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TTA Holdings Limited

Company Profile Analysis

Ticker: TTA.AX

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Year Founded & Workforce

2004

54 Employees

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TTA Holdings Limited Overview

TTA Holdings Limited was a Melbourne-based listed holding company whose only operating asset was TEAC Australia Pty Ltd. TEAC Australia was the Australian licensee and distributor of TEAC-branded consumer audio-visual electronics. Through the 2000s and early 2010s it was a recognisable second-tier TV and audio brand sold through JB Hi-Fi, Harvey Norman, The Good Guys and Betta, and it sponsored V8 Supercars motor racing. Price competition from Korean and Chinese brands and retailer house brands eroded the business, as did the financial distress of its Singapore parent, TT International. Revenue fell from about A$13m in FY2019 to about A$1m by FY2023–FY2024. In July 2022 the company pivoted from wholesale to direct-to-consumer e-commerce. The pivot did not restore viability. The subsidiary resolved to wind up in early 2024, the shares were suspended in April 2024, and ASX delisted the company in July 2025 for failing to lodge periodic reports. Today it is effectively a dormant, controlled shell.


Company's own description (latest primary filing)

In the FY2023 Appendix 4E, lodged 31 May 2023, the company described its principal activity as trading via e-commerce. It sold to retail consumers through the TEAC Store website and various e-commerce platforms, and it stated that the new business model took effect on 1 July 2022. Its segment note describes a single segment: distribution of electronic consumer goods in the Australian market.

The 1H FY2022 interim report, for the period ended 30 September 2021, said TEAC had introduced a "premium TEAC QLED 4K UHD Smart television and Smart Android DVD combo LED". Data-provider descriptions add three further product groups:

  • 12V LED televisions for the caravan market, with DVB-S satellite tuners and Bluetooth.

  • Audio products: soundbars, turntables, earbuds, headphones and Bluetooth speakers.

  • Accessories: CD/radio units, clock radios, set-top boxes, USB conference microphones and wireless chargers.

Business model and revenue model

DimensionCharacterisation
Revenue modelAbout 100% product sales. There was no subscription, service or licensing revenue. Finance income was A$122k in FY2023, interest on cash and related-party balances.
Brand economicsTEAC Australia used the TEAC brand under arrangement within the TT International group. The licence terms (royalty, territory, duration) are not publicly disclosed.
SourcingFinished goods came from Asian OEM/ODM manufacturers, partly bought alongside or on behalf of TTI affiliate Akira Corporation (ChannelNews, 2018).
Channel, to FY2022Wholesale to national CE and appliance retailers: Harvey Norman, JB Hi-Fi, The Good Guys and Betta (ChannelNews).
Channel, from 1 Jul 2022Direct-to-consumer through the TEAC Store website and third-party online marketplaces. The specific marketplaces were not named in the filings retrieved. Technical and customer service were outsourced.
Value-chain positionBrand licensee, importer and distributor. No manufacturing and no R&D.
CustomersBefore FY2023: Australian national retailers. After the pivot: Australian retail consumers.
End marketsAustralian consumer electronics: entry-level TVs, compact TVs for caravans and RVs, personal and home audio, small accessories.

Independent characterisation

TTA was a sub-scale, licensed-brand importer in a commoditised category. It had no pricing power, little buying scale, and a parent that was itself under a creditor scheme of arrangement from 2010. The 2022 move to e-commerce was a cost-cutting retreat rather than a growth strategy. In FY2023, revenue fell 64.8% to A$1.05m while inventory rose from A$0.37m to A$1.32m and cash fell from A$1.99m to A$0.23m. The quarter to March 2024 showed sales of only A$226.9k. By then the board had concluded the business was unviable.

Strategy

Stated strategy (themes from latest filings)

  1. "Shift of business activity from traditional wholesale trading to E-commerce", effective 1 July 2022 (Appendix 4E FY2023).

  2. Cost rationalisation: outsourcing technical and customer service functions and rationalising administration (Appendix 4E FY2023).

