Yoma Strategic Holdings Ltd.

Income statement

Sources: RA23, RA24, RA26; AB25 and AR26 for restated FY2024 Core EBITDA. Basic EPS is calculated after deducting distributions to perpetual securities holders, which is why FY2026 basic EPS (0.28 US cents) is far below attributable profit per share (≈0.84 US cents, analyst-derived).

Margins and growth

Revenue CAGR (analyst-calculated): FY2022→FY2026: 30.7% per year (inflated by Wave Money's consolidation from Dec 2022); FY2024→FY2026: 2.8% per year in USD. Company-reported MMK growth was much higher in FY2025 (+37.5%).

Commentary. The five-year series has three regimes. FY2022–FY2023 were crisis years: revenue was depressed after the 2021 coup and COVID-19, Yoma Central was suspended and written down (US$26.3M fair-value loss plus US$9.1M PPE impairment in FY2023), and finance costs exceeded Core EBITDA. FY2024 was the inflection: the consolidation of Wave Money (US$52.4M revenue), a doubling of property revenue (City Villas, City Loft, Estella) and US$45.1M of investment-property fair-value gains — largely a translation effect of a >45% USD appreciation against MMK — produced a swing to US$21.2M profit (Src: RA24). FY2025–FY2026 show organic consolidation: the USD revenue dip in FY2025 was currency-driven, while FY2026's record revenue came from Pun Hlaing Estate (55.1% of development revenue vs StarCity's 80% the prior year), F&B and a motors recovery, partly offset by Wave Money's structural decline in OTC fees (Src: RA26). The gross-margin proxy fell from 58.5% to 43.2% as mix shifted toward lower-margin construction-heavy development revenue and away from Wave Money's fee-based revenue; Core EBITDA margin was nonetheless held at about 21% because Wave Money's interest income (other gains) and lower agent commissions offset the mix effect.

Balance sheet

Sources: RA23, RA24, RA26; AR26 for latest net debt presentation; FY2022 equity from the statement of changes in equity at 1 April 2022 (RA24). Discrepancies: Net debt at 31 Mar 2024 was originally reported as US$124.3M with gearing 15.5% (RA24/AR2024) and later as US$126.1M/15.7% (AR26); net debt at 31 Mar 2025 was US$135.2M/17.5% in AB25 and US$136.4M/17.7% in AB26/AR26. FY2022 total assets and borrowings at 31 Mar 2022 were not presented on a standalone basis; at 30 Sep 2021 total assets were US$1,229.4M and borrowings US$353.1M (Src: RA23).

Commentary. The balance sheet story is deleveraging plus currency erosion. Net debt fell by more than half from US$284.3M (Mar 2022) to US$131.6M (Mar 2026) through the Yoma Central debt restructuring (US$54M repaid in 6M-Mar2023), asset sales (office buildings to Yoma Bank for US$40M; serviced apartments), conversion of the Ayala-linked loan into perpetual securities (US$49.1M) and strong FY2024 operating cash flow (Src: RA23; RA24). At the same time owners' equity fell from US$528M to US$343M despite cumulative profits in FY2024–FY2026, because MMK depreciation drove a currency-translation reserve of -US$267.4M, and perpetual distributions (US$13.4M in FY2026) are charged directly to accumulated losses (Src: RA26). Working capital tightened sharply in FY2026 as non-current borrowings rolled into current (current borrowings up from US$63.2M to US$108.6M), consistent with the 3-year tranche of the THB bond falling due around November 2026 (analyst inference; tranche amounts not publicly disclosed in reviewed sources).

Cash flow

Sources: RA23, RA24, RA26. FY2022 capex excludes US$5.82M of development properties intended for investing activities; FY2023 excludes US$2.00M.

Commentary. Operating cash flow is lumpy and tied to the property delivery cycle: FY2024's US$104.5M reflected advance receipts on new launches and collections, FY2025 fell to US$23.7M as Estella working capital was paid out, and FY2026 recovered to US$48.0M as Sandakuu and ARA moved into collection (Src: AR26). Investing outflows have been modest since FY2024; the US$48.2M capex in FY2024 included Yoma Fleet vehicles and Yoma Central investment components (Src: RA24). The most important capital-allocation fact for minority shareholders is that no ordinary dividend has been paid in any of the five years, while perpetual distributions rose to US$13.4M in FY2026 (including a one-off settlement of the 2018 securities at an elevated 20% rate).

Ratios

All ratios analyst-calculated from RA23/RA24/RA26; FY2024 net debt/EBITDA and coverage use restated Core EBITDA of US$48.2M. Cash conversion cycle: not publicly disclosed (inventory and receivable days are not meaningful on a consolidated basis given development properties and Wave Money float).

