Wameja Limited Overview
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Entity profiled | Wameja Limited, the former ASX/AIM-listed holding company. It is now wholly owned by Mastercard via Burst Acquisition Co. Pty Ltd |
| Current status | Delisted. Scheme of arrangement court-approved 9 Sep 2021. AIM admission cancelled 13 Sep 2021 (RNS "Cancellation – Wameja Limited", 13 Sep 2021) |
| Successor economic interest | HomeSend SCRL, now part of Mastercard Cross-Border Services |
| Legal name (final) | Wameja Limited |
| Former names | eServ Limited (to January 2001); eServGlobal Limited (January 2001 – July 2019) |
| Name change to Wameja | July 2019, after the sale of the eServGlobal core business to Seamless Distribution Systems AB |
| Founding year | Sources conflict. Edison Investment Research (2017) gives 1983, Edison (2016) gives 1982, and MarketBeat gives 1991 as the incorporation year. The 1991 date most likely reflects incorporation of the current legal entity, and 1982/83 the origin of the predecessor business |
| Founder | Ian Buddery (per CB Insights) |
| Incorporation jurisdiction | Australia (Corporations Act 2001 company, New South Wales registered office) |
| ABN | 59 052 947 743 (as shown in the Scheme Implementation Agreement, Sep 2020, where it is labelled "ACN") |
| Headquarters (final) | Level 2, Pier 8/9, 23 Hickson Road, Sydney NSW 2000, Australia |
| Exchanges & tickers (historical) | ASX: WJA (previously ESV); London Stock Exchange AIM: WJA (previously ESG), traded as depositary interests |
| Listing dates | ASX listing: sources conflict, 2000 (Edison 2017; CB Insights records an IPO on 1 Sep 2000) or 2003 (Edison 2016). AIM admission: 2004 |
| ISIN / CUSIP | not publicly confirmed here |
| Fiscal year end | 31 December for FY2019–FY2020 (Preliminary Final Report FY2020). Earlier eServGlobal years appear to have ended 31 October: the FY2015 preliminary report was lodged on 24 December 2015 |
| Employees | Not publicly disclosed for the Wameja period. |
| Auditor | — |
| Nomad & broker | finnCap Limited (2020–2021); Canaccord Genuity Limited (c. 2015) |
| Financial adviser (2019 core sale) | PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP |
| Market capitalisation | Not applicable (delisted). Last quoted value about £95.66m at a final price of 7.90p (MarketBeat; final trading 10 Sep 2021). Takeover equity value about £96.9m (~US$126m) at 8p/share |
| Website | www.wameja.com (historical); predecessor www.eservglobal.com |
| Investor contact (historical) | investors@wameja.com |
In its final form, Wameja Limited was a single-asset, listed holding vehicle. Its value rested almost entirely on a minority stake of about 35% in HomeSend SCRL, a Belgian-domiciled cross-border payments hub run as a joint venture with Mastercard, which held the remaining ~64–65% and controlled it. Wameja came out of eServGlobal, a Sydney-founded telecom software house that spent nearly four decades building prepaid charging, recharge, mobile-wallet and mobile-money platforms for mobile network operators in emerging markets. In 2014 eServGlobal co-founded HomeSend with Mastercard and BICS, and over time it shed its operating businesses. The last of these, the PayMobile-era core software unit, went to Seamless Distribution Systems in July 2019 for an unadjusted €2m. That left Wameja as a funding partner to HomeSend: it carried capital-call and liquidity-facility obligations but had no operating revenue. Its strategic endpoint was always likely to be absorption by its controlling partner, and that happened in September 2021, when Mastercard paid 8p per share.
Company's own description (final reporting period)
In its FY2020 statutory accounts and H1 2021 half-year report, the company described itself as a partner of Mastercard in building the HomeSend global payments hub. It said HomeSend allows cross-border transfers between bank accounts, cards, mobile wallets and cash outlets from anywhere in the world, and that Wameja, as a founding partner, helped conceive the hub and bring it to market. Ownership was given as Wameja 35.68% / Mastercard 64.32% at 31 December 2020 (FY2020 accounts) and Wameja 35.26% / Mastercard 64.74% at 30 June 2021 (H1 2021 report). The FY2020 accounts describe HomeSend SCRL's principal activity as the provision of international mobile money services and record that it was formed on 3 April 2014.
