Wuling Motors Holdings Limited

Sources: FY2021–FY2025 final results announcements (HKEX); FY2025 summary via Bulletin Express/Tiger (30 Mar 2026); balance sheet and cash-flow line items from S&P Global Market Intelligence (via StockAnalysis, last updated 11 Sep 2026) where not available from filings.

Income statement: notes and sources

Notes: Cost of revenue derived as revenue minus gross profit. FY2025 gross profit approx. RMB 1,092m (gross margin 13.2%). FY2024 R&D derived from the reported 64.5% rise to RMB 464m in FY2025. FY2023 EPS derived (RMB 23.477m ÷ 3,298.16m shares). FY2022 attributable profit RMB 22.6m per S&P data, consistent with reported EPS of RMB 0.69 cent. FY2024 DPS derived from the statement that the FY2025 final dividend of HK 0.6 cent was a 20% increase. Operating income and EBITDA are not presented as standalone line items in the retrieved filings and are left blank rather than estimated. Share of associates' losses attributable to Wuling New Energy in FY2025 was RMB 97.05m, partly offset by other associates.

Margin profile (%)

Revenue CAGR FY2021–FY2025: -13.0% (derived: (8,250.1 ÷ 14,408.5)^(1/4) − 1).

Commentary — income statement. The five-year arc has three phases. (i) Contraction and deconsolidation (FY2021–FY2024): revenue fell from RMB 14.4bn to RMB 7.9bn, driven first by supply-side disruption and SGMW production weakness (FY2022), then by the transfer of NEV vehicle activities into Wuling New Energy and the deliberate exit from low-margin refitted vehicles from H2 2023 (FY2023–FY2024). (ii) Margin repair: gross margin nearly doubled from 7.2% (FY2022) to 13.2% (FY2025) because the revenue that disappeared was the lowest-margin vehicle assembly work, while higher-value NEV components (e-axles, three-in-one drives) grew. (iii) Earnings inflection with new drags (FY2025–H1 2026): FY2025 profit for the year rose 54.3% to RMB 171.6m, helped by lower finance costs, despite R&D rising 64.5%. In H1 2026 net profit fell approx. 26.6% to about RMB 63m and attributable profit fell 33.5% to RMB 26.2m as R&D intensity and the associate loss (RMB 71.3m vs RMB 39.9m) both rose. The persistent gap between "profit for the year" and "profit attributable to owners" reflects the 39.1% minority stake of Guangxi Automobile in Wuling Industrial — roughly half of group profit leaks to non-controlling interests.

Balance sheet

Notes: Bank balances, pledged deposits, borrowings and equity from results announcements where available; FY2023 cash, total debt, receivables, current assets/liabilities and total assets from S&P/Stockopedia data. FY2025 bank borrowings "RMB 2.28 billion" (down 23.4%) and advances on discounted bills with recourse RMB 224.73m (down 90.8%) per FY2025 results summary. The company also held RMB 540m of structured deposits at end-FY2025 (classified outside cash). Goodwill is not separately disclosed in the sources reviewed.

Interim balance sheet, 30 June 2026 (RMB M): bank balances and cash 2,272.5; pledged deposits 345.0; current bank borrowings 1,599.5; non-current bank borrowings 182.3; intangible assets 132.3; net assets 3,188.5; equity attributable to owners 2,035.9; net current liabilities approx. 344. On a simple bank-debt basis the group was net cash of approx. RMB 836m at 30 June 2026 (2,272.5 + 345.0 − 1,781.8, derived), excluding bills payable and discounted-bill advances.

Commentary — balance sheet. The most important structural change is the deleveraging of FY2025: total assets fell by RMB 3.3bn (-24%) as receivables halved (RMB 5.2bn to RMB 2.8bn) and discounted-bill advances were almost eliminated; S&P-basis total debt fell from RMB 5.5bn to RMB 2.6bn. This reduced finance costs and was a key driver of the FY2025 profit increase. However, the group has reported net current liabilities in four of the last five year-ends and its going-concern basis explicitly rests on continued financial support from Guangxi Automobile and available banking facilities — a feature present in every set of accounts reviewed from FY2021 to H1 2026.

Cash flow — S&P Global basis

Data caution. The FY2021–FY2023 operating cash outflows of RMB 6–9bn per year are almost exactly offset by "other financing activities" inflows of RMB 6.7–8.8bn in the same S&P dataset. This pattern is characteristic of a reclassification of bill-discounting/supply-chain financing flows (operating receivables collected via discounted bills recorded as financing) rather than genuine cash burn of that magnitude. FY2024–FY2025 figures, after the run-off of discounted bills, are more representative: operating cash flow approx. break-even, capex RMB 210–335m, and modestly negative free cash flow. No share buybacks were executed in the period.

