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Wameja Limited

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Ticker: WJA.AX

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Year Founded & Workforce

2017

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Wameja Limited Overview

FieldDetail
Entity profiledWameja Limited, the former ASX/AIM-listed holding company. It is now wholly owned by Mastercard via Burst Acquisition Co. Pty Ltd
Current statusDelisted. Scheme of arrangement court-approved 9 Sep 2021. AIM admission cancelled 13 Sep 2021 (RNS "Cancellation – Wameja Limited", 13 Sep 2021)
Successor economic interestHomeSend SCRL, now part of Mastercard Cross-Border Services
Legal name (final)Wameja Limited
Former nameseServ Limited (to January 2001); eServGlobal Limited (January 2001 – July 2019)
Name change to WamejaJuly 2019, after the sale of the eServGlobal core business to Seamless Distribution Systems AB
Founding yearSources conflict. Edison Investment Research (2017) gives 1983, Edison (2016) gives 1982, and MarketBeat gives 1991 as the incorporation year. The 1991 date most likely reflects incorporation of the current legal entity, and 1982/83 the origin of the predecessor business
FounderIan Buddery (per CB Insights)
Incorporation jurisdictionAustralia (Corporations Act 2001 company, New South Wales registered office)
ABN59 052 947 743 (as shown in the Scheme Implementation Agreement, Sep 2020, where it is labelled "ACN")
Headquarters (final)Level 2, Pier 8/9, 23 Hickson Road, Sydney NSW 2000, Australia
Exchanges & tickers (historical)ASX: WJA (previously ESV); London Stock Exchange AIM: WJA (previously ESG), traded as depositary interests
Listing datesASX listing: sources conflict, 2000 (Edison 2017; CB Insights records an IPO on 1 Sep 2000) or 2003 (Edison 2016). AIM admission: 2004
ISIN / CUSIPnot publicly confirmed here
Fiscal year end31 December for FY2019–FY2020 (Preliminary Final Report FY2020). Earlier eServGlobal years appear to have ended 31 October: the FY2015 preliminary report was lodged on 24 December 2015
EmployeesNot publicly disclosed for the Wameja period.
Auditor—
Nomad & brokerfinnCap Limited (2020–2021); Canaccord Genuity Limited (c. 2015)
Financial adviser (2019 core sale)PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Market capitalisationNot applicable (delisted). Last quoted value about £95.66m at a final price of 7.90p (MarketBeat; final trading 10 Sep 2021). Takeover equity value about £96.9m (~US$126m) at 8p/share
Websitewww.wameja.com (historical); predecessor www.eservglobal.com
Investor contact (historical)investors@wameja.com

In its final form, Wameja Limited was a single-asset, listed holding vehicle. Its value rested almost entirely on a minority stake of about 35% in HomeSend SCRL, a Belgian-domiciled cross-border payments hub run as a joint venture with Mastercard, which held the remaining ~64–65% and controlled it. Wameja came out of eServGlobal, a Sydney-founded telecom software house that spent nearly four decades building prepaid charging, recharge, mobile-wallet and mobile-money platforms for mobile network operators in emerging markets. In 2014 eServGlobal co-founded HomeSend with Mastercard and BICS, and over time it shed its operating businesses. The last of these, the PayMobile-era core software unit, went to Seamless Distribution Systems in July 2019 for an unadjusted €2m. That left Wameja as a funding partner to HomeSend: it carried capital-call and liquidity-facility obligations but had no operating revenue. Its strategic endpoint was always likely to be absorption by its controlling partner, and that happened in September 2021, when Mastercard paid 8p per share.


Company's own description (final reporting period)

In its FY2020 statutory accounts and H1 2021 half-year report, the company described itself as a partner of Mastercard in building the HomeSend global payments hub. It said HomeSend allows cross-border transfers between bank accounts, cards, mobile wallets and cash outlets from anywhere in the world, and that Wameja, as a founding partner, helped conceive the hub and bring it to market. Ownership was given as Wameja 35.68% / Mastercard 64.32% at 31 December 2020 (FY2020 accounts) and Wameja 35.26% / Mastercard 64.74% at 30 June 2021 (H1 2021 report). The FY2020 accounts describe HomeSend SCRL's principal activity as the provision of international mobile money services and record that it was formed on 3 April 2014.