Independent characterisation
Between July 2019 and September 2021 Wameja was an investment holding company with no consolidated operating revenue. Its results consisted of:
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Its equity-accounted share of HomeSend's losses. HomeSend was a loss-making growth venture over this period.
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Corporate overhead: board, listing, advisory and legal costs, which rose sharply during the 2020–21 scheme process and the Seamless indemnity dispute.
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Foreign exchange gains and losses on euro-denominated balances.
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Residual items from discontinued operations, meaning the core business sold to Seamless.
Its cash went mainly into HomeSend capital calls, for example a €1,784,118 subscription on 18 March 2021, and into a liquidity facility extended to HomeSend in May 2019 (€2.5m, repaid in full in August 2020).
Revenue model mix
| Period | Product licences | Services / implementation | Recurring / managed services | Transaction-based (look-through) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| eServGlobal era (pre-July 2019) | Software licences for charging, recharge, mobile wallet (PayMobile) | Implementation and integration projects for MNOs | Support & maintenance, managed services | Indirect only, through its HomeSend share of results |
| Wameja era (Jul 2019 – Sep 2021) | — | — | — | Indirect only. HomeSend earned per-transaction fees and FX margin on cross-border flows; Wameja booked its equity share of HomeSend's result |
The last full-year revenue figure found is €8.3m for FY2017 (Wikipedia, citing contemporaneous reporting that contract delays had cut full-year revenue). Edison Investment Research (2017) reported a management break-even revenue target of about €12.5m (~A$19.4m) for FY2018.
Value-chain position
HomeSend operated as a B2B "hub" or network-of-networks. Sending institutions, such as banks, money transfer operators (MTOs), mobile wallets and Mastercard Send clients, connected once. HomeSend then routed payouts to receiving bank accounts, cards, mobile wallets and cash-pickup points through its own direct connections and regional network partners. Transfast, later acquired by Mastercard, was one such partner. Wameja sat one step further back as a minority financial sponsor. Before 2019, eServGlobal also supplied technology: according to company descriptions from 2015, the HomeSend hub was originally built on eServGlobal technology.
Customer types and end-markets
| Customer type (HomeSend) | Role | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Banks / financial institutions | Senders and receivers | More than 20 banks signed via Mastercard Send and HomeSend (RNS, 2018). A contract enabled one of the world's largest global FIs to use Mastercard Send for cross-border payments |
| Money transfer operators | Senders | The Q3 2020 KPI update attributed lower average transaction value to growth in MTO flows |
| Mobile money providers / MNOs | Receivers and senders | eTranzact (Nigeria) and Steward Bank/EcoCash (Zimbabwe) in 2015; Azimo partnership for Africa and APAC mobile money (July 2015) |
| Mastercard Send | Channel / commercial partner | HomeSend powered Mastercard Send's international remittance capability from May 2015 |
End-markets: international remittances (person-to-person), business-to-consumer disbursements, and account-to-account cross-border payments, especially into emerging-market corridors in Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America.
Strategy
Stated strategy (final period)
The strategy in Wameja's last annual report (FY2020) and half-year report (H1 2021) can be summarised in three points:
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Partner with Mastercard to build HomeSend into a global cross-border payments hub. Wameja described its role as a founding partner that helped conceive the hub and bring it to market.
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Fund HomeSend's business plan. The proceeds of the March 2021 capital raise were to cover HomeSend's 2021 operating expenses and its minimum regulatory equity requirements into H2 2021.
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Deliver value to shareholders through the Mastercard scheme. From September 2020 the board unanimously recommended the scheme as being in shareholders' best interests.