  3. Digital marketing investment: "ongoing upgrades and the enhancement of the E-commerce system", with products marketed on multiple online platforms (Appendix 4E FY2023).

  4. Management expectation (FY2023): the challenges of the first year of e-commerce would be "handled much better in the following year". This was not achieved.

Initiatives in the last 24 months (Oct 2024–Oct 2026) and the period just before

InitiativeDateTarget / outcome
Wind-up of TEAC Australia and end of e-commerceResolution at general meeting, Q4 FY2024Effectively ended operations
Interim CEO appointment8 Aug 2024Caretaker leadership
Board reduction (director retirement)31 Oct 2024—
No relisting, recapitalisation or new business announced2025–2026Delisted 9 Jul 2025

There are no ESG commitments, investor-day targets or medium-term financial guidance in the public record.

Products & Services

All products sat in the single segment and were sold under the TEAC brand. Model numbers, specifications and prices were not disclosed in ASX filings. Where noted, the product groups below come from company descriptions as reproduced by data providers (Simply Wall St, Pearler/Morningstar).

Flagship offering (latest): the TEAC QLED 4K UHD Smart TV, based on the 1H FY2022 interim report.

Distinction: these were TEAC-brand products of TEAC Australia under the TTI group. The professional and hi-fi products of Japan's TEAC Corporation and TASCAM were not part of TTA's portfolio.

Product Portfolio

Product lineDescription / capabilities (as disclosed)Target customerLaunch / latest yearPricing

TEAC QLED 4K UHD Smart TV

Premium QLED panel, 4K UHD resolution, smart platform; described as "innovative premium"

Value-seeking mainstream households

Introduced 1H FY2022 (Apr–Sep 2021)

—

Smart Android DVD Combo LED TV

LED TV with integrated DVD player and Android smart OS

Secondary rooms, older demographics, caravans

1H FY2022

—

12V LED TVs (caravan/RV)

12-volt operation, DVB-S satellite connectivity, wide viewing angle, Bluetooth

Caravan and RV owners, a niche where TEAC had relevance

Disclosed FY2022–FY2023

—

20" DVD Combo TV and 32" HD TV

Compact entry-level TVs kept after the 2016 large-screen exit

Budget buyers

Range as of ~2016–2017

—

Soundbars

Home-theatre audio

Mainstream households

Ongoing to FY2024

—

Turntables

Vinyl playback, typically Bluetooth / all-in-one

Lifestyle audio buyers

Ongoing

—

Earbuds and headphones

Personal audio

Consumers

Ongoing

—

Bluetooth speakers

Portable audio

Consumers

Ongoing

—

Portable radio / CD players

CD/radio units, including digital radio (per 2017 ChannelNews description)

Older demographics, kitchens/bedrooms

Ongoing

—

Bluetooth clock radios

Bedside audio

Consumers

Ongoing

—

Set-top boxes

Free-to-air digital receivers

Consumers, caravans

Ongoing

—

USB conference microphones

PC / remote-work peripheral

Home office

FY2022-era addition

—

Wireless chargers

Phone accessory

Consumers

FY2022-era addition

—

DVD players

Disc playback

Budget buyers

Range as of ~2017

—

Services

Outsourced technical and customer support from FY2023. No paid service revenue.

——

Not applicable

“—” = not publicly disclosed.

Financial Narrative

Sources and basis.

  • FY2022 and FY2023: ASX Appendix 4E FY2023 (primary, pre-audit).

  • FY2019–FY2021: Kalkine aggregated annual statements (secondary).

  • FY2024: Simply Wall St and Kalkine headline figures (secondary).

  • All figures in A$k. Blank cells mean not publicly disclosed or not verifiable.

Income statement

Notes:

  1. FY2022 and FY2023 cost of revenue is "changes in inventories" plus "raw materials and consumables used" as reported. In FY2023 that is A$947,980 + A$375,459. In FY2022 it is −A$1,501,841 + A$4,931,199. This matches Kalkine's cost of revenue (A$1.32m and A$3.43m).