Independent characterisation

Between July 2019 and September 2021 Wameja was an investment holding company with no consolidated operating revenue. Its results consisted of:

  1. Its equity-accounted share of HomeSend's losses. HomeSend was a loss-making growth venture over this period.

  2. Corporate overhead: board, listing, advisory and legal costs, which rose sharply during the 2020–21 scheme process and the Seamless indemnity dispute.

  3. Foreign exchange gains and losses on euro-denominated balances.

  4. Residual items from discontinued operations, meaning the core business sold to Seamless.

Its cash went mainly into HomeSend capital calls, for example a €1,784,118 subscription on 18 March 2021, and into a liquidity facility extended to HomeSend in May 2019 (€2.5m, repaid in full in August 2020).

Revenue model mix

PeriodProduct licencesServices / implementationRecurring / managed servicesTransaction-based (look-through)
eServGlobal era (pre-July 2019)Software licences for charging, recharge, mobile wallet (PayMobile)Implementation and integration projects for MNOsSupport & maintenance, managed servicesIndirect only, through its HomeSend share of results
Wameja era (Jul 2019 – Sep 2021)———Indirect only. HomeSend earned per-transaction fees and FX margin on cross-border flows; Wameja booked its equity share of HomeSend's result

The last full-year revenue figure found is €8.3m for FY2017 (Wikipedia, citing contemporaneous reporting that contract delays had cut full-year revenue). Edison Investment Research (2017) reported a management break-even revenue target of about €12.5m (~A$19.4m) for FY2018.

Value-chain position

HomeSend operated as a B2B "hub" or network-of-networks. Sending institutions, such as banks, money transfer operators (MTOs), mobile wallets and Mastercard Send clients, connected once. HomeSend then routed payouts to receiving bank accounts, cards, mobile wallets and cash-pickup points through its own direct connections and regional network partners. Transfast, later acquired by Mastercard, was one such partner. Wameja sat one step further back as a minority financial sponsor. Before 2019, eServGlobal also supplied technology: according to company descriptions from 2015, the HomeSend hub was originally built on eServGlobal technology.

Customer types and end-markets

Customer type (HomeSend)RoleEvidence
Banks / financial institutionsSenders and receiversMore than 20 banks signed via Mastercard Send and HomeSend (RNS, 2018). A contract enabled one of the world's largest global FIs to use Mastercard Send for cross-border payments
Money transfer operatorsSendersThe Q3 2020 KPI update attributed lower average transaction value to growth in MTO flows
Mobile money providers / MNOsReceivers and senderseTranzact (Nigeria) and Steward Bank/EcoCash (Zimbabwe) in 2015; Azimo partnership for Africa and APAC mobile money (July 2015)
Mastercard SendChannel / commercial partnerHomeSend powered Mastercard Send's international remittance capability from May 2015

End-markets: international remittances (person-to-person), business-to-consumer disbursements, and account-to-account cross-border payments, especially into emerging-market corridors in Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America.

Strategy

Stated strategy (final period)

The strategy in Wameja's last annual report (FY2020) and half-year report (H1 2021) can be summarised in three points:

  1. Partner with Mastercard to build HomeSend into a global cross-border payments hub. Wameja described its role as a founding partner that helped conceive the hub and bring it to market.

  2. Fund HomeSend's business plan. The proceeds of the March 2021 capital raise were to cover HomeSend's 2021 operating expenses and its minimum regulatory equity requirements into H2 2021.

  3. Deliver value to shareholders through the Mastercard scheme. From September 2020 the board unanimously recommended the scheme as being in shareholders' best interests.