Initiatives in the 24 months before delisting (Sep 2019 – Sep 2021)
| Initiative | Date | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Cost reduction / board restructure | 2,020 | Board restructured and leadership roles cut to reduce costs |
| HomeSend liquidity support | May 2019 – Aug 2020 | €2.5m facility, repaid Aug 2020 once Mastercard raised its own facility by €10m |
| HomeSend capital contributions | 2020; 18 Mar 2021; 23 Jun 2021 | Further investment of about €1.8m (2020); €1,784,118 (Mar 2021); additional contribution announced Jun 2021 |
| Group simplification | Sep 2020 – Sep 2021 | Residual subsidiaries moved to NewHoldCo and HomeSend shares moved to the parent, as required by the SIA |
| Indemnity resolution | Oct 2020 – Jun 2021 | Settlement Agreement with Seamless and a third-party IP provider; no payment by Wameja |
No medium-term financial targets were given in the Wameja period. ESG commitments: none disclosed.
Products & Services
Wameja-era (look-through to HomeSend)
| Offering | Description | Target customer | Launch | Pricing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HomeSend global payment hub | B2B network enabling cross-border transfers between bank accounts, cards, mobile wallets and cash outlets through a single connection | Banks, MTOs, mobile money operators, fintechs | 2014 (JV formation) | Not publicly disclosed. Transaction fees and FX margin implied |
| HomeSend for Mastercard Send (cross-border) | Delivery and technology partner for Mastercard Send's international transfers | Banks issuing Mastercard Send | May 2015 (remittance); 2018 (first A2A flows) | — |
| Account-to-account payouts | Payouts terminating in bank accounts, tracked as a KPI ("payments terminating to a bank account as % of gross value flows") | Senders into Key Destination Markets | Ongoing | — |
| Mobile wallet payouts | Delivery into mobile money wallets (e.g., eTranzact, EcoCash) | Mobile money providers | 2,015 | — |
KPIs tracked in quarterly HomeSend updates: gross value flows across the platform, transaction numbers, average transaction value, bank-account termination share, number of live sending customers, and Key Destination Markets (markets where HomeSend had ubiquitous reach through banking partners). The absolute KPI values were published in RNS tables, but the retrieved extracts did not reproduce them, so they are not restated here.
eServGlobal-era products (sold to Seamless, July 2019)
| Product / platform | Description | Target customer | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| PayMobile | Mobile financial services suite: mobile wallet, mobile commerce, analytics, advanced recharge, promotions, agent management | MNOs and financial service providers in emerging markets | Transferred to Seamless (2019) |
| Recharge / top-up platforms | Electronic prepaid recharge and distribution | MNOs | Transferred to Seamless |
| Promotions & loyalty | Subscriber promotions engine | MNOs | Transferred to Seamless |
| Business analytics | Transaction analytics | MNOs / FSPs | Transferred to Seamless |
| Rapid service connection | Service activation tools | MNOs | Transferred to Seamless |
| Legacy charging / service control (NGIN-lineage) | Intelligent network and charging platforms | Telcos | Divested earlier (Oracle, 2010). Details not fully verified |
The company's 2019 boilerplate said its platforms covered digital wallets, commerce, remittance, recharge, rapid service connection and business analytics. A 2010s corporate statement claimed more than 75 telcos used eServGlobal solutions to manage over 120 million mobile subscribers (company boilerplate via CB Insights).
Financial Narrative
The final full fiscal year reported was FY2020 (year ended 31 Dec 2020). The last interim was H1 2021 (30 Jun 2021). No further reports were filed after delisting.
Income statement
Gross profit, EBITDA, pre-tax income and margins are not meaningful for FY2019–FY2020, because the company had no consolidated revenue after the core business became a discontinued operation. A revenue CAGR cannot be computed on verified data.
Half-year results
The H1 2021 report also refers to a figure of A$4.955m relating to HomeSend. The extract does not make its precise line item clear, so it is not tabulated.
Balance sheet
FY2020 equity reconciliation from the statement of changes in equity: issued capital A$212.326m, plus reserves A$0.609m and A$4.176m, less accumulated losses A$185.611m, gives total equity of A$31.5m. Accumulated losses of about A$186m against A$212m of contributed capital show how much value eServGlobal destroyed over its listed life.
Total debt: in 2016 a major shareholder had lent the company £7m (Edison, Sep 2016). That debt was restructured in 2016.
