Yanlord Land Group Limited

Income statement

Sources: company filings for FY2023–FY2025 in full. For FY2021–FY2022, revenue, gross profit, profit for the year and attributable profit come from company filings. FY2021–FY2022 PBT, operating profit and EBITDA come from TipRanks (secondary); its formula reconciles exactly to company data for FY2023–FY2024.

Revenue CAGR FY2021–FY2025 (derived): -19.9% p.a.

FY2025 cost structure detail (RMB m, FY2025 vs FY2024): selling expenses 490 vs 638; administrative expenses 938 vs 1,081; net impairment losses on financial assets 267 vs 2,104; fair-value loss on investment properties 130 vs 222; finance cost (net of capitalised interest) 730 vs 1,001; share of associates 374 vs 39; share of JVs 89 vs 632. Income tax, including land appreciation tax (LAT), was 1,463 vs 3,076. Source: FY2025 FS.

Commentary: trends and inflections.

FY2021–FY2022: revenue fell 17.6% on lower delivered GFA. Attributable profit fell 42.3% as fair-value losses replaced prior-year gains. The company withheld the dividend to fund FY2023–24 debt repayments (FY2022 PR).

FY2023: revenue peaked at RMB43.4bn as the pre-sold backlog converted. Gross margin compressed to 19.1%. Combined with RMB1.06bn of financial-asset impairments and RMB3.78bn of tax, the group made an attributable loss despite RMB3.05bn of PBT. The effective tax burden is structurally high because LAT is levied on gains and is not offset by group losses.

FY2024: this was the trough. RMB5.696bn of write-downs, impairments and fair-value losses produced a RMB3.42bn attributable loss (AGM ppt 2025).

FY2025: revenue fell 60.5%, but gross profit rose 16.7% because write-downs dropped from RMB3.37bn to RMB0.49bn and the Shenzhen delivery mix was richer. Attributable profit was RMB268m. However, 2H2025 was already loss-making (attributable -RMB111m).

1H2026: revenue was RMB6.195bn (-33.3%) and gross margin 20.3%. Profit for the period was RMB7m, with an attributable loss of RMB151m (1H2026 PR). This confirms that the FY2025 margin was mix-driven rather than a structural recovery, which DBS anticipated in Aug 2025.

Balance sheet

Sources: AGM ppt 2025 five-year credit metrics for total assets, cash, net debt and equity in FY2021–FY2024. Total debt for FY2021–FY2022 is derived as net debt plus cash. FY2023–FY2025 come from company statements of financial position. Attributable equity for FY2021–FY2022 comes from the FY2022 condensed FS.

Goodwill and intangibles: intangible assets were RMB2.092m at both FY2024 and FY2025 year-ends. FY2025 included a RMB19.2m goodwill impairment tied to Shenzhen Shengzhong (FY2025 FS Note 17). Goodwill and intangibles are immaterial to the balance sheet.

30 June 2026 position (RMB m): total assets 91,452; cash 5,730; total debt 22,804 (senior notes nil; bank and other borrowings 19,397; loans from NCI 1,699; loans from other related parties 1,708); net debt 17,074; total equity 37,588; NAV per share RMB16.76; net gearing 45.4%; average cost of borrowing 3.5%. Source: 1H2026 presentation.

Cash flow

Source: FY2025 condensed FS (cash flow statement). No FY2022–FY2024 shareholder dividends were declared (FY2025 FS Note 15).

Commentary. Operating cash flow is now driven by inventory liquidation. In FY2025, completed properties for sale released RMB7.66bn, while contract liabilities fell by RMB4.06bn as fewer new pre-sales came in. Cash fell RMB2.89bn in FY2025 despite positive OCF and FCF, because the group spent RMB4.56bn on financing. That included note repurchases, net loan repayment and RMB820m to buy minorities in Xingheng (Shenzhen). Cash fell a further RMB1.57bn in 1H2026, as the bond maturity was funded partly from internal resources and partly by new borrowings, including higher related-party loans.

Ratios (derived)

Notes.

• EBIT is PBT plus expensed finance cost.

• The FY2021–FY2022 EBIT and EBITDA inputs rely on TipRanks (secondary).

• Expensed finance cost excludes capitalised interest, so the cash-interest coverage line is the more conservative measure.

• A cash conversion cycle is not meaningful for a property developer and is not publicly disclosed.

Interpretation. On reported numbers, leverage has improved: total debt fell 47% from the FY2022 peak to Jun 2026. The ratios, however, show the denominator shrinking as well. Net debt/EBITDA is higher than in FY2021, and net gearing has drifted up since end-2024 (41.3% to 45.4% at Jun 2026) because cash is falling faster than debt. Returns on equity have been near zero or negative for three of the last five years. This is the main reason the stock trades at about 0.2x book.

