Revlon, Inc.

Scope. The five most recent audited fiscal years publicly available are FY2018–FY2022. Full statement detail was retrieved for FY2019–FY2022 (FY2020 and FY2022 10-Ks). FY2018 revenue and net loss come from Revlon's reported comparatives. FY2023–FY2025: not publicly disclosed. The only post-emergence datapoints are Q1 2023 net sales of $490.0M (vs $479.6M in Q1 2022) and ~$1.5bn of debt at emergence (Reuters, May 2023). The Glossy (Feb 2026) reference to "just over $2 billion" relates to 2021.

Margins (%; calculated)

Revenue CAGR. FY2018–FY2022 was -6.3% a year; FY2019–FY2022 was -6.5% a year.

Commentary.

FY2019: Net sales fell 5.6% as the core Revlon colour business lost share to digitally native and celebrity brands. Operating income was barely positive ($60.7M), flattered by a $26.6M gain on divested assets.

FY2020: COVID cost an estimated $505M of sales. The year also carried a $144.1M impairment and a $158.8M tax charge, largely deferred-tax valuation allowances, which together produced a $619M loss. Within that, e-commerce rose ~40% to 16% of sales.

FY2021: The recovery year: sales +9.2% and gross margin at a peak of 59.2%. Interest of $247.7M still consumed more than twice operating income.

FY2022: Supply-chain shortages, $85.8M of FX headwind and $416.0M of reorganisation items produced the largest loss of the period. Adjusted EBITDA fell 11.1% to $260.3M.

The structural inflection is clear. Even in the best year, Adjusted EBITDA (≈$293M) only modestly exceeded cash interest (≈$242M paid in FY2021), so the capital structure, not the operations, set the outcome.

Balance sheet

FY2022 note: prepetition debt was reclassified into "liabilities subject to compromise" ($3,711.2M). FY2022 funded-debt and net-debt figures therefore cover mainly the DIP facilities and are not comparable with prior years. At filing the prepetition facilities included:

• 2016 Term Loan: $872.4M

• 2020 BrandCo facilities: $1,878.0M

• Amended 2016 ABL / FILO / SISO: $289.0M

• 6.25% Senior Notes due 2024: $431.3M

(Source: FY2022 10-K, Item 1.)

Cash flow

The only equity outflows were tax withholding on RSU settlements: $1.6M (2019), $1.7M (2020), $2.4M (2021) and $3.3M (2022). FY2022 OCF also absorbed $152.0M of cash reorganisation items and a $61.2M inventory build.

Commentary. Revlon did not generate positive free cash flow in any of the four years. Cash interest of roughly $195–242M a year exceeded the gap between Adjusted EBITDA and working-capital needs. Capex was cut to ~0.5–0.7% of sales, below the 2–4% typical for beauty peers. That signals under-investment in the plants whose failures later contributed to the bankruptcy: Oxford, NC, Florida and Mexico facilities had closed or were weeks from closing for lack of supply at filing (Retail Dive, June 2022).

Ratios (calculated from 10-K data)

ROE and debt/equity are not meaningful because stockholders' equity was negative in every year. The FY2022 DPO collapse to 55 days reflects suppliers tightening terms ahead of and during the bankruptcy, the "deadly cycle" described in court filings. Post-emergence supplier data from Dun & Bradstreet show days-beyond-terms of 5–16 between Sep 2024 and Aug 2025, mostly below industry averages. Roughly 25%–37% of supplier payments were 1–30 days late in Jan–Aug 2025, with spikes in April (11) and May 2025 (16) (CosmeticsDesign, Oct 2025). This is a partial read on post-reorganisation liquidity discipline.

Management guidance. None published; Revlon is private and issues no guidance. Management's qualitative messages (Glossy, Feb 2026; WWD, Nov 2025) point to the "next chapter of growth" through fragrance expansion, sharper brand identities, a redesigned supply chain and a data-led culture.

Consensus growth expectations. None (no analyst coverage).

Bull case

1. Fragrance flywheel. Fragrance is already ~25% of sales and historically the highest-margin segment (17–19%). A pipeline of four new or renewed licences (Ice Spice 2026, Aguilera 2026, Champion 2027, Palm Angels 2027) plus Arden's Eternal Aura could mix group margins upward.

2. Fixed capital structure. With >$2.7bn of debt removed, FY2021-level Adjusted EBITDA (~$293M) would leave cash after interest for the brand investment Revlon could never afford, given capex of only 0.5–1.2% of sales historically.

3. Optionality on exit. Separable, recognisable assets (Elizabeth Arden in China, CND, American Crew, Juicy Couture fragrance) give credit-fund owners several monetisation routes.

Bear case

1. Mass colour remains structurally challenged. Revlon-brand North America sales fell >10% in 2018, and e.l.f., L'Oréal and private label continue to take share. The PhotoReady relaunch is a small step against much larger competitors.

