TTA Holdings Limited Overview
TTA Holdings Limited was a Melbourne-based listed holding company whose only operating asset was TEAC Australia Pty Ltd. TEAC Australia was the Australian licensee and distributor of TEAC-branded consumer audio-visual electronics. Through the 2000s and early 2010s it was a recognisable second-tier TV and audio brand sold through JB Hi-Fi, Harvey Norman, The Good Guys and Betta, and it sponsored V8 Supercars motor racing. Price competition from Korean and Chinese brands and retailer house brands eroded the business, as did the financial distress of its Singapore parent, TT International. Revenue fell from about A$13m in FY2019 to about A$1m by FY2023–FY2024. In July 2022 the company pivoted from wholesale to direct-to-consumer e-commerce. The pivot did not restore viability. The subsidiary resolved to wind up in early 2024, the shares were suspended in April 2024, and ASX delisted the company in July 2025 for failing to lodge periodic reports. Today it is effectively a dormant, controlled shell.
Company's own description (latest primary filing)
In the FY2023 Appendix 4E, lodged 31 May 2023, the company described its principal activity as trading via e-commerce. It sold to retail consumers through the TEAC Store website and various e-commerce platforms, and it stated that the new business model took effect on 1 July 2022. Its segment note describes a single segment: distribution of electronic consumer goods in the Australian market.
The 1H FY2022 interim report, for the period ended 30 September 2021, said TEAC had introduced a "premium TEAC QLED 4K UHD Smart television and Smart Android DVD combo LED". Data-provider descriptions add three further product groups:
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12V LED televisions for the caravan market, with DVB-S satellite tuners and Bluetooth.
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Audio products: soundbars, turntables, earbuds, headphones and Bluetooth speakers.
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Accessories: CD/radio units, clock radios, set-top boxes, USB conference microphones and wireless chargers.
Business model and revenue model
| Dimension | Characterisation |
|---|---|
| Revenue model | About 100% product sales. There was no subscription, service or licensing revenue. Finance income was A$122k in FY2023, interest on cash and related-party balances. |
| Brand economics | TEAC Australia used the TEAC brand under arrangement within the TT International group. The licence terms (royalty, territory, duration) are not publicly disclosed. |
| Sourcing | Finished goods came from Asian OEM/ODM manufacturers, partly bought alongside or on behalf of TTI affiliate Akira Corporation (ChannelNews, 2018). |
| Channel, to FY2022 | Wholesale to national CE and appliance retailers: Harvey Norman, JB Hi-Fi, The Good Guys and Betta (ChannelNews). |
| Channel, from 1 Jul 2022 | Direct-to-consumer through the TEAC Store website and third-party online marketplaces. The specific marketplaces were not named in the filings retrieved. Technical and customer service were outsourced. |
| Value-chain position | Brand licensee, importer and distributor. No manufacturing and no R&D. |
| Customers | Before FY2023: Australian national retailers. After the pivot: Australian retail consumers. |
| End markets | Australian consumer electronics: entry-level TVs, compact TVs for caravans and RVs, personal and home audio, small accessories. |
Independent characterisation
TTA was a sub-scale, licensed-brand importer in a commoditised category. It had no pricing power, little buying scale, and a parent that was itself under a creditor scheme of arrangement from 2010. The 2022 move to e-commerce was a cost-cutting retreat rather than a growth strategy. In FY2023, revenue fell 64.8% to A$1.05m while inventory rose from A$0.37m to A$1.32m and cash fell from A$1.99m to A$0.23m. The quarter to March 2024 showed sales of only A$226.9k. By then the board had concluded the business was unviable.
Strategy
Stated strategy (themes from latest filings)
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"Shift of business activity from traditional wholesale trading to E-commerce", effective 1 July 2022 (Appendix 4E FY2023).
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Cost rationalisation: outsourcing technical and customer service functions and rationalising administration (Appendix 4E FY2023).
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Digital marketing investment: "ongoing upgrades and the enhancement of the E-commerce system", with products marketed on multiple online platforms (Appendix 4E FY2023).
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Management expectation (FY2023): the challenges of the first year of e-commerce would be "handled much better in the following year". This was not achieved.