  2. FY2020 cost of revenue and gross profit are from Kalkine.

  3. FY2024 cost of revenue (about A$1.7m), gross profit (−A$608.4k), net loss (about −A$1.5m) and EPS (about −1.1c) are from Simply Wall St. EBITDA of −A$1.537m is from Kalkine.

  4. EBITDA and EBIT are analyst-derived for FY2022–FY2023: pre-tax loss with finance items, depreciation and amortisation added back.

  5. FY2022 net loss: the Appendix 4E shows A$1,783,705, while Kalkine shows A$1,797,240. The table uses the primary figure.

  6. FY2019 for reference (Kalkine): revenue A$12.96m, cost of revenue A$12.33m, pre-tax loss A$3.03m, net loss A$3.50m.

Margins and growth

Revenue CAGR:

  • FY2019→FY2024 (5 years): A$12.96m → about A$1.07m, roughly −39% per year.

  • FY2020→FY2024 (4 years): about −26% per year.

Commentary.

Collapse in revenue: The top line fell by more than 90% over five years. The decline came in three phases:

  • Retailer delistings and the exit from large TVs, a hangover from 2016–2018.

  • A brief FY2021 rebound to A$7.6m, plausibly helped by COVID-era home-electronics demand. That driver is inference, not company-stated.

  • A deliberate end to wholesale on 1 July 2022, which cut FY2023 revenue to A$1.05m.

Negative gross margins: From FY2022 onward the company sold below landed cost, consistent with liquidating aged stock. FY2023 is distorted further by a build-up of inventory into the e-commerce launch: the inventory change was +A$0.95m. The FY2024 gross margin of about −57% is consistent with clearance pricing before the wind-up.

Cost-cutting: Employee costs fell 60% in FY2023 to A$315k after outsourcing, but the fixed-cost base still could not be covered. Marketing rose with the e-commerce rollout and is reported inside other expenses (A$651k vs A$473k).

Related-party leakage: Recurring impairments of related-party receivables (A$78k in FY2022, A$82k in FY2023) and the 2018 provision of A$1.848m against TTI affiliate Akira show value moving to, or being lost through, the parent group.

Balance sheet

Notes:

  • Source: Appendix 4E FY2023.

  • Total liabilities: the Appendix 4E prints A$690,678 (FY2023) and A$687,652 (FY2022) on the total-liabilities line. The component lines sum to A$727,865 for FY2023. That is an internal inconsistency in the filing, and the table uses the component sum.

  • The equity reconciliation in the filing also misprints FY2023 closing equity as "(1,083,261)", which is shown as positive in the balance sheet.

  • FY2020, FY2021 and FY2024 balance sheets are not publicly disclosed in verifiable form. Kalkine shows only FY2024 current deferred revenue of nil. The 2018 ChannelNews report put equity at "over A$9m" around FY2018.

Cash flow

Quarterly data point: the March 2024 quarter saw net cash outflow of about A$80k on sales of A$226.9k (TipRanks summary of the Appendix 4C). FY2024 annual cash flow is not publicly disclosed in verifiable form.

Ratios (analyst-computed from Appendix 4E FY2023)

Notes:

  • FY2022 ROE uses FY2021 opening equity of A$4,120,531 from the statement of changes in equity.

  • ROIC is taken as NOPAT (EBIT, nil tax) divided by average equity plus leases less cash. It is shown for FY2023 only and is not meaningful at this scale.

  • Net debt/EBITDA is not meaningful because the company was net cash with negative EBITDA.

  • The cash conversion cycle is not computable: there is no FY2022 opening data and payables mix trade and other items.

Ratio commentary. Liquidity ratios look adequate in isolation: the current ratio was 2.45x in FY2023. That is misleading, because 75% of FY2023 current assets were inventory selling at a negative gross margin. Cash cover was only about 0.13 years of the FY2023 operating burn. The ROE trajectory and the 365-day inventory cover in FY2023 together explain the board's 2024 decision to wind up the subsidiary.

