Andorinhas closure (May 2016) and the Casposo sale (2016). It produced 56,200 oz at an AISC of US$1,345/oz, against a realised price of US$1,263/oz, which means a negative all-in margin. A pit-wall failure early in 2017, management turnover (Purvis and Apostolou resigned in May 2017), and roughly A$108m of write-downs on Karouni mining property and equipment drove a A$148.2m net loss. The impairment pushed net tangible worth below the Investec facility's A$100m covenant, a technical breach (Stockhead, August 2017).
FY2018 – the operational peak. Under the reappointed MD Ken Nilsson, Karouni delivered its best year: 70,207 oz at 2.64 g/t head grade and an AISC of US$931/oz. EBITDA reached A$24m and operating cash flow A$16.8m. Almost all free cash flow (A$15.9m) plus opening cash went to Investec debt service (A$21.0m principal plus A$2.5m financing costs), leaving year-end cash of only A$1.3m. This shows that even Troy's best year could not build a balance sheet. The 30 June 2018 net current asset deficiency was A$24.0m.
FY2019 – deleveraging plus impairment. Head grade fell to 2.11 g/t after the October 2018 pit-wall failure, which altered the mine plan. Production dropped 17% to 58,118 oz. A A$30m impairment (A$15m mine properties and A$15m PP&E) at 31 December 2018 drove a A$45.8m net loss, along with a A$1.77m derecognised deferred tax asset. Operating cash flow was strong at A$25.6m and three equity raisings brought in A$11.3m net. Together these allowed Investec to be cut to US$1.79m, and year-end net cash was positive at A$4.7m, the only net-cash year in the series.
FY2020 – the fatality shutdown. The 8 October 2019 fatality triggered a ministerial cessation order covering all pits, and the mine closed through most of the December 2019 quarter. Production halved to 23,580 oz. Restart required an AIMS gold loan of 5,200 oz (A$11.7m drawn) and a A$4m placement. A further A$19.5m impairment and A$4.3m of care and maintenance costs produced a A$43.9m loss. Equity collapsed to A$1.5m.
FY2021 – terminal decline. Despite record realised prices (US$1,838/oz), the combination of grade reconciliation failure at Hicks 4 Phase 3, the Spearpoint wall failure, heavy rain, the September 2020 store fire and COVID-19 staffing gaps cut grade to 0.98 g/t. AISC blew out to US$2,290/oz against guidance of US$1,450–1,550/oz, and production of 22,781 oz missed guidance of 35,000–40,000 oz (FY2021 Chairman's Review). The gross loss reached A$24.9m, operating cash flow was -A$10.4m, and equity turned negative at -A$17.1m. PwC's audit report carried a going-concern emphasis of matter, as it had in FY2019.
Structural driver. Across five years Troy raised more than A$29m in net equity (FY2019–FY2021 alone) and incurred cumulative net losses of A$280m (FY2017–FY2021). Accumulated losses reached A$444.9m against issued capital of A$384.5m at 30 June 2021. Shareholder capital was effectively consumed in full.
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Group Entities
| Entity | Jurisdiction | Function | Status (Oct 2026) |
|---|---|---|---|
Troy Resources Limited | Australia | Parent, ex-ASX listed | Registered, delisted, not under external administration |
Azimuth Resources Ltd | Australia | Intermediate holding company (acquired 2013) | — |
Pharsalus Gold Inc. | Guyana | Holder of Karouni prospecting rights; party to the Mineral Agreement | Rights cancelled October 2023 |
Troy Resources Guyana Inc. (TRGI) | Guyana | Karouni operator | In administration since June 2023; licence cancelled |
Reinarda Mineração Ltda | Brazil | Andorinhas; holder of iron-ore rights 802.913/1978 and 810.354/1976 | Subject to the PST lease and assignment agreement |
Casposo Argentina (former) | Argentina | Casposo mine | Sold to Austral Gold (70% in 2016; 30% in Nov 2019) |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Revenue by Segment and Revenue by Segment (%)