Initiatives in the last 24 months (Oct 2024–Oct 2026) and the period just before
| Initiative | Date | Target / outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Wind-up of TEAC Australia and end of e-commerce | Resolution at general meeting, Q4 FY2024 | Effectively ended operations |
| Interim CEO appointment | 8 Aug 2024 | Caretaker leadership |
| Board reduction (director retirement) | 31 Oct 2024 | — |
| No relisting, recapitalisation or new business announced | 2025–2026 | Delisted 9 Jul 2025 |
There are no ESG commitments, investor-day targets or medium-term financial guidance in the public record.
Products & Services
All products sat in the single segment and were sold under the TEAC brand. Model numbers, specifications and prices were not disclosed in ASX filings. Where noted, the product groups below come from company descriptions as reproduced by data providers (Simply Wall St, Pearler/Morningstar).
Flagship offering (latest): the TEAC QLED 4K UHD Smart TV, based on the 1H FY2022 interim report.
Distinction: these were TEAC-brand products of TEAC Australia under the TTI group. The professional and hi-fi products of Japan's TEAC Corporation and TASCAM were not part of TTA's portfolio.
Product Portfolio
| Product line | Description / capabilities (as disclosed) | Target customer | Launch / latest year | Pricing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
TEAC QLED 4K UHD Smart TV | Premium QLED panel, 4K UHD resolution, smart platform; described as "innovative premium" | Value-seeking mainstream households | Introduced 1H FY2022 (Apr–Sep 2021) | — |
Smart Android DVD Combo LED TV | LED TV with integrated DVD player and Android smart OS | Secondary rooms, older demographics, caravans | 1H FY2022 | — |
12V LED TVs (caravan/RV) | 12-volt operation, DVB-S satellite connectivity, wide viewing angle, Bluetooth | Caravan and RV owners, a niche where TEAC had relevance | Disclosed FY2022–FY2023 | — |
20" DVD Combo TV and 32" HD TV | Compact entry-level TVs kept after the 2016 large-screen exit | Budget buyers | Range as of ~2016–2017 | — |
Soundbars | Home-theatre audio | Mainstream households | Ongoing to FY2024 | — |
Turntables | Vinyl playback, typically Bluetooth / all-in-one | Lifestyle audio buyers | Ongoing | — |
Earbuds and headphones | Personal audio | Consumers | Ongoing | — |
Bluetooth speakers | Portable audio | Consumers | Ongoing | — |
Portable radio / CD players | CD/radio units, including digital radio (per 2017 ChannelNews description) | Older demographics, kitchens/bedrooms | Ongoing | — |
Bluetooth clock radios | Bedside audio | Consumers | Ongoing | — |
Set-top boxes | Free-to-air digital receivers | Consumers, caravans | Ongoing | — |
USB conference microphones | PC / remote-work peripheral | Home office | FY2022-era addition | — |
Wireless chargers | Phone accessory | Consumers | FY2022-era addition | — |
DVD players | Disc playback | Budget buyers | Range as of ~2017 | — |
Services | Outsourced technical and customer support from FY2023. No paid service revenue. | — | — | Not applicable |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Financial Narrative
Sources and basis.
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FY2022 and FY2023: ASX Appendix 4E FY2023 (primary, pre-audit).
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FY2019–FY2021: Kalkine aggregated annual statements (secondary).
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FY2024: Simply Wall St and Kalkine headline figures (secondary).
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All figures in A$k. Blank cells mean not publicly disclosed or not verifiable.
Income statement
Notes:
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FY2022 and FY2023 cost of revenue is "changes in inventories" plus "raw materials and consumables used" as reported. In FY2023 that is A$947,980 + A$375,459. In FY2022 it is −A$1,501,841 + A$4,931,199. This matches Kalkine's cost of revenue (A$1.32m and A$3.43m).
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FY2020 cost of revenue and gross profit are from Kalkine.
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FY2024 cost of revenue (about A$1.7m), gross profit (−A$608.4k), net loss (about −A$1.5m) and EPS (about −1.1c) are from Simply Wall St. EBITDA of −A$1.537m is from Kalkine.