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Financial Detail

Income Statement and Per-Share Data

MetricFY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024

Revenue (AUD K)

3,5307,6102,9831,0491,070

Cost of revenue (AUD K)

4,2106,5603,4291,3231,700

Gross profit (AUD K)

-6801,050-447-274-608

Employee benefits expense (AUD K)

——782315—

Other expenses (AUD K)

——473651—

Depreciation and amortisation (AUD K)

——9757—

Impairment of related-party receivable (AUD K)

——7882—

EBITDA (AUD K)

——-1,789-1,319-1,537

Operating income / EBIT (AUD K)

——-1,886-1,376—

Finance income (AUD K)

——116122—

Finance costs (AUD K)

——140.4—

Pre-tax income (AUD K)

-2,680—-1,784-1,254—

Net income (AUD K)

-2,897-694-1,784-1,254-1,500

EPS basic (A cents)

——-1.30-0.91-1.10

EPS diluted (A cents)

——-1.30-0.91-1.10

Dividends per share (A cents)

00000

Margin Analysis (%)

MetricFY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024

Gross margin (%)

-19.313.8-15.0-26.2-56.8

EBITDA margin (%)

——-60.0-125.7-143.6

Operating margin (%)

——-63.2-131.2—

Net margin (%)

-82.1-9.1-59.8-119.5-140.2

Revenue growth YoY (%)

-72.8115.6-60.8-64.82.0

Balance Sheet and Per-Share Data

MetricFY2022FY2023

Total assets (AUD K)

3,0241,811

Cash and equivalents (AUD K)

1,993225

Trade and other receivables (AUD K)

169182

Inventories (AUD K)

3751,323

Total current assets (AUD K)

2,8631,766

Total current liabilities (AUD K)

627720

Short-term debt: lease liabilities, current (AUD K)

7029

Long-term debt: lease liabilities, non-current (AUD K)

617

Total debt, leases only (AUD K)

13136

Net debt; negative = net cash (AUD K)

-1,862-189

Total liabilities (AUD K)

688728

Total equity (AUD K)

2,3371,083

Issued capital (AUD K)

6,4856,485

Accumulated losses (AUD K)

-4,148-5,401

Goodwill and intangibles (AUD K)

00

Working capital (AUD K)

2,2371,046

NTA per share (A cents)

1.60.8

Cash Flow

MetricFY2022FY2023

Operating cash flow (AUD K)

442-1,728

Capital expenditure (AUD K)

8040

Free cash flow (AUD K)

362-1,768

Dividends paid (AUD K)

00

Share buybacks (AUD K)

00

Debt repayment (AUD K)

60

Net change in cash (AUD K)

357-1,768

Returns & Leverage Ratios (%) and Financial Ratios (x)

RatioFY2022FY2023

ROE on average equity (%)

-56.1-73.3

ROA on average assets (%)

—-51.9

ROIC (%)

—-73.6

Current ratio (x)

4.572.45

Debt / equity, leases (x)

0.060.03

Interest coverage, EBIT / finance costs (x)

-139-3,185

Asset turnover (x)

—0.43

Inventory days on cost of revenue (days)

40365

Revenue by Region

RegionFY2021FY2022FY2023

Australia revenue (AUD K)

7,6102,9831,049

Rest of world revenue (AUD K)

000

Valuation Snapshot

MetricValueSource

Last traded price

A$0.003

Kalkine (last update 16 Jan 2025); InvestSMART

52-week range before suspension

A$0.002–A$0.01

Kalkine

Market cap at delisting

A$412.3k

Simply Wall St; TipRanks

1-year return (Stockopedia)

−81.25%; underperformed All Ordinaries by 82.87 pts

Stockopedia

1-year return (Simply Wall St)

−80%

Simply Wall St

5-year average annual change

−14% to −17.7% (sources differ)

Pearler (two page versions)

10-year price change

about −85% to −90%

Pearler

3-year return

Not publicly disclosed in verifiable form

—

P/E

Not meaningful (losses)

—

EV/EBITDA

Not meaningful (negative EBITDA)

—
—

about 0.4

Computed

P/B (A$412k vs FY2023 equity A$1,083k)

about 0.38

Computed (stale book)

Analyst consensus

None. Market Index states no major broker coverage.