| Metric | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gold Mining Guyana segment revenue (AUD K) | 115,714 | 101,776 | 56,303 | 59,548 |
Gold Mining Guyana segment operating profit before exploration/impairment (AUD K) | 2,738 | -2,259 | — | — |
Corporate revenue incl. hedging (AUD K) | 0 | 1,845 | — | — |
Group revenue (AUD K) | 115,714 | 103,621 | 56,303 | 59,548 |
Guyana share of group revenue (%) | 100 | 98.2 | 100 | 100 |
Segment revenue YoY growth (%) | — | -12.0 | -44.7 | 5.8 |
Operating Metrics (oz) and Margin Analysis (USD)
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Gold produced (oz) | 56,200 | 70,207 | 58,118 | 23,580 | 22,781 |
Gold sold (oz) | 58,139 | 70,959 | 57,798 | 23,726 | 24,227 |
Cash cost (US$/oz) | 970 | 737 | 782 | 1,277 | 1,928 |
AISC (US$/oz) | 1,345 | 931 | 1,095 | 1,725 | 2,290 |
AISC (A$/oz) | 1,784 | 1,182 | 1,531 | 2,582 | 3,066 |
Realised gold price (US$/oz) | 1,263 | 1,302 | 1,257 | 1,581 | 1,838 |
Realised gold price (A$/oz) | 1,675 | 1,679 | 1,757 | 2,371 | 2,454 |
AISC margin (US$/oz) | -82 | 371 | 162 | -144 | -452 |
Ore milled (t) | — | 871,660 | 888,198 | 567,782 | 797,904 |
Head grade milled (g/t) | — | 2.64 | 2.11 | 1.35 | 0.98 |
Recovery (%) | — | 94.9 | 96.2 | 95.8 | 90.4 |
Income Statement and Per-Share Data
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (AUD Mn) | 91.8 | 115.7 | 103.6 | 56.3 | 59.5 |
Cost of sales (AUD Mn) | — | 109.0 | 104.0 | 62.3 | 84.5 |
Gross profit (AUD Mn) | — | 6.7 | -0.4 | -6.0 | -24.9 |
EBITDA before impairment, non-IFRS (AUD Mn) | -7 | 24 | 12 | -4 | -13 |
Depreciation and amortisation (AUD Mn) | — | 28.8 | 23.0 | 19.1 | 16.7 |
Impairment (AUD Mn) | — | 0 | 30.0 | 19.5 | 0.6 |
Finance costs (AUD Mn) | — | 4.8 | 3.1 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
Exploration expense (AUD Mn) | 7 | 1.3 | 4.5 | 6.8 | 5.5 |
Government royalties (AUD Mn) | — | 10.5 | 9.9 | 5.4 | 5.8 |
Pre-tax income (AUD Mn) | -160.2 | -9.6 | -44.1 | -43.9 | -32.8 |
Net income attributable (AUD Mn) | -148.2 | -9.6 | -45.8 | -43.9 | -32.8 |
EPS basic (A$ cents) | -34.7 | -2.1 | -9.3 | -7.2 | -4.6 |
EPS diluted (A$ cents) | -34.7 | -2.1 | -9.3 | -7.2 | -4.6 |
Dividends per share (A$ cents) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Gross margin (%) | — | 5.8 | -0.4 | -10.7 | -41.8 |
EBITDA margin (%) | -7.6 | 20.7 | 11.6 | -7.1 | -21.8 |
Pre-tax margin (%) | -174.5 | -8.3 | -42.6 | -78.0 | -55.1 |
Net margin (%) | -161.4 | -8.3 | -44.2 | -78.0 | -55.1 |
Revenue YoY growth (%) | -36.9 | 26.0 | -10.5 | -45.7 | 5.9 |
Balance Sheet
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total assets (AUD Mn) | — | 108.3 | 73.8 | 50.1 | 29.2 |
Cash and equivalents (AUD Mn) | 8.9 | 1.3 | 7.8 | 4.9 | 1.8 |
Inventories (AUD Mn) | — | 15.8 | 9.8 | 11.1 | 6.9 |
PP&E (AUD Mn) | — | 44.6 | 22.7 | 10.4 | 5.9 |
Mine properties (AUD Mn) | — | 36.5 | 24.5 | 16.0 | 6.3 |
Short-term debt incl. leases (AUD Mn) | — | 14.2 | 3.1 | 14.3 | 0.3 |
Long-term debt incl. leases (AUD Mn) | — | 0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 11.8 |
Total debt (AUD Mn) | — | 14.2 | 3.2 | 14.3 | 12.1 |
Net debt (AUD Mn) | — | 12.8 | -4.7 | 9.4 | 10.3 |
Trade and other payables (AUD Mn) | — | 28.6 | 25.8 | 26.6 | 27.1 |
Total liabilities (AUD Mn) | — | 48.5 | 34.9 | 48.6 | 46.3 |
Shareholders' equity (AUD Mn) | 65.3 | 59.8 | 38.9 | 1.5 | -17.1 |
Goodwill and intangibles (AUD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Working capital (AUD Mn) | — | -24.0 | -10.9 | -24.1 | -11.8 |
Cash Flow
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Operating cash flow (AUD Mn) | — | 16.8 | 25.6 | -0.8 | -10.4 |
Capex incl. mine development (AUD Mn) | 16 | 0.9 | 15.8 | 14.5 | 4.0 |
Free cash flow (AUD Mn) | — | 15.9 | 9.8 | -15.3 | -14.5 |
Debt repaid (AUD Mn) | — | 21.0 | 13.2 | 4.5 | 3.7 |
Debt / gold loan drawn (AUD Mn) | — | 0 | 0 | 13.7 | 1.7 |