Cash flow
Operating cash flow, capex and free cash flow were not separately verified. Capex was immaterial for a holding company.
Commentary on trends and drivers
FY2015–FY2018: a value-destructive operating period. eServGlobal lost A$32.4m at the operating line in FY2015, needed a 2016 recapitalisation and debt restructuring, and in FY2017 recorded revenue of only €8.3m because contracts slipped. At no point did it reach the c.€12.5m break-even revenue level management targeted. Edison concluded at the time that most of the company's value sat in its HomeSend stake.
FY2019: strategic simplification at a cost. The core business was sold in July 2019 for an unadjusted €2m, a token amount next to its historical investment. The continuing-operations loss was A$13.2m, and cash fell A$15.5m over the year, reflecting the €2.5m HomeSend liquidity facility, capital contributions and disposal-related costs. H1 2019 alone lost A$10.4m.
FY2020: a smaller loss, but structurally dependent. With no operating revenue, the loss narrowed to A$9.2m. This came from cost cuts, including the board restructuring, and a smaller share of HomeSend losses. Cash ended the year at A$8.0m, helped by repayment of the €2.5m loan in August 2020. Every additional HomeSend capital call either diluted Wameja or used up its cash, and the company could not fund HomeSend's growth indefinitely. That funding gap made a sale to Mastercard close to inevitable.
H1 2021: holding pattern. The loss of A$3.4m reflects scheme-related legal and advisory costs during the Seamless indemnity dispute and Wameja's share of HomeSend losses. The stake was diluted to 35.26%.
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View Subscription PlansFinancial Detail
Income Statement and Key Financials
| Metric | FY2015 | FY2016 | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenue (EUR Mn, eServGlobal consolidated) | — | — | 8.3 | — | — | 0 |
Operating loss, statutory (AUD Mn) | -32.374 | — | — | — | — | — |
Net loss from continuing operations after tax and minorities (AUD Mn, statutory) | — | — | — | — | -13.2 | -9.159 |
Net loss from continuing operations (AUD Mn, preliminary report) | — | — | — | — | -13.2 | -9.43 |
Basic loss per share (A$ cents, statutory) | — | — | — | — | -1.09 | -0.76 |
Basic loss per share (A$ cents, preliminary) | — | — | — | — | -1.09 | -0.78 |
Dividends per share (A$ cents) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key Financials and Per-Share Data
| Metric | H1FY2019 | H1FY2020 | H1FY2021 |
|---|---|---|---|
Loss after tax (AUD Mn) | -10.434 | -3.205 | -3.405 |
Basic loss per share (A$ cents) | -0.9 | -0.3 | -0.3 |
Cash at period end (AUD Mn) | — | 5.305 | — |
Balance Sheet
| Metric | FY2015 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|
Total equity (AUD Mn) | 32.771 | 31.5 |
Issued capital (AUD Mn) | — | 212.326 |
Accumulated losses (AUD Mn) | — | -185.611 |
Cash and equivalents (AUD Mn) | — | 8.014 |
Cash Flow
| Metric | FY2019 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|
Net change in cash (AUD Mn) | -15.5 | -3.6 |
Net investing outflow, mainly HomeSend (AUD Mn) | — | -1.965 |
Dividends paid (AUD Mn) | 0 | 0 |
Share buybacks (AUD Mn) | 0 | 0 |
Returns & Leverage Ratios (%)
| Ratio | FY2020 | Comment |
|---|---|---|
ROE (%) | -29 | Derived: A$9.159m statutory loss ÷ A$31.5m closing equity. Analyst calculation, not company-reported |
Region Overview
| Region | FY2020 |
|---|---|
Australia (AUD Mn) | 0 |
Europe (AUD Mn) | 0 |
Middle East & Africa (AUD Mn) | 0 |
Asia-Pacific excl. Australia (AUD Mn) | 0 |
Americas (AUD Mn) | 0 |
Capital Markets
| Metric | Aug2020 | Sep2020 | Sep2021 |
|---|---|---|---|
Share price reference (GBp) | 5.51 | 7.76 | 7.90 |
Valuation Snapshot
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
Equity value at offer | About £96.9m (~US$126m) |
Implied shares on issue | About 1.21bn (derived: £96.9m ÷ 8p; analyst calculation) |
Consideration per share | 8p (about A$0.143 at announcement) |
Implied value of the 35.68% HomeSend stake plus ~€4m cash | About £96.9m in total, implying roughly £270m for 100% of HomeSend net of cash (analyst derivation; indicative only) |
Price / book (FY2020 equity A$31.5m) | About 5.5x (derived using an approximate GBP/AUD rate of 1.78 at Sep 2020; indicative) |
P/E, EV/EBITDA, EV/Sales | Not meaningful (loss-making, no revenue) |
Analyst consensus | None. Edison Investment Research covered eServGlobal on a sponsored basis to about 2018 |
Capital Markets — Dividend history
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
Dividend history | No dividends paid (FY2019–FY2020 Appendix 4E: nil) |
Credit ratings (Moody's / S&P / Fitch) | Not rated |
Debt maturity profile | No disclosed borrowings in the Wameja period |
Analyst Conclusions
Management guidance and consensus
No guidance applies because the company no longer exists as an independent listed entity. Before delisting, management gave no earnings guidance. Its stated goal was to complete the Mastercard scheme. No consensus estimates exist.