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EBITDA and EBIT are analyst-derived for FY2022–FY2023: pre-tax loss with finance items, depreciation and amortisation added back.
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FY2022 net loss: the Appendix 4E shows A$1,783,705, while Kalkine shows A$1,797,240. The table uses the primary figure.
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FY2019 for reference (Kalkine): revenue A$12.96m, cost of revenue A$12.33m, pre-tax loss A$3.03m, net loss A$3.50m.
Margins and growth
Revenue CAGR:
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FY2019→FY2024 (5 years): A$12.96m → about A$1.07m, roughly −39% per year.
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FY2020→FY2024 (4 years): about −26% per year.
Commentary.
Collapse in revenue: The top line fell by more than 90% over five years. The decline came in three phases:
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Retailer delistings and the exit from large TVs, a hangover from 2016–2018.
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A brief FY2021 rebound to A$7.6m, plausibly helped by COVID-era home-electronics demand. That driver is inference, not company-stated.
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A deliberate end to wholesale on 1 July 2022, which cut FY2023 revenue to A$1.05m.
Negative gross margins: From FY2022 onward the company sold below landed cost, consistent with liquidating aged stock. FY2023 is distorted further by a build-up of inventory into the e-commerce launch: the inventory change was +A$0.95m. The FY2024 gross margin of about −57% is consistent with clearance pricing before the wind-up.
Cost-cutting: Employee costs fell 60% in FY2023 to A$315k after outsourcing, but the fixed-cost base still could not be covered. Marketing rose with the e-commerce rollout and is reported inside other expenses (A$651k vs A$473k).
Related-party leakage: Recurring impairments of related-party receivables (A$78k in FY2022, A$82k in FY2023) and the 2018 provision of A$1.848m against TTI affiliate Akira show value moving to, or being lost through, the parent group.
Balance sheet
Notes:
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Source: Appendix 4E FY2023.
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Total liabilities: the Appendix 4E prints A$690,678 (FY2023) and A$687,652 (FY2022) on the total-liabilities line. The component lines sum to A$727,865 for FY2023. That is an internal inconsistency in the filing, and the table uses the component sum.
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The equity reconciliation in the filing also misprints FY2023 closing equity as "(1,083,261)", which is shown as positive in the balance sheet.
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FY2020, FY2021 and FY2024 balance sheets are not publicly disclosed in verifiable form. Kalkine shows only FY2024 current deferred revenue of nil. The 2018 ChannelNews report put equity at "over A$9m" around FY2018.
Cash flow
Quarterly data point: the March 2024 quarter saw net cash outflow of about A$80k on sales of A$226.9k (TipRanks summary of the Appendix 4C). FY2024 annual cash flow is not publicly disclosed in verifiable form.
Ratios (analyst-computed from Appendix 4E FY2023)
Notes:
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FY2022 ROE uses FY2021 opening equity of A$4,120,531 from the statement of changes in equity.
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ROIC is taken as NOPAT (EBIT, nil tax) divided by average equity plus leases less cash. It is shown for FY2023 only and is not meaningful at this scale.
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Net debt/EBITDA is not meaningful because the company was net cash with negative EBITDA.
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The cash conversion cycle is not computable: there is no FY2022 opening data and payables mix trade and other items.
Ratio commentary. Liquidity ratios look adequate in isolation: the current ratio was 2.45x in FY2023. That is misleading, because 75% of FY2023 current assets were inventory selling at a negative gross margin. Cash cover was only about 0.13 years of the FY2023 operating burn. The ROE trajectory and the 365-day inventory cover in FY2023 together explain the board's 2024 decision to wind up the subsidiary.