Net equity raised (AUD Mn) | — | 0 | 11.3 | 3.7 | 14.0 |
Dividends paid (AUD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Share buybacks (AUD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Returns & Leverage Ratios (%) and Financial Ratios (x)
| Metric | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ROE on average equity (%) | — | -15.3 | -92.8 | -217.3 | — |
ROA on year-end assets (%) | — | -8.9 | -62.1 | -87.6 | -112.3 |
Current ratio (x) | — | 0.46 | 0.64 | 0.42 | 0.58 |
Debt to equity (x) | — | 0.24 | 0.08 | 9.53 | — |
Net debt to EBITDA (x) | — | 0.53 | -0.39 | — | — |
Interest coverage EBITDA / finance costs (x) | — | 4.9 | 3.9 | — | — |
Asset turnover on average assets (x) | — | — | 1.14 | 0.91 | 1.50 |
Market cap at year end (AUD Mn) | 36 | 67 | 57 | 53 | 31 |
Share price at year end (AUD) | 0.078 | 0.145 | 0.096 | 0.083 | 0.039 |
Revenue by Region
| Region | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|
Guyana revenue (AUD Mn) | 101.8 | 56.3 | 59.5 |
Brazil revenue (AUD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Argentina revenue (AUD Mn) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Australia corporate revenue incl. hedging (AUD Mn) | 1.8 | 0 | 0 |
Total revenue (AUD Mn) | 103.6 | 56.3 | 59.5 |
Region Margins & Growth (%)
| Region | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|
Guyana revenue YoY growth (%) | -12.0 | -44.7 | 5.8 |
Operating Metrics (oz)
| Region | FY2015 | FY2016 | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Gold-equivalent production, all sites (oz) | 121,835 | 82,826 | 56,200 | 70,207 | 58,118 |
Silver production, Casposo Argentina (oz) | 3,111,182 | 1,668,604 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Share Price and Market Valuation
| Metric | FY2015 | FY2016 | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Share price at year end (AUD) | 0.37 | 0.54 | 0.078 | 0.145 | 0.096 | 0.083 | 0.039 |
Market cap at year end (AUD Mn) | 107 | 184 | 36 | 67 | 57 | 53 | 31 |
Raising Details
| Raising | Date | Amount (AUD Mn) | Price (AUD) |
|---|---|---|---|
Placement plus SPP | 2015 | 40.0 | 0.40 |
Equity raising | Sep–Oct 2016 | 40.7 | 0.36 |
Placement | Jan 2019 | 2.76 | 0.105 |
Share Purchase Plan | Mar 2019 | 1.61 | 0.105 |
Placement | May 2019 | 7.57 | 0.085 |
Placement | Dec 2019 | 4.0 | 0.10 |
Two-tranche placement | Oct–Dec 2020 | 15.0 | 0.12 |
Barrick subscription | Jul 2021 | ~1.6 (US$1.2m) | — |
Recapitalisation placements and entitlement | 2022 | ~7.2 placement target plus 9.2 entitlement plus 0.8 shortfall | 0.022 |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Debt instrument
| Debt instrument | Maturity | Status |
|---|---|---|
AIMS gold loan (5,200 oz) | 16 Jun 2023 (as extended) | Defaulted 1 Oct 2021; converted to equity under the 2022 recapitalisation |
RiverFort convertible note | — | A$2m drawdown planned (Sep 2022); status not disclosed |
Exploservice residual trade debt | Standstill to April 2023 | Status not disclosed |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance
None. The company has provided no public guidance since the November 2022 restart plan, which was abandoned. There is no consensus.
Bull-case arguments (low probability)
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Brazilian iron-ore monetisation: The PST agreement carries US$4m of gross consideration (about A$6m). If completed with manageable Brazilian tax leakage, it could leave residual cash in a shell with no operations, potentially exceeding net parent-level liabilities.
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Shell optionality: A registered public company with a large historical register and possibly retained tax attributes could attract a reverse-takeover or recapitalisation sponsor. The 1 December 2025 reversal of ASIC strike-off and the 22 May 2026 officer change suggest someone is maintaining the entity.