Management guidance

There is no quantitative guidance (FY2025 FS Item 4). The qualitative message (1H2026 PR, 13 Aug 2026) is that the PRC market is still adjusting, with tentative recovery in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Yanlord will prioritise reducing inventory and debt and keeping a stable financial position. The 2H2026 launch slate consists only of new batches of existing projects; no new projects were announced.

Consensus expectations

Aggregators point to continued revenue decline (about -14% a year over three years per Simply Wall St) and a next-year EPS forecast of about -RMB0.21 (Stockopedia). Sell-side targets of S$0.54–0.58 sit below the last observed prices of S$0.68–0.71.

Bull case

1. Deep asset discount with a de-risked balance sheet. At about 0.23x P/B, the market values equity at roughly RMB7.4bn against attributable equity of about RMB32.4bn. With no public bonds outstanding and an average funding cost of 3.5%, the risk of a forced sale has fallen.

2. Recurring-income floor. RMB36.7bn of investment properties and RMB3.2bn a year of recurring revenue (FY2025) cover a large part of the market value. Singapore assets alone are carried at RMB12.0bn of non-current assets.

3. Optionality from a controlling shareholder. A 71.55% holder, renewed buyback and issuance mandates, a reinstated dividend and a stock at a deep discount create room for value-unlocking actions. Brokers have discussed this; it is unconfirmed.

Bear case

1. Earnings engine running out. Pre-sales of RMB3.7bn in 1H2026 and a backlog of RMB10.1bn imply FY2026–FY2027 development revenue far below FY2025's RMB9.8bn without new land.

2. Value trap dynamics. Three of the last four reported half-years were loss-making at the attributable level. LAT absorbs most pre-tax profit, and book value is exposed to further write-downs (Shenyang, Wuhan) and IP fair-value cuts in the PRC.

3. Liquidity drift. Cash fell from RMB10.2bn to RMB5.7bn in 18 months, net gearing rose from 41.3% to 45.4%, and related-party loans are rising.

Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)

• Monthly and quarterly contracted pre-sales from the 2H2026 launches (Haikou PUTTING LAND Ph2–3; Suzhou STARRY BAY, PRELAND, XI TANG; Jinan Riverside City).

• FY2026 results, expected around late Feb 2027: size of write-downs, IP revaluation, dividend decision.

• Any land acquisition, which would mark a strategic pivot from run-off to replenishment.

• Moody's rating status after the bond retirement (affirmation or withdrawal).

• Use of the buyback mandate, or any controlling-shareholder corporate action.

• UE BizHub Tower redevelopment partnership; CMBS and operating-loan refinancing in Tianjin.

• Related-party funding trends and cash balance at Dec 2026.

• PRC policy measures affecting Tier-1 and New Tier-1 cities (purchase restrictions, mortgage rates, inventory buy-back programmes).

Concluding analyst verdict

Yanlord's 2022–2026 story is one of disciplined survival rather than growth. The group chose liquidity over land. It suspended dividends, retired every public offshore bond on time, and cut total debt by roughly half from the FY2022 peak. In a sector where private developers commonly defaulted, that record is valuable and explains why the company still has bank access at a 3.5% average cost. The cost of that choice is now visible in the numbers. Contracted pre-sales collapsed from RMB68.1bn to an annualised run-rate below RMB10bn, and the unrecognised backlog is down to RMB10.1bn. The FY2025 profit rebound relied on one Shenzhen project and on lower write-downs, and it did not last: 1H2026 returned to an attributable loss.

Equity value therefore rests on the balance sheet rather than the P&L. The RMB36.7bn investment-property portfolio and the Singapore assets give tangible support, and the 0.2x price-to-book multiple already discounts heavy further impairment. But a discount alone does not trigger a re-rating. With almost no new land, the development business is shrinking toward a small residual. LAT absorbs most pre-tax profit. Cash is falling faster than debt, and related-party funding is rising. Without a capital-allocation catalyst, the shares look more like a value trap than a recovery story. Possible catalysts include renewed land acquisition in Tier-1 cities, monetisation of recurring assets, sustained distributions or buybacks, or a controlling-shareholder transaction.

Verdict: Neutral, with a value-trap risk bias. The credit profile is improving: lower debt, no bond maturities and an adequate liquidity buffer. The equity is cheap on book value but lacks earnings visibility past FY2026. Investors should track 2H2026 pre-sales, FY2026 write-downs, Yanlord's land-bank strategy, and any signal from the controlling family on capital return. Those factors, more than the PRC macro cycle alone, will decide whether the discount narrows.

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Prepared from public information as of 13 October 2026. Derived figures are calculations from reported data using the formulas stated. Secondary-source figures are flagged and should be checked against the FY2025 Annual Report before external use.