Initiatives in the 24 months before delisting (Sep 2019 – Sep 2021)

InitiativeDateDetail
Cost reduction / board restructure2,020Board restructured and leadership roles cut to reduce costs
HomeSend liquidity supportMay 2019 – Aug 2020€2.5m facility, repaid Aug 2020 once Mastercard raised its own facility by €10m
HomeSend capital contributions2020; 18 Mar 2021; 23 Jun 2021Further investment of about €1.8m (2020); €1,784,118 (Mar 2021); additional contribution announced Jun 2021
Group simplificationSep 2020 – Sep 2021Residual subsidiaries moved to NewHoldCo and HomeSend shares moved to the parent, as required by the SIA
Indemnity resolutionOct 2020 – Jun 2021Settlement Agreement with Seamless and a third-party IP provider; no payment by Wameja

No medium-term financial targets were given in the Wameja period. ESG commitments: none disclosed.

Products & Services

Wameja-era (look-through to HomeSend)

OfferingDescriptionTarget customerLaunchPricing
HomeSend global payment hubB2B network enabling cross-border transfers between bank accounts, cards, mobile wallets and cash outlets through a single connectionBanks, MTOs, mobile money operators, fintechs2014 (JV formation)Not publicly disclosed. Transaction fees and FX margin implied
HomeSend for Mastercard Send (cross-border)Delivery and technology partner for Mastercard Send's international transfersBanks issuing Mastercard SendMay 2015 (remittance); 2018 (first A2A flows)—
Account-to-account payoutsPayouts terminating in bank accounts, tracked as a KPI ("payments terminating to a bank account as % of gross value flows")Senders into Key Destination MarketsOngoing—
Mobile wallet payoutsDelivery into mobile money wallets (e.g., eTranzact, EcoCash)Mobile money providers2,015—

KPIs tracked in quarterly HomeSend updates: gross value flows across the platform, transaction numbers, average transaction value, bank-account termination share, number of live sending customers, and Key Destination Markets (markets where HomeSend had ubiquitous reach through banking partners). The absolute KPI values were published in RNS tables, but the retrieved extracts did not reproduce them, so they are not restated here.

eServGlobal-era products (sold to Seamless, July 2019)

Product / platformDescriptionTarget customerStatus
PayMobileMobile financial services suite: mobile wallet, mobile commerce, analytics, advanced recharge, promotions, agent managementMNOs and financial service providers in emerging marketsTransferred to Seamless (2019)
Recharge / top-up platformsElectronic prepaid recharge and distributionMNOsTransferred to Seamless
Promotions & loyaltySubscriber promotions engineMNOsTransferred to Seamless
Business analyticsTransaction analyticsMNOs / FSPsTransferred to Seamless
Rapid service connectionService activation toolsMNOsTransferred to Seamless
Legacy charging / service control (NGIN-lineage)Intelligent network and charging platformsTelcosDivested earlier (Oracle, 2010). Details not fully verified

The company's 2019 boilerplate said its platforms covered digital wallets, commerce, remittance, recharge, rapid service connection and business analytics. A 2010s corporate statement claimed more than 75 telcos used eServGlobal solutions to manage over 120 million mobile subscribers (company boilerplate via CB Insights).

Financial Narrative

The final full fiscal year reported was FY2020 (year ended 31 Dec 2020). The last interim was H1 2021 (30 Jun 2021). No further reports were filed after delisting.

Income statement

Gross profit, EBITDA, pre-tax income and margins are not meaningful for FY2019–FY2020, because the company had no consolidated revenue after the core business became a discontinued operation. A revenue CAGR cannot be computed on verified data.

Half-year results

The H1 2021 report also refers to a figure of A$4.955m relating to HomeSend. The extract does not make its precise line item clear, so it is not tabulated.

Balance sheet

FY2020 equity reconciliation from the statement of changes in equity: issued capital A$212.326m, plus reserves A$0.609m and A$4.176m, less accumulated losses A$185.611m, gives total equity of A$31.5m. Accumulated losses of about A$186m against A$212m of contributed capital show how much value eServGlobal destroyed over its listed life.