-
Ring-fencing of Guyanese liabilities: The royalty arrears (GY$2.6bn) and TRGI creditor claims sit primarily with TRGI, which is in administration. If the parent is not held liable, its residual position could be cleaner than the headlines imply.
Bear-case arguments (high probability)
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Core asset permanently lost: The Government of Guyana cancelled the Mineral Agreement, seized the site, licensed 112 small miners on the concession and is assessing five third-party operator proposals. There is no path back to Karouni value for Troy.
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Direct parent exposure: Troy Resources Limited was a named party to the cancelled Mineral Agreement, and the Guyana AG is pursuing recovery. Equity sat at -A$17.1m even before the 2021–2023 losses, and accumulated losses were A$444.9m against A$384.5m of contributed capital.
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Equity holders rank last: Any residual value (PST proceeds, cash) is subject to Brazilian tax, administration costs, legacy creditors and claims. deListed Australia assesses the securities as having little or no value, and there is no trading venue.
Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
| Monitorable | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| ASIC filings and officer changes (follow-up to the 22 May 2026 notice) | Signals intent: revival, sale of the shell, or wind-up |
| Completion or termination of the PST iron-ore lease and assignment | The only identified monetisable asset |
| Guyana AG court proceedings on royalties | Scale of parent-level exposure |
| Selection of a new Karouni operator by the Government of Guyana | Confirms permanent value transfer away from Troy |
| Any members' voluntary liquidation, creditors' voluntary liquidation, or renewed ASIC strike-off | Terminal event for equity |
| TRGI administration outcome | Recovery for AIMS, Exploservice and other creditors |
Analyst verdict
Troy Resources Limited is a cautionary case study in junior-miner fragility rather than an investable equity. Over FY2017–FY2021 the company reported cumulative net losses of about A$280m on cumulative revenue of about A$427m. It generated meaningful free cash flow in only two years (FY2018 and FY2019), and nearly all of that was absorbed by Investec debt service. Its last audited balance sheet, at 30 June 2021, showed negative equity of A$17.1m, A$27.1m of trade payables and a gold loan that was in default within three months.
The proximate causes were operational: grade reconciliation failures of up to 40% to 50%, three geotechnical incidents, two fatalities, a store fire and COVID-19 disruption. The root cause was strategic. Troy was a single-asset producer with a reserve life measured in months, and it never built the balance-sheet buffer needed to bridge from depleting open pits to the Smarts Underground. That underground reserve (89,400 oz at 2.6 g/t, about US$10m of initial capex) was modest in absolute terms, but the company had no capacity to fund it.
The 2022 recapitalisation converted creditors into owners but drew only A$9.2m from the A$37.4m entitlement. That shortfall was a market verdict that reinstatement could not overturn. TRGI's administration (June 2023), ASX removal (September 2023) and Guyana's licence cancellation (October 2023) closed the operating story permanently.
What remains is a registered but dormant Australian shell. Its only identified asset is a contingent US$4m Brazilian iron-ore lease, exposed to Brazilian tax, and it faces potential sovereign claims tied to roughly GY$2.6bn of unpaid royalties.