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View Subscription PlansFinancial Detail
Income Statement and Per-Share Data
| Metric | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (AUD K) | 3,530 | 7,610 | 2,983 | 1,049 | 1,070 |
Cost of revenue (AUD K) | 4,210 | 6,560 | 3,429 | 1,323 | 1,700 |
Gross profit (AUD K) | -680 | 1,050 | -447 | -274 | -608 |
Employee benefits expense (AUD K) | — | — | 782 | 315 | — |
Other expenses (AUD K) | — | — | 473 | 651 | — |
Depreciation and amortisation (AUD K) | — | — | 97 | 57 | — |
Impairment of related-party receivable (AUD K) | — | — | 78 | 82 | — |
EBITDA (AUD K) | — | — | -1,789 | -1,319 | -1,537 |
Operating income / EBIT (AUD K) | — | — | -1,886 | -1,376 | — |
Finance income (AUD K) | — | — | 116 | 122 | — |
Finance costs (AUD K) | — | — | 14 | 0.4 | — |
Pre-tax income (AUD K) | -2,680 | — | -1,784 | -1,254 | — |
Net income (AUD K) | -2,897 | -694 | -1,784 | -1,254 | -1,500 |
EPS basic (A cents) | — | — | -1.30 | -0.91 | -1.10 |
EPS diluted (A cents) | — | — | -1.30 | -0.91 | -1.10 |
Dividends per share (A cents) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Margin Analysis (%)
| Metric | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Gross margin (%) | -19.3 | 13.8 | -15.0 | -26.2 | -56.8 |
EBITDA margin (%) | — | — | -60.0 | -125.7 | -143.6 |
Operating margin (%) | — | — | -63.2 | -131.2 | — |
Net margin (%) | -82.1 | -9.1 | -59.8 | -119.5 | -140.2 |
Revenue growth YoY (%) | -72.8 | 115.6 | -60.8 | -64.8 | 2.0 |
Balance Sheet and Per-Share Data
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|
Total assets (AUD K) | 3,024 | 1,811 |
Cash and equivalents (AUD K) | 1,993 | 225 |
Trade and other receivables (AUD K) | 169 | 182 |
Inventories (AUD K) | 375 | 1,323 |
Total current assets (AUD K) | 2,863 | 1,766 |
Total current liabilities (AUD K) | 627 | 720 |
Short-term debt: lease liabilities, current (AUD K) | 70 | 29 |
Long-term debt: lease liabilities, non-current (AUD K) | 61 | 7 |
Total debt, leases only (AUD K) | 131 | 36 |
Net debt; negative = net cash (AUD K) | -1,862 | -189 |
Total liabilities (AUD K) | 688 | 728 |
Total equity (AUD K) | 2,337 | 1,083 |
Issued capital (AUD K) | 6,485 | 6,485 |
Accumulated losses (AUD K) | -4,148 | -5,401 |
Goodwill and intangibles (AUD K) | 0 | 0 |
Working capital (AUD K) | 2,237 | 1,046 |
NTA per share (A cents) | 1.6 | 0.8 |
Cash Flow
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|
Operating cash flow (AUD K) | 442 | -1,728 |
Capital expenditure (AUD K) | 80 | 40 |
Free cash flow (AUD K) | 362 | -1,768 |
Dividends paid (AUD K) | 0 | 0 |
Share buybacks (AUD K) | 0 | 0 |
Debt repayment (AUD K) | 6 | 0 |
Net change in cash (AUD K) | 357 | -1,768 |
Returns & Leverage Ratios (%) and Financial Ratios (x)
| Ratio | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|
ROE on average equity (%) | -56.1 | -73.3 |
ROA on average assets (%) | — | -51.9 |
ROIC (%) | — | -73.6 |
Current ratio (x) | 4.57 | 2.45 |
Debt / equity, leases (x) | 0.06 | 0.03 |
Interest coverage, EBIT / finance costs (x) | -139 | -3,185 |
Asset turnover (x) | — | 0.43 |
Inventory days on cost of revenue (days) | 40 | 365 |
Revenue by Region
| Region | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
Australia revenue (AUD K) | 7,610 | 2,983 | 1,049 |
Rest of world revenue (AUD K) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Valuation Snapshot
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
Last traded price | A$0.003 | Kalkine (last update 16 Jan 2025); InvestSMART |
52-week range before suspension | A$0.002–A$0.01 | Kalkine |
Market cap at delisting | A$412.3k | Simply Wall St; TipRanks |
1-year return (Stockopedia) | −81.25%; underperformed All Ordinaries by 82.87 pts | Stockopedia |
1-year return (Simply Wall St) | −80% | Simply Wall St |
5-year average annual change | −14% to −17.7% (sources differ) | Pearler (two page versions) |
10-year price change | about −85% to −90% | Pearler |
3-year return | Not publicly disclosed in verifiable form | — |
P/E | Not meaningful (losses) | — |
EV/EBITDA | Not meaningful (negative EBITDA) | — |
| — | about 0.4 | Computed |
P/B (A$412k vs FY2023 equity A$1,083k) | about 0.38 | Computed (stale book) |
Analyst consensus | None. Market Index states no major broker coverage. | Market Index |
Margin Analysis (%) (FY2011–FY2023)
| Metric | FY2011 | FY2012 | FY2013 | FY2022 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Final dividend per share (A cents, 100% franked) | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 |
Capital Markets
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
Credit ratings (Moody's / S&P / Fitch) | Not rated |
Debt maturity profile | No borrowings. Lease liabilities of A$36k at FY2023 (A$29k current, A$7k non-current). |
Shares on issue | About 137.4m (implied by FY2023 EPS of −0.91c on a A$1.254m loss) |
Analyst Conclusions
Guidance and consensus
Management guidance: none current. The last forward-looking statement, in FY2023, expected e-commerce challenges to be "handled much better in the following year". That was overtaken by the 2024 decision to wind up the subsidiary.