Ratios

Notes: ROE and debt/equity and liabilities/assets as published by MarketScreener (S&P data), consistent with analyst recomputation (attributable profit ÷ average attributable equity). ROA, current ratio, interest coverage and asset turnover derived. FY2025 payout derived: HK 0.6 cent × 3,298m shares ≈ HK$19.8m ≈ RMB 18m, ÷ RMB 79.0m.

Commentary — ratios. Returns are low but improving monotonically: ROE has risen every year from -1.4% (FY2021) to 4.0% (FY2025), still well below any plausible cost of equity. The step-down in leverage in FY2025 (debt/equity 80.6% from 180.4%) is the most material ratio change in five years. Interest coverage remains thin (below 3x on a cash-interest basis), so earnings are sensitive to rate and financing-cost changes — which helped in FY2025 and could reverse if bill financing is reinstated.

Management guidance

Management provides qualitative guidance only: continue the components business's external expansion and overseas build-out; push new-energy power systems; scale YuanCore Drive's autonomous logistics vehicles; maintain cost control; and cooperate with the LINXYS Project. No numeric revenue or profit guidance has been issued for FY2026.

Consensus

No consensus exists. The only broker model (Tianfeng, Oct 2025) projected FY2026 revenue of RMB 9.72bn and attributable profit of RMB 110m; on H1 2026 run-rates (revenue RMB 4.00bn, attributable RMB 26.2m) both look out of reach unless H2 is markedly stronger.

Bull case

1. Operating franchise is improving under the surface. All three segments grew profit in H1 2026 (components +17.1%, power +141.2%, CV +76.7%) on flat revenue, and gross margin reached 12.5%; if associate losses stabilise, reported earnings can re-accelerate.

2. Autonomous logistics is a real, contracted volume path. Independent shareholders approved purchase caps rising from RMB 792m (2026) to RMB 1.73bn (2028); first mass-produced vehicles shipped in June 2026 with an L4 delivery operator already ordering.

3. Valuation is anchored by book and net bank cash. At approx. 0.42x P/B, with bank cash exceeding bank borrowings by approx. RMB 836m at June 2026, downside appears asset-backed.

Bear case

1. Wuling New Energy is an open-ended drain. Its H1 2026 net operating loss of RMB 320.2m and the doubling of associate losses already turned FY2025's earnings momentum into a 34% attributable profit decline; a future option to increase the stake to control would magnify this.

2. Governance discount is earned, not imposed. RMB 17.75bn of structured deposits were placed without required approvals; the board is dominated by controlling-shareholder appointees; and connected-party agreements govern key revenue streams.

3. Shareholders capture only half the economics, at single-digit ROE. Attributable profit was RMB 79.0m on group profit of RMB 171.6m in FY2025, ROE was 3.95%, and revenue remains 43% below FY2021.

Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)

Analyst verdict

Wuling Motors Holdings is a company whose operating reality and equity story have diverged. Operationally, it has executed a credible repositioning: it shed RMB 6bn of low-value revenue between FY2021 and FY2024, nearly doubled gross margin to 13.2%, halved S&P-basis debt in FY2025, and delivered segment profit growth across all three divisions in H1 2026. The components business has broken out of total dependence on SAIC-GM-Wuling, now selling to Great Wall, Chery, Geely, BYD and VinFast, and the YuanCore autonomous logistics venture has moved from concept to delivered product with approved purchase caps that could approach a fifth of current revenue by 2028.

The equity story, however, is dominated by three structural discounts. First, economics leak: roughly half of group profit belongs to Guangxi Automobile's minority stake in Wuling Industrial, and ROE remains below 4%. Second, the Wuling New Energy associate is consuming the earnings gains the core business produces, and its losses are widening. Third, governance quality is weak, as shown by the 2025–2026 structured deposit breach and a board and revenue base intertwined with the controlling shareholder through multiple connected agreements.

The October 2026 price of HK$0.29 — around 0.42x book and 13x trailing attributable earnings — already discounts much of this. The stock is therefore not expensive, but it lacks a near-term catalyst that would close the book-value discount: no buyback activity, a token dividend (yield approx. 2%), no consensus coverage and thin liquidity. We would characterise the shares as a deep-value, low-quality "show-me" situation. Absent evidence on these three points by the FY2026 results in March 2027, the valuation discount is likely to persist.