Market Index

Margin Analysis (%) (FY2011–FY2023)

MetricFY2011FY2012FY2013FY2022FY2023

Final dividend per share (A cents, 100% franked)

0.40.40.400

Capital Markets

ItemStatus

Credit ratings (Moody's / S&P / Fitch)

Not rated

Debt maturity profile

No borrowings. Lease liabilities of A$36k at FY2023 (A$29k current, A$7k non-current).

Shares on issue

About 137.4m (implied by FY2023 EPS of −0.91c on a A$1.254m loss)

Analyst Conclusions

Guidance and consensus

Management guidance: none current. The last forward-looking statement, in FY2023, expected e-commerce challenges to be "handled much better in the following year". That was overtaken by the 2024 decision to wind up the subsidiary.

Consensus: none. There is no broker coverage.

Bull case (low probability)

  1. Shell / backdoor-listing value. The roughly 137m-share entity with an Australian ACN and a shareholder base resembles the vehicle Jingyi Group and TST Partners sought in 2017. A reverse takeover could revive value, although relisting would require full ASX re-admission.

  2. Recovery of related-party balances. If TTI's scheme creditors allow repayment of intercompany amounts, provisions (A$1.848m in 2018, plus later impairments) could be reversed and returned to holders.

  3. Brand monetisation. Industry interest in TEAC rights in Australia (ChannelNews) suggests the licence, if controlled within the group, has residual value. Inventory realisation from the A$1.32m FY2023 balance could add a small cash recovery.

Bear case (base case)

  1. Operations have ceased. The wind-up of TEAC Australia leaves TTA as a holding company with no trading business.

  2. No exit liquidity. After the 9 Jul 2025 delisting, minority holders (about 14.5%) can only sell off-market. The controlling holder has no evident incentive to buy them out at a premium.

  3. Equity erosion. Equity was A$1.08m at FY2023. With losses of about A$1.5m in FY2024 and negative gross margins, book value may now be near zero or negative. That cannot be verified because audited FY2024 accounts were not lodged.

Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)

MonitorableWhy it matters
ASIC registry status of TTA Holdings and TEAC Australia (liquidation, deregistration)Determines whether any residual distribution occurs
Any lodgement of overdue FY2024 / FY2025 audited accounts with ASICReveals true equity position
TT International SGX disclosures on its Australian subsidiariesThe parent may disclose write-offs, disposals or restructuring
Off-market takeover or compulsory acquisition by TTIPossible exit route for minorities
Use of the shell for a reverse takeoverThe only plausible value catalyst

Analyst verdict

TTA Holdings is not an investable equity. It is a post-mortem case study in how a licensed-brand consumer electronics distributor fails in a market dominated by vertically integrated global brands and retailer private labels.

The financial record is unambiguous. Revenue fell from A$12.96m in FY2019 to about A$1m by FY2023–FY2024. Gross margins turned negative from FY2022. Cash fell 89% in a single year, FY2023. Management cut staff costs 60% and moved to direct-to-consumer e-commerce in July 2022. Even so, the business could not cover its fixed costs, and the board resolved in early 2024 to wind up the only operating subsidiary.

Governance compounds the economic failure. TTA was 85.5%-controlled by TT International, a parent under a Singapore creditor scheme since 2010 and suspended on SGX since 2017. Its board was dominated by parent-group executives. The record includes related-party loans, provisions against those loans, and a 2017 transfer of freehold property to the parent. Finally, the company did not lodge its periodic reports, and ASX removed it from the Official List on 9 July 2025.