Total debt: in 2016 a major shareholder had lent the company £7m (Edison, Sep 2016). That debt was restructured in 2016.

Cash flow

Operating cash flow, capex and free cash flow were not separately verified. Capex was immaterial for a holding company.

Commentary on trends and drivers

FY2015–FY2018: a value-destructive operating period. eServGlobal lost A$32.4m at the operating line in FY2015, needed a 2016 recapitalisation and debt restructuring, and in FY2017 recorded revenue of only €8.3m because contracts slipped. At no point did it reach the c.€12.5m break-even revenue level management targeted. Edison concluded at the time that most of the company's value sat in its HomeSend stake.

FY2019: strategic simplification at a cost. The core business was sold in July 2019 for an unadjusted €2m, a token amount next to its historical investment. The continuing-operations loss was A$13.2m, and cash fell A$15.5m over the year, reflecting the €2.5m HomeSend liquidity facility, capital contributions and disposal-related costs. H1 2019 alone lost A$10.4m.

FY2020: a smaller loss, but structurally dependent. With no operating revenue, the loss narrowed to A$9.2m. This came from cost cuts, including the board restructuring, and a smaller share of HomeSend losses. Cash ended the year at A$8.0m, helped by repayment of the €2.5m loan in August 2020. Every additional HomeSend capital call either diluted Wameja or used up its cash, and the company could not fund HomeSend's growth indefinitely. That funding gap made a sale to Mastercard close to inevitable.

H1 2021: holding pattern. The loss of A$3.4m reflects scheme-related legal and advisory costs during the Seamless indemnity dispute and Wameja's share of HomeSend losses. The stake was diluted to 35.26%.

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Financial Detail

Income Statement and Key Financials

MetricFY2015FY2016FY2017FY2018FY2019FY2020

Revenue (EUR Mn, eServGlobal consolidated)

——8.3——0

Operating loss, statutory (AUD Mn)

-32.374—————

Net loss from continuing operations after tax and minorities (AUD Mn, statutory)

————-13.2-9.159

Net loss from continuing operations (AUD Mn, preliminary report)

————-13.2-9.43

Basic loss per share (A$ cents, statutory)

————-1.09-0.76

Basic loss per share (A$ cents, preliminary)

————-1.09-0.78

Dividends per share (A$ cents)

000000

Key Financials and Per-Share Data

MetricH1FY2019H1FY2020H1FY2021

Loss after tax (AUD Mn)

-10.434-3.205-3.405

Basic loss per share (A$ cents)

-0.9-0.3-0.3

Cash at period end (AUD Mn)

—5.305—

Balance Sheet

MetricFY2015FY2020

Total equity (AUD Mn)

32.77131.5

Issued capital (AUD Mn)

—212.326

Accumulated losses (AUD Mn)

—-185.611

Cash and equivalents (AUD Mn)

—8.014

Cash Flow

MetricFY2019FY2020

Net change in cash (AUD Mn)

-15.5-3.6

Net investing outflow, mainly HomeSend (AUD Mn)

—-1.965

Dividends paid (AUD Mn)

00

Share buybacks (AUD Mn)

00

Returns & Leverage Ratios (%)

RatioFY2020Comment

ROE (%)

-29

Derived: A$9.159m statutory loss ÷ A$31.5m closing equity. Analyst calculation, not company-reported

Region Overview

RegionFY2020

Australia (AUD Mn)

0

Europe (AUD Mn)

0

Middle East & Africa (AUD Mn)

0

Asia-Pacific excl. Australia (AUD Mn)

0

Americas (AUD Mn)

0

Capital Markets

MetricAug2020Sep2020Sep2021

Share price reference (GBp)

5.517.767.90

Valuation Snapshot

MetricValue

Equity value at offer

About £96.9m (~US$126m)

Implied shares on issue

About 1.21bn (derived: £96.9m ÷ 8p; analyst calculation)

Consideration per share

8p (about A$0.143 at announcement)