2. Operational fragility persists. The CCC was 215 days (FY2022), supplier payments were still 25–37% late in early-to-mid 2025, and production is concentrated in a few plants. A new supply shock could again strain liquidity.

3. Leverage is still meaningful and opaque. At roughly 5.8x pre-improvement leverage with no public reporting, there is limited evidence the turnaround is earning out. Licence-driven fragrance growth can reverse if celebrity launches underperform.

Catalysts and monitorables (next 12 months)

• Ice Spice "In Ha Mood" sell-through at Ulta and any expansion into international and mass distribution.

• Christina Aguilera and Elizabeth Arden Eternal Aura launches (2026) and Champion and Palm Angels readiness (2027).

• Evidence of shelf-space gains for the repositioned Revlon brand at Walmart, CVS and Ulta.

• Any refinancing, ratings action or owner-led sale process. Credit funds' typical hold periods make a 2026–2028 exit plausible, though nothing has been announced.

• Hair-relaxer MDL developments and any residual exposure for the reorganised entity.

• Executive stability: CFO and CSTO tenure since 2023, and the board chair after Smith.

• Completion of the R&D relocation to the NEST campus and China R&D output.

Analyst verdict. Revlon in 2026 is a credit-fund-owned turnaround of a heritage beauty franchise. Its last audited numbers (FY2022: $1.98bn sales, 57.8% gross margin, $260M Adjusted EBITDA, -$257M free cash flow) describe a company whose operations were sound enough to survive but whose capital structure was not. The 2023 reorganisation fixed the most urgent problem by cutting debt from roughly $3.4bn of funded borrowings to about $1.5bn. It did not by itself fix the operating gaps: under-investment, slow working capital, customer concentration and a fading mass-colour brand.

The Peluso agenda is credible and well sequenced. It starts with the cheapest, fastest lever, fragrance licensing, where Revlon has proven infrastructure and the highest historical segment margin. Next comes brand clarity for Revlon and Almay, aimed at recovering mass shelf space, alongside a supply chain rebuilt for resilience. The 2025–26 execution evidence is real but early: four licences signed or renewed, a PhotoReady relaunch, a national Ice Spice launch at Ulta and a strengthened executive bench. The financial evidence is largely absent. No revenue, EBITDA or leverage figure has been published since 2022, and supplier-payment data show a company that is managing liquidity rather than enjoying a surplus.

On balance, Revlon looks like a stabilised, modestly improving business. Its value depends on whether the fragrance-led mix shift can lift Adjusted EBITDA margins sustainably above the ~13–14% achieved in FY2021–22, and whether its owners can then refinance or exit at a valuation that repays their conversion of debt into equity. For counterparties (suppliers, licensors, retailers), we judge credit risk elevated but much lower than in 2022. For prospective acquirers, the most attractive pieces are probably Elizabeth Arden (China skin care), CND and the fragrance licence book rather than the namesake mass colour business. Our view is cautiously constructive on direction and low-confidence on magnitude until the company resumes financial disclosure.

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Principal sources

• Revlon, Inc. Form 10-K FY2022 (filed 17 Mar 2023) and XBRL R-pages R3, R5, R9, R33, R57 — SEC EDGAR CIK 887921

• Revlon, Inc. Form 10-K FY2020 (filed 11 Mar 2021) and XBRL R2, R4, R8, R46

• Revlon Q4/FY2022 results release (Business Wire, 15 Mar 2023)

• Reuters, "Revlon emerges from bankruptcy after lender takeover" (2 May 2023); ABL Advisor, FashionUnited, Cosmetics Business, Beauty Packaging emergence coverage (May 2023)

• Retail Dive (Revlon hires Peluso, Oct 2024; supply-chain bankruptcy, Jun 2022; RSA, Mar 2023; sale exploration, 2019)

• FashionNetwork (Peluso appointment, Oct 2024; Marshall CIDO, Mar 2025; refinancing, May 2020)

• FashionUnited (Medema, Apr 2025)

• Happi top-company profile (Revlon); Happi (Aug 2023 executive hires; Ice Spice licence)

• Glossy, "3 standout strategies driving Revlon's 2026 comeback plan" (23 Feb 2026)

• GCI Magazine / Cosmetics & Toiletries company pages (Champion, Aguilera, Juicy Couture, NEST lab); GCI / PR Newswire (Ice Spice "In Ha Mood" launch, 2026)

• CosmeticsDesign, "Financial Focus: Revlon's path to revival" (23 Oct 2025)

• Gulf News/Reuters, City A.M., Business of Fashion (Elizabeth Arden deal, 2016); Fortune and Industry Week (2019 strategic review)

• Behindthechair (Revlon Professional Color Excel, 2026); Snov.io and Clay company profiles (2026; used only for low-weight context)