For the roughly 14.5% minority, the economic interest is effectively illiquid and of uncertain, probably minimal, value. The last verified equity was A$1.08m at March 2023, before a further loss of about A$1.5m in FY2024. The only theoretical routes to value are a shell transaction, a buy-out by the controller, or recovery of related-party receivables. None has been announced, and none appears likely given the parent's own constraints.

Classification: Delisted / dormant controlled shell — no rating applicable. Stakeholders should monitor ASIC registry events and TT International's SGX disclosures, which are now the only public windows into the entity. Any figure beyond FY2023 should be treated as provisional until audited accounts appear.

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Executive Leadership

Board of Directors

NameRoleTenureBackground (as disclosed)Source

Sng Hiang

Non-Executive Chairman, Non-Executive Director

Since May 2008

Director of other TTI group companies; Chairman of the TTI Executive Committee, responsible for group policy and strategy; 38+ years trading electrical and electronics products in emerging markets

Market Index director profile

Julia Pi

Non-Executive Director

Since May 2008

37+ years trading consumer products in emerging markets; runs TTI group administration, corporate planning and new business development. Direct holding of 51,288,385 shares as last noticed (31 Mar 2023). This figure looks inconsistent with TTI's 117.5m stake out of about 137.4m shares and could not be reconciled.

Market Index director profile

Ahamad Bin Abdullah

Executive Director and (Interim) Chief Executive Officer

Signed the FY2023 Appendix 4E as CEO (31 May 2023); recorded as Executive Director / Interim CEO from 8 Aug 2024

Prior roles and education not publicly disclosed

Appendix 4E FY2023; Business News WA

Jason Zhang

Non-Executive Director

Resigned 15 Nov 2023

—

Simply Wall St (ASX notice)

Unnamed director

Director

Retirement announced 31 Oct 2024

—

HotCopper / ASX

CFO / Company Secretary

——

Not publicly disclosed in sources retrieved

—

“—” = not publicly disclosed.

Major Shareholders

HolderShares%Source

TT International Limited

117,500,000

85.5 (88.5 per Market Index display)

Market Index; ChannelNews

G & E Holdings Pty Ltd (G & E Murphy Super Fund A/C)

200,0000.15

Market Index

Other top-10 holders

Not publicly disclosed in sources retrieved

——

Institutional ownership

None identified

~0

—

Insider ownership

Sng Hiang's indirect interest, through TTI, of 120,000,000 shares at the 2008 notice

—

Market Index

Competitive Landscape

Key Competitors

CompetitorSegment overlapRevenue (latest public)Positioning vs TTA

Samsung Electronics

TVs, audio

Global; Australian revenue not separately disclosed here

Premium/mainstream leader; overwhelming scale

LG Electronics

TVs, soundbars

Global

Mainstream leader

Hisense

Value TVs

Global

Took over TEAC's "value TV" space

TCL

Value TVs

Global

Aggressive value pricing

Sony

TVs, audio

Global

Premium

Kogan.com (ASX: KGN)

Private-label TVs, audio, online DTC

—

Direct DTC rival; far larger online reach

Retailer house brands (e.g. JB Hi-Fi, Harvey Norman labels)

Entry-level AV

—

Displaced TEAC on shelf

Tempo (Australian distributor; brands such as Akai, Bauhn supply)

Licensed-brand distribution

Private, not publicly disclosed

Like-for-like licensed-brand model

Laser Corporation

Value electronics and accessories

Private, not publicly disclosed

Like-for-like value accessories

Majority, Bush, Polaroid-brand distributors

Small audio, radios

Private

Value audio

Caravan-specialist TV brands (e.g. Majestic)

12V TVs

Private

Niche rival in caravan TVs

“—” = not publicly disclosed.