Consensus: none. There is no broker coverage.
Bull case (low probability)
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Shell / backdoor-listing value. The roughly 137m-share entity with an Australian ACN and a shareholder base resembles the vehicle Jingyi Group and TST Partners sought in 2017. A reverse takeover could revive value, although relisting would require full ASX re-admission.
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Recovery of related-party balances. If TTI's scheme creditors allow repayment of intercompany amounts, provisions (A$1.848m in 2018, plus later impairments) could be reversed and returned to holders.
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Brand monetisation. Industry interest in TEAC rights in Australia (ChannelNews) suggests the licence, if controlled within the group, has residual value. Inventory realisation from the A$1.32m FY2023 balance could add a small cash recovery.
Bear case (base case)
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Operations have ceased. The wind-up of TEAC Australia leaves TTA as a holding company with no trading business.
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No exit liquidity. After the 9 Jul 2025 delisting, minority holders (about 14.5%) can only sell off-market. The controlling holder has no evident incentive to buy them out at a premium.
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Equity erosion. Equity was A$1.08m at FY2023. With losses of about A$1.5m in FY2024 and negative gross margins, book value may now be near zero or negative. That cannot be verified because audited FY2024 accounts were not lodged.
Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
| Monitorable | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| ASIC registry status of TTA Holdings and TEAC Australia (liquidation, deregistration) | Determines whether any residual distribution occurs |
| Any lodgement of overdue FY2024 / FY2025 audited accounts with ASIC | Reveals true equity position |
| TT International SGX disclosures on its Australian subsidiaries | The parent may disclose write-offs, disposals or restructuring |
| Off-market takeover or compulsory acquisition by TTI | Possible exit route for minorities |
| Use of the shell for a reverse takeover | The only plausible value catalyst |
Analyst verdict
TTA Holdings is not an investable equity. It is a post-mortem case study in how a licensed-brand consumer electronics distributor fails in a market dominated by vertically integrated global brands and retailer private labels.
The financial record is unambiguous. Revenue fell from A$12.96m in FY2019 to about A$1m by FY2023–FY2024. Gross margins turned negative from FY2022. Cash fell 89% in a single year, FY2023. Management cut staff costs 60% and moved to direct-to-consumer e-commerce in July 2022. Even so, the business could not cover its fixed costs, and the board resolved in early 2024 to wind up the only operating subsidiary.
Governance compounds the economic failure. TTA was 85.5%-controlled by TT International, a parent under a Singapore creditor scheme since 2010 and suspended on SGX since 2017. Its board was dominated by parent-group executives. The record includes related-party loans, provisions against those loans, and a 2017 transfer of freehold property to the parent. Finally, the company did not lodge its periodic reports, and ASX removed it from the Official List on 9 July 2025.