Implied value of the 35.68% HomeSend stake plus ~€4m cash

About £96.9m in total, implying roughly £270m for 100% of HomeSend net of cash (analyst derivation; indicative only)

Price / book (FY2020 equity A$31.5m)

About 5.5x (derived using an approximate GBP/AUD rate of 1.78 at Sep 2020; indicative)

P/E, EV/EBITDA, EV/Sales

Not meaningful (loss-making, no revenue)

Analyst consensus

None. Edison Investment Research covered eServGlobal on a sponsored basis to about 2018

Capital Markets — Dividend history

ItemDetail

Dividend history

No dividends paid (FY2019–FY2020 Appendix 4E: nil)

Credit ratings (Moody's / S&P / Fitch)

Not rated

Debt maturity profile

No disclosed borrowings in the Wameja period

Analyst Conclusions

Management guidance and consensus

No guidance applies because the company no longer exists as an independent listed entity. Before delisting, management gave no earnings guidance. Its stated goal was to complete the Mastercard scheme. No consensus estimates exist.

Bull case (as framed at the 2020–21 decision point)

  1. Strategic premium realised. Mastercard paid a 39% premium and an equity value of about £96.9m, roughly 5.5x book. For a holding company with no revenue, that crystallised value which had been trapped in an illiquid minority stake.

  2. Exposure to a structurally growing market. HomeSend's gross value flows and live customer count (36 by Feb 2020) were rising during the COVID-era shift to digital remittances.

  3. Legacy risk resolved at no cost. The June 2021 settlement extinguished the Seamless indemnity claims with no payment by Wameja and left the consideration unchanged.

Bear case

  1. Decades of capital destruction. Accumulated losses of A$185.6m against A$212.3m of contributed capital mean long-term holders lost most of their invested capital, even after the takeover.

  2. No negotiating leverage. As a 35% non-controlling holder that depended on the majority partner for liquidity, Wameja effectively had one buyer for its asset. Mastercard's parallel purchase of Transfast showed the buyer had alternatives.

  3. Value leakage along the way. The core business sold for only €2m. Shareholders were diluted by capital calls (35.68% → 35.26%), carried the cost of FY2015 and FY2020 restatements, and saw completion delayed by about nine months.

Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)

For Wameja itself there are none: it is a wholly owned subsidiary. For anyone tracking the successor asset, the things to watch are:

  • the cross-border volume and revenue disclosures in Mastercard's filings (Mastercard Cross-Border Services);

  • regulatory developments in the Belgian/EU payment-institution regime affecting HomeSend's licence; and

  • the competitive moves of Visa Direct, Thunes and TerraPay in B2B cross-border payouts.

Analyst verdict

Wameja Limited is a closed case. Its significance now lies in the lessons it offers on minority joint-venture economics rather than in any investment opportunity. The company began as eServGlobal, a technically capable Australian telecom software vendor that served more than 75 operators at its peak. It repeatedly failed to turn engineering into durable profits. The FY2015 operating loss of A$32.4m, the 2016 recapitalisation, the FY2017 revenue miss and the final sale of the core business for an unadjusted €2m all point to a firm that could not scale profitably in emerging-market MNO software.

Its one strategic success was co-founding HomeSend with Mastercard and BICS in 2014. That bet was right about the direction of the market: cross-border payments moved toward network-of-networks hubs delivering to any end-point, and card networks became the consolidators. Wameja's problem was structural. With about 35%, no control and a capital-hungry asset that needed pre-funding liquidity, it was always going to end up in one of two places: funding HomeSend until its own resources ran out, or selling to the partner that held the remaining shares. Mastercard's €15m facility in July 2020 and its €10m increase a month later made the imbalance plain. The September 2020 offer at 8p, a 39% premium, was a fair outcome for shareholders whose only other option was continued dilution.

Completion was delayed by about nine months by indemnity claims from the 2019 asset sale, and those claims were settled at no cost to Wameja. The scheme closed in September 2021. HomeSend now sits inside Mastercard Cross-Border Services, which by 2023 reportedly reached more than 100 markets.