Peer Comparison FY2023

CompanyLatest revenueRevenue growthGross marginR&D intensitySource note

TTA Holdings (FY2023)

A$1.05m

−64.8%−26.2%0%

Appendix 4E FY2023

Samsung / LG / Hisense

Multi-billion USD group revenue

——

Material (>5% at group level)

—

Recent Developments

The 18-month window contains very few events because the company was suspended and then delisted. Earlier entries are included for context. Twenty-five material entries do not exist in the public record.

Company Snapshot

$0.7M

Revenue

54

Employees

2004

Founded

Thomastown, Australia

Headquarters

SWOT Analysis

Strengths

  • Debt-free balance sheet. Total debt was only A$36k of lease liabilities at 31 Mar 2023, with net cash of A$189k (Appendix 4E FY2023).
  • Heritage brand. The TEAC Australia business dates to 1978 (Market Index) and was ranged at all four national CE chains as late as about 2018 (ChannelNews).
  • Caravan / 12V niche. It offered 12V LED TVs with DVB-S satellite tuners, a specialised and defensible micro-niche (company description via Pearler).
  • Cost-cutting ability. Employee and director costs fell 60% (A$0.47m) in FY2023 (Appendix 4E FY2023).
  • Controlling-holder backing. TTI's 85.5% stake allowed fast decisions, such as the 2024 wind-up resolution, without minority blocking.
  • Clean equity base. Issued capital was unchanged at A$6.48m from FY2021 to FY2023, so the company had not resorted to dilutive raisings (Appendix 4E FY2023).

Weaknesses

  • Revenue collapse. A$12.96m (FY2019) to A$1.05m (FY2023), a fall of about 92% (Kalkine; Appendix 4E).
  • Negative gross margins. −15.0% in FY2022, −26.2% in FY2023 and about −57% in FY2024 (computed).
  • Cash depletion. Cash fell 89% in FY2023, from A$1.99m to A$0.23m (Appendix 4E FY2023).
  • Inventory overhang. Inventory of A$1.32m at FY2023 equalled about 365 days of cost of revenue (computed).
  • Related-party credit losses. A A$1.848m provision against Akira in 2018, plus A$78k and A$82k impairments in FY2022–FY2023.
  • Governance and compliance. The company failed to lodge periodic reports for more than a year, which caused delisting under LR 17.12 (ASX, July 2025).

Opportunities

  • Shell value. About 137m shares, a clean ACN and a shareholder base could in principle support a backdoor listing. Jingyi/TST Partners pursued a similar route in 2017.
  • Recovery of related-party receivables if TTI's scheme creditors approve repayments (ChannelNews, 2018).
  • Brand licensing. ChannelNews reported that several companies sought rights to the TEAC brand in Australia.
  • Caravan / RV demand for 12V TVs.
  • Liquidation of remaining inventory to return capital to the parent.
  • Possible tax-loss value. Accumulated losses were A$5.4m at FY2023. Usability is not disclosed and is subject to continuity tests.

Threats

  • Wind-up of the sole operating subsidiary (resolution in Q4 FY2024).
  • Parent distress. TTI has been under a scheme of arrangement since 2010, with SGX trading suspended since August 2017. In FY2024, TTI posted a loss from operations of S$10.6m on revenue of S$25.7m (TTI Annual Report FY2024).
  • Delisting. There is no liquidity for minority holders, whose roughly 14.5% stake is effectively stranded.
  • Dominant global and private-label competitors in value AV (industry structure).
  • Online price transparency removes the premium a legacy brand could command.
  • Regulatory exposure. ChannelNews (2018) publicly raised the possibility of ASIC scrutiny of inter-company loans.