Bull case (as framed at the 2020–21 decision point)
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Strategic premium realised. Mastercard paid a 39% premium and an equity value of about £96.9m, roughly 5.5x book. For a holding company with no revenue, that crystallised value which had been trapped in an illiquid minority stake.
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Exposure to a structurally growing market. HomeSend's gross value flows and live customer count (36 by Feb 2020) were rising during the COVID-era shift to digital remittances.
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Legacy risk resolved at no cost. The June 2021 settlement extinguished the Seamless indemnity claims with no payment by Wameja and left the consideration unchanged.
Bear case
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Decades of capital destruction. Accumulated losses of A$185.6m against A$212.3m of contributed capital mean long-term holders lost most of their invested capital, even after the takeover.
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No negotiating leverage. As a 35% non-controlling holder that depended on the majority partner for liquidity, Wameja effectively had one buyer for its asset. Mastercard's parallel purchase of Transfast showed the buyer had alternatives.
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Value leakage along the way. The core business sold for only €2m. Shareholders were diluted by capital calls (35.68% → 35.26%), carried the cost of FY2015 and FY2020 restatements, and saw completion delayed by about nine months.
Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)
For Wameja itself there are none: it is a wholly owned subsidiary. For anyone tracking the successor asset, the things to watch are:
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the cross-border volume and revenue disclosures in Mastercard's filings (Mastercard Cross-Border Services);
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regulatory developments in the Belgian/EU payment-institution regime affecting HomeSend's licence; and
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the competitive moves of Visa Direct, Thunes and TerraPay in B2B cross-border payouts.
Analyst verdict
Wameja Limited is a closed case. Its significance now lies in the lessons it offers on minority joint-venture economics rather than in any investment opportunity. The company began as eServGlobal, a technically capable Australian telecom software vendor that served more than 75 operators at its peak. It repeatedly failed to turn engineering into durable profits. The FY2015 operating loss of A$32.4m, the 2016 recapitalisation, the FY2017 revenue miss and the final sale of the core business for an unadjusted €2m all point to a firm that could not scale profitably in emerging-market MNO software.
Its one strategic success was co-founding HomeSend with Mastercard and BICS in 2014. That bet was right about the direction of the market: cross-border payments moved toward network-of-networks hubs delivering to any end-point, and card networks became the consolidators. Wameja's problem was structural. With about 35%, no control and a capital-hungry asset that needed pre-funding liquidity, it was always going to end up in one of two places: funding HomeSend until its own resources ran out, or selling to the partner that held the remaining shares. Mastercard's €15m facility in July 2020 and its €10m increase a month later made the imbalance plain. The September 2020 offer at 8p, a 39% premium, was a fair outcome for shareholders whose only other option was continued dilution.
Completion was delayed by about nine months by indemnity claims from the 2019 asset sale, and those claims were settled at no cost to Wameja. The scheme closed in September 2021. HomeSend now sits inside Mastercard Cross-Border Services, which by 2023 reportedly reached more than 100 markets.