Verdict: Not investable (delisted). Historically, the outcome was a value-recovery exit at the end of a value-destructive listed life. Investors wanting exposure to the HomeSend franchise can now get it only through Mastercard Incorporated (NYSE: MA), where it is immaterial to group results.

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Executive Leadership

Board of Directors

NameRoleAppointment / notesSource

John Conoley

Non-Executive Chairman (previously Executive Chairman)

Executive Chairman from April 2015. Under the 2019 SPA disclosure he was to step out of the executive role within six months of the sale completing. Shown as Non-Executive Chairman from Nov 2020

RNS 2015; iTnews 2019; BusinessNews

Tom Rowe

Non-Executive Director and Company Secretary

Role recorded Nov 2020

BusinessNews

Stephen Baldwin

Non-Executive Director

Role recorded Nov 2020

BusinessNews

Jamie Brooke

Non-Executive Director

Role recorded Nov 2020

BusinessNews

James Hume

Non-Executive Director

Appointed to the board as an internal executive in 2020; NED role recorded 25 Nov 2020

Alliance News; BusinessNews

S. Ben Lassoued

Role not specified in source (recorded 25 Nov 2020)

—

BusinessNews

Executive Leadership Team

NameRoleDepartureContext

Andrew Hayward

CFO and director

Jul 2019

Resigned on completion of the core-business sale

Stephen Blundell

COO, eServGlobal (2015)

—

Quoted in the May 2015 Mastercard Send announcement

Unnamed CEO

Chief Executive Officer

2 Mar 2015

Resignation announced by RNS; the role was then filled by an Executive Chairman

Share-Based Incentives

Option trancheNumberExercise price (AUD)Expiry

Tranche A

3,650,0000.21

8 Aug 2021

Tranche B

6,000,0000.21

13 Mar 2022

Tranche C

3,350,0000.21

24 Nov 2022

Major Shareholders

HolderStakeDateSource

Lombard Odier Asset Management (Europe) Ltd

23.5%

Sep 2020

Offer announcement coverage (AskTraders)

Largest shareholder (unnamed in source)

24.8%2016

Edison, Sep 2016 (possibly the same holder)

Other top-10 holders

Not publicly disclosed in retrieved sources

——

Insider ownership

Not quantified; all directors said they would vote in favour of the scheme

Sep 2020

SIA announcement

Competitive Landscape

Key Competitors

CompetitorPositioning vs HomeSend

Visa Direct (including Earthport, acquired by Visa in 2019)

Card-network rival offering push payments and a cross-border bank payout network

Western Union (B2B / network services)

Incumbent MTO with a large cash and digital payout network

MoneyGram

Incumbent MTO with a payout network and wallet partnerships

Thunes

B2B cross-border network to wallets and banks in emerging markets

TerraPay

B2B mobile-wallet and bank payout network

MFS Africa (now Onafriq)

Pan-African mobile money interoperability hub

Ripple (RippleNet / ODL)

Blockchain-based cross-border settlement for banks and MTOs

SWIFT gpi

Bank correspondent network upgrade for faster cross-border payments

Wise Platform

Infrastructure licensed to banks for cross-border transfers

Nium

B2B cross-border payout and card-issuing platform

Comviva (Tech Mahindra)

Mobiquity mobile money platform; large MNO base

Huawei

Mobile money platform deployments

Ericsson

Wallet platform

Seamless Distribution Systems

Recharge and distribution; later bought eServGlobal's core

Oracle Communications

Charging (partly eServGlobal lineage)

Competitor Detail

MetricWameja (FY2020)

Revenue

Nil (holding company)

Growth

n/m

Net margin

n/m (loss A$9.2m)

Recent Developments

Because the company delisted in September 2021, there has been no company newsflow in the 18 months to October 2026.