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Key Developments

DateEventSignificance
30 Nov 20211H FY2022 interim: revenue A$1.95m; loss A$628k (+713%); QLED 4K TV launchLast period of meaningful wholesale
1 Jul 2022Switch to e-commerce modelStrategic pivot
29 Nov 20221H FY2023 interim: revenue A$166k; loss A$718.5kPivot causes revenue to collapse
31 May 2023FY2023 Appendix 4E: revenue A$1.05m; loss A$1.25m; cash A$225kLiquidity crisis evident
15 Nov 2023Director Jason Zhang resignsBoard thins
28 Nov 20231H FY2024 interim: loss A$571.9kLosses narrow, but on a minimal base
Q4 FY2024 (early 2024)General meeting resolves to wind up TEAC AustraliaEnd of operations
Apr 2024March-quarter 4C: sales A$226.9k (−30% QoQ); cash outflow ~A$80kFinal operating disclosure found
19 Apr 2024Suspension from quotationTrading halted permanently
30 May 2024FY2024 Preliminary Final ReportLast financial filing identified
8 Aug 2024Ahamad Bin Abdullah named Executive Director / Interim CEOCaretaker management
18 Oct 2024On ASX long-term suspended entities listDelisting countdown
31 Oct 2024Director retirementBoard contraction
22 Jan 2025On ASX long-term suspended entities list—
9 Apr 2025On ASX long-term suspended entities list—
8 Jul 2025ASX announces removal from Official ListDelisting
9 Jul 2025Removal effective from start of tradingShares no longer quoted
Jul 2025–Oct 2026No further public announcements identifiedEntity dormant

Financial Performance

Explore key financial metrics, segmented revenue, balance sheet health, and performance trends.

Revenue

2 charts
Income Statement: Revenue & Gross Profit: Revenue fell from AUD 3.5 Mn in FY2020 to AUD 1.1 Mn in FY2024.
TTA Holdings Limited — Income Statement: Revenue & Gross Profit
Series (AUD Mn)FY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024
Revenue3.57.6311.1
Cost of revenue4.26.63.41.31.7
Gross profit-0.71.1-0.4-0.3-0.6

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Sources

Sources

  1. ASX Appendix 4E, TTA Holdings, year ended 31 Mar 2023 (lodged 31 May / 1 Jun 2023) (announcements.asx.com.au)
  2. ASX Interim Report 1H FY2024 (28 Nov 2023) (announcements.asx.com.au)
  3. ASX Interim Report 1H FY2023 (29 Nov 2022) (asx.com.au)
  4. ASX Interim Report 1H FY2022 (30 Nov 2021) (asx.com.au)
  5. ASX announcements index, TTA (removal notice; AWG → TTA code history) (asx.com.au)
  6. Delisted.com.au, TTA Holdings Limited (delisted.com.au)
  7. MarketScreener, "ASX says TTA Holdings has been removed from official list" (8 Jul 2025)
  8. TipRanks, "TTA Holdings Limited to be Delisted from ASX" (8 Jul 2025); "TTA Holdings Announces Subsidiary Wind-Up Amid Revenue Dip" (2024)
  9. Market Index: TTA company page; Preliminary Final Report (30 May 2024); Suspension from Quotation (19 Apr 2024); director pages for Sng Hiang and Julia Pi
  10. HotCopper, TTA announcement timeline
  11. Morningstar Australia, TTA company profile
  12. Simply Wall St, TTA stock pages
  13. Kalkine, ASX:TTA fundamentals
  14. InvestSMART, TTA (dividend history, last price)
  15. Stockopedia, TTA share price; Pearler, TTA
  16. Business News (WA), Ahamad Abdullah profile
  17. ChannelNews: "TEAC In Trouble, How Long Will They Last?"; "EXCLUSIVE: TEAC Sells Assets…"; "EXCLUSIVE: TEAC Distributor Facing New Problems"; "TEAC Still A 'Basket Case' In Australia"; "Serious Questions Raised Over TEAC Inter Company Loans…"
  18. Appliance Retailer (2008), Austral Waste Group purchase of TEAC Australia
  19. TechPartner News (2008), "TEAC plans to list on the ASX"
  20. NSX announcements, Austral Waste Group Limited (21 Nov 2005)
  21. TEAC Corporation TSE disclosure (30 Mar 2005), TEAC Australia Pty Ltd voluntary administration
  22. TT International Limited, Annual Report FY2024 and FY2023 unaudited results (SGX)

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