For ordinary shareholders, the rational course is to treat the holding as worthless and crystallise the capital loss. For special-situations or shell investors, the only conceivable angle is a clean-shell transaction, and none has been disclosed. Verdict: no investment case. Equity value is effectively nil, with residual legal and tax tail risk.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Title | Tenure | Prior roles / education |
|---|---|---|---|
Peter A. Stern | Non-Executive Chairman | Director since 16 June 2017 | B.Sc. (Hons), FAICD. Principal of Metropolis Corporate Advisory Services (since 2000). Previously in corporate finance at Macquarie Bank, UBS and Deutsche Bank. Director of Anglo Australian Resources NL. |
Richard L. Beazley | Managing Director and CEO (interim from 21 Sep 2021; Business News records the CEO/MD role from 18 Jan 2023) | NED from 3 October 2018 | B.Eng. (Mining), MBA, AusIMM, MAICD. Over 30 years of experience. Former Interim COO of Sandfire Resources, MD of Peak Resources, GM Operations at Consolidated Minerals, GM Southern Cross Operations at St Barbara. Director of Altair Mining Consultancy. Since then: NED of Nova Minerals and Non-Executive Chair of MetalsGrove Mining (Aug 2024). |
Andrew Barclay | Non-Executive Director; Company Secretary from 2022 | From 10 December 2020 | B.Econ., LLB (Hons). Former partner of Mallesons Stephen Jaques (King & Wood Mallesons). Chairman of Decmil Group. |
Rebecca Broughton | CFO and Company Secretary (part-time) | 4 January 2021 to 2022 | B.Com. Chartered Accountant with over 20 years of experience; began at EY. CFO of Flinders Mines and Barton Gold. |
Executive Leadership Team — Ken K. Nilsson
| Name | Role | Period |
|---|---|---|
Ken K. Nilsson | MD / CEO | Joined 1997; MD 1998–2006; Executive Director Operations from 2006; MD again from June 2017 until his death on 19/20 Sep 2021. The AR gives both dates. |
John L.C. Jones AM | NED (long-time chairman) | 27 Jul 1988 – 10 Dec 2020 |
Martin Purvis | MD / CEO | 1 Sep 2014 – 31 May 2017 |
Paul Benson | MD / CEO | 13 Sep 2010 – 31 Jul 2014 (led Karouni development financing) |
Fred Grimwade | Executive Chairman | 27 Nov 2010 – 16 Jun 2017 |
David Dix | NED Chairman / Deputy CEO | 2010 – 1 Feb 2016 |
Gerry Kaczmarek | CFO / Company Secretary | 4 Jul 2017 – 31 Dec 2019 |
Raymond Parry | CFO / Company Secretary | 6 Jan 2020 – 31 Dec 2020 |
Stacey Apostolou | CFO / Company Secretary | 30 Nov 2016 – May 2017 |
David Sadgrove | CFO | 1 Oct 2008 – 30 Nov 2016 |
Executive Leadership Team — K. Nilsson
| Name | Role | Cash salary and fees | Superannuation | Share-based payments | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
K. Nilsson | MD / CEO | 465,774 | 0 | 106,291 | 584,384 (includes 12,319 long service leave) |
P. Stern | Chairman | 132,300 | 12,569 | 44,522 | 189,391 |
R. Beazley | NED | 72,000 | 6,840 | 26,714 | 105,554 |
A. Barclay | NED (from Dec 2020) | 93,352 (includes A$53,000 of legal services) | 3,833 | 0 | 97,185 |
J. Jones | NED (to Dec 2020) | 31,978 | 3,038 | 0 | 35,016 |
R. Parry | CFO (to Dec 2020) | 147,700 | 13,150 | 0 | 163,248 |
R. Broughton | CFO (from Jan 2021) | 46,216 | 4,117 | 6,759 | 57,839 |
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Shares | Voting power |
|---|---|---|
M&G plc | 128,150,577 | 14.99% |
Ruffer LLP | 67,377,163 | 8.29% |
Major Shareholders — HSBC Custody Nominees
| Holder | % |
|---|---|
HSBC Custody Nominees | 34.52 |
BNP Paribas Nominees (Clearstream) | 6.75 |
J. Thomas & I. Ponniah Super Fund | 3.16 |
Citicorp Nominees | 3.05 |
BNP Paribas Nominees (DRP) | 2.28 |
Exploservice Guyana Inc. | 1.90 |
Staltari Investments | 1.29 |
ACK Pty Ltd | 1.27 |
BNP Paribas (IB AU Noms) | 1.17 |
RiverFort Global Opportunities | 1.06 |
Competitive Landscape
Key Competitors
| Competitor | Segment / overlap | Relative positioning vs Troy |
|---|---|---|
Zijin Mining Group (Aurora mine, via 2020 acquisition of Guyana Goldfields) | Guyana gold production | Larger operator in the same jurisdiction, with major-company balance sheet backing |
G Mining Ventures (Oko West project, after acquiring Reunion Gold in 2024) | Guyana gold development | Large-scale development; strong capital access |
Reunion Gold (former, absorbed into G Mining) | Guyana exploration | Discovered Oko West; outcompeted Troy for capital |
Omai Gold Mines | Guyana redevelopment (historic Omai mine) | Exploration and development peer |
Goldsource Mines | Guyana (Eagle Mountain) | Junior peer |
Guyana Goldstrike | Guyana exploration | Junior peer |
Barrick Gold | Guyana / Guiana Shield exploration | Former partner; global major |
Austral Gold | Argentina (acquired Troy's Casposo) | Successor owner of a Troy asset |
ASX-listed small gold producers (sector peers) | Capital-markets peer group | Competed for the same Australian equity capital |
Guyanese small and medium-scale miners | Same Karouni district (now 112 permit holders) | Current occupants of the former Troy concession |
Recent Developments
The first four entries fall inside the 18-month window.



