Vallianz Holdings Limited

Income statement

Sources: FY2023, FY2024 and FY2025 results announcements. EBIT equals segment results before finance costs, share of associates/JV and exceptional items; it includes other income such as disposal gains and FX. FY2022 and FY2023 other operating expenses (US$2.61m and US$3.67m) are embedded in the EBIT figures. FP2023 covers 9 months.

Calendar-year reconstruction. The FY2024 announcement restates calendar 2023 (1 Jan – 31 Dec 2023) revenue at US$268.8m (1H US$81.3m, 2H US$187.5m) and profit after tax at US$1.06m. On a calendar basis, revenue was US$268.8m (CY2023), US$497.9m (CY2024) and US$332.3m (CY2025).

Margin profile

Revenue CAGR. Revenue grew from US$64.2m in FY2022 (YE Mar 2022) to US$332.3m in FY2025 (YE Dec 2025), an analyst-computed CAGR of about 55% over the 3.75 years elapsed. From FY2023 (YE Mar 2023) the CAGR is about 34%. Both figures are flattered by the low FY2022 base and by the related-party newbuild cycle, and should not be extrapolated.

Commentary — income statement. Three phases are visible. In FY2022 the group was still in post-Swiber distress, with a gross loss on both segments and earnings propped up by equity-accounted RVOS profits (US$8.1m) and a disposal gain on RVOS (US$6.4m). In FY2023–FY2024 a Rawabi-linked newbuild and project management programme drove revenue up more than seven-fold to US$497.9m. Margins stayed thin (shipyard gross margin 4–5%), but scale and a stronger vessel market turned EBIT positive. The FY2024 bottom line (US$20.4m attributable) was dominated by US$19.2m of exceptional gains from discounted settlement of legacy convertible bonds and perpetual securities, so recurring profitability was close to zero. In FY2025, revenue fell 33% as the newbuild programme matured. Chartering revenue rose 70% on fleet additions, higher day rates and better utilisation, which lifted the analyst-derived EBITDA margin to 11.8%, the best in the series. Even so, about US$6.4m of FY2025 EBIT came from disposal gains (US$3.9m) and FX gains, and a further US$2.5m exceptional gain came from loan restructuring. Excluding these, FY2025 pre-tax profit would have been near break-even (analyst estimate: US$11.4m PBT less roughly US$8.9m of non-recurring gains, about US$2.5m).

1HFY2026. Revenue fell 70% to US$60.0m and gross profit collapsed 87% to US$1.1m, as the Middle East conflict delayed delivery of Gulf-bound newbuilds and suppressed vessel utilisation while raising war-risk insurance and security costs. The group still reported US$0.3m of attributable profit only because other income of US$11.3m included a US$3.65m loan-settlement gain and US$6.0m of disposal gains. The total-group result was a loss of US$0.7m.

Balance sheet

Balance sheet dates: 31 Mar 2022, 31 Mar 2023, 31 Dec 2023, 31 Dec 2024, 31 Dec 2025. No goodwill or intangible assets appear on the balance sheet. NAV excluding advances and perpetuals for FY2022–FY2023 is analyst-computed; the company reported −0.06 and −1.44 US cents on an "excluding perpetual securities only" basis for those dates. At 30 June 2026: total assets US$471.1m, cash US$7.4m, term loans US$90.4m (current US$7.3m), lease liabilities US$37.4m, total equity US$99.9m, owners' equity US$125.7m, NAV per share 10.37 US cents (0.31 US cents excluding shareholder advances).

Commentary — balance sheet. The headline improvement in equity, from negative total equity in March 2022 and 2023 to US$100.6m at December 2025, is almost entirely attributable to Rawabi. Shareholder advances classified as equity rose from US$13.7m to US$121.9m, and the FY2024 discounted settlement of the convertible bonds and perpetual securities was funded largely by a US$66.8m advance. Excluding the advances, attributable NAV was only US$3.4m (0.28 US cents per share) at December 2025 and US$3.8m at June 2026. The advances bear interest (5% per annum per the FY2023 disclosure; US$8.3m of interest charged in FY2025) and are classified as equity only because Rawabi has undertaken not to demand repayment. Gross debt including leases has fallen from US$172.8m (December 2023) to US$137.9m (December 2025), but lease liabilities have replaced part of the bank debt: ROU assets rose to US$70.5m, largely related-party leases of vessels and shipyard assets, including US$34.7m of ROU additions from related companies in FY2024. December 2023 shows an extreme working capital deficit (−US$109.5m) because term loans were classified as current pending restructuring and contract liabilities of US$202.2m (customer prepayments on newbuilds) peaked. Both conditions have since normalised.

Asset quality. Two holding-level assets have driven reported equity. The ROPL preference shares, carried at US$27.3m in December 2024 and secured on a vessel held by a Swiber-linked entity, were fully realised or written off in FY2025: US$23.3m was redeemed and US$4.0m written down to nil. The 19.77% RVOS stake (US$60.9m, Level 3, unquoted) remains, is valued by an independent valuer annually, and was not revalued at June 2026. It equals roughly 60% of total equity and is itself a related-party (Rawabi-controlled) asset.

Cash flow

Capex shown as a positive outflow. FCF equals OCF minus capex (analyst-derived). FY2025 investing inflows also included US$23.3m of preference share redemption and US$9.5m of equipment disposal proceeds. 1HFY2026: OCF US$9.9m, capex US$0.6m, interest paid US$3.0m, lease repayments US$6.7m, loan repayments US$0.6m, new loan US$0.7m. StockAnalysis/S&P report different OCF and capex for FY2023 and FP2023 because of classification differences; company figures are used here.