For the roughly 14.5% minority, the economic interest is effectively illiquid and of uncertain, probably minimal, value. The last verified equity was A$1.08m at March 2023, before a further loss of about A$1.5m in FY2024. The only theoretical routes to value are a shell transaction, a buy-out by the controller, or recovery of related-party receivables. None has been announced, and none appears likely given the parent's own constraints.
Classification: Delisted / dormant controlled shell — no rating applicable. Stakeholders should monitor ASIC registry events and TT International's SGX disclosures, which are now the only public windows into the entity. Any figure beyond FY2023 should be treated as provisional until audited accounts appear.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Board of Directors
| Name | Role | Tenure | Background (as disclosed) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Sng Hiang | Non-Executive Chairman, Non-Executive Director | Since May 2008 | Director of other TTI group companies; Chairman of the TTI Executive Committee, responsible for group policy and strategy; 38+ years trading electrical and electronics products in emerging markets | Market Index director profile |
Julia Pi | Non-Executive Director | Since May 2008 | 37+ years trading consumer products in emerging markets; runs TTI group administration, corporate planning and new business development. Direct holding of 51,288,385 shares as last noticed (31 Mar 2023). This figure looks inconsistent with TTI's 117.5m stake out of about 137.4m shares and could not be reconciled. | Market Index director profile |
Ahamad Bin Abdullah | Executive Director and (Interim) Chief Executive Officer | Signed the FY2023 Appendix 4E as CEO (31 May 2023); recorded as Executive Director / Interim CEO from 8 Aug 2024 | Prior roles and education not publicly disclosed | Appendix 4E FY2023; Business News WA |
Jason Zhang | Non-Executive Director | Resigned 15 Nov 2023 | — | Simply Wall St (ASX notice) |
Unnamed director | Director | Retirement announced 31 Oct 2024 | — | HotCopper / ASX |
CFO / Company Secretary | — | — | Not publicly disclosed in sources retrieved | — |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Shares | % | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
TT International Limited | 117,500,000 | 85.5 (88.5 per Market Index display) | Market Index; ChannelNews |
G & E Holdings Pty Ltd (G & E Murphy Super Fund A/C) | 200,000 | 0.15 | Market Index |
Other top-10 holders | Not publicly disclosed in sources retrieved | — | — |
Institutional ownership | None identified | ~0 | — |
Insider ownership | Sng Hiang's indirect interest, through TTI, of 120,000,000 shares at the 2008 notice | — | Market Index |
Competitive Landscape
Key Competitors
| Competitor | Segment overlap | Revenue (latest public) | Positioning vs TTA |
|---|---|---|---|
Samsung Electronics | TVs, audio | Global; Australian revenue not separately disclosed here | Premium/mainstream leader; overwhelming scale |
LG Electronics | TVs, soundbars | Global | Mainstream leader |
Hisense | Value TVs | Global | Took over TEAC's "value TV" space |
TCL | Value TVs | Global | Aggressive value pricing |
Sony | TVs, audio | Global | Premium |
Kogan.com (ASX: KGN) | Private-label TVs, audio, online DTC | — | Direct DTC rival; far larger online reach |
Retailer house brands (e.g. JB Hi-Fi, Harvey Norman labels) | Entry-level AV | — | Displaced TEAC on shelf |
Tempo (Australian distributor; brands such as Akai, Bauhn supply) | Licensed-brand distribution | Private, not publicly disclosed | Like-for-like licensed-brand model |
Laser Corporation | Value electronics and accessories | Private, not publicly disclosed | Like-for-like value accessories |
Majority, Bush, Polaroid-brand distributors | Small audio, radios | Private | Value audio |
Caravan-specialist TV brands (e.g. Majestic) | 12V TVs | Private | Niche rival in caravan TVs |
“—” = not publicly disclosed.
Peer Comparison FY2023
| Company | Latest revenue | Revenue growth | Gross margin | R&D intensity | Source note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
TTA Holdings (FY2023) | A$1.05m | −64.8% | −26.2% | 0% | Appendix 4E FY2023 |
Samsung / LG / Hisense | Multi-billion USD group revenue | — | — | Material (>5% at group level) | — |
Recent Developments
The 18-month window contains very few events because the company was suspended and then delisted. Earlier entries are included for context. Twenty-five material entries do not exist in the public record.