Company Snapshot

$126M

Market Cap

2017

Founded

Sydney, Australia

Headquarters

SWOT Analysis

Strengths

  • Founding stake in a Mastercard-backed hub: 35.68% of HomeSend at Dec 2020 (FY2020 accounts)
  • Embedded in Mastercard Send: HomeSend has powered Mastercard Send's international remittances since May 2015 (RNS)
  • Growing customer base: 36 live sending customers and Mastercard customers by Feb 2020 (KPI RNS)
  • Bank pipeline: More than 20 banks signed via Mastercard Send/HomeSend by 2018 (RNS)
  • Debt-free, cash-holding parent: A$8.014m cash at Dec 2020; €2.5m loan repaid Aug 2020
  • Global reach: Payout capability into more than 100 countries (2018 RNS)

Weaknesses

  • No operating revenue: Core business sold Jul 2019; revenue nil in FY2020
  • Persistent losses: FY2019 loss A$13.2m; FY2020 A$9.159m; H1 2021 A$3.405m
  • Large accumulated deficit: A$185.6m accumulated losses against A$212.3m issued capital (FY2020)
  • Minority, non-controlling position: Mastercard held 64.32–64.74%
  • Recurring capital calls and dilution: €1.78m in Mar 2021; stake fell to 35.26% by Jun 2021
  • Low-value core exit: Core business sold for only €2m unadjusted (Jun 2019 SPA)

Opportunities

  • Takeover premium: 8p offer was a 39% premium to the 5.75p close
  • Growing digital cross-border flows: Rising gross value flows reported in Q3 2020 KPIs
  • Mastercard liquidity backing: €15m facility (Jul 2020) plus €10m increase (Aug 2020)
  • MTO channel growth: Q3 2020 KPI notes higher MTO transaction value
  • Clean exit structure: SIA required €4m cash and a stripped-out subsidiary structure
  • Shareholder alignment: Lombard Odier (23.5%) backed the scheme

Threats

  • Legacy indemnity liabilities: Seamless notices (Oct–Nov 2020) delayed the scheme by about 9 months
  • Regulatory approvals: Scheme conditional on National Bank of Belgium and FIRB approvals
  • Partner-owned competing assets: Mastercard bought Transfast in 2019, a HomeSend network partner
  • Funding gap: HomeSend's real-time settlement model needed pre-funding (Aug 2020 RNS)
  • Mix dilution: MTO flows lowered average ticket and bank-account termination share (Q3 2020)
  • Intense competition: Visa/Earthport, Thunes, TerraPay, MFS Africa, Ripple, SWIFT gpi

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Key Developments

DateEventSignificance
28 Feb 2020FY2019 preliminary results; HomeSend Q4 2019 KPI update (36 live sending customers and Mastercard customers; 8 added since the start of Q4 2019)Commercial traction at HomeSend
2020Further €1.8m investment in HomeSend; facility amendedContinued funding drain
2020Board restructure and leadership cutsCost reduction
2020James Hume appointed to the boardGovernance
1 Jul 2020Mastercard provides a €15m loan facility to HomeSendMastercard deepens its control
12 Aug 2020€2.5m Wameja loan repaid; Mastercard facility raised by €10m; shares up about 10% to 5.51p intradayLiquidity returns to Wameja
1 Sep 2020H1 2020 results: loss A$3.205m (H1 2019: A$10.434m); cash A$5.305mNarrower losses
10 Sep 2020SIA signed at 8p/share; shares jump about 35% to 7.76pTakeover announced
Oct 2020HomeSend Q3 2020 KPI update: gross value flows rising; MTO mix lowers average transaction valueVolume growth with mix shift
23 Oct 2020Seamless notice of potential third-party claim; timetable extended (scheme meeting set for 16 Dec 2020)Deal risk
3 Nov 2020Board roles reconstituted (Conoley NE Chair; Rowe, Baldwin, Brooke NEDs)Governance
5 Nov 2020Mastercard to resolve the claims directly with Seamless; meeting moved to 27 Jan 2021Deal delay
25 Nov 2020James Hume becomes NEDGovernance
3 Dec 2020Scheme updateProcess
5 Feb 2021Scheme updateProcess
26 Feb 2021FY2020 preliminary results: loss A$9.43m; cash A$8.014mResults
18 Mar 2021€1,784,118 HomeSend capital subscription; scheme updateFunding
31 Mar 2021FY2020 statutory accounts: loss restated to A$9.159mAudited figures
9 Apr 2021First SIA amendmentSunset extended
23 Apr 2021HomeSend KPI updateOperating data
28 Apr 2021Notice of AGMGovernance
24 May 2021Second SIA amendmentSunset extended
28 May 2021AGM resultsGovernance
18 Jun 2021Third SIA amendment; sunset extended to 2 Jul 2021Settlement nearly done
21 Jun 2021Settlement Agreement executed by all partiesKey deal risk removed
23 Jun 2021HomeSend capital contributionFunding
5 Jul 2021HomeSend KPI updateOperating data
6 Jul 2021Indicative scheme timetableProcess
27 Jul 2021Court order to convene the scheme meetingProcess
2 Aug 2021Notice of scheme meetingProcess
20 Aug 2021Scheme meeting moved to virtual-onlyCOVID-19 logistics
31 Aug 2021H1 2021 report: loss A$3.405m; stake 35.26%Final results
2 Sep 2021Shareholders approve the schemeApproval
9 Sep 2021Court approves the schemeLegal effect
13 Sep 2021AIM admission cancelledDelisting
2021–2023HomeSend integrated into Mastercard Cross-Border Services. By May 2023 the business reportedly covered more than 60 currencies in over 100 markets and could reach about 90% of the world's population (Nilson Report)Successor-asset trajectory