Commentary — cash flow. Over the five periods Vallianz generated cumulative OCF of about US$49.2m against cumulative capex of about US$68.8m, a cumulative free cash outflow of about US$19.6m. Over the same periods it received about US$109.3m of cash shareholder advances from Rawabi. Rawabi funding, not internal cash generation, has financed the deleveraging and the legacy-instrument settlements. FY2025 was the first period of positive FCF (US$4.75m), aided by working capital release. Cash balances have dwindled to US$7.4–7.6m, about 4–5 months of finance costs plus lease payments.

Ratios

All ratios are analyst-derived from company filings. Total debt to total equity is not meaningful for FY2022 and FY2023 (negative equity); cells are left blank. FP2023 ratios use 9-month flows and are not annualised (working capital days use 275 days). ROIC equals EBIT × (1 − 17% Singapore statutory rate) divided by (total debt including leases + total equity − cash). Because contract assets and liabilities dominate working capital on newbuild projects, conventional cash conversion cycle metrics understate true working capital swings. StockAnalysis (S&P, August 2026, TTM basis) reports ROE 9.83%, ROA 2.53%, ROIC 6.64%, current ratio 0.99, debt/equity 1.37x, interest coverage 1.12x and Altman Z-score −0.2.

Commentary — ratios. Leverage has improved meaningfully: net debt/EBITDA has fallen from more than 20x to 3.3x, but this rests on an FY2025 EBITDA that included non-recurring gains, and 1HFY2026 annualised EBITDA would be far weaker. Interest coverage of 1.1–1.5x leaves almost no margin of safety, which is consistent with the repeated covenant breaches disclosed in FY2024, FY2025 and 1HFY2026. In FY2025 trade receivables tripled to US$106.9m (DSO 117 days) while trade payables also stretched (DPO 92 days), indicating that liquidity is managed partly through supplier credit. Receivables rose further to US$140.8m at June 2026.

Management guidance

No numerical guidance has been issued. The 1HFY2026 commentary states that operating conditions are expected to remain challenging for the rest of FY2026, with adverse conditions, higher costs, utilisation pressure and mobilisation delays likely to persist, and that the ultimate financial impact cannot be determined. Consensus growth expectations are not publicly available.

Bull case

1. Deferred, not lost, revenue. Revenue on Gulf-bound newbuilds and mobilisation income was deferred because of Hormuz constraints (1HFY2026, Note (a)). De-escalation could release a backlog of deliveries into 2H2026–2027 and restore shipyard revenue towards the US$250m-plus run-rate of FY2025.

2. Tight OSV supply. Higher oil prices and fleet scarcity could push charter rates and utilisation of an expanded fleet above FY2025 levels, when chartering already produced a US$21.8m segment result at about 25% gross margin.

3. Deep value versus book with a supportive parent. At about 0.45x P/B and a market value of about S$60–67m against US$125.7m of owners' equity, any recapitalisation that converts Rawabi advances into shares, or any strategic move by Rawabi Energy Company, could crystallise value. This is speculative; no such proposal exists.

Bear case

1. Earnings are largely non-recurring. Excluding disposal gains, FX gains and debt-settlement gains, the group has been near break-even in FY2025 and loss-making in 1HFY2026, while bearing about US$17m a year of finance costs.

2. Solvency rests on forbearance. NAV excluding shareholder advances is 0.3 US cents per share, covenant waivers expire on 31 Dec 2026, and cash is only US$7.4m.

3. Concentrated exposure to the war zone and the related party. Revenue is concentrated in the Gulf and with RHC entities, the RVOS stake (61% of equity) is unrevalued, and minorities hold about 10% of a thinly traded Catalist stock with limited protection.

Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)

Analyst verdict

Vallianz is best understood as a financially dependent satellite of Rawabi Holding rather than an independent OSV growth story. The past three years have produced genuine operational progress: the shipyard delivered a large AHTS programme, the owned fleet was expanded and modernised at the margin, the chartering segment more than doubled its segment result, and the Swiber-era capital structure was largely cleaned up through discounted settlements. Those achievements, however, were financed by Rawabi capital and by Rawabi-sourced project volume, and they have not yet translated into self-sustaining profitability. Stripped of disposal, FX and debt-settlement gains, FY2025 pre-tax earnings were marginal, and 1HFY2026 shows how quickly the model deteriorates when the Gulf — the group's core market and its parent's home region — is disrupted.

The balance sheet tells the same story. Headline equity of about US$100m consists almost entirely of US$121.9m of interest-bearing shareholder advances held in equity by undertaking, supported by a Level 3 valuation of a Rawabi-controlled minority stake. Lender waivers run only to year-end 2026, and cash is under US$8m. Minority shareholders own about a tenth of the company, trading is thin, and the board has only two independent directors overseeing a business in which roughly half of revenue, much of the funding and a large share of leased assets involve the controlling shareholder.

The investment case therefore turns on Rawabi's intentions rather than on industry fundamentals, which are moderately supportive. A ceasefire would likely unlock deferred newbuild revenue and restore chartering utilisation, and VC Power offers a low-cost option on Singapore's harbour-craft electrification mandate. Until the waivers are renewed, the Rawabi Energy restructuring is explained, and recurring earnings comfortably cover finance costs, the shares warrant a high risk premium. This is a speculative, special-situation holding.

Where sources conflict (ISIN; loan settlement completion date of 1 vs 2 July 2026; submersible barge deadweight figures; training-hours figures), both values are noted. Figures labelled analyst-derived are calculations from reported line items and are not company disclosures.*