Commentary. Returns are low in absolute terms (ROE 5.8%, pre-tax ROIC under 5%) despite the turnaround, because a large share of the asset base (Yoma Central's ≈US$408M of segment assets) earns nothing until restart, while carrying ≈US$10M a year of finance cost (Src: AB26; POEMS June 2026). Interest coverage below 2x on a Core EBITDA basis is thin for a frontier-market issuer, and the stated target of long-term gearing in the "low- to mid-teens" implies only modest further deleveraging from 17.8% (Src: RA26).

Half-year and quarterly trajectory

Sources: RA26; TU1Q27. The second half systematically carries the annual investment-property revaluation, which is why first halves report losses.

Management guidance (qualitative)

Management expects continued demand for residential property, conversion of the US$90.3M backlog over 18–24 months, new launches timed to market conditions, projects outside Yangon in FY2027, a phased Yoma Central restart in FY2027, 6–8 new restaurants, WaveScore progress, local SKD assembly options in Motors, an increased Mandalay Airport stake, gearing toward the low- to mid-teens and replacement of USD debt with MMK facilities within 24 months (Src: RA26).

Consensus

No consensus revenue or earnings estimates exist. The 1Q FY2027 run-rate (revenue +4.0% YoY) points to slower growth in FY2027 unless Yoma Land recognition accelerates as Sandakuu nears completion, as management indicates (Src: TU1Q27).

Bull case

1. Deep-value balance sheet with a visible re-rating trigger: trading at ≈0.44x P/B, Yoma Central's restart could convert a non-earning asset base (≈US$408M) into recurring income while eliminating a major drag on net profit (≈US$10M annual finance cost) (RA26; POEMS).

2. Property engine has proven resilient: development revenue compounded from US$27.8M (FY2022) to US$137.1M (FY2026) in USD despite currency collapse, supported by strong sell-through and a diversified price ladder (RA23; RA26).

3. Consumer and payments optionality: F&B is growing double-digit with expanding margins; Wave Money's float income (US$7.9M) and 218k-merchant base could support credit products via WaveScore (RA26; AR26).

Bear case

1. Jurisdictional and governance overhang: the founder's 2024 regulatory entanglement, reliance on related-party banking with Yoma Bank, and Myanmar's political environment may cap valuation regardless of fundamentals (Crain Currency; RA26).

2. Minority shareholders see little cash: no dividends, rising perpetual distributions at 18–20%, NCI holding ≈43% of equity, and book value eroded by ≈35% since March 2022 through currency translation (RA26).

3. Earnings quality and growth sustainability: fair-value gains made up ≈95% of FY2026 pre-tax profit (US$31.2M of US$32.6M); Wave Money revenue has fallen 63% in two years; Q1 FY2027 growth slowed to 4% (RA26; TU1Q27).

Key catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)

• 1H FY2027 results (≈November 2026) and the progression of Sandakuu handovers.

• Refinancing or repayment of the THB bond's 3-year tranche (≈November 2026).

• Formal Yoma Central restart announcement and associated financing/debt rescheduling.

• Mandalay Airport stake transaction terms.

• Wave Money: digital revenue mix, WaveScore launch, unique-user trend (8.4M → 7.2M → 6.8M).

• MMK exchange-rate trajectory and MMK interest costs.

• Any change in Ayala's or Tokyo Century's shareholding; any update on Serge Pun's status.

• Dividend policy at FY2027 results (May 2027).

Analyst verdict

Yoma Strategic enters its third decade in better operating shape than at any point since the 2021 coup. FY2026 delivered record revenue, an operating cash flow of US$48M, and a cash position (excluding customer float) at a historic high, while net gearing has been held below 18%. The property engine — now led by Pun Hlaing Estate rather than StarCity — has demonstrated pricing power and sell-through across product tiers, and F&B has become a reliable, self-funding growth business. These are genuine achievements in one of Asia's hardest operating environments.

The equity case, however, is less about operations than about who captures the value. Reported profit is dominated by non-cash revaluation gains; owners' equity has shrunk by about US$185M since 2022 through currency translation; perpetual-security holders receive 18–20% distributions while ordinary shareholders receive nothing; and non-controlling interests own a large slice of the Group's assets. Interest coverage of under 2x and a step-up in current borrowings mean refinancing execution in late 2026 matters. Wave Money, once the second-largest revenue line, is in a costly transition whose payoff is unproven.

Governance is the swing factor. The Board is independent-majority and the Company scores well on Singapore transparency rankings, yet the founder's 2024 regulatory issues and the Group's reliance on related-party banking keep institutional investors at a distance. At roughly 0.4–0.6x book and 5–6x simple EV/EBITDA, the market is pricing in permanent impairment of Yoma Central and continued currency erosion.

Our synthesis: the stock is a high-risk, catalyst-dependent deep-value situation. Upside requires a funded Yoma Central restart, clean refinancing of the THB maturity, and evidence that Wave Money's digital model can monetise. Absent those, the discount to NAV is likely to persist. Investors should size positions for jurisdictional loss risk and treat reported net profit with caution, focusing instead on Core EBITDA, operating cash flow and backlog conversion.