Financial Performance

Explore key financial metrics, segmented revenue, balance sheet health, and performance trends.

Income Statement

3 charts
Income Statement: Revenue fell from EUR 8.3 Mn in FY2017 to EUR 0 Mn in FY2020.
Wameja Limited — Income Statement
Series (EUR Mn)FY2017FY2020
Revenue8.30

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Sources

Sources

  1. Wameja Limited, Scheme Implementation Agreement announcement (ASX/RNS), 10 Sep 2020
  2. Wameja Limited, Preliminary Final Report, year ended 31 Dec 2020 (26 Feb 2021)
  3. Wameja Limited, Full-Year Statutory Accounts FY2020 (31 Mar 2021)
  4. Wameja Limited, Half-year Report & Appendix 4D, H1 2020 (1 Sep 2020) and H1 2021 (31 Aug 2021, ASX)
  5. Wameja Limited, RNS: Scheme updates (23 Oct 2020, 5 Nov 2020), SIA amendments (9 Apr, 24 May, 18 Jun 2021), Resolution of Potential Indemnity Claims (21 Jun 2021), HomeSend KPI updates (28 Feb 2020, Q3 2020), Cancellation (13 Sep 2021)
  6. eServGlobal Limited, RNS: Proposed sale of core business and name change (4 Jun 2019) · HomeSend/Mastercard Send (21 May 2015) · HomeSend/Azimo (21 Jul 2015) · HomeSend commercial milestones (2018) · Mastercard's Transfast acquisition (2019) · FY2015 correction notice
  7. Edison Investment Research: eServGlobal Update (5 Sep 2016) · Banking on HomeSend (2017)
  8. iTnews, eServGlobal prepares to sell core business, change name (5 Jun 2019)
  9. Sharecast News, Wameja rises as it repays HomeSend loan facility (12 Aug 2020)
  10. AskTraders, Wameja shares surge 35% on Mastercard buyout offer (10 Sep 2020)
  11. BusinessNews (WA), Wameja company profile (board roles, Nov 2020)
  12. MarketBeat, Wameja (LON:WJA) and eServGlobal (ASX:ESV) profiles
  13. Nilson Report, Mastercard Cross-Border Services Expands (May 2023)
  14. Mobile Payments Today / ATM Marketplace, Mastercard expands mobile remittance services in Africa (Mar 2015)
  15. World Bank, Migration and Development Briefs (2021) for remittance market sizing

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