Verdict: Not investable (delisted). Historically, the outcome was a value-recovery exit at the end of a value-destructive listed life. Investors wanting exposure to the HomeSend franchise can now get it only through Mastercard Incorporated (NYSE: MA), where it is immaterial to group results.
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View Subscription PlansExecutive Leadership
Board of Directors
| Name | Role | Appointment / notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
John Conoley | Non-Executive Chairman (previously Executive Chairman) | Executive Chairman from April 2015. Under the 2019 SPA disclosure he was to step out of the executive role within six months of the sale completing. Shown as Non-Executive Chairman from Nov 2020 | RNS 2015; iTnews 2019; BusinessNews |
Tom Rowe | Non-Executive Director and Company Secretary | Role recorded Nov 2020 | BusinessNews |
Stephen Baldwin | Non-Executive Director | Role recorded Nov 2020 | BusinessNews |
Jamie Brooke | Non-Executive Director | Role recorded Nov 2020 | BusinessNews |
James Hume | Non-Executive Director | Appointed to the board as an internal executive in 2020; NED role recorded 25 Nov 2020 | Alliance News; BusinessNews |
S. Ben Lassoued | Role not specified in source (recorded 25 Nov 2020) | — | BusinessNews |
Executive Leadership Team
| Name | Role | Departure | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
Andrew Hayward | CFO and director | Jul 2019 | Resigned on completion of the core-business sale |
Stephen Blundell | COO, eServGlobal (2015) | — | Quoted in the May 2015 Mastercard Send announcement |
Unnamed CEO | Chief Executive Officer | 2 Mar 2015 | Resignation announced by RNS; the role was then filled by an Executive Chairman |
Share-Based Incentives
| Option tranche | Number | Exercise price (AUD) | Expiry |
|---|---|---|---|
Tranche A | 3,650,000 | 0.21 | 8 Aug 2021 |
Tranche B | 6,000,000 | 0.21 | 13 Mar 2022 |
Tranche C | 3,350,000 | 0.21 | 24 Nov 2022 |
Major Shareholders
| Holder | Stake | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
Lombard Odier Asset Management (Europe) Ltd | 23.5% | Sep 2020 | Offer announcement coverage (AskTraders) |
Largest shareholder (unnamed in source) | 24.8% | 2016 | Edison, Sep 2016 (possibly the same holder) |
Other top-10 holders | Not publicly disclosed in retrieved sources | — | — |
Insider ownership | Not quantified; all directors said they would vote in favour of the scheme | Sep 2020 | SIA announcement |
Competitive Landscape
Key Competitors
| Competitor | Positioning vs HomeSend |
|---|---|
Visa Direct (including Earthport, acquired by Visa in 2019) | Card-network rival offering push payments and a cross-border bank payout network |
Western Union (B2B / network services) | Incumbent MTO with a large cash and digital payout network |
MoneyGram | Incumbent MTO with a payout network and wallet partnerships |
Thunes | B2B cross-border network to wallets and banks in emerging markets |
TerraPay | B2B mobile-wallet and bank payout network |
MFS Africa (now Onafriq) | Pan-African mobile money interoperability hub |
Ripple (RippleNet / ODL) | Blockchain-based cross-border settlement for banks and MTOs |
SWIFT gpi | Bank correspondent network upgrade for faster cross-border payments |
Wise Platform | Infrastructure licensed to banks for cross-border transfers |
Nium | B2B cross-border payout and card-issuing platform |
Comviva (Tech Mahindra) | Mobiquity mobile money platform; large MNO base |
Huawei | Mobile money platform deployments |
Ericsson | Wallet platform |
Seamless Distribution Systems | Recharge and distribution; later bought eServGlobal's core |
Oracle Communications | Charging (partly eServGlobal lineage) |
Competitor Detail
| Metric | Wameja (FY2020) |
|---|---|
Revenue | Nil (holding company) |
Growth | n/m |
Net margin | n/m (loss A$9.2m) |
Recent Developments
Because the company delisted in September 2021, there has been no company newsflow in the 18 months to October 2026.



